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ABSTRACT
Political Geography recognises the importance of the
State as a politico-territorial unit and several approaches
to the study of its internal and external relationships have
been advanced. One such approach put forward by Hartshorne
(A.A.A.G., Vol,XL, 1950, No,2, June, 95-130) proposed a
functional study examining the various influences that favour
or work against the evolution of homogeneity within the State,
It is the balance between these two sets of influences,
'centripetal' and 'centrifugal' forces, that may usefully be
examined in any assessment of the viability of the State,
This study of Pakistan is in the spirit of Hartshorne's
ideas and concentrates on the internal aspects of the state,
only referring to some external influences. Culturally, the
population of Pakistan remains deeply divided by the traditional
linguistic boundaries. In the economic field, while on the
one hand it has made some impressive progress, on the other
the persisting inter-regional disparities in the levels of
development have created bitter differences between the
provinces. Politically, it has tried two constitutions and
failed} it is now trying' to frame yet another. These differences
have further been confounded by the territorial fragmentation
into the two wings separated by a thousand miles of alien
territory. All these differences in the cultural, economic
and political distributions exert their centrifugal influence
on the state in varying degrees, sometimes in the form of a
relatively mild provincialism, sometimes as outright separatism.
'Regionalism' in this study covers all such influences.
Opposed to 'Regionalism' are the influences that favour
a more positive unity between the various constituent areas of
the state. 'Political Integration' represents these 'centri¬
petal' forces which work for homogeneity and cohesiveness.
Respite the secular outlook of the educated elite, Islam is
still the most important uniting influence in Pakistan.
Apart from the common religion there are indications that
certain other centripetal influences have also developed
during the course of the past twenty-three years.
whereas it is highly speculative to predict which of the
two, Regionalism or Political Integration, will triumph, an
attempt has been made in this study to examine the nature and
extent of these two sets of influences to demonstrate the
complex interplay of the cultural, economic and political
forces which will shape the future of Pakistan.
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Chapter 1 Theory and Method




Although the origin of political geography is often dated
to Sir William Petty in the seventeenth century or even to the
Greek period, and despite its more or less continuous development
since Ratzel in the late nineteenth century (Goblet 1955), it
is still considered to be a relatively young and less developed
branch of human geography (Bartshorne 1954). It was thrown into
disrepute by its corruption into 'geopolitik' during the inter-
war period in Germany and, while on the one hand this unfortunate
stage in its development did much harm to its growth, on the
other it forced geographers, particularly in America, to give
it more vigorous attention and redefine its proper academic
standing. This process of defining the scope and aims of
political geography still goes on and nearly all works on
political geography contain definitions of the subject. Some
of the definitions are too vague to be of much help, as for
example: "Political geography can be described as that discipline
which treats political phenomena geographically" (Cohen 1964,
p.iv); "...as the study of political phenomena in their areal
context" (Jackson 1964, p.1 ); and "...the study of political
regions as features of the earth's surface" (Alexander 1963,
p.1). Because of the highly confusing state through which
political geography has been passing the more specific defini¬
tions are still quite broad and general: "...as the analysis of
inter-state relationships and of internal adaptations to
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environmental conditions" (Moodie 1959, p.18)j "...the study
of the variations of political phenomena from place to place
in inter-connection with variations in other features of the
earth as the home of man" (Hartshorne 1960, p.52); and
"Political geography is concerned with politically organized
areas, their resources and extent, and the reasons for the
particular geographical forms which they assume" (Pounds 1963,
p.1 ).
The only thing in common with all the definitions is the
recognition that man's political activity expressed territorially
is the main focus of study in political geography. Here it
differs distinctly from political science which also deals with
man's political activity but focuses on the institutional
expression of that activity. However, it is by no means easy
to demarcate sharply the spheres of political geography and
political science, nor indeed of history, international
relations and in fact of all social sciences, because there is
so much overlapping along the borders of all these disciplines.
Perhaps there is relatively more overlapping in political
geography not only in relation to other social sciences but
also with other branches of human geography, and probably for
this reason it has proved more difficult to define its scope
and aims and to establish a distinct method of study. This
confusion over content is reflected in many published works,
for example Hartshorne (1950) and Jackson (1958). It is
unfortunate that at a time when most other disciplines, having
settled their sco e and aims, have been engaged in refining
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and developing their methodologies, political geography had to
remain occupied with finding its own identity, The development
of 'geopolitik' was indeed an unfortunate episode hut, perhaps,
there has heen a certain amount of over-reaction towards its
influence on political geography. The science of genetics was
equally, or prohahly more, used hy the German national
socialists to justify their theories of Teutonic superiority
and of territorial expansion, hut genetics is now a vigorously
growing field of the biological sciences. In political
geography* on the other hand, one can still feel some persisting
caution against saying anything which may have even a remote
possibility of being used as another 'geopolitik'.
However, all this does not mean that political geography
has remained stagnant, though its development has relatively
lagged behind that of some other branches of geography.
Important contributions have been made over the past four or
five decades by scholars like Whittlesey, Hartshorne, Jones,
Gottman and many others on both sides of the Atlantic. Their
main concern has been, as said earlier, to define political
geography and settle on what is to be included in politico-
geographical studies. Although there is still a variety of
opinion on these issues, it seems that there is an agreement
on man's "political activity in its areal context" as being
the centre of study. The areal context of such activity is
undoubtedly the territorial organization.
Political organization of territory by people can have
many forms and levels ranging from small local administrative
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units to states and supra- and international organizations.
All organizations above the level of the state do not have
sovereignty except such as their member states may voluntarily
concede, and even then any member state may withdraw from such
an organization at any time. Below the state level too the
units are not sovereign, and although their rights and powers
differ widely according to the constitutions of their states,
they are always subordinate to the state of which they are the
components. The state is the most important political area,
characterized by its sovereignty and commanding the supreme
loyalty of its inhabitants. Even where the component units
have considerable autonomy the loyalties of their populations
to them are subordinate to the overall loyalty to the state.
Where this does not happen it is a matter of considerable
weakness for the state. Any loyalty to an ultra-state organiza¬
tion is derived through its member states and not directly.
Although political geography is interested in all these levels
of organization, it is particularly "concerned with that most
significant of all such areas, the state. ... States are part
of a hierarchy of politically organized areas, though unquestion¬
ably the most important level in this hierarchy" (Pounds op.cit.
p.1-3). "The phenomena called the state has been accepted by
geographers generally as the formal or central subject matter
of political geography" (Jackson op.cit. p. 178). Hartshorne has
also emphasized the importance of the state as the centre of
study in political geography though there is, according to him,
"a place for the geographic study of politically organized areas
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of lower levels - the subdivisions of states" (1950, p.101).
Yet in many ways the state is probably the most ignored area
of study in the substantive literature of political geography.
A great deal of material has been written on the global level
in power analyses and studies of international relations. The
sub-state level too has received relatively more attention,
e.g. in boundary studies. A boundary is important only insofar
as it bounds a state, and the need to study power or interstate
relations arises only because there are different politico-
territorial organizations in the form of states. If the
surface of the earth was not divided into the various political
units none of these problems would have arisen and there would
have been no political geography. Yet the published material
on the regional geographies of different countries commonly
contains very little on their political geographies. There is a
definite two-way relationship between geography and politics
because geography, in all its physical, social and economic
aspects, influences the internal and external relationships of
the state, and political decisions in turn affect human activity
in all spheres (Wooldrige & Bast, 1951). The importance of
political geography was very ably stressed by Whittlesey (1935)
in his article 'The Impress of the Effective Central Authority
upon the Landscape'. He observedj "Phenomena engendered by
political forces should have a recognized place as elements in
the geographic structure of every region" (ibid. p.97).
Perhaps, as pointed out earlier, one can feel a fear of
'geopolitik' which has kept geographers wary of political
7
geography at the state level because of its possible identifi¬
cation with any particular nationalistic ideas. However, there
does not now seem to be any disagreement among political
geographers that the state is the main focus of study because
all substate political areas are only its components and all
ultra-state organizations are voluntary associations of
different states (Hartshorne op.cit. ). The only notable
exception is that of Jones (Jackson op.cit.) who considers all
'political areas' as being equally important and who is against
putting the state in such a central position.
The second problem in political geography, after that of
its definition and scope, has been that of method and approach.
Because of a lack of clearly defined aims and of a body of
theory, Hartshorne in 1950, while surveying the literature
produced in political geography, "found the greatest variety
of methods, and the use of almost every kind of material
conceivable" in the writings of political geographers; there
was "no indication of common purpose or objective" (op.cit.
p.96). Similar observations have also been made by Jackson
(1958), in his highly critical essay, 'Whither Political
Geography?' Nevertheless, out of this confusion of method and
material political geographers, like Hartshorne (1950, 1954),
Cohen (1964), Alexander (op.cit.), have recognised four distinct
approaches employed in politico-geographical studies. These
are: 1) Power Analysis; 2) Historical; 3) Morphological; and
4) Functional.
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The first approach, that of power analysis, looks at the
state mainly as an instrument of power, and tries to assess
the power potential of states in relation to each other on the
basis of their geography - i.e. physical features, climate,
population, economic resources, etc. It looks at geography as
a determinant of power, a result of the philosophy of geographic
determinism. Hartshorne rejected this approach as not being a
"technique of analysis" (op.citv p.97).
The historical approach concentrates on the present-day
state as a result of a long historical process of evolution,
and although useful in understanding the historical background
of the present political pattern, it does not explain the
existing internal or external state relationships. It may
ascribe the same deterministic role to history as the first one
does to geography. In fact it has been called "another form of
geographic determinism" (Hartshorne ojbivLZ. p.97). This approach,
moreover, has been considered to be properly a part of historical
rather than political geography (Moodie op.cit.), but, of course,
there cannot be a sharp division between the two branches.
Historical studies of the genesis of the state are sometimes
useful in understanding the present political geography, for
example Whittlesey's study of France (1939)» but to use genetic
studies as a basis for "projecting the political roles and
activities of states today can prove fruitless and even mis¬
leading" (Oohen op.cit. p. 13).
The third, or morphological, approach focuses on "the
present state-area as a geographic phenomenon" (Hartshorne
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/<?5j£>p.99) &nd includes the size, shape, location and
boundaries of a state, its natural and cultural regions and
the location of its capital. Hartshorne considered this to be
"almost pure morphology, and therefore static and dull" (ibid.
p.99). Morphology was important, as he thought, only in its
effects on the functioning of the state-area. By itself it
did not serve any purpose as, for example, the curious shape
of a state-area may look very interesting on a map but it is
meaningless unless related to the actual functions of that
state.
The fourth approach, functional, was introduced by
Hartshorne (ibid. ) in his presidential address to the Association
of American Geographers, He considered the state as established
primarily to bring about homogeneity in an area heterogeneous
in physical and human distributions. He proposed to study the
state from the angle of its functions regarding the primary
objective of achieving homogeneity. The state, to him, was an
area "homogeneous in political organization; heterogeneous in
other respects", and was subject to two sets of forces, centri¬
petal and centrifugal, which respectively aided or hindered
the cohesiveness for which the state strives. Every state has
a 'state-idea', its 'raison d'etre', distinct from those of
other states, and as a first measure of homogeneity it was
useful to find out the degree of correspondence between the
'state-idea' and the state-area. Any parts of a state where
the state-idea was not fully accepted constituted an important
centrifugal force. And so by assessing all the physical and
human elements which work for and against homogeneity he hoped
to measure the viability and the strength of the state. This
approach is his major contribution to the methodology of
political geography but there are some practical difficulties
in the application of his ideas.
Firstly, it may be extremely difficult to define the state-
idea of a particular state, especially if the state is old-
established, because it might have undergone many changes and
modifications since its origin. Even in the case of some young
states the state-idea may not exist in a definite and well
expressed form, and thus it may not be possible to discern it.
It is very likely that the idea may be present only in a vague
form in the minds of the people, and not clearly embodied in
the constitution as a 'national' objective.
Secondly, in order to find out the state-idea of a
particular state one may have to dip back into history to see
how that idea originated and led to the emergence of the present
state. Apparently there seems to be a slight contradiction
here in his ideas because, in his discussion of the historical
approach, he says that he does not consider that "historical
studies of genesis are essential for every study in political
geography" (ibid. p.98); yet an examination of at least some
historical material is necessary to study the emergence of
every state-idea.
Thirdly, even where one can pinpoint the contemporary
state-idea of a present-day state, there are no means available
to a single research worker to measure its acceptance in
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different parts of that state. Even if one had the resources
to conduct a state-wide survey the government might not allow
it to he carried out for political reasons. Therefore one has
to depend upon one's subjective judgement which may not he very
accurate. The problem of the lack of proper data also hesets
the assessment of other centripetal and centrifugal forces
though, as has heen attempted in this study, the usual census
material is of considerable help.
Two other notable contributions to the methodology since
the last war have been made by Gottman (1952) and Jones (1954).
Gottman saw the political processes as an interplay of two
factors: a) 'circulation' or the 'movement factor' which
includes all forms of movement whether of people, goods or
ideas; and b) 'iconography', a system of symbols in which a
people believes. There is a struggle between these two factors
"which oppose one another in the play of forces constantly
shaping and reshaping the political map" (Gottman, op.cit.).
Jones' contribution, made in the form of his 'A Unified
Field Theory of Political Geography' (op.cit.), takes the two
words which make Hartshorne's 'state-idea' as the two end links
of a chain with three links between them instead of the hyphen:
Political Idea - Decision - Movement - Field - Political Area.
It means that a political idea is born which leads to a decision
creating a movement in a field which results in a political area,
a state or any other. The theory uses both Hartshorne's
'state-idea' and Gottman's 'circulation', though the former
becomes a 'political-idea' which according to Jones means "any
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political idea", and the latter is simply 'movement'. The
flow in this chain-reaction is not one way, i.e. idea to area,
"but the links are rather similar to five basins interconnected
at the same level "so that whatever enters one will spread to
all the others" (ibid. p.115). In other words the chain, once
it has formed, is a continuous circular system rather than
being open-ended.
In at least one respect these ideas, of Gottman and Jones,
are similar to those of Hartshorne in that they also involve a
study of the historical past as the origins of 'state-idea',
'political idea' and 'iconography* must necessarily lie in the
past, and the older a state gets the more distant this past
will be. However, these three contributions greatly differ from
the historical approach because of their emphasis on the present-
day political processes of the state. Hartshorne'a functional
approach seems to be more straightforward as it involves a study
of the balance between the converging and diverging interests
within a state and herein, in fact, lies the whole strength,
economic and political, of the state. This marks the major
difference, and a deep one, between this approach and that of
power analysis. While the latter looks at the state mainly as
an instrument of power in conflict with other states, the former
sees the politico-territorial organization as established mainly
to bring about internal cohesion. A state may be weak relative
to other states and yet may have a high degree of internal
cohesion and strength. A lack of internal cohesion has been,
perhaps, the greatest weakness of empires, as for example of
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Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and the earlier Muslim
Caliphates.
Another important methodological contribution has come
from Deutsch (1953), a political scientist. In his search for
a theory of nationalism and the reasons why nationalism has
succeeded in some areas and failed in others, he developed the
idea of 'social communication'. In his opinion the cohesiveness
of a community lies mainly in the effectiveness of its social
communication. He proposed a quantitative method of studying
such effectiveness and his ideas have proved to he of much
interest to political geographers though, however, the absence
of proper data remains the major problem in applying those ideas.
With the recent advances in quantitative techniques and
their increasing use in geographic research there are possibili¬
ties of employing them in politico-geographical research, as
for example Minghi (1962). However, there is much in political
geography which will remain of empirical nature because: "It is
difficult to enumerate and impossible to measure the intangibles
that make a nation" (Pounds op.cit, p.8). And, "...there are
many problems in political geography that are not capable of
solution through such detailed work. But political geography,
no less than other areas of geography, can and does lend itself
to quantitative approaches" (de Blij 1967, p.158). The fact
that at least one recent important work on quantitative techniques
contains a short section on political geography (Cole and King
1968) is indicative of the future trend in research. However,
as Pounds, Moodie and de Blij have observed, political geography
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will have to depend mainly on empirical research "because of
the very nature of the complex human problems involved in it.
Another work worth mentioning is a study of modernization in
Kenya (Soja 1968) which indicates that, if proper data is made
available, modern quantitative methods may prove useful in
some politico-geographical problems. Whereas one can look
forward excitingly to these new methods one should, however,
remember that: "So complicated and intangible are the forces
at work that they are not reducible to fixed laws. There are
certain common measures within groups of States, but these are
ill defined, arising as they do of subjective rather than
objective conditions. Any branch of study, therefore, which
is primarily concerned with States and their relationships
cannot be an exact science" (Moodie op.cit. p.164).
This particular study, as it is explicit in its title, is
about the state of Pakistan. It is one of the older of the
new generation of states which came into being as a result of
post-war decolonization. Its short but eventful history is
apparently not of particular interest as it falls within the
general pattern of political instability and coups which most
of these states have experienced in their post-independence
years. However, for a political geographer Pakistan is a unique
case if only because of its territorial fragmentation on a
scale never seen before. It came into being amidst so much
bitterness and hostility that millions of people were forced
to leave their homes and migrate; hundreds of thousands aied.
The British Indian Empire was divided into two independent
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states, Pakistan and India, Pakistan started almost from
scratch; it had neither a state capital nor the machinery of
a central government. Gradually the whole governmental
machinery was "built up for a state with over eighty million
inhabitants. Despite all the Handicaps and problems it has
survived for twenty three years.
Survived it certainly has, but is it any closer to the
cohesiveness and homogeneity, in which lies the strength of a
state, than it was in 1947? During these past twenty three
years it has experienced two Martial Laws and three constitutions;
it is preparing for the fourth one at present. To outsiders
it has appeared at times to be a model for all the developing
states, on other occasions it has seemed to be on the verge of
ei.
collapse. A considerable,/material has been written about the
problems and prospects of Pakistan, and it is generally well
known to all who have some acquaintance with it that the main
problems lie in the unequal distributions of area, population
and resources between its two widely separated parts, or 'wings'
as they are popularly called, East and West Pakistan, and also
in the cultural heterogeneity reflected in the variety of
languages spoken by its population. A common religion apparently
still remains an important force to keep these two wings
together. However, no attempt has been made, as far as the
writer is aware, to study these problems systematically. This
study, therefore, is an attempt to look into the nature and
extent of the forces of 'national' divergence and convergence
in the light of the various governmental policies regarding an
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effective integration of the components into a cohesive whole.
So, it is in the spirit of Hartshorne's ideas that this study
is undertaken.
During the past years one of the main issues in the
political controversies in Pakistan has been that of the
division of powers between the central and provincial governments.
While all the proponents of a strong centralized system have
considered the demands of provinces for more autonomy as
something disastrous for the state, the provinces have been
asking for more powers as a matter of right. Behind all these
differences, which have often resulted in violence, have been
the complex economic and cultural differences. Although the
causes and the circumstances are different, this struggle
between the centre and the provinces has some resemblance to
the States' Rights controversy in America during the pre-Civil
War period. During the past twenty three years these differences
and controversies, mainly between the wings but also within West
bt&ii
Pakistan, have deepened instead of having^resolved. On the
other hand there are the more hopeful signs of the development
of thinking among certain sections of the population on the
state level rather than on the provincial level. Although no
area has yet demanded separation, separatism is a potential
threat. The term 'regionalism' has been used in this study
not in any geographic meaning but as a substitute for the
provincial tendencies for autonomy as opposed to a strong
centralized system. It is used in terms of being a 'centrifugal
force' opposed to the idea of a strong centre, but not
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necessarily in terms of separatism. Perhaps the use of
provincialism, or 'localism' (East & Spate 1966), or of
'particularism' (Spate 1956) would have "been more appropriate
"but 'regionalism' is a term commonly used in Pakistan for these
specific meanings, and for this reason it has "been selected.
•Political Integration' is also a little confusing because
in a sense all states, irrespective of their internal relation¬
ships, are politically integrated inasmuch as they provide a
common political framework for all their component parts. In
this study, however, political integration has been taken as
exactly opposite to regionalism. All the provinces and other
areas, of course, share a common political framework provided
by the state but political integration here means more than
the sharing of common international boundaries. It is difficult
to define exactly but political integration has been taken to
mean some common acceptance of objectives, a system of social
and economic values, and of political institutions. In short
•regionalism' implies the same meanings as Hartshorne's
'centrifugal forces', and 'political integration' is a substitute
for what he considers that states strive for, cohesiveness.
In political geography the state has a dual role; as a
sovereign territorial unit and as a part of the larger world
political pattern. Its internal relationships are of as much
interest as are its relations with other states. These two
sets of relationships are themselves linked to each other
because a state's attitude towards other states depends on the
conditions within ner boundaries. Similarly its internal
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relationships are affected by its relations with other states.
It is not always easy to separate these two sets of relationships
though for convenience it is often done (Hartshorne 1950; Moodie
op.cit), because "for the sake of analysis, it is helpful to
examine the politico-geographical conditions of the State from
each of the two aspects" (ibid. p.34). Exactly for this reason,
to keep the study manageable, only the internal aspects have
been included here, though in places it has been necessary to
refer to some external aspects.
This work has been divided into five parts. Part I includes,
besides this chapter, a brief introduction to Pakistan. The
second Part, Cultural Distributions, deals with such character¬
istics of the population as religion, literacy and education,
urban and rural population, and migration. Part III, Economic
Distributions, is concerned with agriculture, industries,
transport and communications, and trade and commerce. Parts II
and III both conclude with chapters which sum up and integrate
all the chapters in each part respectively. The emphasis is
on finding out the differences and similarities between the
provinces in the various distributions considered. Part IV,
Political Distributions, takes up the pattern of administration,
political institutions and constitutional changes, and the two-
way relationship between the socio-economic realities and
politics. The nature and extent of 'regionalism1 is then
considered on the basis of the evidence available. Part V is
the Conclusion.
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The choice of the topics discussed in the chapters has
been determined to a considerable degree by the availability
of data. The main sources are the censuses of population and
other official published material. Apart from the inadequacy
of the available data, which has been frequently pointed out
in the text, discrepancies in the figures have been a constant
problem. All possible care has been taken in the choice of
statistics but the writer does not take any responsibility for
their accuracy. Their sources, however, have been appropriately
mentioned. Pakistan has had two censuses, in 1951 and 1961,
and the quality and quantity of the data in them differs widely.
Different definitions used in the two censuses have rendered
some of the figures incapable of comparison. It is hoped that
in the next census, due in 1971, while still improving the
standard, comparability with the 1961 material will be kept in
mind.
The division of the chapters into social and economic is
to some degree arbitrary because in the case of some topics
it is difficult to draw a sharp line. For example, transport
and communications have both social and economic implications.
Instead of splitting this topic into the two categories, and
thus involving much repetition, it has been put under the
Economic Part. 3o, no rigid basis for this division is being
offered here; the arrangement is simply for the sake of
convenience.
The writer has tried to follow the advice given by Moodie
that "if false deductions are to be avoided, the study of
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Political Geography also requires a high degree of objectivity
and detachment; in short, it requires a scientific attitude
of mind on the part of its exponents, who must weigh carefully
the available evidence and avoid rash generalizations
Objectivity should be the guiding light of the political
geographer. There is no easy road to the solutions of problems
of the State, neither within its internal political framework
nor in inter-State relations" (ibid. pp.14-15). However, being
himself a Pakistani, certain deep rooted opinions and prejudices
of the writer might have inadvertently crept in here and there,
because some of the issues involved are highly emotive. Any





Pakistan as an independent state came into "being on 14th
August, 1947, when at the time of British withdrawal the sub¬
continent was partitioned. Before that date it had never
existed in a tangible form but only as a vague idea in the
minds of the Muslim population of the subcontinent. The word
'Pakistan' was coined only in 1933, but the socio-religious
differences which were the basis of the partition and the
creation of Pakistan had their roots in the history of past
centuries. The unique and curious nature of the territorial
morphology of Pakistan, consisting as it does of two widely
separated parts, raised doubts even in the minds of its
supporters as to the possibility of running it as a unitary
state. The demand for Pakistan, as formally expressed in the
famous Lahore Resolution of the All-India Muslim League on 23rd
March, 1940, was put forward thus:
"Resolved that it is the considered view of this session
of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan
would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims
unless it is designated on the following basic principle,
viz. that geographically contiguous units are demarcated
into regions which should be so constituted with such
territorial adjustments as may be necessary, that the areas
in which the Muslims are numerically in majority as in the
Northwestern and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to
constitute Independent btates in which the Constituent Units
shall be autonomous and sovereign" (Binder 1963, p.62).
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One can only be amassed at the vagueness of the Resolution.
It used six different words as measures of territorial units:
"geographically contiguous units"; "regions"; "areas"; "zones";
"Independent States"; and "Constituent Units". It did not
mention anywhere the existing administrative units - provinces,
divisions, districts etc. The part of the Resolution most
difficult to understand is this: "...Independent States in
which the Constituent Units shall be autonomous and sovereign".
It did not explain how the constituent units of an independent
state could be autonomous and sovereign. However, one thing
which is clear from the Resolution is that at that time among
the leaders of the League there was no concept of a unitary
state consisting of the widely separated "Northwestern and
Eastern zones of India". Perhaps the idea was to have a loose
federation, or rather a confederation, of the Muslim majority
areas with the provinces having a high degree of autonomy. There
is no indication as to where the sovereignty would have rested,*
because it is one thing that cannot be divided between the
different levels of government. If it was to be vested in the
"Constituent Units", as said in the Resolution, then certainly
there was going to be more than one 'state', perhaps as many
as the number of provinces. They could, of course, have an
* Both the Constitutions of Pakistan, of 1956 and 1962, affirmed
that sovereignty over the entire Universe rested with Allah
(God), but this certainly was not in the minds of those who
passed the Resolution in 1940. Otherwise no unit could have
'autonomy' and 'sovereignty'.
economic, and possibly political, union but such an arrangement
would have been on an international basis.
Notwithstanding its vagueness and ambiguity the Resolution
is indicative of four things: a) that the Muslims of the sub¬
continent were determined to be independent of Hindu India once
the power had been transferred by the British; b) that the
cultural heterogeneity of the Muslim majority areas was recog¬
nized, hence the emphasis on the autonomy of the constituent
units and the absence of the word Pakistan; c) that there was
a lack of any real effort to understand the problems which were
bound to arise after independence; and d) an absence of any
mention of establishing an Islamic state. So, this means that
the state-idea, or perhaps state-ideas, of the Muslim League at
that time was based on a not too distinct sense of religious
unity and on a more definite alarm occasioned by the numerical
superiority of the Hindu population. In the general election
of 1946 the League emerged with an overwhelming support for its
policy by a large majority of the Muslim population. What
happened after independence is discussed in Part IV as this
chapter is meant to be only a general introduction to Pakistan
as it was finally born twenty three years ago.
A detailed chapter on the physical geography is not included
in this study because, firstly, it has been thoroughly dealt
with in the various regional and economic texts that have been
published (e.g. Spate & Learmonth 1967; Ahmad 1964; Ahmad 1968).
Secondly, physical features, climate, etc., do not have any















they are of interest only in their relation to cultural and
economic distributions.
"In the organization of diverse areas into a unit, regional
differences in climate, landforms, water resources or
minerals no doubt raise complications for central governments,
but rarely are these more than minor difficulties in
themselves.
"regional heterogeneity creating difficulty for political
organization of area is solely that of cultural heterogeneity"
(Hartshorne 1968, p.29).
In a state in which the two parts are separated from each other
by about one thousand miles, with a total area of over 300,000
square miles, regional differences in the physical environment
are only to be expected, but they are probably not so drastic
as one would tend to think. In landforms the main difference
between the wings is that the eastern one is for the most part
a flat deltaic plain, while in the western one a large part is
plateau and mountain country (Pig.2). In climate the more
important difference is in the amount of rainfall (Pig.3). A
very large part of West Pakistan is arid or semi-arid; in East
Pakistan the annual rainfall is nowhere less than 50 inches.
Apart from some winter rains in West Pakistan, the general
seasonal distribution in the two wings is similar. Both the
wings are also characterized by hot summers and mild winters,
though the latter in "West Pakistan are much cooler in the plains
and very cold in the higher areas. These salient differences
in the climate have resulted in different vegetation, both
natural and cultivated. Rice and jute are the main crops in






























In some areas of the latter but under irrigation. However, as
pointed out earlier, the differences which are more important
in political geography are cultural and economic, and they have
been dealt with in the next two Parts.
Territory: Except for minor boundary adjustments with India and
Iran, and the return to Pakistan of the small port of Gwadur
on the Baluchistan coast by Oman, there have been no territorial
changes since independence. The total area of the state* is
365*529 square miles, out of which 510,403 sq.m., or 85 percent
of the total, is in West Pakistan, and 55*126 sq.m. in East
Pakistan. East Pakistan is almost entirely surrounded by India
on the west, north and east. To the south is the Bay of Bengal
and in the southeast there is some common border with Burma.
West Pakistan has its common boundaries with India on the east,
Iran and Afghanistan in the west, Kashmir and Gilgit in the
north, and the Arabian Sea is in the south. In the extreme
north a narrow salient of the Afghan territory separates it
from the U.S.S.H.
At the time of independence the whole territory was
divided into several administrative areas, which were:
1. Five provinces: East Bengal (East Pakistan); West Punjab;
North West Frontier Province (NWFP); Sind; Baluchistan.
2. Princely states, all in the western wing; Bahawalpur
(Punjab); Khairpur (Sind); Kalat, Mekran, Kharan and lasbela
(Baluchistan); Chitral, Swat, Dir and Amb (NWFP).
* Gilgit, Baltistan and the part of Kashmir controlled by
Pakistan do not form a part of this study be cats e of their disputed
status. All the following figures are from the Census of
Population, 1961.
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3. Tribal areas divided into six Tribal Agencies: Malakand,
Mohmand, Khyber, Kurrara, North and South Waziristan (NWFP).
In addition to these there were some other tribal areas
attached to administered districts.
After independence Karachi district was enlarged and brought
under the jurisdiction of the central government because it
was selected as the state capital. The provinces were divided
into districts, roughly equivalent to counties in Britain, which
had further subdivisions, called Talukas or Tehsils in West
Pakistan and Thanas in Bast Pakistan.* Two or more districts
were grouped together to form a Division. In the princely
states administrative divisions corresponded to either districts
or tehsils. Tribal Agencies were directly under the central
government and the administrative control over them was
extremely rudimentary. The main administrative divisions are
shown in Pig.4.
This territorial pattern of administration continued more
or less unchanged till 1955 when the provinces of West Pakistan
were abolished and the whole wing was reconstituted as a single
province of West Pakistan. Princely states in Baluchistan and
Sind were incorporated as individual districts, that of
Bahawalpur in the form of three districts but those of the NWFP
continued to function as before. The status of Tribal Agencies
also remained unchanged. In spite of all these changes the
basic pattern of districts, except for some local adjustments
and their regrouping into Divisions, did not alter very much.
* Thana is also an administrative unit in West Pakistan, below the
level of the Tehsil, and means a Police Station, or its jurisdiction.
Fig 4. Administrative divisions, 1947~55«
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Pig.5 shows the administrative structure as it existed in 1961.
In fact this map is almost up to date till 30th March, 1970,
when the present government ordered the disintegration of West
Pakistan into the former provinces. This reorganization is at
the moment going on and also involves some more changes
particularly regarding the incorporation of the princely states
of the NWPP as regular districts. There are, however, no plans
to alter the status of Tribal Agencies.
The district is the most important level of local administra¬
tion and it is at this level that most of the census data in
this study has been analyzed. The total number of administrative
districts in Pakistan, before the new reorganization, was 62,
and on the basis of former or new provinces they were distributed
thus:
The area of these districts ranges between 30,931 sq.m. for the
largest (Kalat) to 1211 sq.m. for the smallest (Mardan). All
the tribal agencies also fall within this range except two
which have 855 sq.m. (Malakand) and 995 sq.m. (Khyber). As can
be seen from Appx. I there is relatively less variation of area
in East Pakistan where the largest and the smallest districts
have 6361 sq.m. (Mymensingh) and 1371 sq.m. (Kushtia) respectively.
In West Pakistan there are 12 districts which have more area












Fig. 5. Administrative Districts, 1961.
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Population: The estimated population of Pakistan at the time
of independence was a little over 70 million. In the 1951
census it was recorded at 75.7 million and at 93.7 million in
1961, a decennial increase of about 24 per cent. During this
inter-eensal period the population grew at a faster rate in
West than in East Pakistan, 27.0 and 21.2 percent respectively.
The most important feature of the population distribution is
that a majority lives in the eastern wing. In 1951 Bast
Pakistan had 55.4 percent of the total, and although because
of its lower growth rate its share had been falling, it was
still 54.2 percent in 1961. This distribution of population
between the wings has important economic and political implica¬
tions which are discussed under the appropriate chapters.
Because of the unequal distribution of area and population
between Bast and West Pakistan the two wings differ greatly in
population density which in 1961 was 922 and 138 persons per
sq.m. respectively (Pig.6). The area, population and density
of all districts is given in Appendix I. The share of the
provinces in the total population is given in Table 1.
























Fig# 6. Density of population (Districts), 1961
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The distribution within West Pakistan may also be kept in mind
because, as will be seen, it has played an important part in
the various constitutional and economic issues. The particular
thing to be remembered is that the Punjab has about 60 percent
of the total population of West Pakistan.
Pig.7 shows topologically the distribution of population
in both the wings on the district level in 1961. It is a much
better picture, than that provided by conventional maps, of
the relative position of different areas in terms of absolute
numbers of population. As can be seen from this map (and also
in Appx. 1) the district population varies between about 7
million (Mymensingh) and 0.04 million (Chagai). Unlike the
distribution of area, there are 9 districts in East Pakistan,
each having more population than that of the largest in the
western wing. Generally the range of difference in the district
population, if the relatively sparsely populated Chittagong Hill
Tracts is excluded, is smaller in Bast than in West Pakistan.
Because of the differentials in the size of areas and
populations of the districts, the area/population relationships
in the two wings are also different. In East Pakistan there
is some direct relationship between the two and the Spearman
Bank Correlation Coefficient for the area and population of the
17 districts is +0.5; it is +0.7 if the Chittagong Hill Tracts
districts is excluded. In West Pakistan, on the other hand,
the relationship is, if anything, inverse, i.e. some of the
districts that have a high ranking in area are low in population.












East Pakistan population densities are relatively more uniform
between the districts - with the exception, as already pointed
out, of Chittagong Hill Tracts - there is a wide range in the
western wing, from 1506 persons/sq.m. in Karachi to 2 persons/sq.m.
in Ghagai. On the whole the densities are higher in the
central and eastern districts of the Punjab and are low in the
trans-Indus area. Provincial metropolitan districts are all
the most densely populated in their respective provinces.
Karachi, of course, has the highest density in West Pakistan
and matches those of the highest of East Pakistani districts.
However, the important difference lies in the fact that while
Karachi's high density is due to urban growth, that of East
Pakistani districts is largely rural.
Since the administrative reorganization of West Pakistan
in 1955, when the old provinces were merged to form a single
province, till March, 1970, Pakistan had only two provinces,
East and West Pakistan. However, in this study the word
'province' has been used only in reference to the former five
provinces which have emerged again as a result of the recent
break-up of the one unit of West Pakistan. For East and West
Pakistan the word 'wing' has been used throughout. Most of the
data has either been available at the level of the wings or
that of the districts. At the time of the last census in 1961
the provinces did not exist as administrative units, therefore
in the census and other reports there is no reference to them
at all. An attempt haB been made, as far as possible, to
rearrange the data on the provincial level but in some cases it
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has not been possible. Figs. 4 and 5 should be used as
reference to the names and location of the various administra¬
tive areas and cities. From much of the study the Frontier
States and Tribal Agencies had to be excluded because the
census information about them is scanty.
/mother important administrative change which should be
kept in mind is that of the state capital. Karachi was the
provincial capital of Sind before independence. It was selected
as the state capital of Pakistan at the time of independence,
and the provincial capital of Sind was shifted to Hyderabad.
In 1960 the state capital was transferred temporarily to
Rawalpindi pending its reshifting to Islamabad, a new city just
north of the interim capital. Islamabad is now the seat of
the central government. When Karachi no longer remained the
capital it was handed over to the jurisdiction of the provincial
administration of West Pakistan, and since 1960 it has not
been the capital of any unit, except as a Divisional head¬
quarters. Now, with the re-emergence of the provinces it may
once again become the provincial capital of Sind.
In the next two parts various socio-economic distributions
have been examined and, wherever possible, the main changes
that have taken place in those distributions since independence
have been discussed. Politics is a result of society and the
socio-economic nature of society has a direct relationship with
the political organization of the area over which a society
extends. As has been explained in the succeeding chapters
the various provinces of Pakistan are not just administrative
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divisions, "but differ markedly from each other in various ways.
These provinces have existed as political units for a longer
time than the state of which they are now parts. Under the
British the circumstances were different, as, because of the
presence of an impartial alien rule, there was relatively
little inter-provincial conflict. After independence, however,
when these culturally diverse areas became equal partners in
the affairs of an independent state, their differences came to
be reflected in the political field. For the new state of
Pakistan the major task since independence has been to create
a feeling of 'national' identity to which the provinces may
subscribe more fully than to their own separate cultural
identities; in other words to create a new loyalty transcending
the various provincial and local loyalties which have had the
benefit of historical continuity. This is a difficult task
especially in view of the fact that the demand for Pakistan
affirmed that such continuity would be maintained after
independence. So, in the forthcoming pages an attempt has been
made to distinguish the provincial differences in social and
economic distributions, their role in politics, and what the
state has done to transcend these differences.
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Pakistan was demanded on the basis of religion and the
entire case of the Muslim League, the political party represent¬
ing the Muslims of the sub-continent, rested on the theory that
the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent constituted a separate
'nation' with a right to live in a separate state of their own.
These Muslims, it was claimed, not only shared Islam, which is
a complete way of life, but also a common historical experience.
However, the distribution of Muslims in British India was such
that they consisted of several groups with considerable cultural
differences. Their main concentrations were in the north-western
and eastern parts of the sub-continent, a fact which was later
to become the main political problem for the new state of
Pakistan. There is no need here to discuss the requirements
which are necessary to make a nation, and some of the arguments
against the 'Two Nations' theory of the League could be used,
with greater force, against the idea that India was one nation.
There is also no need to go into the validity of these arguments
from different angles, but if the simple criterion that "...if
a sufficient number of people are determined to be a nation,
then practically they are one" (Spate AhdYipearmohthrtfbY^ p.17)
is acceptable, the Muslim League had shown by 1946 that it had
the support of a great majority of the hundred million Muslims
in demanding partition of the sub-continent. During the elections
of that year the League had won all of the thirty Muslim seats
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in the Central Legislative Assembly and 446 out of 495 Muslim
seats in all the provincial assemblies (Symonds 1950). Thus
on 14th August, 1947, Pakistan came into being composed of
areas of Muslim concentration in the northwest and east of the
sub-continent, with a thousand miles of alien territory between
the two. West Pakistan inherited the provinces of Sind, North
West Frontier (N.W.F.P.) and the western half of Punjab,
Baluchistan and the Baluchistan States, the states of Bahawalpur,
Khairpur, Swat, Chitral, Dir and Amb, and various tribal areas.
East Pakistan consisted of the eastern half of Bengal province
and one district of Assam. This chapter looks mainly into the
spatial distribution of religions in Pakistan and the changes
that have taken place in those distributions since independence.
In 1941, according to the Census of India, Muslims comprised
24.3$ of the total population of the sub-continent as against
69.5$ Hindus. Though Muslims were concentrated in certain areas
which later formed Pakistan, there were no areas in which they
were completely absent. Nor was there a single district where
Muslims formed 100$ of the population. This meant that any
plan for partition could not possibly eliminate religious
minorities from the new successor states. In other words
whatever the boundaries of Pakistan she was bound to have some
non-Muslim population and a proportion of Muslims was bound to
be left outside the new state. As a consequence the new state
of Pakistan, with the partition boundaries as delimited by the
Boundary Commission headed by Sir Cyril Hadcliffe, acquired
53.8 million Muslims, or 57$ of all the total in the sub-continent
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(Davis 1951). This means that at the time of independence
76.l°/o of the total population of Pakistan was Muslim, which is
a considerable degree of religious homogeneity. West Pakistan
acquired all the Muslim majority areas of northwest India
except Kashmir, whose status is still under dispute, and parts
of some districts in the central Punjab which were awarded to
India (Spate 1947). In East Pakistan all the Muslim majority
areas of Bengal with one district of Assam (Sylhet) went to
Pakistan and in addition two non-Muslim majority districts, of
Khulna and Chittagong Hill Tracts, were also awarded to Pakistan.
Thus the shortfall of the League's demand in the Punjab was
counterbalanced by the restriction of the Congress demand in
Bengal (Tayyeb 1966).
The partition, and later its plan and execution, did not
envisage any transfer of population between the successor states
in order to eliminate or reduce minorities. Had there been any
such proposal it would have been opposed by the League because
such a transfer of population would certainly have been against
the interests of Pakistan as delimited by the Commission. At
the time of independence the number of non-Muslims left in
Pakistan was about 20 million while about 38 million Muslims
were left out of Pakistan and were scattered all over India.
So, an exchange of 20 million Hindus, Sikhs etc. for 38 million
Muslims would leave Pakistan with 18 million additional
population, certainly too high a price for complete homogeneity.
Pakistan could not pay this price in 1947 nor indeed at any
time since then (Davis op.cit.).
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Many outsiders, especially Europeans, have failed to
understand the differences between Islamic and Hindu ways of
life. To them all 'Indians', whether Muslim, Hindu, Sikh, or
even Christian, have seemed the same, at best only minor
variants of one 'Indian' culture. Those who have spent some
time in the sub-continent know what distinguishes and
differentiates between Muslims and Hindus. In doctrine and
practice no two religions could be more different not only in
worship but in almost all aspects of daily life (Stephens 1964).
It is true that Islam and Hinduism coexisted in the peninsula
for centuries and the two borrowed at least a little from each
other, yet the two religions have remained inimical to each
other (Spear 1965), and it was these differences of spiritual
and social outlook, strengthened further by complex historical-
economic causes, which made the partition of the sub-continent
inevitable. The geographical distributions of these two major
religions in India had confounded the issue still further so as
to make either one or the other group a minority religion in
practically all districts. Muslims and Hindus had reacted in
different ways to the British colonial rule, and in early years
the British rulers' attitude had definitely been more favourable
to Hindus (Hunter 1884). The British probably saw in Muslims
the main opponents to their future empire in India because it
was the Muslim Mogul empire that they replaced in the sub¬
continent; for Hindus it was just a change of masters, a change
which certainly proved to their advantage. This differential
treatment by the new rulers combined with all the differences
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of their creeds further widened the gulf between the two major
religious communities in India. Of course one can find examples
of Hindu-Muslim unity at certain times, e.g. Gandhi's support
Of the Khilafat Movement to preserve the Ottoman Caliphate, but
there was never a possibility of binding these two groups into
one nation. On the contrary one finds Hindu-Muslim clashes
often with violence resulting in riots and deaths to be a more
common feature in the present century than their united efforts
to fight the colonial power. At least the Muslims by 1940,
when the league formally demanded partition, had become
undoubtedly convinced that they were not prepared to live in
an independent united India where Hindus would always remain
in numerical and economic superiority. After that year all
attempts to bring these two communities together were pre¬
determined to failure.
The partition of the sub-continent brought in its wake
something for which the British government were surprisingly
not prepared. There was a complete breakdown of law and order
as violence suddenly erupted on both sides of the proposed new
boundary. Religious groups who found themselves on the wrong
side of the new partition boundary were set upon, murdered or
forced to leave their homes leaving all their assets behind.
Although nearly all parts of India experienced these violent
outbreaks, Punjab was the province that suffered most. There
are no exact figures available about the number of people who
migrated to either of the two new states and those who were
killed en route, but according to one estimate about one million
39
persons died, Pakistan received about 6 million Muslims from
India and between 5 and 6 million Hindus and Sikhs left Pakistan
for India (Davis op.cit,). Most of this exchange took place
in a matter of a few months and was mainly between West
Pakistan and India. Although about an equal number of persons
crossed the boundary in each direction, the problems for
Pakistan were by far greater. This two-way migration altered
the pattern of spatial distribution of religions in both the
states, more so in Pakistan, particularly in the western wing,
because of the greater proportion of displaced persons in
relation to the total population. For Pakistan one result of
this migration in religious terms was a greater homogeneity
because, whereas on the basis of 1941 census, areas comprising
Pakistan had 76.7$ Muslim population, by 1951 the proportion
had increased to about 85$. As has been said earlier, West
Pakistan experienced a greater change as a result of the
migrations: in 1951 about 97$ of the total population of West
Pakistan was Muslim while in East Pakistan it was nearly 77$.
Compared to West Pakistan, it is estimated, a lesser number of
non-Muslims left East Pakistan and even fewer Muslims from
India entered that wing. Between the two censuses of 1941 and
1951 the population of West Pakistan showed an increase of
16.2$, that of East Pakistan only 0.1$. Admittedly there are
other causes of this extremely low increase in the eastern wing
during that decade, but a net loss as a result of partition
seems to be a major reason. Within West Pakistan it was the
partitioned half of the Punjab where the communal distribution
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underwent a radical change. The undivided Punjab had just
over 55$ of the population as Muslim and the proportion varied
in the western half from 60$ for one district to 90$ in another.
The proportion in 1951 had become 97$ with no district below
95$ and Christians had now replaced Hindus and Sikhs as the
main religious minority. The proportion of Muslim population
in other provinces of West Pakistan in 1951 was: N.W.P.P. 99,9$,
Sind (excluding Karachi) 90.5$» Baluchistan 98.4$, Karachi
96,1$. These areas had already high Muslim population before
partition and since they were not affected by partition there
was relatively less communal trouble. This is also reflected
in the composition of religious minorities in these provinces.
In Sind and Baluchistan Hindus are still the principal
minorities. However, even from these areas there was an
exodus of Hindus and Sikhs to India and an influx of some
Muslim refugees from across the boundary.
In East Pakistan the general trend was the same - Hindus
leaving for India and Muslim refugees coming into it - but the
overall changes in the communal picture were less drastic. In
Bengal province as a whole the Muslims were about 55$ of the
total population and 60.7$ in Sylhet district of Assam. In
the Muslim majority districts of the province Muslim proportion
ranged between 56.6$ in Murshidabad to 84$ in Bogra. Here too,
as in the Punjab, the partition boundary did not follow district
boundaries, and consequently some Muslim majority areas were
awarded to India, but, unlike the Punjab, East Pakistan received
Khulna district, where Muslim proportion was 49,3$, and
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Chittagong Hill Tracts with only 3% Muslim population. In the
latter district with low total population the majority was, as
it still is, of tribal animists. By 1951 the share of the
Muslim population in East Pakistan was 77% and the only signifi¬
cant change since partition was that Khulna had now acquired a
Muslim majority. In 1951 about 20% of the population of the
wing was Hindu i.e. nearly 10 million strong, and they were
about equally distributed all over the province.
The 1961 census showed a communal picture substantially
the same as in 1951. The general trend towards an increasing
proportion of Muslim population continued but this time with
more obvious changes in East Pakistan where the Muslim share
had increased from 76.8% to 80.4%. This was a result of non-
Muslims who continued to trickle out of East Pakistan and vice
versa. West Pakistan, however, showed a steady position, or
rather in fact some districts showed a slight decrease in Muslim
proportion. In Hyderabad division the Hindu population had
increased by 229° during the ten years from 1951 to 1961.
Christians in the whole of West Pakistan had shown a rise of
nearly 35%, partly because of conversions of Scheduled Castes
(out-caste Hindus) who probably considered it more convenient
to change their religion, which in any case had kept them to
the lowest rung of the social ladder, rather than to migrate
to India. The increase in Muslim population was nearly 30%,
well above the average for the whole country, which was partly
because of some conversions and the fact that Muslims had, in
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due to the fact that a steady, though diminishing, stream of
refugees continued to come in during those years. There is
considerable evidence that after 1951 very few, if any, of the
Hindus from West Pakistan left for India because their total
numbers registered an increase of over 17$ between the last
two decennial censuses. That their proportion should have
decreased is only to be expected in view of the lower natural
increase among Hindus compared to Muslim population (Davis op.
cit.).
In East Pakistan the position was different; while the
Muslim population had increased by 26.8$, the Hindus gained
only about 1.5$. This was a direct result of the outflow of
Hindus from the delta districts to India which resulted in
only a very slight increase in their absolute numbers and a
decreased proportion within the total population. Pig.8 shows
the distribution of Muslims and non-Muslims by divisions in
both the wings. It shows the greater homogeneity of West
Pakistan in religious terms compared to East Pakistan. Only
in Hyderabad division of Sind province is there a sizeable
religious minority. The composition of religious minorities
is shown in Pig.9 which illustrates also the regional differences
in the complexion of minorities. In East Pakistan and the
former provinces of Sind and Baluchistan, except Quetta
division, Hindus and Scheduled Castes are the major minority
groups. The Punjab, i.e. Lahore, Bawalpindi, Sargodha and
Multan divisions, has now very few Hindus and the only minority









Fig. 9- Composition of Religious minorities (Divisions),
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minorities, whose total number is very small, are comprised of
both Hindus and Christians. The greatest change in the
religious complexion of the population, greater even than in
the Punjab, took place in Karachi. Before independence Karachi
was a relatively minor port, compared to Calcutta and Bombay,
situated rather marginally in relation to the rest of the sub¬
continent. Though it was the provincial headquarters of Sind,
an overwhelmingly Muslim province, its Muslim population was
in a minority, Parsi (Zoroastrians) and Hindu commercial classes
forming a majority. Independence brought a sudden change in
the status of the city; almost overnight it became the state
capital of Pakistan and the major port of an independent
country. The central government and their thousands of employees
in addition to a large influx of refugees from India and an
outflow of Hindus rendered the city 96$ Muslim by 1951. This
proportion, in keeping with the general trend in the rest of
the country, increased to 97$ by 1961. This increase in the
Muslim share after 1951 does not appear to have been at the
cost of minorities, who together marked an increase of 23.8$.
Hindus of all castes gained only 3.3$ but this does not mean
that after 1951 Hindus had been leaving the city in any great
numbers. Figures for the Caste groups show a rather contrary
trend. The population of caste Hindus from 1951 to 1961 swelled
by about 137$, no doubt largely because of the movement of
Hindus from up-country towns and rural areas to the relative
safety of the metropolis. However, the very fact that these
people decided to move into Karachi rather than to India shows
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that Sind had remained comparatively free from communal trouble
at the time of the partition. The numbers of Scheduled Castes
decreased during the two censuses by 46.3%t a fact which partly
explains the increase of 73.2% in Christian population of the
city during the same period. Other religions in the city,
which include mainly Parsis, showed a steady population during
that period though in the whole of West Pakistan they registered
an increase of 28.5%. This is certainly because of the movement
of these people from Karachi to other towns and cities of the
province to fill the vacuum created in business and commerce
by the departure of Hindus, who had dominated these spheres of
life before independence.
Pig.10 shows the religious composition of population in
all cities of Pakistan with over 100,000 inhabitants in 1961.
It shows the same trend i.e. a substantial minority in all the
cities of East Pakistan who are mostly Hindus, relatively small
minorities in West Pakistan, Christian in central and northern
areas, Hindu in the lower Indus valley, and Karachi with a
mixed minority but mostly Christian.
Besides these regional differences in the religious compo¬
sition of population there are some further characteristics of
the minorities in different areas. These characteristics are
not so obvious from census data but are of a more fundamental
nature. An analysis of the same data on which Pigs.8-10 are
based suggests that, whereas in West Pakistan religious
minorities tend to concentrate in urban areas, in East Pakistan
they are more numerous in small towns and rural areas. In 1961
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the percentage of the total population that lived in cities of
over 100,000 inhabitants in West Pakistan was 13.5} the comparable
figure for East Pakistan was 2.4. However, while 14.7$ of all
the minorities in West Pakistan lived in such cities, only 1.8$
of East Pakistani minorities were recorded in those cities. In
other words West Pakistani cities recorded 3.2$ of their
population as non-Muslim when in the whole of the wing the ratio
was 2.9$; minority proportion in the whole of East Pakistan
was 19.but in the cities 14.7$. This shows that in East
Pakistan minorities, mostly Hindu, are less numerous in cities,
contrary to what is the case in West Pakistan.
The situation in West Pakistan is far from uniform and
there are regional differences. Table 2 gives comparable
figures for the different areas of West Pakistan which show
that within the province there are differences similar to those
that exist between the two wings.
Table 2 shows that there is a tendency for minorities to
concentrate in urban areas in the former provinces of the Punjab,
N.W.P. and Baluchistan. This tendency is much more marked in
Quetta and Kalat Divisions where the only city of over 100,000
inhabitants, Quetta, has only 9.2$ of the total population of
the area but contains 29.5$ of the minorities. In Sind the
position is different. Here, as in East Pakistan, cities do
not show a concentration of minorities; instead they are less
numerous in large cities than elsewhere in the province. Cities
account for only 2.6$ of the total minorities when their total
population is 10.4$ of that of the province. To sum up, there
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Table 2
Religious Minorities in Cities (by Provinces), 1961
Provinces 1 2 4
Punjab 11.4 16.6 2.2 3.2
N.W.P.P. 2.9 5.3 1.1 2.1
Sind (excluding
Karachi)
10.4 2.6 8,7 2.2
Baluchistan 9.2 29.5 1.3 4.1
(Source: Census 1961)
1. City population (of cities over 100,000 persons)
as fo of total population of area.
2. City minorities (of cities over 100,000 persons)
as °j» of total minorities in areas.
3. Total minorities as i> of total population of areas.
4. City minorities (of cities over 100,000 persons)
as i<> of total city population.
are differences in the religious composition and distribution
of population not only between East and West Pakistan but also
within West Pakistan where the lower Indus valley, i.e. Sind
province, is different in this regard from the rest of the wing.
On the whole the trend during the past years has been that of
increasing religious homogeneity though minorities, after the
initial setback to Hindus especially in West Pakistan, have
been holding their own. The increase in the proportion of
minorities at some places can, however, be explained by conversion,
movement from other areas as in Karachi, and also by the assump¬
tion that in 1951 some people, especially Hindus, might not
have declared their true religion because of fear but did
register their true faith in 1961 when things had become more
settled.
47
So much for the religious distributions in Pakistan, and
now the much more complex issue of the relationships, social
as well as political, between different religious communities
and the importance of religion in the short but eventful history
of the state. The rise of Muslim 'nationalism' in the sub¬
continent and later the demand for Pakistan elicited different
reactions from different quarters. To all those steeped in
the modern ideals of secular democracy the very idea of Pakistan
appeared repugnant. The leaders of the Muslim League were
dubbed as anachronistic reactionaries who were trying to set
up a regressive, intolerant theocracy in the middle of the
twentieth century. This was the general opinion of the Congress
leaders and of many foreign observers as well. But to anyone
who looked at the Muslim League leadership more carefully it
would have been clear that the truth was different. Unlike
the impression which some people tried to create, the leaders
of the League were not orthodox religious people, but, like
the Congress leaders, were modern progressive men educated at
Oxford and Cambridge and at Inns of Law rather than in
traditional 'madrassahs'.* It seems rather strange how some
people missed the fact that almost all the orthodox religious
leaders not only did not join the League but actively opposed
it till the very last when the League succeeded in winning the
support of only a few of them. The rest continued to oppose
the idea of Pakistan - the reasons will be explored shortly -
* Madrassah is a traditional Islamic school often attached to
a mosque.
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and did in fact ally themselves with the Congress (Binder op.
cit.). It seems rather groundless to assert that the League
was trying to set up a theocratic state in view of the above,
and also the fact that after independence it was demonstrated
at a number of times that neither the League nor the religious
leaders had any idea what an Islamic state meant and how it
was to be achieved. The nationalism of the League was based
on religion because somehow religion had coincided with other
important economic and social factors. Many independent
writers (e.g. Myrdal 1968) have stressed the secular training
and outlook of the League leaders, for which they were often
condemned by some religious leaders. The desire of the
Bengali Muslims to be free of the control of Calcutta's Hindu
industrialists, or that of the Punjabi peasants to get rid of
the local Hindu moneylender, found a common expression in the
demand of the League to have a separate state, a desire so
strong that even the opposition of their own religious leaders
could not keep the Muslims from throwing their full weight
behind the League. The coincidence that the people who felt
oppressed in Bengal and those in the Punjab who wanted to be
free of Hindu domination, were Muslim was not by chance but
had historical and social reasons. The fact that these widely
separated people joined in a common struggle does mean that
religious unity was a bond of considerable strength, at least
during that period. Nevertheless, however strong the bonds of
a common faith might have been, the political unity of the
Muslims was in fact based essentially on the negative tie of a
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common fear of Hindu dominance, a fear grown stronger, with
considerable justification, during the last years of British
rule in India (Stephens 1964 & 1968). However, this chapter
is concerned more with the conditions after independence/, there
is no need to go into the details of what happened "before 1947.
It should, however, "be kept in mind that the "bulk of Muslim
religious opinion had taken no part in the struggle for Pakistan -
it in fact had opposed it.
Since common religion was the only ground on which the
Muslim League's case was "based it was inevitable that the issue
of religion should come to the forefront of politics once
Pakistan had come into being. Islam was certainly going to be
the main driving force in the new state, as Muslims had shown
overwhelmingly their belief in this state-idea during the 1946
elections. However, the Muslim League had no intention of
setting up a theocracy. At least the League leadership was
not trained to take up such a job. Jinnah, the leader of the
League and the first Governor-General of Pakistan, while
addressing the Constituent Assembly on 20th August, 1947, saidi
"How, I think that we should keep that in front of us our
ideal and you will find that in the course of time Hindus
would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be
Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the
personal faith of each individual, but in the political
sense as citizens of the State" (Constituent Assembly,
Debates, vol.1, Aug.11, 1947, p.20).
Yet his trusted lieutenant and the first Prime Minister,
Liaquat Ali Khan, had this to say to the same Assembly in 1949s
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"Pakistan was founded "because the Muslims of this Sub-
Continent wanted to build up their lives in accordance with
the teaching and traditions of Islam, because they wanted
to demonstrate to the world that Islam provides a panacea
to the many diseases which have crept into the life of
humanity today" (ibid. vol.Y, March 7, 1949» p*2).
Herein lay the basic contradiction which frustrated all efforts
to find a workable constitution commonly agreed upon. It was a
formidable task to remove the scars of partition in relation to
Muslims and Hindus, it was well nigh impossible to reconcile
the two ideas of western style parliamentary democracy and an
Islamic state, the latter concept being subject to various
rather nebulous interpretations by different groups and
individuals. So far the religious leaders have been referred
to as one body of opinion, and although they shared a common
opposition to the idea of Pakistan, there were deep differences
among them, often more fundamental than those between them and
the league. However, one other respect in which they agreed
among themselves was the role of minorities in an Islamic state.
Islam does not deprive non-Muslims of all their democratic
rights but instead Muslims are ordered "...to tolerate and to
protect non-Muslims and to allow them to continue to practice
their religion provided they undertook no activities inimical
to the welfare of the State and the millat" (Callard 1957).
"Unto each nation have We given sacred rites which they
are to perform; so let them not dispute with thee of the
matter, but summon thou unto thy Lord. Lo! thou indeed
followest right guidance.
"And if they wrangle with thee, say: Allah is best aware
of what ye do.
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"Allah will judge between you on the Day of Resurrection
concerning that wherein ye used to differ" (Quran, Surah
XXII).
This also does not mean that non-Muslims have absolutely equal
rights in an Islamic state. Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, a
religious scholar and a League supporter, voiced a common
opinion when he addressed the assembly in these words:
"The Islamic State means a State which is run on the
exalted and excellent principles of Islam. It is evident
that a State which is founded on some principles, be it
religious or secular (like the U.S.S.R.), can be run only
by those who believe in those principles. The services of
such persons as do not subscribe to those ideas may be
utilized in the administrative machinery of the State but
they cannot be entrusted with the responsibility of framing
the general policy of the State or dealing with matters
vital to its safety and integrity" (Constituent Assembly,
Debates, Vol.V", March 9, 1949, p.45).
Thus Jinnah's secularism was in conflict with the requirements
of an Islamic state as put forth by the religious leaders. In
the latter the non-Muslims were going to have their rights but
not equal to those of Muslims. At least the minorities were
to be excluded from the processes of law-making and policy
decisions. All these words were spoken to an Assembly which
also contained non-Muslim members representing minorities.
Religious leaders were divided among themselves, as has
been said before, but their common opposition to the Muslim
League was based on the principle of the unity of the believers
(millat) and according to them in Islam there was no place for
petty nationalisms based on territorial units.
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the Jammat-i-Islami, a politico-religious party, Maulana
Maududi, rejected nationalism in these words:
"These satanic principles [of nationalism] have stood as
formidable obstacles and powerful adversaries against the
moral and spiritual teachings embodied in the heavenly
books and against the law of God" (Maududi 1947, p.25).
He goes on to condemn all forms of nationalist ideas:
"Prom the Islamic viewpoint both these types of nationalists
[Indian and Muslim] are equally misled, for Islam enjoins
faith in truth only; it does not permit any kind of nation-
worshipping at all" (ibid. p.25).
All this does not mean that various viewpoints among Muslim
scholars do not find any place for territorial nationalism,
for example Ibn-hhaldun, a fourteenth-century Muslim historian,
in his 'Muqaddimah' (1958) not only finds nationalism and Islam
compatible but also considers the former to be a natural
development of society. Unfortunately the work and ideas of
this great scholar had equally been ignored by the religious
and the League leaders. As a matter of fact Muslim League
leaders did not pay any attention to this issue before indepen¬
dence either because of a lack of will to do so or because they
were so much occupied to fight against the Congress and the
British Government to get their demands fulfilled that they
had no time to engage in controversies among themselves.
"The failure of the intelligentsia of Pakistan is owing in
part to various insuperable political and economic problems,
but also to the nearly complete lack of any intellectual
effort on the problem of Islamic government before
partition" (hinder op. cit. p.5).
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This discussion about the religion in politics is left here
and will be taken up again in Part IV to trace in great detail
the influence of these controversies on the political life of
the country. One final remark, however, needs to be made.
The role of minorities in these controversies has been minimal
because of the fact that the bulk of the minorities consist of
Hindus who have been on the defensive because of their fear of
being identified with the interests of India, whose relations




The importance of language in the social, economic and
political life of a state cannot he overemphasized. Though
each state has its own particular circumstances, it is fair to
say that linguistic unity among the people of a state is
generally a source of strength while hi- or multi-lingual states
have to face some problems, which may vary in time and space,
in bringing about homogeneity within their borders. The rise
of nation-states in Europe during the last two centuries was
often based on the idea that language and nation are coincident
and that state boundaries should conform to linguistic boundaries.
This, however, has not been universally achieved. In the case
of Arab Nationalism, for example, linguistic unity has not been
able to overcome other differences. Nevertheless, it is a fact
that unilingual states do not have to face the difficulty of
choosing national and official languages, a difficulty which
besets those where two or more languages are spoken by consider¬
able proportions of their populations. Apart from the political
problems, bi- or multi-lingualism also involves an increased
cost in education, administration, business, and so on, and a
decreased efficiency in communication. Recent history of some
states has shown that this problem is by no means easy to solve
and that governments often run into conflict when some
inhabitants feel that their language has not received proper
recognition or that some other language has been imposed on them.
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Yet some solution has to be sought to decide in which language
the inhabitants of a state are going to communicate with each
other in their economic and social relationships, in which
language they are to receive education, in which language the
business of the government and courts is to be carried on, and
so forth. That people generally resist when they think their
language is not getting a fair deal is natural because language
is often the most tangible characteristic distinguishing
cultural groups. Physical racial differences, especially when
they are apparent like skin colour, may prove more important,
as for example in the United States and South Africa, but in
the Indian sub-continent where racial stocks are so mixed and
difficult to trace, language is the most differentiating feature
of the population. As will be seen, linguistic heterogeneity
is one of the major problems in Pakistan and in order to evolve
a homogeneous nation the state has to find some measure by
which to enable inhabitants from different parts to communicate
and share their experiences more freely. In this context some
of the ideas of narl Deutsch's theory of social communication
will be employed in Chapter 7 to assess the magnitude of the
linguistic problem in Pakistan.
The Indian sub-continent has been called a 'cul-de-sac'
(Spate 1956, p.481; and Toynbee 1961, p.2) where, over a period
of centuries, different races entered only to lose their
identity, but in so doing so left their imprint on the then
existing fabric of life to create the highly complex social
and cultural pattern which exists today. Numerous races have
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inter-mixed over a period of centuries and language now, perhaps,
remains the only indicator of the past ethnic origins. This
generalization cannot, however, be taken too seriously because
over this very long period of racial mixing languages have
evolved across ethnic boundaries which themselves have all but
vanished. The whole linguistic pattern has further been
confounded by the rise within the sub-continent, or arrival
from outside, of different religio-social systems giving rise
to dialects within the main languages by contributing different
vocabulary and script. This has resulted in a wide variety of
languages and their innumerable dialects, some of which are
mutually unintelligible. In view of this it is no wonder that
for many centuries before independence the sub-continent's
official languages have been two foreign languages - Persian
under the Muslims and later English under the British. Each
of them was the lingua franca of the elite in their respective
periods. Under the Moguls a new language, Urdu, did evolve
by the fusion of Sanskrit and Persian, but it had to wait till
1947 before it could become an official language, though it
was in use on the lowest administrative level under the British.
As long as the British remained in the sub-continent the
linguistic differences remained buried under the overall
superiority of English as the language of the government and
of higher education, but once independence was achieved these
differences came to the surface when the question of replacing
English was raised. It was then that in both India and Pakistan
different languages started to vie with each other and the
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political controversies over language brought about some
bloody incidents. India, with its greater area and a wider
variety of languages, has experienced greater violence, but
Pakistan too has had its share. There is an old Punjabi
proverb that language changes after every eighteen miles, and
this is literally true in some parts of the sub-continent,
which illustrates how serious this problem is in evolving a
nation in its true meaning.
However, some figures overstate the case of linguistic
diversity, as for example the 1931 Census of India which listed
as many as 225 languages as spoken in the sub-continent. Most
of these are undoubtedly tribal variants of a smaller number
of languages, and a great majority of these account for only
a small proportion of the total population. India's 1951
Census goes even further to list 720 languages and dialects
with less than 100,000 speakers each, and out of these 73 as
having only a single speaker each (Spate and Learmonth 1967).
The 1961 Census of Pakistan records 24 languages with numerous
dialects. The classification of languages followed by the
Census Commission of Pakistan is based on Sir George Grierson's
monumental work 'Linguistic Survey of India' and is given in
Appendix IY. Many out of these 24 are spoken by a relatively
very small number of persons, however important they may be
from a philologist's point of view. Seven languages - Bengali,
Punjabi, Pushto, Sindhi, Baluchi, Brahui and Urdu - account
for about 98.2/- of the total population. Six out of these seven,
excepting Brahui, belong to the Indo-European family. Brahui
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is a curious outlier of the Dravidian family which, but for
Brahui, is confined to South India. All of these languages
are indigenous except Urdu which is the mother tongue of some
of those who migrated to Pakistan after partition, mostly from
the United Provinces and Bihar in India. As these people
have not spread evenly over the country Urdu too has now
assumed particular local importance in certain areas. MZEJ-31 Fi*j-%
shows the general distribution of these languages on the district
level. In this chapter the languages have been studied both as
mother tongues and as spoken languages and also their spatial
relationships in order to prepare for a study of cultural
diffusion and its political implications in a later chapter.
Mother Tongues: The provinces, or parts of the provinces,
which Pakistan inherited from British India, very roughly
coincided with linguistic boundaries although with many
exceptions in detail. Though political divisions could have
been brought more in line with cultural distributions, an
exact correspondence between the two was impossible because of
the complexity of the latter and the frequent overlapping of
linguistic regions. Moreover, the political divisions were
created from the view of administrative convenience which is
reflected in the fact that the former North West Frontier was
separated from the Punjab in 1301, and Sind remained a part
of Bombay province till as recently as 1935. The division of
Bengal into two provinces, East and West, in 1905> which was
hailed by the Bengali muslims, was annulled in 1911. However,
as a result of the partition in 1947 Pakistan experienced
100
—i lilies
1 Source: Census 1961.




Mother Tongues as per cent of total population, 1961
Seng. Bun.i. Bush.Bind. Urdu Balu.Brah.Eng.Others
Pakistan 55.48 29.01 3.70 5.51 3.65 1.09 0.41 0.02 1.12
West Pakistan 0.12 66.39 8.47 12.59 7.57 2.49 0.93 0.04 1.40
East Pakistan 98.42 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.61 - - 0.01 0.92
(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)
of the total population had Bengali as their mother tongue and
in 14 out of the total 17 districts its percentage is over 97;
in two others between 96 and 97; even in Chittagong Hill
Tracts where there is a large proportion of tribal people, it
is claimed by more than 91 per cent. The percentage of people
in East Pakistan having West Pakistani languages as their
mother tongues is just about 0.04 which means that the largest
language minority group in Bast Pakistan is Urdu speaking but
having a percentage of only 0.61. Their greatest concentration
is in Dacca district - 2.17 per cent - and they are least
numerous in Bakerganj with only 0.02. Thus East Pakistan
enjoys a remarkable linguistic unity which has been little
disturbed by the population transfers as a consequence of
partition in 1947.
Unlike religious distributions, in which West Pakistan
has a great homogeneity than the eastern wing, languages show
an opposite picture. There are seven major languages, including
Urdu, spoken as mother tongues and in many areas they overlap
each other so as to make it impossible for administrative
boundaries to correspond with linguistic districts. In fact
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there axe no linear linguistic "boundaries, except locally at
some places, and there is usually a wide transitional zone
"between two linguistic regions. In some areas two or more
languages have co-existed for a long period and no single
language has a majority. Moreover, the post-partition migration
has changed the linguistic pattern drastically in some areas.
Appendix V gives the percentages of the total population of
the districts of different mother tongues in all districts of
Pakistan. Only 0.12 per cent of the total population in West
Pakistan have Bengali as their mother tongue, many of them
presumably central government employees from East Pakistan.
In 1961 over 56 per cent of them were living in Karachi. So,
Bengali as a mother tongue in West Pakistan is as relatively
unimportant as West Pakistani languages are in the eastern wing.
To analyse the relative position of major mother tongues
in West Pakistan, i.e. Punjabi, Sindhi, Pushto, Baluchi,
Brahui, each of them has been dealt with separately.
(a) Punjabi. In terms of numbers who speak it Punjabi is the
second language in the whole of the state and first in West
Pakistan. In the last census more than 26 million persons
claimed it as their mother tongue, making 66.4 per cent of the
population of West Pakistan. The distribution of Punjabi-speaking
population in the former provinces of West Pakistan and Karachi
district is given in Table 4.
It is the predominant mother tongue in the Punjab claiming
92.8 per cent of the total population with only one district,
Lahore, having a percentage of less than 90. Even there about
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Table 4
Percentage distribution of Punjabi











(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)
98 per cent of the people could speak it. Outside the Punjab
it is also the majority mother tongue in two of the districts
in the former N.W.F.P., Hazara and Dera Ismail Khan, where it
was claimed by 86.3 and 73.9 per cent respectively. So this
is one area where the provincial boundaries have cut across
linguistic distributions. Besides these areas, Punjabi claimed
considerable proportions in many other districts, for example
in the Loralai and Quetta districts of Baluchistan - 26.4 and
17.7 per cent respectively; in Sind the districts of Nawabshah
and Khairpur - 10.4 and 10.2; Heshawar in the N. V/.P.P. - 11.2;
and Karachi - 12.8. The presence of Punjabi population in these
districts has been a result of different reasons such as the
opneing up of new irrigation schemes, trade, industries etc.
Thus it is important to note that Punjabi as a mother tongue is
present in all districts of West Pakistan in varying degrees.
If the two Punjabi majority districts of Hazara and D.3KKhan,
which together account for 4.4 per cent of total Punjabi
speakers in West Pakistan, are excluded the rest of the N.W.F.P.
is left with only 0.7 per cent of Punjabi speakers, less than
63
in Sind and Karachi. This means that of all the persons
speaking Punjabi as their mother tongue 7.7 per cent are outside
the Punjab and only 3.3 per cent in districts where speakers
of other languages are in a majority.
Before concluding this account of the Punjabi mother tongue
it should, however, be made clear that the Census does not
record persons speaking different dialects. Thus Punjabi
includes all its dialects as listed in Appendix IV, and, though
of the same language, the dialects have considerable variations
from area to area. Punjabi does not have a script of its own
and can be written in any of the three scripts, Arabic, Hagari
or G-urmukhi. The latter is used exclusively by Sikhs, who all
migrated to India after partition. Muslims, because of their
associations with Arabic, use the first script which has been
modified to meet the phonetic needs of the language. However,
Punjabi is primarily a spoken language and as a medium of
instruction its importance has been minimum. Punjabis have
been using Urdu as a language of literacy as will be seen in
the next Chapter. It does not have any notable literary
tradition, with a few exceptions, and therefore has not been
able to claim any position as a language of literacy and
education. This does not mean that Punjabi speaking people are
not very much concerned with the language controversy and some
groups have lately been trying to advance the cause of Punjabi
but as a reaction to similar demands from other regions.
(b) Pushto. Pushto is the language spoken in the northwestern
parts of West Pakistan and also by the people immediately on
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the other side of the "boundary with Afghanistan. Like Punjabi
it is also mainly a spoken language with a poor literary
tradition. It also uses a modified Arabic script but has a
vocabulary different from that of Urdu or Punjabi. During
recent years a consciousness on the part of its speakers has
led to an attempt to extend its use in education but in the
absence of a substantial literature such attempts have not
proved very successful. It too contains some dialects but
apparently there is much in common between them. The differences
are of accent rather than of vocabulary.
About 3.5 million people claimed it as their mother tongue
in 1961, 8.5 per cent of the population of West Pakistan. The
distribution of these people in different areas is given in
Table 5 as the percentage of its total speakers.
Pushto is the main mother tongue in the former Frontier province
though, compared to Punjabi, a greater percentage of its
speakers are outside the N.W.F.P. If the two Punjabi majority
districts, Hazara and D.I.Khan, are excluded the rest of the
province is left with 76.9 per cent of the total persons having
Table 5
Percentage distribution of Pushto











(Sources Census of Pakistan, 1961
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Pushto as their mother tongue. On the other hand there are
three districts in adjoining Baluchistan where Pushto is the
main mother tongue. They are Zhob, Quetta and Loralai - 95.8,
61.4, 61.1 percent Pushto-speaking respectively - together
having 8.6 percent of all Pushto speakers. The inclusion of
these districts, and the exclusion of two Punjabi majority
districts of the U.W.F.P., means that all Pushto majority
districts contain 85.5 per cent of all speakers of this language
as mother tongue, a percentage less than that in the Punjabi
speaking districts where 96,7 per cent of all Punjabi speakers
live. The most homogeneous Pushto speaking district is Bannu
where 96.5 per cent of the inhabitants speak the language as
their mother tongue; in the Punjab there are five districts
with a higher percentage of Punjabi speakers. This means that
a greater proportion of Pushto speakers live outside the main
Pushto area compared to Punjabi. However, their actual number
is relatively small because of their lower overall population.
Sindhi. Sindhi is the main language in the lower Indus
valley which is the former Sind province, and also of some
adjoining parts of Baluchistan. It uses a script derived from
Arabic, like Urdu, but is so modified that it is not understood
by people literate in Urdu, Punjabi or Pushto. It has a
comparatively rich literary tradition of which its speakers
are proud. Because of its literature and a suitably adopted
script it has been in use as a medium of instruction in schools.
This has resulted in opposition to the introduction of Urdu as
the official language and the language issue has played an
important part in local politics.
00
The number of persons claiming Sindhi as their mother
tongue in 1961 was about 5 million, forming 12.6 per cent of
the total population of West Pakistan, making it the second
language in the western wing in terms of the numbers speaking
it. Table 6 shows its relative distribution in different parts
of West Pakistan.
Of all the Sindhi speakers 93*2 per cent are in the former Sind
province. By the inclusion of Karachi, the percentage goes up
to 96.2. Besides being the main language in all districts of
Sind, excluding Karachi, it is also the major language of
Lasbela district, Baluchistan, where it is spoken by 66.6 per
cent of the inhabitants. The adjoining Kalat district of
Baluchistan has 24.7 per cent of its inhabitants Sindhi
speaking. So, Sind, Karachi, Lasbela and Kalat together hold
over 99 per cent of all Sindhi speakers in West Pakistan.
However, within Sind the position of the Sindhi speaking
population is not as strong as that of Punjabi speaking in the
Punjab or of Pushto speaking in N.W.P.P. There is only one
district, Sanghar, over 90 per cent Sindhi speaking; all the
Table 6
Percentage distribution of Sindhi











(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)
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rest are "below 80 per cent. Out of a total of eleven, four
districts are under 70 per cent Sindhi.
Sindh, as has been seen from the above figures, is different
from the Punjab and N.W.F.P. in terms of the distribution of
mother tongues. Firstly because very few Sindhi speaking
people have moved out of their native areas, and, secondly,
Sindhi speakers, rather paradoxically, do not enjoy so over¬
whelming a majority even in their native areas as do the
Punjabi or Pushto speakers. There are many reasons for this
curious situation which will be explained later. The only
observation which can be made here is that the greater proportion
made up of 'outsiders' who have come into these Sindhi areas
has had important political repercussions and has been one of
the reasons for the reassertion of the provincial basis.
(d) Baluchi. Baluchi, the main language of former Baluchistan,
belongs to the Iranian branch of the Indo-European languages,
as does Pushto, but is vastly different in vocabulary from the
latter though it uses the same type of script. The mutual
intelligibility of the two is very low. Unlike Pushto it
derives the bulk of its vocabulary from Persian, to which it
is much closer than it is to any other language. Though it is
the major tongue of Baluchistan, this province is much more
linguistically heterogeneous than even Sind. In fact in absolute
numbers there are more Baluchi speakers in Sind than in Balu¬
chistan. The latter in 1961 had about 420,000 persons speaking
Baluchi as their mother tongue. They formed 33 • 5 per cent of
the total population of Baluchistan but were only 42.7 per cent
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of the total Baluchi speakers in West Pakistan. Table 7 gives
their distribution in all the areas.
In only four districts, all in Baluchistan province, has
Baluchi a majority. They are Sibi, Chagai, Mekran, and Kharan.
Though a greater portion of Baluchi speakers is in Sind, in no
district of that province are they in a majority. In Jacobabad
they form 31.5 per cent of the population, in all the rest under
11 per cent. Only 2.7 per cent of their total number is located
in the Punjab, while in N.W. P.P. they are practically absent.
Baluchistan, Sind and Karachi together contain 97.3 per cent of
all Baluchi speakers. It should, however, be kept in mind that
they are only 2.5 per cent of the whole population of West
Pakistan. Because of the low numbers with Baluchi as their
mother tongue, and their more scattered distribution, Baluchi
has not been of any great importance, except locally, in the
politics of language and, therefore, has not been a basis of
any strong Baluchi regionalism.
Table 7
Percentage distribution of Baluchi










(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)
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(e) Brahui. Brahui belongs to the Dravidian family, one of the
older groups of languages. It is spoken mainly in parts of
the former Baluchistan and surrounding areas and is a mystery
from the historical and philological points of view because all
the other Dravidian languages are confined to South India where
they were pushed back before the successive incursions of
peoples from the northwest. Brahui has the smallest number of
mother tongue speakers - a little over 452000 persons in 1961
or about 0.4 per cent of the whole population of Pakistan.
Their distribution as per cent of the total speakers is given
in Table 8.
The distribution of Brahui shows a pattern similar to that
of Baluchi except that a majority of the Brahui speakers live
in Baluchistan. However, in none of the districts do its
speakers form a majority. Their highest percentage is in Kalat
district where they form 59.4 per cent of the population of
the district.
Table 8
Percentage distribution of Brahui










(Sourcej Census of Pakistan, 1961)
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) Urdu. Urdu is not an indigenous tongue of any of the areas
in Pakistan. Almost all its speakers as mother tongue migrated
to Pakistan after independence. It originated during the Mogul
period as a "... lingua franca developed by the Mogul soldiery
in contact with the Hindu inhabitants" (Census 1961, Vol.1,
Part IV, p.30). It was basically a mixture of Persian and
Sanskrit and the religious differences split its growth into
two branches, Urdu and Hindi, The former, using Perso-Arabic
script with some additional characters to meet the phonetic
demands of Sanskrit words and with a large Persian vocabulary,
became mainly a language of the Muslims. Hindi remained a
language of the Hindus using a vocabulary and script both
derived from Sanskrit. A colloquial form of Hindi spoken in
the bazaar, with various regional variants, is classed as
Hindustani, again with two branches depending on whether the
speaker is a Muslim or a Hindu. Hindi, and also the Hindu form
of Hindustani, have practically no speakers left in Pakistan.
The language of those Hindus who are still in Pakistan is
Bengali because most of them reside in East Pakistan.
Though the speakers of Urdu came into Pakistan after its
creation, Urdu as a language of literacy and official business
at lower levels had been in existence for a long time. It has
a rich literary tradition and Muslims generally have an attach¬
es' HA. UC A.
ment to it, not pi-itU mnturffifry in East Pakistan, with nostalgic
memories of the days when they were the rulers in India. Its
importance as a spoken language will be seen shortly but first
a look at its distribution as a mother tongue, which is given
in Table 9 as per cent of the total speakers.
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Table 9















(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)
The main features of the distribution of Urdu as a mother
tongue seem to be that it is spread over all of the state in
varying degrees, and that a third of its speakers are concen¬
trated in Karachi alone forming the majority tongue - 53.9 per
cent - in that district. Another third is located in the Punjab
where its percentage varies between 9.3 in Multan to 1.2 in
Campbellpur. About one fifth of the total speakers are in Sind;
they form 24.1 per cent of the district population in Hyderabad
and the district with their lowest percentage is Larkana - 4.4.
The whole of East Pakistan contains only 9.4 per cent of the
total Urdu speakers as mother tongue and there the percentage
ranges between 2.2 per cent of the district population in Dacca
to 0.1 per cent in Paridpur. The role of this Urdu speaking
element in the population of Pakistan has been very important
because much controversy arose as a reaction against the
adoption of Urdu as a national or official language. To sum up,




Mother Tongues as Per Cent of the Population
of each area, 1961
Area Bene. PunJ. Push. Sind. Urdu Balu. Brah
E. Pakistan 98.4 0.01 o • o - 0.61 - -
W. Pakistan 0.1 66.4 8.5 12.6 7.6 2,5 0.9
Punjab - 92.8 0.5 0.1 4.4 0.1 -
N.W.F.P. - 32.7 64.9 - 2.2 - -
Sind 0.1 4.9 0.7 71.7 10.2 6.6 2.3
Karachi 1.3 12.8 5.2 7.1 53.9 5.3 1.0
Baluchistan 0.1 7.4 28.1 12.2 1.7 33.5 15.8
(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)
In linguistic homogeneity, as far as mother tongues are
concerned, East Pakistan leads, followed by, in decreasing
order, Punjab, Sind, N.W.F.P., Karachi and Baluchistan.* Before
considering the question of national and official languages and
the politics of language, it is useful to examine the importance
of these languages, as well as that of English, as languages
of speech. Mother tongues may be important as a measure of
cultural heterogeneity but languages of speech, and the
acceptance of lingua franca in different regions, indicate
the degree of assimilation and of 'national' cohesion.
Spoken Languages: Besides the seven languages discussed above
English is also included in this analysis because it is still
* With the inclusion of Karachi in Sind under the present
administrative reorganization of West Pakistan, the overall
linguistic heterogeneity of Sind will appreciably increase.
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the official language and the medium of instruction at higher
levels of education. The relative position of the eight
languages in the two wings is shown in Table 11.
Table 11
Spoken Languages* as Per Gent of the Population
of Each Area, 1961
Beng. Pun.1. Push. Sind. Urdu Balu. Brah. Engl.
East Pakistan 99.0 - - - 1,3 - - 0.9
West Pakistan 0.1 67.6 8.9 14.2 14.9 2.9 1.2 2.1
(Source: Census of I'akistan, 1961)
Following the position in mother tongues, East Pakistan
shows a remarkable homogeneity in spoken languages too. The
number of persons who speak more than one language is less in
East Pakistan than in the western wing. The importance of
West Pakistani languages in East Pakistan is negligible.
Unfortunately, the Census does not provide the actual number of
persons who are bilingual and multilingual and in which language.
Each person is counted as many times as the number of languages
he speaks. However, the Census figures do throw considerable
light on the relative importance of each language in West
Pakistan (Table 12). It appears that Urdu is by far the most
popular second language in West Pakistan followed by English and
that the regional languages are relatively far less important
* 'Spoken language' includes all the persons who speak a
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aa the second languages of speech. In East Pakistan the
position of second languages is different i.e. English is more
important as a second language - 0.9 per cent of the total
population, than Urdu with only 0.7 per cent. This means that
in inter-wing communication a greater number of persons from
East Pakistan can participate in English rather than in Urdu.
Bengali, which gives East Pakistan a remarkable unity, is of
no consequence in West Pakistan, nor are West Pakistani
languages, Punjabi, Pushto, Sindhi, Baluchi and Brahui, in East
Pakistan. Languages of literacy and their relationship with
the languages of speech will be considered in the next Chapter.
Spoken Languages in Urban Areas: For urban areas all the cities
and towns with over 50,000 inhabitants have been selected. The
composition of spoken languages in these is shown in Appendix VI,
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which indicates that in general the cities and towns show the
characteristics of the area in which they are situated but with
a higher degree of multi-lingualism, a question to be explored
in greater detail in Chapter 7. Here a comparison of the urban
figures with those of the whole of former provinces brings out
interesting results regarding the mode of distribution of the
speakers of different languages in the former provinces. Table
13 shows the percentage occurrence of different spoken languages
in urban areas of West Pakistan compared to the percentage of
urban population in the total population of the Provinces.
Table 13
Percentage of total speakers in the Provinces living




Area Bene:. Pun.1. Push. Sind. Urdu Balu. Brah. Engl. total
Punjab 60.0 12.2 25.8 8.4 38.2 2.9 16.1 51.0 13.4
U, W,P.P. 62.0 8.2 8.6 50.8 21.2 59.1 90.3 32. 1 8.5
Sind 19.2 17.1 26.5 4.5 41.7 2.2 2.0 39.0 10.2
Baluch. 85.2 49.0 8.8 1.9 46.8 1.7 4.2 71.2 6.5
Karachi 96.6 97.6 95.5 69.3 95.9 80.2 73.0 98.8 93.6
(Source:Census of Pakistan, 1961)
Urdu and English speakers, as is clear from the table, tend
to concentrate in cities mainly because the two languages are
related to literacy and education. Bengali speaking persons are
also concentrated in urban areas except in Sind where a considerable
proportion is in rural areas. This is because of some Bengalis
who have been settled in the canal colonies of lower Sind,
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particularly in Tharparkar and Sanghar districts. Sindhis are
generally more numerous outside urban areas because most of
them go out of their areas to work as hired labour on the farms
except in the N.W.F.P, where more than 50 per cent of them are
in urban areas. Baluchis, like Sindhis, are also less urban
except in the Frontier province. Brahuis on the other hand
outside their native areas are more urban as are Pushto speaking
people who, in Punjab, are about equally divided between rural
and urban areas. Punjabis are highly urban in Karachi and
Baluchistan where they are engaged mostly in commerce and trade,
they are less so in Sind where a large proportion of them are
cultivators in the canal colonies. These characteristics of
different cultural groups may reflect their level of develop¬
ment and literacy, and consequently their role in the political
processes. They may also result in different reactions in
different areas to 'outsiders'. How far has this mixing led
to assimilation or is the cause of regional divergence? This
is the main question to be considered in the succeeding chapters.
The role of language in politics will be discussed in Part
IV. Here it may be noted that since 1956 Urdu and Bengali
have been the two national languages while English is still in
use as the official language. Recently the present government
announced the intention to replace it with the national languages
by 1975 but it is doubtful whether it will be completely
abolished at the higher academic level or in the business of




The need to study education and literacy in political
geography is imperative from many angles. First of all, the
literate population in any state is usually the most active
section of the inhabitants in the political life of that state.
Education and literacy enable people to participate more fully
in politics directly through elections and indirectly through
press, radio and other forms of mass media. Through education
people are more able to communicate effectively with each other
and thus it often becomes an important basis of state policies,
especially where cultural plurality is a major hindrance to
national integration. It is one way of diminishing the linguistic
or even physical barriers within the boundaries of a state.
Even where linguistic unity does exist people's inability to
read and write tends to keep them in relative isolation. The
benefits of modern developments in communications can only be
reaped if people are able to use thenu In countries like
Pakistan, where different languages are spoken in different
areas, it is through education that people can learn to communi¬
cate with each other in a common language and thus be able to
share each other's experiences. This raises the problem of
which language is to be used as a medium of instruction in
schools and whether people in different areas are going to
accept it or not. Though it depends on different languages
whether they are suited for education or not, the government's
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decision in this regard often reflects the state policy towards
cultural heterogeneity. If different regional languages are
used for education in their respective areas then even high
literacy may not bring about any appreciable increase in the
intensity of communication between various regions. On the
other hand people are often resentful when their children are
forced to be educated in a language which is not their mother
tongue. In a situation where a group of people are literate
and educated in a language which is not accepted in other parts
of the state or in employment, that group may feel discontented
to the extent that a serious political issue may arise. "These
persons therefore are more likely than any others to experience
national conflict, and they are the persons who first take part
in it" (Deutsch 1966, p.130). This sort of situation certainly
exists in Pakistan as this and the succeeding chapters will show.
Secondly, from an economic angle, the role of education
need not be stressed in the field of development. It is now
recognised that education is as important an ingredient for
economic development as capital and manpower. A well-known
economist writes "...no independent value attached to education
is considered to be valid if it conflicts with the value of
education as an instrument for development ... Prom a development
point of view, the purpose of education must be to rationalize
attitudes as well as to impart knowledge and skills" (Myrdal
1968, p.1621). Unfortunately, these considerations are exactly
the aspects of education that are most difficult to quantify
and treat statistically. However, the quantitative aspects of
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education, quite apart from qualitative ones, as often gathered
and published by government agencies in the form of statistics
on expenditure, number and types of institutions, teachers,
students etc. are a fair indication of the regional differences
and the government policies concerned with those differences.
Perhaps more important than these figures are those on different
languages as vehicles of literacy and education and their
relative importance in various areas of the state. It may be
possible to test, by using this information, how far education
has led to cultural integration and the relationships between
education and some other indicators of cultural homogeneity
within Pakistan. Obviously there is a strong relationship
between education and urbanization but the latter does not
necessarily act as a cultural 'melting pot' because, although
cities act as 'up-draughts' pulling in population from surrounding
or even distant areas, social distance may in many cases tend
to increase in cities rather than diminish. Therefore while
cities on the one hand may increase the prospects of national
integration through increased literacy and education, they are
on the other hand also sources of political conflict by bringing
together disparate elements. This latter is more true of such
places which have experienced rapid urban expansion, e.g.
Karachi, and have drawn in all the cultural elements in
substantial numbers. However, these points will be taken up
in detail in a later Chapter when all the relevant accessible
information is available.
80
This chapter follows the same pattern as the preceding
one i.e. first exploring the issue of education and literacy
"between East and west Pakistan and then considering the
differences within the provinces of West Pakistan.
Literacy: There is a great deal of confusion about the figures
of literacy because of varying definitions of the term used in
different censuses. In the 1951 Census of Pakistan, for
example, literacy was defined as the "...ability to read clear
print in any language". This is obviously an inadequate
criterion because in all Muslim countries, and particularly in
Pakistan, there is a large number of persons who can read the
Koran in Arabic without any understanding. To count such
persons as literate is certainly not justified. Secondly,
this definition also included those children who were at the
elementary stages of schooling and who, though they could read
their primers, were not really literate. It hab been suggested
that at least five years of regular schooling is necessary to
achieve basic literacy. However, in 1961 the definition of
literacy was changed to bring it in line with that prescribed
by U.N.E.S.0.0. and the criterion for literates became the
'ability to read any language with understanding'. Though this
definition does not exactly conform to the U.N.E.S.C.0. standard,
which is 'ability to read and write any language', in the 1961
Census separate figures were collected for those able to read
and write, those able to read with understanding and also those
able to read the Koran without understanding. Since comparable
figures for 1951 do not exist the data on literacy in the two
censuses cannot be compared.
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Another reason for the/iiricomparability of data is C9P91
MX
thftJ" different methods of deriving literacy rates/,used in
different countries or even in different censuses of one country.
These rates may be obtained as the percentage of literates
out of the total population, population over five years of age,
over nine years, over ten years and so on. So, any comparison
of figures relating to different countries, or to different
censuses in one country, is not meaningful unless a standardized
formula for obtaining the rates is used. It does not really
matter what formula to derive rates is used so long as it is
uniform for all areas and all censuses. It is also important
to know in which language a person is literate because, obviously,
one literate in the lingua franca of the state is better
qualified for communication at the state level than one who is
literate only in a minor regional language. The data on the
languages of literacy may also reveal how far education within
a state has been a means to increase bi- or multilingualism
transcending the traditional linguistic isolation. In this
regard it is interesting to study the education policies of
states and assess their effects in terms of increased or decreased
communication between different cultural groups.
Another difficulty about literacy figures is that many
persons, especially in rural areas, who drop out during or
after completing primary schooling may lapse into illiteracy
after some time. This problem may be circumvented by analysing
the figures, if available, about the levels of education reached
by the literate persons. Two areas may have the same literacy
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rates but in one of them a greater portion of the literate
population may have attained higher standards of education than
in the other. A greater proportion of literates with higher
education in an area may result in its being more prominent
in the state politics than an area with higher literacy rate
but lower educational standards.
Though in the Indian sub-continent literacy made rapid
progress during this century Pakistan and India are still in
relative terms highly illiterate countries. During the sixty
years from 1881 to 1941 the percentage of literate population
in the sub-continent aged ten years and over increased nearly
three times (Davis 1951). However in 1941 it was still as low
as 15.1 per cent. Since independence this trend of rising
literacy has continued. In 1961 in Pakistan the percentage of
literates out of the total population aged five years and over
was 19.2. East Pakistan is better placed in literacy than
West Pakistan as a whole with a literacy rate of 21.5 in 1961
compared to 16.3 in the western wing. This is a rather curious
phenomenon because it is generally less developed than West
Pakistan. The reason for this anomaly lies mainly in the fact
that East Pakistan, or former East Bengal, lies close to
Calcutta, one of the earliest strongholds of the British and
from where their penetration into the sub-continent was launched.
Since modern education was introduced by the British, those
areas which came into contact with the colonial rulers earlier
were more affected by the process of modernization. This is
true of all areas of European rule and consequently higher
literacy in the sub-continent is to be found on or near the coast.
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"It seems clear that, as in Turkey and other Asian countries,
the areas of greatest foreign contact, the coast, boasts the
greatest amount of literacy. This connection of literacy
with the coast is noticeable even by districts - those
districts lying to the interior of the coastal states and
provinces being less literate than those on the shore" (ibid.
Another factor which led to higher literacy in Bast
Pakistan has been undoubtedly the linguistic unity of the
province. One language facilitates the introduction of uniform
courses and text books at a lower cost, while linguistic
heterogeneity not only increases the expenditure but also
raises the delicate question of the language of literacy. It
is certainly easier to impart education in the mother tongue
of the recipient but in order to bring about the integration
of different areas the imposition of one lingua franca may
be necessary.
The difference in literacy between urban and rural areas
is naturally high, as shown in Table 14.
p.153)
Table 14












(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)
* All literacy rates are those used in the Census of Pakistan, 1961,
i.e. literates as per cent of total population aged five years
and over, except where otherwise stated.
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Here again the difference "between Hast and West Pakistan
is ohvious, but the difference between urban and rural literacy
is higher in West Pakistan, perhaps because of higher urban
growth in that province. This unequal rate of literacy in
urban and rural areas is expected but the distribution of
literates in these areas is highly unbalanced between the two
wings as shown in Table 15.
Table 15
Percentage Distribution of Literates
in Urban and Rural Areas, 1961
$> of total literates in: Urban Population
as fo of
Areas Urban Areas Rural Areas total population
1. Pakistan 25.8 74.2 13.5
2. East Pakistan 11.4 88.6 5.2
3. West Pakistan 49.8 50.2 24.9
(Source: Census, 1961)
Cities always attract a greater portion of literate persons
than their share of the total population both because of better
education facilities and the sort of jobs that literates naturally
lisI
demand^ However, in East Pakistan the proportion of literates
in urban areas, though greater than the percentage of urban
population, is not high. On the other hand in West Pakistan
about half of the total literates are in urban areas whereas
the urban population is about a quarter of the total population.
For this disparity between the two wings of the state one can
think of two main reasons: (i) that in East Pakistan urban areas
have not offered /$ta» employment opportunities to literates from
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rural areas as $jjgM9sCnSRaBHH0 in West Pakistan; (ii) that
because of its more compact size and smaller area the distribu¬
tion of educational facilities in rural areas are more diffused
in East Pakistan i.e, education is not so much an urban
phenomenon as one would have thought. While the first
point will be supported by other evidence in Part III, the
second one is supported by the findings of a sample survey
carried out in 1959* These findings are given in Table 16
which shows the percentage of rural population situated at
different distances from schools.
Table 16
Rural Population and Distance to School
io of villages situated









Primary W.Pakistan 10.5 7.7 7.2 13.3 37.4 24.9
E.Pakistan 85.0 7.5 2.0 1*5 4.0 -
High W.Pakistan 4.4 17.7 16.6 34.8 26.5
(Boys) E.Pakistan 24.0 45.0 15.5 13.5 4.0
High W.Pakistan 1.1 6.1 7.2 25.4 55.8 4.4
(Girls) E.Pakistan 2.0 6.5 7.0 22.0 62.5 —
(Source: Govt, of Pakistan, Central Statistical Office,
National Sample Survey, Pirst Round, 1959)
Rural areas in East Pakistan are definitely better served
in at least primary and secondary education. Only the girls
wishing to have high school education are about equally placed
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in both JdBLwings.* So, in West Pakistan people have to travel
relatively far to get education, often to the urban centres
which also offer better employment facilities than their counter¬
parts in East Pakistan, which are less numerous anyway, and
thus a greater concentration of literates in urban areas in
West Pakistan has taken place. This is a very important
difference, and a fundamental one, between the cultural
geography of Bast and West Pakistan of which the political
implications will be discussed later. Here it is sufficient
to note that rural East Pakistan is about twice more literate
than rural West Pakistan, and this fact combined with the
linguistic unity of the eastern wing must have important
repercussions on the political and cultural life of the state
as a whole•
There is a great deal of inequality between the sexes in
both wings of the state. The sub-continent as a whole has been
an extreme case of this sort of inequality due to a number of
social reasons which discouraged, and in many cases made people
look down upon, female education. Though Islam enjoins all
Muslims, male and female, to get education, the attitude of
the orthodox religious people has been against the spread of
modern education generally, particularly among females. However,
during the past decades female literacy has also shown rapid
increase, in fact it has increased more rapidly than among
* Shorter distance in East Pakistan, however, may not necessarily
mean less journey time because of slower transportation.
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males, though still the percentage of female literates is far
short of that of males. Table 17 gives the literacy rates for
the sexes in Pakistan and the wings.
Table 17














(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)
The figures of the proportion of male and female literates
in the two wings show the same sort of inequalities as are found
in the total literates.
Table 18
Distribution of Literates in Rural/Urban
Areas by Sex, 1961
Total Total
literates Urban Ruralliterates Urban Rural
Areas (Males) Areas Areas(females) Areas Areas
1. Pakistan 100 24.0 76.0 100 32.0 68.0
2. East Pakistan 100 —A o * 00 89.2 100 13.5 86.5
3. West Pakistan 100 45.3 54.7 100 66.9 33.1
(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)
The information summarized in Table 18 is very interesting
in that it once again brings out the fundamental differences in
the social life of the two wings. The rural/urban distribution
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of male literates is about the same as that of total literates
as given in fable 15, but the distribution of females is more
interesting. In West Pakistan over two-thirds of the total
female literates are in urban areas which means that female
education is even more closely related with urbanization than
that of males. Because of social taboos, literacy and
education among females remained very low indeed in the whole
of the sub-continent. When the first census was taken in
1891 females literates as a percentage of population aged ten
years and over were only 0.5 as against males over 10 per cent
(Davis ibid.). Since then female literacy has made rapid
progress but in 1941 it was still only about 6 per cent. When
female literacy did start rising it was mostly among the girls
of upper class urban families that modern education was accepted.
In areas that later comprised West Pakistan the orthodox
influence has been much stronger with the result that female
education remained confined to certain urban classes only and
its spread to rural areas has been comparatively slow. Even
now higher education, especially at the level of universities
which are all co-educational, is not considered suitable for
girls in many families. On the other hand in East Pakistan
the social conditions have been more favourable and the influence
of the orthodox religious opinion has not been so great in
opposing modern education. Eor example, dancing and music,
which is not encouraged by certain sections of religious
opinion, have been two of the important artistic aspects of
Bengali culture. To teach dancing and music to children in
West Pakistan is generally considered evil, while in East
Pakistan they are not only taught hut considered a source of
pride and of cultural attainment in many families. All these
conditions have led to not only a higher general female
literacy in East Pakistan hut also a much greater portion -
86.5$ of the total - of female literates in rural areas. Here
urbanization has not controlled the spread of female literacy,
as it has not controlled male literacy, and the rural/urban
inequality in literacy of the sexes is not so pronounced as it
is in West Pakistan. This is perhaps in general contrast to
other under-developed areas where literacy and education are
dependent on a process of diffusion radiating from urban
centres. This has been possible because of the use of a
single language, Bengali, with a rich literary tradition of
its own, as the medium of instruction in schools. Unlike most
of West Pakistan, education in East Pakistan has been available
to the people in their own mother tongue and nearer to their
homes.
Literacy has varied considerably between the different
religious groups in the sub-continent, although the greatest
amount of inequality involved only minor religions. The most
highly literate religious group has been the Parsis - with a
literacy rate of over 80 per cent - but their number is very
small and almost all of them are confined to Karachi city.
In general literacy in the sub-continent varied from region to
region depending to a large extent on the degree of urbanization.
The more urbanized a religious group in an area, the higher the
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literacy among its members. However, this general rule has
many exceptions because before independence in many areas the
literacy differential between Muslims and Hindus varied
inversely to their degree of urbanization and hence there must
have been some other factors influencing the rate of literacy.
One of them, different reactions of the communities to colonial
rule and western influence, has already been pointed out in an
earlier chapter. Commenting on this Davis says,
"What this factor is which favours Hindus we cannot say
for sure, but it is probable that it is partly a function
of Hindu cooperation with the English-introduced educational
system and partly a function of the higher socio-economic
status of Hindus in the rural or within the urban habitat"
(ibid. p.154).
Table 19 gives the share of each religious community in the
literate as well as total population in both the wings.
Table 19
Literacy and Religious Communities, 1961











































(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)
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Apart from a small Parsi community in Karachi, literacy
is highest among East Pakistani Hindus. This higher literacy
is probably because of the previously mentioned historical
reasons. In West Pakistan Hindus, who are a small proportion
of the total population, have a slightly greater share in the
literate population. Scheduled castes in both the wings show
a smaller share in the literate population than their percentage
of the total population. This is undoubtedly due to their low
social standing and the fact that they have been a depressed
class for centuries. Muslims in West Pakistan now have a
slightly greater share in the literate than in the total
population, but in East Pakistan they are definitely relatively
less literate, nevertheless, it must be remembered that since
the literacy rate is higher in East Pakistan than in the
western wing, the former has a greater absolute number of
literates.
There are even wider variations among the religious groups
in female literacy. Along with general literacy, female
literacy is a vital measure of modernization and reflects the
different socio-religious influences and the historical
experiences of different communities. Table 20 shows the
percentage of female literates out of the total literates in
each religious group in both the provinces.
The group classed Others in West Pakistan, which includes
mostly Parsi s, is the most highly advanced educationally with
literacy about equally divided between the sexes. Next are
the Christians who have a higher female literacy in both the wings.,
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Table 20
Female Literates as Per Gent of Total Literates
in Each Religious Community, 1961
Religious Communities East Pakistan West Pakistan
Muslims 23.0 20.7
Caste Hindus 29.2 16.7




(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)
probably because of the involvement of modern European
missionary activity in education. East Pakistani Hindus again
show their educational superiority with 29.2 per cent female
literates. Scheduled castes because of social reasons are the
least literate group, and among Muslims female literacy still
remains low to religious and historical reasons already
mentioned, though, in keeping with the general trend, it is
relatively higher in East Pakistan.
Another feature of the literacy differential between East
and West Pakistan is that in the former literacy is more evenly
distributed with the seventeen districts ranging between 15.3
and 27.2 per cent; out of these, twelve districts have literacy
ratios of 20.0 per cent or over (Appendix VII). As already pointed
out the literacy rate in East Pakistan is generally higher in
the coastal districts (Pig.12).
In West Pakistan there are wide variations in literacy
rates between different areas. The forty-five districts of the
Fig. 12. Literacy (Districts), 1961.
bo
wing range in literacy from 3.4 to 38.1 per cent, and the
interesting feature is that the districts at the two extremes,
Lasbela and Karachi, are contiguous and have belonged to one
administrative division since 1955 (Appendix VII). However, the
general literacy rates when considered on the level of the
provinces do not tend to be so variable as is shown in Sable 21.
Table 21
Literacy Bates in the Former Provinces







(Source; Census of Pakistan, 1961)
The highest literacy rate of Karachi is obviously due to
a higher degree of urbanization and economic development, as
~tkcui pf-
is alsolSBSSEBSBBSEli the Punjab. Sind ranks higher than the
Frontier Province and Baluchistan, a fact which may partly be
explained by the use of Sindhi, the local mother tongue, at
the lower levels of education. Like Bengali, though not to the
same degree, Sindhi is a more developed language having its
own literature. Literacy rates, however, are hardly uniform
within these provinces (Appendix VII).
Literacy in urban areas show the same pattern as general
literacy in East and West Pakistan. Appendix VIII gives the
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literacy rates in all the cities and towns of Pakistan with
over 50,000 inhabitants. It will he observed from these figures
that two features stand out. Firstly that East Pakistani cities
have higher literacy than their West Pakistani counterparts,
and secondly, that the largest cities do not necessarily have
the highest literacy.
Education: Apart from the general data on literacy, the 1961
census also provides fairly detailed information on the levels
of eduoation. The literates have been divided into two broad
categories - (i) those who have had no formal education; and
ii) the educated i.e. those who have had some formal schooling.
The latter group is then divided into different categories
according to the level of education reached. Before these
figures are analysed, the reader should be familiar with the
system of education, at least in its broad features so that one
can compare the system with other systems with which one may be
more familiar. The schooling system from the age of entering
a primary school is shown in Pig. 13.
Although this structure of school system is uniform through¬
out Pakistan, the actual courses that are taught at different
levels differ according to the type of school and the region
where it is situated. For example the teaching of English as
a compulsory language starts at the primary level in most
missionary schools and some government schools in large cities,
while in rural areas it may not be taught before the secondary
level. Secondly, the language of instruction also varies in
different areas; it is Bengali up to, at least, secondary level
95
15
The Structure of the School System in Pakistan
Age















in East Pakistan, in Sind it is Sindhi in many primary schools,
elsewhere it is Urdu. In Punjab, or anywhere else, Punjabi is
not taught at any level.
The first thing that emerges from an analysis of the figures
on education is that in East Pakistan the percentage of educated
persons out of the total literates is considerably lower than
in West Pakistan. The comparable figures for the two wings are
61.3 and 87.4 per cent respectively. This means that in the
eastern wing a greater proportion of literates have had no formal
education. The Census (1961) provides detailed data about the
levels of education of the literate population of only the
Muslims in both the wings. However, these figures do reveal
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interesting differences in education "between the various parts
of the country. Although the general literacy is higher in
East Pakistan, of total as well as Muslim population, the
percentage of educated persons is lower but their absolute
number remains higher than in the western wing, though the
difference between the two wings is considerably narrowed.
Table 22 gives the figures of population at different levels
of education.
Table 22
Levels of Education (Muslim Population), 1961*
fo of the total educated:
Educated as $ Matric. Inter. Degree Higher
Area of literates & over & over & over Degree
East Pakistan 61.3 4.7 1.3 0.5 0.1
West Pakistan 87.4 13.9 1.9 1.7 0.5
(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)
In education East Pakistan does not have the same
superiority over West Pakistan as it has in general literacy.
Prom Table 22 it is clear that a vast majority of the educated
have received education only up to the primary level, or at
any rate below matriculation. And the East Pakistani position
becomes increasingly weaker as the academic level increases.
* Matriculation is the final high school examination and
intermediate is the stage, comprising two years at a college,
between leaving high school and entering a degree course.
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The greatest disparity is found at the higher degree level
where the percentage figure in West Pakistan is five times
that in East Pakistan. This puts the whole issue of literacy
and education in a different perspective, and one has to look
for some reasons which may explain these wide disparities.
pwpixko
One reason for the low^jggSBSSSSgB of the educated above
the primary level in East Pakistan is probably to be found in
the partition of the sub-continent. Though East Pakistan
inherited a larger number of primary schools than West Pakistan,
its position was less favourable in institutions of post-
secondary level because at the time of partition higher
education was confined to urban areas, as it still is to a
large extent. In the provinces of British India, institutions
of higher level were more or less confined to the provincial
metropolis which in the case of East Bengal was Calcutta. The
partition of the Punjab left Lahore, the provincial capital
and an educational centre, within Pakistan. All other provinces
were transferred to Pakistan intact with their capitals and
educational institutions. East Bengal was the comparatively
less developed part of the Bengal province, so it lacked the
facilities of higher education which were mostly transferred
to India as a result of the partition. Secondly, at the higher
levels of education, especially post-secondary, the language
of instruction was English. Therefore, the advantage of having
education in their own language, Bengali, which East Pakistanis
had at lower levels, was not available to them at higher levels.
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Another and more convincing reason is found in what has
happened since independence. Appendix IX shows the number of
different types of educational institutions, teachers and
students over most of the period since independence, This
information has been summarized in Table 23 in the form of
percentages.
Table 23
Relative Position of East and West Pakistan in Education,
1953-54 to 1965-66
East Pakistan West Pakistan












1.Ho. of Primary Schools65.7 44.7 +5.7 34.3 55.3 +150.3
2.Ho. of Students in
Primary Schools 68.7 60.5 +59.7 31.3 39.5 +128.6
3.No. of Secondary
Schools 58.9 47.0 +27.8 41.1 53.0 +106.5
4.No.of Students in
Secondary Schools 40.2 39.1 +114.7 59.8 60.9 +124.7
5.No.of Teachers in
Primary Schools 68.5 53.7 +34.4 31.5 46.3 +151.9
6,No.of Teachers in
secondary Schools 49.3 39.0 +64.8 50.7 61.0 +151.3
7.No.of Teachers'




47.2 52.1 +266.2 52.9 47.9 +199.8
9.No.of Colleges (all
types) 47.5 37.6 +135.1 52.5 62.4 +252.9
10.No.of Universities 33.3 40.0 +100.0 66.7 60.0 +50.0
11.No.of Students in
Universities 61.5 32.1 +263.3 38.5 67.9 +1130.0
(Sources Govt, of Pakistan, Central Statistical Office, 20 Years
of Pakistan in Statistics, 1947-1967)
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Figures in Table 23 - and in Appendix IX - at once reveal
a highly imbalanced picture of educational development in the
two wings of the country. In general the expansion of education
at all levels has taken place at a much higher rate in West
Pakistan. Between 1951 and 1961 the number of matriculates
increased by 143.7 per cent in West Pakistan, only by 6.3 per
cent in East Pakistan; graduates increased by 21.3 per cent in
the former, they decreased by 32.3 per cent in the latter;
variation in postgraduates was 68.6 per cent increase and 12.0
per cent decrease respectively. Even in primary and secondary
education, in which East Pakistan was ahead of the western wing,
the share of the former has steadily declined to less than half
the country's total. Though East Pakistan still has a higher
portion of primary students, the decreasing number of schools
must have increased the number of students per school or per
class. The number of teacher training institutions for the
primary and secondary levels has actually decreased in East
Pakistan by 19.2 per cent. The only items in which East Pakistan
has shown an improvement are in its share of the enrolments in
teacher training institutions and in the number of universities.
Moreover, in the latter case, although there has been an improve¬
ment in the share of universities in East Pakistan, as far as
the number of students are concerned, university education has
expanded at an enormous rate in West Pakistan. Here the inevitable
question arises: whether this increasing disparity between the
wings has been due to government policies or whether some other
factors are involved? This will be pursued later in connection
with important economic distributions, but here it should be noted
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that in view of the increasing disparities it is highly probable
that East Pakistan may lose whatever advantage it has had in
general literacy and it is not difficult to visualise the
political implications of these vital inequalities.
To complete this survey of education in the country,
governmental expenditure on education has also been analysed.
Education in Pakistan has been a provincial subject but there is
a fully fledged central ministry of education whose main task is
to formulate educational policy, grant aid and loans to provincial
administrations and to run educational institutions in the centrally
administered areas. The actual implementation of policies and
the running of most educational institutions is a provincial
responsibility. The revenue budgets and the expenditure on
education by the central government as well as the two provincial
governments are considered. Appendix X gives the actual
expenditure on education as well as the total expenditure of the
central and provincial governments since independence; this
information is summarised in Table 24.
The reason for the increasing disparity between East and
West Pakistan is apparent from the figures on expenditure on
education. Only about half the amount spent on education in West
Pakistan has been available in the eastern wing. No wonder the
share of the latter in educational facilities has been going down.
Moreover, the benefit of the amount spent by the central government
on institutions in the central capital must also go to West
Pakistan because of the location of the capital in that wing.
This disparity may not necessarily mean that the central government
101
Table 24
Expenditure on Education, Pakistan and Wings
East West
Expenditure Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan
1. Expenditure on Education as $
of Total Expenditure, 1948-49 0.5 11.8 11.6
2. Expenditure on Education as 1°
of Total Expenditure, 1967-68 0.5 9.9 16.2
3. Per cent Increase in the expendi¬
ture on Education, 1948-49 to
1967-68 533.3 736.8 797.1
4. Per cent Increase in the Total
Expenditure, 1948-49 to 1967-68 487.7 901.2 542.5
5. Expenditure on Education as per
cent of Total spent on Education
by Pakistan and the wings:
1948-49 4.9 33.7 61.4
1967-68 3.9 32.3 63.8
(Source: Pakistan, Central Statistical Office, Twenty Years of
Pakistan in Statistics, 1947-1967)
has deliberately kept East Pakistan at a disadvantage because,
as has been remarked, education is a provincial subject and the
total revenue receipts available to East Pakistan have been less
than in West Pakistan (Appendix X), hence less overall provision
for education in the budget of East Pakistan.
In education there are differences within West Pakistan
as in other distributions though the range of differences is not
so high. Appendix XI gives the complete information on levels of
education of the literate population by administrative divisions.
It seems that in educational levels of the literate population
the Punjab does not have a pre-eminent position. However, Karachi
again stands out, as in literacy, for obvious reasons (Table 25).
Punjab is in fact at a disadvantage in relation to Sind and the
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Frontier province as there is a greater proportion of literates
without any formal education in the former.
Table 25
Levels of Education in the Provinces
of West Pakistan, 1961
°fo of the total educated:
Educated as # Matric. Inter. Degree Higher
Area of literates & over & over & over Degree
1. Punjab 88.7 12.8 3.3 1.4 0.4
2. 3J.W.P.P. 96.0 14.7 3.7 1.6 0.4
3. Sind 92.8 7.5 2.4 0.9 0.4
4. Baluchistan 86.9 00•f- 3.8 1.6 0.4
5. Karachi 84.0 26.1 8.3 4.3 1.4
(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)
However, within the Punjab there are considerable differences
from one area to another, as one can see from Appendix XI, for
example Lahore division is well ahead of other areas in education
and is second to Karachi. Unfortunately, comparable figures are
not available for the earlier census which would have made possible
the comparison of the effects on different regions of the admini¬
strative integration of West Pakistan. It will be tried later to
find out from other available evidence if this integration has
had any significant influence on the socio-economic distributions
but one must not expect to discover any radical changes in those
distributions because this integration has been in force for
only about fourteen years.
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Languages of Literacy: Having analysed the regional disparities
in literacy and education, and the nature of those disparities,
the position of different languages as languages of literacy
should now he looked at. As was remarked at the beginning of
this chapter, the main interest of a political geographer lies
in the outcome of education and literacy in terms of increased
communication. If literacy is achieved in different languages
in different regions of a state, then any rise in it may not
necessarily mean a greater degree of cultural integration.
States may develop as coherent political entitles even with
many regional or national languages - Switzerland is an example
but, perhaps, the only such example - and in most states
linguistic heterogeneity is a real problem as in Pakistan.
States have developed into coherent entities with the evolution
of one common language - U.S.A. - and where old ethnic or
linguistic groups have retained their identities - Canada -
the evolution of a nation has been difficult, if not impossible.
For this analysis of languages of literacy only those
literates have been treated who could read and write in any
language; firstly, because this conforms to the U.N.E.S.C.O.
standard of literacy, and secondly, because data on this
hew
category^#®* available in greater detail. Appendices XII and XIII
give complete information on languages of literacy by divisions
in both the wings of Pakistan and in some selected urban areas.
The first thing that stands out is that distribution of languages
of literacy is not so complex as is the case of mother tongues
or spoken languages. Four of the regional languages, Punjabi,
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Pushto, Baluchi and Brahui, account for a very small portion
of the literates. However, two additional languages, Persian
and Arabic, become more prominent in literacy than they are
in mother tongues, and their importance is mainly due to
religious and historical reasons, For the state as a whole
Bengali, Urdu and English - to a lesser extent Sindhi too -
are the principal languages of literacy (Table 26).
Table 26
Languages of Literacy, 1951 and 1961
Able to read and write as i» of Population 5 & over
Piakiatan West Pakistan East Pakistan
Languages 1961 1951 1961 1951 1961
1.Bengali 9.50 10.85 0.01 0.04 16.60 19.43
2.Punjabi 0.09 0.09 0.19 0.18 0.01 0.02
3.Pushto 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.18 - 0.01
4.Sindhi 0.51 0.76 1.18 1.71 - 0.01
5.Urdu 3.76 6.11 7.63 12.46 0.86 1.08
6.Baluchi - 0.02 0.01 0.03 — 0.01
7.Brahui - - - 0.01 - -
8.Persian 0.33 0.46 0.60 0.92 0.13 0.09
9.Arabic 0.27 0.57 0.11 0.48 0.43 0.63
10.English 3.12 3.22 2.35 3.02 3.69 3.38
- means negligible or data not available.
(Source) Census of Pakistan, 1961)
Within East Pakistan Bengali is by far the most important
language of literacy because it is the medium of instruction in
schools. The higher level of education, at which a student
would require English or some other language, accounts for a
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relatively small portion of education. In all divisions the
percentage of those literate in Bengali out of the total
literates is above 95« Prom 1951 to 1961 the number of Bengali
literates rose by about 36 per cent. English is the second
important language in the eastern wing with 17 per cent of the
total literates, but the increase in it between the two censuses
has been only 6.4 per cent. English is followed by Urdu having
5.4 per cent of the total literates and with the ten years
increase of about 46 per cent. This increase in Urdu may hot
be due to any significant spread of the language among Bengali
speaking population in view of the fact that during the same
period there was an increase of 68.5 per cent in the number
of persons with Urdu as their mother tongue. However, whatever
the reason, Urdu still accounts for only one-twentieth of the
tc
total literates. Arabic,which all Muslims have^deep
/2rr
attachment^teaasHSKs®#'- religious reasons, jumped by 84 per cent
and in 1961 more than 3 per cent of literates could read and
write it. Persian, which was the official language during
the Muslim period in the sub-continent and is also a subject
of historic associations for them particularly in the north and
west of the sub-continent, declined in East Pakistan by about
20 per cent. This may be a reflection on the fact that West
Pakistani Muslims look towards neighbouring Muslim countries
for their cultural attachment in the past, while in East Pakistan
these sentiments are not of much substance.
In West Pakistan the importance of different languages
is summed up in Table 27.
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Table 27
Languages of Literacy in West Pakistan, 1961
As fo of total able to read and write
Languages
West
Pakistan Punjab N.W.P.P. Sind
Baluchi¬
stan Karachi
1•Urdu 86.43 97.90 96.20 35.54 91.61 82.88
2.English 20.95 21.94 24.05 10.16 26.97 25.67
3.Sindhi 11.82 0.06 0,08 74.47 1.84 4.91
4. Persi an 6.37 6.90 13.92 1.83 14.42 2.69
5.Arabic 3.34 4.26 1.77 1.69 6.14 1.58
6.Punjabi 1.28 1.02 1.52 1.27 1.14 2.22
7.Pushto 1.22 0.09 11.65 0.49 1.93 0.73
8.Bengali 0.25 0.03 0.30 0.20 0.61 1.27
9.Baluchi 0.20 0.02 N 0.85 1.32 0.57
10.Brahui 0.08 N if 0.20 0.76 0.16
IT = less than 0.01
(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)
Here Urdu has about the same overall position as of Bengali
in East Pakistan, followed by English and Sindhi. As regards
the position of provinces it was found that there were important
regional differences though the magnitude this time is not so
high. Urdu is undoubtedly the main language of literacy in West
Pakistan and the lingua franca except in the former Sind province
where Sindhi is at the top because of being the medium of
instruction in most of the schools. Outside Sindhi speaking
areas, however, Sindhi is unimportant. Punjabi, as a language
of literacy, is not of much importance and surprisingly it has
a higher percentage everywhere compared to within the Punjab.
Pushto is also relatively unimportant except in the former
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Frontier province where it accounts for over 11 per cent of the
literates. Baluchi and Brahui are of no consequence even within
their own areas. English ranks second in all provinces except
Sind where its position is third after Sindhi and Urdu; the
seems to have a direct relation with
higher education, which is logical. Persian commands a
considerable^ g&SKtea&gapa in the former Frontier province and
Baluchistan, a fact probably due to strong cultural and commer¬
cial links of these areas with Afghanistan and Iran where it is
the official language, but, as has already been remarked,
Muslims everywhere in West Pakistan generally feel a strong
attachment to Persian as being 'their' former official language.
Urdu itself, as being the outcome of a marriage between Persian
and Sanskrit, borrows heavily from Persian in vocabulary and
form. Arabic, because of religious attachment, is also quite
important even though it is of no practical value in government
or business employment. Surprisingly Sind has the lowest
percentage of literates in Arabic since it was the first area
in the sub-continent to come in direct contact with Muslim Arabs
in the eighth century A.D., but one does find the evidence of
this contact in Baluchistan where Kalat division has more than
11 per cent literates in Arabic. There are Arab settlers on
the Mekran coast, especially around Gwadur, which till recently
was under Oman, and some trade on the local scale has been going
on across the Persian Gulf for centuries.
What do these figures on the languages of literacy really
reveal? It is too early to say that the areas with higher
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percentageiof regional languages are lower on the scale of
Sc
national integration though it does seem to be/LiyaasasfflR#, a
point to he elaborated in Chapter 7. It is certain that Urdu
and English are the only languages which have a state-wide
distribution. Bengali, though a language of a majority of the
population, is almost totally confined to East Pakistan. In
West Pakistan only 0.25 per cent of the literates can use it,
the majority of them are certainly East Pakistanis living in
the western wing. Likewise Urdu is not accepted to any large
extent in East Pakistan where it accounts for only 5.4 per
cent of the literates. So, any effective communication between
the two wings must of necessity be confined to those literate
in Urdu and English, 6.11 and 3.22 of the total literates
respectively, a very small portion of the total population indeed.
The number of Urdu literates in West Pakistan rose by over 100
per cent between 1951 and 1961 and it also increased by over 45
per cent in East Pakistan, which is a good sign. Nevertheless,
it is certain that Pakistan cannot hope to become a uni-lingual
state in any foreseeable future. The best which can be achieved,
with great effort and compromise, is a bi-lingual state with
Bengali in the east and Urdu in the west. This can be achieved
only if there are no other serious causes of conflict, economic,
social or political.
Languages of literacy in cities show the same general
pattern as the areas in which they are situated, the only
difference being that the percentage of English is higher. In
East Pakistan cities also have a considerably higher percentage
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of literates in Urdu than in the wing as a whole. This means
that the position of Bengali is even stronger in rural areas.
In West Pakistan the major difference is to "be found in Sind
where cities command a higher percentage of Urdu than Sindhi
literates - the position is the reverse in the whole of the
province. This is due to the fact that in the cities of Sind,
Sindhi speakers are in a minority. The greater concentration
of non-Sindhis in the large cities not only gives a higher
percentage of Urdu literates hut is also a considerable source
of friction in that province.
So, the overall picture emerges as that of deep regional
differences with Bast Pakistan more literate but considerably
less educated than West Pakistan, and that, while the literacy
gap has been narrowing, disparities in education are increasing.
In the acceptance of a lingua franca, if Urdu can be taken as
such for the whole state, the provinces in decreasing order are
the Punjab, K.W.P.P., Baluchistan, Karachi, Sind and Bast
Pakistan. If the importance of regional languages is considered
as an indicator of regionalism then Bast Pakistan leads, followed
by Sind, N.W.F.P., Baluchistan, Karachi and Punjab* This is,
however, a tentative conclusion to be explored in greater detail
in a later chapter when other cultural considerations will also
be taken into account.
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CHAPTER 6
URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION
The study of the distribution and growth of urban and rural
population is interesting not only as an indicator of economic
development but also of social and political change. Even in
countries where a greater portion of population is rural, cities
play a dominating role by virtue of being centres of industry,
trade and commerce as well as of decision-making and political
power. In geography the role of capital cities in the evolution
of states has received considerable attention (e.g. Cornish
1922; Spate 1942) and the degree of importance of sub-national
7*Lf
capitals vis-a-vis^ state capital may be of vital importance in
assessing how well integrated different regions in a state are
in a national framework. In this chapter urban and rural
population is studied from the viewpoint of distribution and
growth, necessarily involving the internal movement of people
between different regions. The composition of the population
of some selected cities and towns has been analysed on the basis
of the origin of the inhabitants, as far as the available data
allows, in order to see how far these cities and towns have
helped in intermixing different cultural groups as identified
in Chapter 4.
In Pakistan, as in the rest of the sub-continent, urban
population has expanded rapidly during the present century but
still a large proportion of people live in rural areas. Some
areas have shown greater urbanization than others for varying
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reasons. In the past a great majority of the population in
the whole of the sub-continent lived in self-sufficient
agricultural villages more or less isolated from the few urban
centres. There was relatively little contact between cities
and villages because, though cities depended on rural areas
for food supply, timber, other agricultural materials, etc.,
villages were not only self-sufficient in food supply but also
their craft industries provided them with all of their other
necessities. With the development of modern transport and
communications and industrialization, this isolation became
weaker and the two segments of society, rural and urban, became
more and more dependent on each other. Besides food supply
and industrial raw materials, cities drew on rural areas for
labour supply while villages, whose craft industries could not
face the competition from mass produced factory goods, became
increasingly dependent on cities for the supply of manufactures.
Even so this two-way relationship between cities and villages
has not been so strong as in the western countries and the
"...gulf between city and country is greater in Pakistan-India
than in Western countries" (Davis 1951, p.130). This gulf is
apparent in occupational structure, literacy and education, sex
ratios, age structure, density and housing, and so on. Moreover,
this gulf has apparently increased during these early stages of
development probably because urban areas have generally developed
at a faster rate than rural areas. However, with increasing
urbanization the social and political impact of cities on rural
areas is likely to become more pronounced.
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"The city is where social change begins, where the speciali¬
zation, talent, and organization necessary for originating
and executing new ideas are available. City development is
therefore a good index of past economic progress and safe
augury of new progress to come. In many ways what is happening
in the city today is what will be happening to all of India
in the future" (ibid. p.127).
The differences between cities and villages which are more
fundamental than those referred to above are sociological
relating to peoples' attitudes and habits. In cities generally
people are more aware of their surroundings and react more
effectively partly through higher literacy and education, and
partly through organizations like trade unions, student unions
and other such bodies. In rural areas peasants still remain
politically inert because of illiteracy, poverty and lack of
organization, thus giving a far greater advantage to cities
in politics than their proportion in the total population. Not
much statistical evidence is available about these differences
but reference will be made to them in this study wherever other
indirect sources of information make it possible.
In a study of urban/rural population the first problem
which arises is one of definition. What constitutes urban and
rural population? Obviously if one can delimit either of the
two the other can be derived by subtracting it from the total,
therefore in censuses of most countries urban population is
defined and delimited and the rest is considered rural. Urban
areas are usually defined on the basis of size, functions, or
administrative prganization, or any combination of these. In
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the Census of Pakistan, 1961, areas considered as urban were
"Municipalities, Civil Stations and Cantonements not
included within municipal limits, and any other continuous
collection of houses inhabited by not less than 5000 persons
which the Provincial director may decide to treat as urban
for census purposes" (Census 1961, Vol,3» Ch.I, p.24).
So the basic criteria were size and administrative organization,
but places with less than 5000 inhabitants and with none of the
above forms of organization were also considered as urban if
they fulfilled the following conditions:
"1) All areas having Town Committees under the Basic
Democracies Order, 1959.
2) Concentration of population in continuous collection
of houses possessing one or more of the following
characteristics:
a) Those where the community sense is well developed
and the community maintains public utilities such
as roads, street lighting, water supply, sanitary
arrangements etc.
b) Centres of trade and commerce with a population
substantially non-agricultural or having a non-
agricultural labour concentration.
c) Those possessing a markedly high literacy rate or
which are civil stations" (ibid, p.24).
All this left much to the discretion of the Provincial Directors
in the case of smaller settlements whether to class them as
urban or not, therefore much depended on the subjective judgement
of Census officials in classifying urban population, at least
on the lowest scale of towns. Commenting on some new areas
classed a3 urban one Provincial Director wrote:
"These areas were declared urban after local investigation
and discussion with local administration. Some of these
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areas have developed so recently that no Municipal body or
Town Committee has yet come into existence" (ibid. Vol.2,
Ch.II, p.17).
On the other hand all places with more than 5000 persons were
considered urban irrespective of their functions or occupational
structure thus giving validity to the argument that in Pakistan
many small towns which are considered urban are in fact 'outgrown
villages', leaving this point for settlement geographers to
argue about, in this study the census figures have to be
0>u' '
accepted because they are the onlyAavailable, however faulty
they may be. The problem can, hov;ever, be somewhat overcome
by dealing with only larger cities and towns when analyzing
the characteristics of particular urban areas, say with more
than 50,000 persons, because at this level the confusion about
urban functions and administrative organization is not likely
to arise. Secondly, it is only at this level of urban areas
that the data is available in greatest detail.
It is common knowledge that Pakistan is a predominantly
rural country. The most striking feature of urbanization is
not its extent but that it is highly uneven, and that the
disparity between the two wings had been a feature even before
independence (Table 28). What is now West Pakistan not only
had a greater percentage of urban population than what is the
East Pakistan area at the beginning of the present century but
the former has also shown a faster growth since then. It is
difficult to pinpoint precisely the causes for the slow
urbanization in East Pakistan and it seems that a number of
115
Table 28
Urban and Rural Population in East and West Pakistan
1901-1961
East Pakistan
Year Urban e Change Rural fa Change
1901 702 2.4 - 28226 97.6
1911 807 2.5 +15.0 30748 97.5 +8.9
1921 878 2.6 +8.8 32367 97.4 +5.3
1931 1076 3.0 +22.6 34528 97.0 +6.7
1941 1537 3.4 +42.8 40460 96.6 +17.2
1951 1820 4.3 +18.4 40112 95.7 -0.9
1961 2641 5.2 +45.1 48200 94.9 +20.2
(Thousands)
(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)
"West Pakistan
Urban % Change Rural £ Change
1619 9.8 - 14957 90.2
1689 8.7 +4.3 17693 91-3 +18.3
2058 9.8 +21.9 19051 90.2 +7.7
2769 11.8 +34.6 20773 88.2 +9.0
4015 14.2 +45.0 24267 85.8 +16.8
6019 17.8 +49.9 27761 82.2 +14.4
9654 22.5 +6Q.4 33226 77.5 +19.7
factors have played their part. Lack of industrialization, of good
potential urban sites, of efficient transportation and of capital
have all played their part. Bengal province, of which East
Pakistan was a part, was one of the most highly industrialized
parts of British India but most of the industries were located
in the western half especially in and around Calcutta, and there
was little spill-over from this process of industrialization to
the eastern districts. East Bengal remained primarily a jute
producer to feed the mills on HooglLyside; in fact the partition
of the province did not leave a single jute mill in East Pakistan,
The problem of the shortage of capital has not been overcome
even since independence. Means of transport have been so
inadequate that even today there does not exist a bridge over
the main channel of the Brahfcmputra River throughout its course
in East Pakistan.
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Consequent upon the disparity in urban/rural population
between the wings, West Pakistan has more cities and towns in
all categories (Table 29).
Table 29
Urban Population by Size of Cities and Towns,
1951 and 1961
Number $ of Urban Population
Size of cities
and towns
East Pak. West Pak. East Pak. West Pak.
1951 1961 1951 1961 1951 1961 1951 1961
1.Over 100,000 3 4 9 12 34.4 45.9 55.3 58.9
2.50,000-99,999 3 5 6 10 12.0 11.2 7.4 7.3
3.25,000-49,999 12 15 23 30 27.1 20.6 13.9 11.4
4.10,000-24,999 20 23 54 78 17.9 14.6 13.6 11.9
5.Under 10,000 25 31 123 185 8.6 7.8 9.9 10.5
6.Total 63 68 215 315 100.0 100.0 100.0 1 00.0
(Sources Census of Pakistan, 1961)
So here in the case of Pakistan there is no direct relationship
between population density and urbanization (Davis op.cit.).
This is not only true between the wings but also within East
Pakistan where some of the most densely populated districts
have relatively low urban population (Appendix XIV and Pig.14).
In 1961 Chittagong was the most urban district and the least
urban was Noakhali with 11.7 and 1.0 per cent urban population
respectively. By comparison there were 31 districts in West
Pakistan with an urban percentage higher than that of Chittagong,
and even the least urban district of the western wing, Lasbela,




Pig. 14« Distribution of urban population (Districts), 1961.
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Between the provinces of West Pakistan there is not much
disparity in urbanization although there is a wide difference
between individual districts. The percentage of urban population
varies from 93•6 in Karachi to 3*5 in Lasbela (Appendix XIV" and
Pig.14). When looking at the figures of West Pakistan on
district level there do seem to be some interesting relation¬
ships which are absent from East Pakistan. The most urban
districts of each of the provinces - Lahore (Punjab), Peshawar
(N.W.F.P.), Hyderabad (Sind), Quetta (Baluchistan - have not
only the highest density in their respective province but also
contain the former provincial capitals and the main cultural
and educational centres. They may well be regarded as regional
cores considering the fact that these provinces coincide more
or less to distinct cultural units. Their actual role in
politics since independence is considered in Part IV.
Table 30
Urban Population in West Pakistan
Urban Population as
























(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)
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In West Pakistan urban population has generally increased
at a faster rate than rural population and in three districts
of Baluchistan, Sibi, Mekran and Kharan, the percentage of the
latter actually decreased between 1951 and 1961. Whether
greater urbanization during this period in West Pakistan has
been a direct result of industrialization or not is a dabatable
point, but if urbanization is considered as an indicator of
modernization in any way then East Pakistan has certainly been
lower on the scale than most of West Pakistan. Thus to bring
about parity between the two wings urban expansion in the
eastern one must go on at a much faster rate than has so far
been achieved. Pig.15 shows the rate of growth of urban and
rural population in both wings of the country on the district
level.
Apart from the differences in the percentage and the growth
of urban/rural population, the pattern of rural settlement
also differs radically between East and West Pakistan. In West
Pakistan rural population is generally located in nucleated
villages with relatively easy access. On the other hand rural
settlements in East Pakistan are mainly in the form of dispersed
hamlets often situated on higher ground along rivers and the
number of compact villages is small except in the Ghittagong
Hill Tracts and Sylhet (Ahmad 1968). This wouldmean that rural
population in East Pakistan has been more isolated than in the
western wing making any process of diffusion of modernization
more difficult in the former. However, as seen in Chapter
primary and middle schools are more accessible to villages in
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East Pakistan, at least in matter of distance, but in other
services and public utilities West Pakistani rural population
is definitely better served as shown in Table 31.
Table 31
Distances to Services and Utilities from Villages
in East and West Pakistan, 1961
Percentage of villages at a distance of (miles)s
*
-1 1--5 5--10 10-20 Over 20 Not reptd
E.P. W.P. E.P. W.P. E.P. W.P. E.P. W.P. E.P. W.P. E.P. W.P.
1. 5.5 22.7 20.3 38.0 14.8 21.3 26.1 9.1 21.4 4.1 11.8 4.8
2. 3.1 4.8 24.2 28.5 20.3 26.4 19.5 22.0 23.4 15.6 9.5 2.7
3. 3.5 0.7 13.3 2.0 14.5 1.4 16.6 28.5 0.3 23.4 95.6
4. 9.8 21.0 29.7 51.5 18.4 19.0 23.1 4.0 12.5 1.0 6.5 3.4
5. 36.7 33.2 45.3 38.6 3.9 14.2 0.4 3.1 0.4 - 13.3 10.8
6. 5.1 6.4 35.9 30.9 38.3 42.0 15.6 16.9 1.9 1.7 3.2 2.0
Over 10 miles
E.P, W.P.
7. 20.2 7.8 25.8 21.6 16.4 22.4 32.8 43.8 7.0 5.1
8. 17.6 32.0 26.2 20.3 16.4 13.2 30.1 23.4 9.8 21.0
9. 28.1 32.9 32.1 21.0 13.7 18.3 18.4 23.1 7.8 4.8
0. 23.5 14.6 50.4 49.9 16.4 25.1 6.6 9.8 3.1 0.7
1. 0.8 4.8 5.8 20.7 14.1 24.1 68.0 47.1 11.3 3.4
(Govt, of Pakistan, C.S.O., National Sample Survey (Third Hound),
1961)
*1.Metalled Road 6.Police Station
2.Railway Station 7.Library
3.Steamer Station 8.Radio




Besides the differences Between urban/rural population as
discussed above, there are other differences on some of which
statistical evidence is available but on some no data exists
and reliance has to be placed on observation. There are two
important demographic factors which should be taken into account
here: age structure and sex ratio. In both of these, urban and
rural populations differ from each other in both parts of the
country. Generally speaking urban population in both the wings
has a higher percentage of the more productive age group i.e.
between 10 and 40 years (Table 32).
Table 32
Age Structure of Total and Urban Population
by Sex in Bast and West Pakistan, 1961
Age groups as percentage of total
0--9 10-• 19 20--39 40-59 60 and over
M. P. M. P. M. P. M. P. M. P.
Total Pop.
E.Pakistan 35.9 38.2 17.2 16.4 26.9 27.7 15.5 12.9 5.5 4.8
W.Pakistan 31.9 33.8 19.0 18.2 26.8 27.7 14.9 13.9 7.4 6.4
Urban Pop.
E.Pakistan 26.5 37.1 19.6 19.9 36.1 27.6 14.0 11.4 3.8 4.0
W.Pakistan 28.7 33.0 20.3 20.8 30.9 28.4 14.4 12.5 5.8 5.3
(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961) (M=males; P=females)
This difference in age structure is undoubtedly because of the
selective movement of people into urban areas from villages in
search of employment and education. Normally a person going
to a city to find a job would leave his family behind in the
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village, if he is married at all, and send money home regularly
to maintain his wife and children. Occasionally he would visit
his home on religious festivals or family occasions. Similarly,
students going to cities and towns for education often find
jobs in urban centres after the completion of their studies
and sometimes marry into urban families. Even if the graduate
cannot find a job he is reluctant to go back to his village
once he has been exposed to city life, thus creating problems
of unemployment and housing. In this way experience of city
life often estranges rural people from their own environment.
This is probably more true of those rural areas which are not
very productive economically. Unfortunately no statistical
evidence is available on this problem of alienation as a result
of modernization.
As a corollary to the movement of people into urban areas,
cities and towns have more males than females. In 1961 the
number of females per 1000 males in East and West Pakistan was
930 and 868 respectively; in urban areas the female ratio was
commonly lower - less than 850 in most places, (Table 33). It
is not difficult to visualize the social and political problems
created in urban areas by this uneven distribution of male/
female population. It is difficult, however, to find out the
main causes for the lower number of females generally in
Pakistan - higher female mortality may be the main reason but
no reliable figures are available - but the effect of partition
and the subsequent transfer of population have probably been
quite important. In the welter of post-independence movement
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Table 55




















































(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)
123
of people men probably fared better than women. In that case
the predominantly male nature of the refugee population would
have increased the male ratio of the overall population. Thus
West Pakistan, which received the bulk of refugees, has fewer
females per 1000 males than East Pakistan. As a result of
resettlement the disparity between the sexes showed some improve¬
ment in 1961 over 1951 figures. In urban areas, however, this
disparity is expected to persist as the cities continue to grow
and draw in population from rural areas. The proportion of
men to women is generally higher in those cities and towns
which have either experienced rapid growth or contain military
cantonments. Bast Pakistani cities and towns have on the whole
an even greater proportion of male population and therefore
the differences between rural and urban areas are greater in
that wing. This could be due to the relatively less favourable
economic conditions in East Pakistani cities which force more
migrants to leave their families back in their homes (Ahmad
op.cit.).
Internal migration. Movement of people between all parts of
the country is unrestricted, as it was before independence, and
the government does not collect and publish figures on permanent
or temporary migration between districts or even provinces.
The censuses do, however, contain some data which, with some
limitations, can be used to assess the extent and direction
of migration on the district level. Thf.se data/^k» on the basis
of birth places of the inhabitants in each district and presents
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two major difficulties when used to ascertain migration.
Firstly, every individual was enumerated in the district where
he happened to he on the date of the census and, if this was
not his birthplace, no clue was given as to whether he was a
permanent or temporary migrant, or if he had moved more than
once since the previous census. Secondly, all the refugees
who had come in after independence were listed under the
general heading 'born elsewhere in the sub-continent' and
their movements after coming into Pakistan were not revealed.
Their children who were born in Pakistan were listed under the
district of their birth and their number could not be separated
from the local inhabitants born in the same district.
Similarly no information is available about the origin of the
refugees, hence no indication of their mother tongues. However,
with these limitations in view, a fairly detailed picture of
internal migration can be construed if the actual numbers
involved are not of great concern.
Voluntary migration, as a general rule, is motivated by
economic interests which can be both negative and positive.
As an example of the former, when people from depressed areas,
like drought or flood affected rural districts, move to other
areas, urban or rural, in search of better opportunities the
motive may be called negative. It is positive when movement
takes place as a result of definite attraction by urban
employment or agricultural expansion. This negative push and
positive pull can often combine to induce people to leave their
homes and go to other areas. So, an outflow can be expected
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from rural areas particularly those where economic prospects
are not favourable and from densely populated regions where
pressure of population is comparatively higher. The inflow
would then he expected into urban centres particularly those
with industrial expansion or rural areas with greater scope
for agricultural expansion. Thus migration is a useful index
of the economic status of different areas and can be correlated
with other distributions like industrialization, irrigation etc.
Migration, however voluntary it may be, is affected by govern¬
ment policies in land grants, industrial and government employ¬
ment and so on. Besides economic implications, migration is
also an indicator of cultural intermixing and can provide some
insight into the degree to which different regions come into
contact with eachcother and how this contact affects the
political life of the state. Contact between cultural groups
can lead to better mutual understanding and certainly isolation
rarely brings about cohesion. However, depending on the
particular nature of the contact it can also cause conflict,
even violence.
Contact between East and West Pakistan measured in terms
of human beings born in one wing and living in the other showed
a rapid rise between 1951 and 1961, Persons born in West
Pakistan but living in the eastern wing increased by 70 per cent
during the ten years and those born in the East and enumerated
in West Pakistan jumped by more than four times (Appendix XV).
However, the actual number of persons involved in this exchange
still remains very small because in East Pakistan the persons
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born in the western wing were only 0.03 per cent of the total
population, and those from East Pakistan counted in the western
wing formed 0,08 per cent of the population of West Pakistan.*
These percentages would "be still lower if it was known how
many of those "born in West Pakistan and counted in East
Pakistan were not West Pakistanis, "but were actually children
of East Pakistanis who happened to "be in the western wing at
the time of their "birth, and vice versa. Considering also the
fact that those who undertake inter-wing movement are mostly
government officials and "businessmen it "becomes clear that
there has "been little contact between the two wings of the
state at the level of common man. Obviously distance and the
physical separation of the two parts is the major cause for
this lack of contact but other factors, social and economic,
have also played their parts. This problem of the relative
isolation of East and West Pakistan from each other has been
the main hindrance in evolving a sense of nationhood and is the
root of many political ills. It is difficult to see how this
problem can be overcome to any significant degree in the near
future.
Within East Pakistan high densities of population, slow
industrialization and urban growth, little scope for agricul¬
tural expansion and meagre means of transportation have not
left much room for inter-district movement. Before independence
there was some outflow from the East Pakistan area to the
upper Brahamputra valley and the tea estates of Assam (Davis
op.cit.; Spate and Learmonth 1967) but this possible outlet
* It is thought that a considerable number of these were officials
from one province posted in the other, and their families.
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for the densely populated districts of the delta was cut off
"by partition in 1947. Thus, as Appendix XVI and Pig. 16 show,
the percentage of persons involved in inter-district migration
has been relatively small. Prom none of the districts has more
than 10 per cent of the population moved out, in fact in 14
out of the 17 districts less than 5 per cent of the inhabitants
have migrated to other districts. The general trend of
whatever migration there has been is from high density areas
to those with comparatively low densities. The districts
which have lost the highest percentage of population as a result
of migration are those of Noakhali and Oomilla, two of the
most densely populated. It is an unfortunate fact that in East
Pakistan the potential advantages of having a culturally
homogeneous population are largely lost through a lack of
greater mobility mainly because of economic backwardness and
stagnation. The slower rate of industrialization and of urban
growth, and the difficulty of movement, besides the social
factors which keep people tied down to their homes, have
discouraged the pull of urban employment, even though the push
by rural poverty has been very strong.
Though mobility in West Pakistan has been lower than in
some Western countries, inter-district migration has taken
place at a greater scale than in East Pakistan. This migration
has been of two types: a) from rural areas to urban centres
because of industrial growth particularly after independence;
b) from rural to rural areas as a result of new irrigation
schemes. The first type of migration started on an appreciable
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Fig. 1&. Inter-district migration, 1961.
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scale in the post-independence period when industrial and
commercial expansion was undertaken as a result of various
development plans. Before independence industries were mostly
concentrated in areas which went to India after partition and
the areas that constituted Pakistan were predominantly
agricultural and primary producing. The history of the second
category of migration dates hack to the early twentieth
century when new canal irrigation schemes were undertaken in
central Punjab, This process of opening up new areas for
agriculture, popularly called 'canal colonies', gradually
moved south and westward down the Indus valley and is still
going on, though the ultimate limit of cultivable area is
coming nearer. This steady advance of irrigation has drawn
in agricultural population from eastern and northern districts,
a trend which is visible from Pig.17. Figures in Appendix
X3T, which are plotted on Pigs.16 and 17, clearly tell the
difference in the extent of internal migration in both wings
of the country.
In West Pakistan there are eleven districts, out of a
total of 45, in which more than 10 per cent of the population
born there were enumerated in other districts. Table 34 gives
the number of districts according to the percentage of
population born outside their boundaries in both the wings.
In West Pakistan most of the districts in the first category
of Table 34 are situated in Baluchistan and N.W.F.P., or in
those parts of Sind and Punjab where because of a lack of
irrigation agriculture has not been so much developed.*
* Generally the trans-Indus districts have seen little
irrigation compared with those east of the river.
Sources Census l$6l.




Districts and their Population by Birth Places
-i 9^1
Number of Districts
Born outside the district
as a of total population East Pakistan West Pakistan
2. 10.0 to 20.0
3. 20.1 to 30.0
4. 30.1 to 40.0
5. More than 40.0
Total










(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)
The figures on which this table is based also include all the
persons born outside the boundaries of Pakistan who were mainly
refugees from India,* and since most of the refugees came into
West Pakistan, rather than East Pakistan, the districts in the
western wing would naturally have shown a higher proportion of
in-migrants. Moreover, these refugees who had already been
uprooted from their homes, kept wandering about the country,
often changing their residence before settling down and thus
rather inflated the migration figures in both the censuses.
In order to remove the effect of these refugees, to a certain
extent, Table 35 gives the gain or loss in each district as a
result of internal migration both including and excluding those
born outside Pakistan, In both cases the general trend of
* There were some other persons born in Afghanistan, Iran and
other countries but their number was relatively small.
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gable 35
Internal Migration as Gain or Loss
Percentage of Total Population, 1961
(a = including born in all
District (a ) (b)
IN . \ i . P • Jr •
Hazara - 2 0 - 2 8
Mardan + 0 3 - 0 4
Peshawar +27 4 +25 2
Kohat - 7 4 - 7 7
D. I.Khan + 0 3 - 1 2
Bannu -68 0 -68 7
Pun.i ab
Campbellpur - 6 8 - 7 9
Rawalpindi + 9 4 + 1 1
Jhelum - 7 1 - 9 8
Gujrat + 0 5 - 6 7
Sargodha +13 0 + 1 7
Mianwali + 6 3 - 0 3
Lyallpur +28 6 - 2 5
Jhang + 6 5 - 2 7
Lahore +26 7
Gujranwala +19 1 - 0 8
Sheikhupura +46 8 +23 9
Sialkot + 5 4 -11 9
D.G. Khan - 0 1 - 2 9
Muzaffargarh + 10 9 + 3 7
Multan +21 9 + 1 8
Sahiwal +26 9 + 0 9
Bahawalpur + 17 7 + 5 7
Bahawalnagar +36 6 + 8 9
R,Y.Khan +22 9 + 1 2 8
Sind
Jacobabad + 4 4 + 3 2
Sukkur + 9 0 + 0 8
Larkana + 4 6 + 1 7
Mawabshah +13 7 + 5 6
Khairpur + 10 0 + 5 1
Hyderabad +23 6 + 3 9
Dadu + 4 3 + 0 4
Tharparkar + 9 3 + 0 1
Sanghar +24 7 + 11 2
Thatta + 1 7 + 0 1
; b = born only in Pakistan)
District (a) (b)
Karachi +56.2 + 13.2
3aluchistan
Quetta + 4.5 — 2.6
Sibi 7.3 5.2
Loralai + 5.7 + 4.5
2hob + 3.4 + 2.2
Chagai - 2.4 - 4.1
Kalat — 2.4 — 2.9
Makran — 10.2 £ 10,8
Kharan — 4.8 — 4.9
Lasbela + 4.4 + 4.0
i<ast Pakistan
Dinajpur + 9.0 + 4.4
Rangpur + 6.0 + 3.8
Bogra + 0.3 — 0.7
Raj shahi + 5.6 + 2.4
Pabna — 3.3 — 3.6
Kushtia + 8.2 + 0.4
Jessore + 5.4 + 3.4
Khulna + 4.6 + 3.0
Bakerganj — 1.2 — 1.2
Mymensingh - 1.5 - 1.6
Dacca + 3.0 + 1.0
Paridpur - 1.8 - 2.1
Sylhet + 3.5 + 2.8
Comilla — 4.1 — 4.3
Noakhali — 8.5 — 8.5
Chittagong 2.9 + 1.7
C.H.Tracts + 10.1 + 9.5
(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961 )
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migration is the same i.e. from northern ana eastern districts
south and westwards down the Indus valley to canal colonies
and industrial centres. The only reverse trend is that of
movement from L.I.Khan division of II.W.P.P. northwards into
Peshawar division where industry and agriculture have experienced
greater expansion. Baluchistan, which is mostly an arid rocky
upland with little scope for agricultural development, has
not attracted any great number of migrants (Pig.17) and because
of its low overall population relatively fewer people from it
have entered other areas. The main areas of in-migration are
southwest Punjab, Bind, Karachi and industrial centres in
central Punjab; of out-migration N.W.P.P., northern mountainous
districts and eastern densely populated ones of Punjab, and
Baluchistan. Punjab has also received disproportionately higher
numbers of refugees who, in 1961, were distributed thus:
Punjab 69.43; Karachi 13*46; Bast Pakistan 10.07; Sind 6.44;
N.W.E.P. 0.47; Baluchistan 0.13. It is clear from Table 35
that Sind is the only province in which all districts have
gained population as a result of migration irrespective of the
refugees from India who, when included in column (a), further
increase the gain. This is because of the more recent canal
colonies in that province and new areas still being won for
cultivation. Canal colonies of central Punjab, which were opened
up earlier, are showing signs of saturation with the resultant
onward movement to new projects, for example the district of
L.G.Khan is expected to show a rise of in-migration in the next
census because new areas are still being colonized which are
attracting people from eastern districts.
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Table 36
Percentage Distribution of Persons Born in Different Areas,
1951 and 1961
(a = 1951j b = 1961 )
Enumerated in
























































































(Sources Census of Pakistan, 1961 )
To asses s the relative mobility of the people in various
provinces Table 36 gives percentage distribution of persons
bom in different areas. The most mobile people have been those
born in the Frontier Province and Baluchistan (Table 36). In
both of these provinces most of the land is rocky and mountainous,
unfit for agriculture, and industries are relatively few. This
explains sufficiently why a greater proportion of people from
these areas have moved out to more promising agricultural areas
of Sind and Punjab, and to industrial Karachi. Though only
about 2 per cent of those born in the Punjab had gone out to
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other areas, they far exceed migrants from other areas in actual
numbers because the total population of Punjab was more than
half that of West Pakistan in 1961. These people have mostly
gone to Sind as cultivators in the canal colonies or to Karachi
for industrial and commercial employment. Though there are
JUi >
no statistics available to substantiate it is generally
believed that Punjabis, when they go to other areas, urban or
rural, have a better economic status than the comparable local
population. They are better cultivators, as their record in
the canal colonies shows, usually have some money to invest
because of their better economic background and secure better
jobs as a result of their better education. All these factors
have generated feelings of hostility against Punjab, particularly
in Sind, which have been reflected in politics at a number of
times.
Sindhis, with the exception of East Pakistanis who have
problems of distance and transport, are the most immobile
people as less than one per cent of them have been enumerated
outside their province. Even Karachi, which has attracted
people from all over the country and was the administrative
capital of Sind province till 1947, had in 1961 only less than
half of one per cent of the population born in Sind. This
extremely insular nature of the people of Sind has its roots
in the social and economic character of the province. The
people have been under the control of big landlords and
religious leaders, and the number of owner-cultivators compared
to Punjab has been small. These latter are the people who
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generally have a motive to better their lot and are independent
enough to go wherever they think they can achieve their
objectives. Such people have been few in Sind. This character
of Sind ties in with other cultural characteristics, some of
which have been discussed earlier. Together with the fact
that there is a considerable proportion of people from outside
the province whose economic status is higher than that of the
majority of the local population it has made Sind a politically
sensitive area.
It is difficult to say what the effect has been of the
administrative unification of West Pakistan upon the pattern
and degree of internal migration. This one unit had been in
operation for only five years when the last census was taken
in 1961. However, 1961 figures showed a general increase in
the movement of people within West Pakistan, as well as that
between the wings. Nevertheless, this increase was nowhere
drmatic and even by 1961 inter-provincial movement of people
was relatively small. Prom none of the provinces more than 8
per cent of the people had moved out, even in West Pakistan
where means of transport and economic opportunities are relatively
better. Though there is no measure which prescribes a minimum
amount of intermixing to evolve a homogeneous nation, 8 per
cent is clearly a small and inadequate amount; there is a greater
movement across international borders in some parts of the world.
Urban Areas. Urban population in Pakistan has expanded at a
faster rate than rural population, particularly in West Pakistan
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(Tables 28 and 30)» There are two reasons for this growth.
The influx of refugees after partition increased the population
of cities and towns, especially that of the larger ones, because
some of the refugees already came from urban areas (the Muslims,
for example, were largely urban in the United Provinces) and
preferred to settle in cities and towns. Many of those who
originally came from rural areas also decided to stay on in
cities after they had experienced city life in the emergency
refugee camps which were located in urban centres. This sudden
increase in the population of cities and towns put a great
strain on housing, services and employment. After this initial
increase in urban population the growth was continued as a
result of the establishment of industries and expansion of trade
and commerce. G-unnar Myrdal, in his book 'Asian Drama' (1968),
talking generally of urbanization in South Asia does not consider
urban growth to be a result of economic development and the
I attraction of cities, but rather of the poverty of rural areas
and peoples' attempt to escape from it. He writes:
"Urbanization is thus more a reaction against the lack of
vigorous economic growth than a response to rising levels
of income per head. Indeed, much of it is due to factors
inhibiting economic development, such as civil wars,
instability, and crop failures, as well as to excessive
rates of population growth. Instead of standing as symptom
of growth, as it was in the West, urbanization in South
Asia is an aspect of continued poverty" (ibid. p.471).
It is true that rural areas generally have not experienced any
appreciable economic development, some areas have actually
undergone stagnation, yet it is difficult to see how this
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assertion is entirely true in the case of Pakistan. If
Myrdal's analysis applied correctly to all areas then East
Pakistan, where rural areas are more subject to population
pressure, floods, drought, and other natural calamities,
should have experienced a greater urban growth than it actually
has. And in West Pakistan some of those districts in which
rural areas are economically better off should not have
experienced rapid growth of urban population. In support of
his argument, Myrdal refers to the increase in urban population
in the Indian Punjab as a result of partition and migration
(ibid, fn.2, p.471 ). It is true that the influx of refugees
brought an increase in the population of cities but in Pakistan,
as probably in India too, urban growth was higher between 1951
and 1961 than in the preceding decade. Urban population in
West Pakistan rose by over 60 per cent between 1951 and 1961,
as against about 50 per cent between 1941 and 1951. And most
of the refugees had entered the country by 1951. In East
Pakistan the comparable figure for the latter decade was 45.1
per cent, and that of 1941-51 about 18.5 per cent. However,
economic considerations will be taken up more fully in Part
III; in this chapter the interest is in the composition of urban
population according to origin.
The population of some selected cities and towns in all
the provinces of Pakistan is given in Table 38 according to
the origin of birth in both the censuses. It is at once clear
from this table that cities and large towns are more heterogeneous
than their corresponding districts. In East Pakistan all the
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cities and large towns, with the exception of Saidpur, are
predominantly Bengali with a comparatively higher proportion
of persons born in the same district. In West Pakistan there
refugees from India, and those born in the same district are
relatively less important. Within West Pakistan, urban areas
of the Frontier Province stand out prominently as there is a
greater $&&&&*&&$& of persons born in the same province and
district, and the of those born outside, particularly
of refugees, is relatively low. In all other areas of West
Pakistan the refugee element is strong; in 1951 the refugees
formed a majority in many urban areas but by 1961 their
had decreased all over the country. However, this does not mean
that now the refugees are in a minority in cities and towns
because the census figures do not reveal the number of children
born to refugees after they had come into Pakistan. Bast
/T/U
Pakistani cities have generally lower gawe-MTfcafegsgi of those born
outside Pakistan because that wing received only about 10 per
cent of the total refugees coming from India.
Table 38 also shows that in West Pakistan the trend in
the composition of urban population between 1951 and 1961 has
been towards greater mixing of population from different areas.
Karachi has the greatest mixture, followed by Quetta, and Sind
and Punjab also show an increase in the percentage of people
born in other provinces. However, this increase has nowhere
been dramatic, although the trend towards greater mixing is an
encouraging sign that in most areas of West Pakistan cities are
born outside Pakistan, mostly
138
pulling in and "bringing together different cultural elements.
The crucial question, however, is what is the reaction of local
inhabitants to outsiders? Whether local people resent the
presence in their midst of alien languages and customs, or has
cultural fusion taken place in urban areas? The answer is by
no means easy and no generalizations can be made about this
highly complex human problem. In the light of actual experiences
since independence some explanation of these questions will be
sought later. In East Pakistan the situation is different.
Here the trend has been towards a decreasing proportion of
persons born outside the province. It is natural that the
number of those born outside Pakistan should gradually decrease
as the number of original refugees goes down - it has also
happened in West Pakistan - but a diminishing percentage of
people born in West Pakistan in many East Pakistani cities and
towns is not a good sign for national integration. Between
the two censuses cities and towns in East Pakistan have become
more 'Bengali' which means their cultural insularity has
increased. In West Pakistan although there is not much
substantial difference between the two census years, the
increase in the percentage of those born in the same province
has been at the cost of those born outside Pakistan, and not
of those from other provinces within the state.
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Table 33
Population of Some Selected Cities and Towns
by Birth Places, 1951 and 1961
(a = 1951; b = 1961)
Percentage of Population born in;
Cities/ Same East Vvest Outside

































































































































Percentage of Population born in:
Cities/ Same East West Outside
Towns Dist. Pak. Pak. NWFP Pun.i. Sind Balu. Kara. Pak.
Sind
Sukkur (a) 37.33 0.03 45.00 0.64 3.77 39.05 1.15 0.30 54.97
(b) 54.81 0.02 66.26 1.05 5.61 57.37 1.41 0.82 33.72
Shikarpur
(a) 59.92 - 63.97 0.10 0.76 61.34 1.59 0.18 36.03
(b) 72.40 0.02 79.35 0.49 1.74 74.97 1.78 0.37 20.62
Hyderabad
(a) 28.37 0.09 35.53 1.03 2.49 31.18 0.26 0.56 64.38
(b) 44.28 0.10 53.30 1.84 3.01 46.93 0.35 1.17 46.60
Mirpur Khas •
(a) 18.33 — 30.54 1.18 2.30 21.69 4.46 0.91 69.46
(b) 38.44 0.02 53.35 0.87 6.40 43.60 1.37 1.11 46.63
Baluchistan
Quetta (a) 38.76 0.49 71.81 8.03 20.94 0.40 42.23 0.22 27.70
(b) 54.19 0.98 84.51 8.31 18.19 0.61 56.90 0.60 14.50
Karachi (a) 27.34 0.25 40.75 4.27 4.84 1.30 3.01 27.34 59.00




















































































(Source: Census of Pakistan, 1961)
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CHAPTER 7
A iVlEASURE OP CULTURAL IM'EGRAlxOH
This chapter is in effect a summation of the cultural
aspects which have been looked at in the preceding chapters in
which the emphasis has been on finding out the differences in
cultural distributions between the various provinces of the
state. In the present chapter, however, an attempt has been
made to assess how far these provinces have been culturally-
integrated. It has been shown that a common religion, streng¬
thened by certain economic factors, foraed the basis of the
partition of the sub-continent, and although all the areas now
comprising Pakistan are predominantly Muslim, there are
differences between East and '.Vest Pakistan, as well as within
West Pakistan, in the proportion and composition of religious
minorities. However, the role of these minorities in politics
has not been very important, especially in West Pakistan. In
other cultural distributions too it has been seen that the
provinces have their own particular characteristics in which
they differ from each other more profoundly than in religion,
with West Pakistan having a markedly heterogeneous population
corresponding more or less to the provincial boundaries
inherited from British India. The main questions raised in this
chapter are, what is the common ground between these culturally
different areas that make up the state of Pakistan; how far
have these provinces progressed towards national assimilation;
and what are the cultural barriers that are hindering the
evolution of a nation?
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A common religion may prove a strong "binding force, as it
did in the sub-continent, against what is considered a common
enemy, but once independence has been achieved the evolution
of a nation in its full meaning depends mainly on other
cultural and economic forces and not merely on sharing a common
faith and common political boundaries. To live within the
boundaries of one state undoubtedly provides a framework within
which national integration and cultural fusion can become
relatively easier to achieve, but as long as the population
of the state is divided by cultural barriers a coherent,
homogeneous nation cannot emerge. In this regard language is
an important element the unity of which facilitates,and the
diversity hinders, assimilation. Economic and political
barriers hinder the physical movement of people and goods but
linguistic barriers shut up people from each other's idea,
attitudes and experiences. Only when the freedom of physical
movement is accompanied by the freedom of the movement of
ideas can an effective exchange of information take place, and
in that case a common religion can provide an added stimulus
to the emergence of a united national feeling. Otherwise the
sharing of a religion may prove no more effective than the
sharing of common political boundaries. The political unity
provided only by a common religion can often wear off once
independence has been achieved because the negative influence
of a common enemy is then removed and the inherent cultural
differences begin to assert themselves. However, sometimes
the political unity is prolonged even after independence
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because of a foreign threat, supposed or real, but a foreign
threat, especially if it is supposed, is flimsy ground on which
to base the foundations of a nation because it can cease to
exist at any time. There must be some solid, positive factors
for national integration to be stable and lasting.
Karl Deutsch in his search for a theory of nationalism
put forward the idea of "communicative efficiency" or the
"complimentarity of communicative facilities" as the basis of
a nation in its full meaning (Deutsch 1966). He considered the
effectiveness of social communication to be the necessary
ingredient in the process of national evolution and suggested
a quantitative method of studying this aspect of nationalism.
However, his concept cannot be fully used and tested in this
study because of the obvious limitations of data. Firstly, it
is not possible with the existing statistics to divide the
population of the provinces into the nine groups suggested by
him in order to assess their relative degree of national assimi¬
lation. Secondly, his method of predicting the probable growth
of assimilation is also not practicable because there simply
is not enough information available to make any predictive
projections. Pakistan has had only two censuses so far, with
much of the information of the two not being capable of
comparison because of the different definitions used. Only
two sets of census figures are inadequate for making projections
anyway. This being so an attempt has been made here to utilize
Deutsch's basic concept of communication within the limitations
of the available data in order to see how different areas rate
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on different scales of communication and what are the
relationships "between different cultural distributions which
have already been discussed. For this purpose the provinces
have been ranked on the district level according to the various
indices derived from the distributions already discussed. By
A
usingArank correlation method, illustrated by scatter diagrams,
an attempt has been made to find out not only the degree of
cultural integration of different areas but also how this
integration is related to various distributions on the level
of districts. The ranking of districts on the various indices
used is given in Appendix XVII.
The distribution of various languages, both as mother
tongues and as languages of speech, was discussed in Chapter 4,
and the importance of these languages as vehicles of literacy
wa3 seen in Chapter 5. It was also seen that the linguistic
distributions in Pakistan are highly complex and that the
provincial boundaries more or less enclose linguistic regions.
In Chapter 6 the internal movement of people was considered
and it was shown that between the two wings there has been very
little migration. Even within East Pakistan there has not been
much inter-district movement. In the western wing there has
been relatively greater movement in which people from the
Punjab have been more prominent, with relatively little outflow
from Sind. The refugees who came from India have introduced
another cultural element since independence. Naturally the
question arises as to what extent all these factors of movement,
urbanization, literacy and education have brought about cultural
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integration. Obviously the first thing to look at is language -
or communication in Heutsch's terms - but here there are some
serious limitations posed by the form in which the census data
is available. As has been pointed out earlier every person is
counted as many times as the number of languages he speaks, and
there is no way of finding out the number of persons who are
bi- or multilingual and in which languages. However, disregard¬
ing the actual numbers involved, an index of multilingualism




M is the index score of multilingualism;
S is the total number of speakers of all languages
including mother tongues and second languages;
P is the total population.
The underlying assumption is that although the actual number
of bi- or multilingual persons is not known, the index score
is a reasonably accurate indication of how much different
linguistic groups in each district have learnt to speak languages
other than their own mother tongues. The scores thus derived
are given in Table 39 and have been plotted on Pig.18. There
is no information in the census data about the mother tongue
or the origin of persons speaking more than one language. Even
if a correct estimate of the bi- or multilingual persons can be
made no clue exists as to their origin; whether they are local
inhabitants or immigrants; if immigrants, then from which areas.
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Table 59







































































Anyway, if the index of multilingualism described above is an
any sense an indicator of communication between different
S o
linguistic groups, which it is hoped is then it is
important to see the relationships, if any, between this index
and other cultural factors. Table 40 gives the Spearman Rank











































multilingualism and literacy, urbanization, in-migration,
linguistic heterogeneity. Surprisingly, there is no relationship
between peoples' ability to communicate across linguistic
boundaries and literacy (Table 40). This is probably because
of two factors: a) that in the country as a whole a large
of the population is still illiterate, and b) that
a majority of the literate persons can communicate only in
their mother tongues - especially in East Pakistan and Sind as
has been seen in an earlier chapter. This means that in order
to enable literacy to make an appreciable impact on communicative
efficiency not only education must be expanded but also that
- %
it must be imparted in one language. As long as regional mother
tongues are retained for basic literacy linguistic boundaries
will remain a barrier to effective communication.
Urbanization, like literacy, has not made any significant
impact on multilingualism (Table 40, Fig.19 c and d) but the
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Pig. 19. Scatter diagram showing some cultural relationships (Districts), 19^1
Source: Census 1961.
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to the fact that non-Bengali speaking refugees from India, as
well as the few West Pakistanis, in the eastern wing are mainly
concentrated in urban areas. In West Pakistan as a whole the
more rapid urban growth does not seem to have had any effect
on the linguistic differences of their inhabitants. Perhaps
twenty years is too short a period for cities to show/ their
cultural 'melting-pot' effect. The influence of in-migration
on multilingualism seems to be similar to that of urbanization
(Table 40, Pig.20 a and b). The most significant relationship
of multilingualism is with the degree of linguistic heterogeneity
(Table 40, Pig.20 c and d). In both wings of the country the
districts that have a greater mixture of mother tongues are
also generally higher on the index of multilingualism. This
means that even without literacy different linguistic groups
learn to speak each others' language when they live and work
long enough in the same area. The district which is highest
on the index score, Kalat, has three mother tongues, Sindhi,
Baluchi and Brahui, in more or less equal proportions. This
explains the low scores of East Pakistani districts in which
there is a remarkable homogeneity of mother tongues. This may
seen encouraging that when people come into direct contact
with each other they learn each other's languages, but it is
not a very satisfactory means of achieving better communication
because only a fraction of the population, in the cities or
districts where linguistic boundaries overlap, is affected.
And, secondly, this process is rather slow requiring perhaps
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and literacy to overcome linguistic barriers cannot be
substituted. However, literacy along with greater mobility
and mixing will no doubt accelerate the growth of communication.
Within West Pakistan, however, the situation is far from
uniform and rank correlations as well as scatter diagrams show
important differences between the provinces (Table 41).
Table 41
Hank Correlation Coefficients







HWFP Pun.i. Sind. Balu.
+0.71 +0.71 -0.56 +0.05
+0.77 +0.50 -0.05 +0.07
+0.54 -0.11 -0.02 +0.18
+0.49 +0.12 +0.69 +0.73
In the Punjab and the Frontier Province literacy does have a
strong relationship with multilingualism (Table 41, Pig.19 b),
because education in both, especially in the Punjab, is imparted
in Urdu and English, and not in the local mother tongues as is
the case in East Pakistan, Sind, and to some extent in Balu-
chistan. The same isurbanization which has had
a relatively greater effect in removing linguistic barriers in
the Frontier Province and the Punjab. Migration of people into
the districts does not seem to have had any influence except
to some extent in the Frontier Province. In Sind and Baluchistan
linguistic heterogeneity has influenced multilingualism more than
150
anything else (Table 41, Jig. 20 d). This may mean that most
of the hi- and multilingual persons in Sind and Baluchistan
are immigrants from India and other provinces of Pakistan and
that the local population, i.e. Sindhi or Baluchi speaking,
is still relatively isolated by linguistic barriers because
in Sind even most of the literates have received education in
their own mother tongue, oindhi. If this is$&*&&&&% then
Sind, and to a lesser extent Baluchistan, are less integrated
into the larger framework of West Pakistan compared to the
Punjab and the frontier Province. This conclusion is in
accord with the observation made in earlier chapters that
Sindhis have made little movement out of their province and
that immigrants into Sind's canal colonies and urban centres
are economically better off than most of the local inhabitants.
In the above analysis of multilingualism all the major
eight languages - Bengali, Pushto, Punjabi, Sindhi, Baluchi,
Brahui, Urdu and English - were included, but it is surely
unrealistic to imagine that cultural integration can come about
as a result of people from all areas learning all other languages.
It is impossible to expect all people, or even a sizeable
percentage of the population, to become fully conversant with
all the languages, even only the major ones, spoken within the
state. There has to be one language, a lingua franca, in which
people receive education and prepare for effective communication
with each other. However, it has already been shown that
unfortunately there are no prospects, short or long term, for
achieving a unilingual state in Pakistan. The best that can be
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hoped for is a bilingual state and the government policies
have been directed towards this end by declaring two national
languages, Urdu and Bengali, for each wing and retaining English
as the language of the government, higher courts and higher
education. It was also seen in Chapters 4 and 5 that in West
Pakistan persons speaking Bengali and in East Pakistan persons
speaking any of the West Pakistani tongues as their second
language are very few. So, any communication between the two
wings must of necessity be confined to Urdu and English speakers.
Unfortunately it is also a fact that because of various reasons
Urdu is not accepted to any large extent in East Pakistan* nor
Bengali in the western wing*; Urdu is the most widespread
language as its speakers as mother tongue are to be found in
all parts of the country, but relatively few in East Pakistan.
The opposition to Urdu in East Pakistan is understandable
because of the remarkable linguistic unity of the wing and the
attachment to Bengali. In West Pakistan it is the linguistic
fragmentation which is the main problem as the adoption of Urdu
requires the acceptance by five different groups. To make even
the present three language system succeed it is necessary to
assimilate all parts of West Pakistan to Urdu and any resistance
to such a move must be considered a major hindrance to the
* It is the experience of the writer that some East Pakistanis
refuse to speak in Urdu, even though they can, when they meet
West Pakistanis, especially Punjabis, These feelings against
Urdu in East Pakistan have seriously affected the growth of
communication between the two wings.
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cultural integration of the state as a whole. Fig,21 shows
the distribution of Urdu spoken as an additional language
but it does not mean that in the districts showing higher
percentage of Urdu speakers Urdu is accepted among the local
inhabitants because the origin of the Urdu speakers is not
known. Table 42 shows the correlation coefficients between
Urdu spoken as an additional language and literacy, urbanization,
Urdu as mother tongue, in-mlgration.
Table 42
Speakers of Urdu as Additional Language:
Rank Correlations
Correlation Coefficient ( )
Rank Correlation between E.P. W.P. HWFP Pun.i. Sind Balu.
Urdu and:
1. literacy +0.44 +0.56 +0.66 +0.83 -0.04 +0.86
2. urbanization +0.45 +0.43 +0.71 +0.55 +0.31 +0.13
3. Urdu as mother tongue +0.29 +0.39 -0.20 -0.07 +0.79 +0.97
4. in-migration +0,44 +0.40 +0.60 +0.06 +0.85 +0.70
In both East and West Pakistan as a whole there is a positive
relationship between Urdu as additional language and other
factors considered in Table 42 and Pigs.22 and 23 but not a
very significant one. In the case of the provinces of the
western wing, however, in the Punjab, the Frontier Province
and Baluchistan literacy is mainly responsible for Urdu as an
additional language but not in Sind where there is absolutely
no relation between the two (Table 42, Fig.22 b). In the
Punjab and Frontier urbanization is also positively correlated
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Source? Pen Ems 1961. 2
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with Urdu. What then explains the situation in Sind? Part of
the answer can "be gathered from Table 42 and Pigs. 23 b and d.
In Sind, and Baluchistan too, there is high positive correlation
between Urdu as additional language and in-migration as well
as Urdu as mother tongue. This means that more people speak
Urdu as an additional language in those districts where there
is a higher proportion of immigrants and Urdu speaking refugees.
This may well mean that in Sind and Baluchistan the distribution
of spoken Urdu does not necessarily mean that the language is
accepted as in the Punjab, and that whatever number of the
local inhabitants speak it they do so because ofA^is© necessity
to do so rather than voluntarily. This conclusion is supported
by what has happened in the political field as discussed in
Part IV. To achieve a communicative efficiency in terms of
Deutsch's concept it is necessary for a great majority of the
population of west Pakistan, excluding only the Urdu speaking
refugees and their descendants, to become bilingual in Urdu.
The populations of districts with^low percentage of Urdu
speakers and a high one of literates in vernaculars can be
considered to fall under the category 'mobilized but differen¬
tiated' which Deutsch (op.cit.) considers to be the first to
experience national conflict. On this scale Sind comes to the
top of the list with Punjab at the bottom.
Table 43 gives the correlation coefficients between the
index of multilingualism and the percentage of persons in each
district speaking Urdu as additional language. This indicates
the importance of Urdu in multilingualism in East and West
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Table 45
Multilingualism and Urdu as Additional Language
Areas
Rank Correlation Coefficients ( )













Pakistan as well as in the provinces. The higher figure for
East Pakistan is undoubtedly due to the fact that Urdu is
practically the only other language in that wing. In West
Pakistan the complete acceptance of Urdu in literacy and
education explains the high figure for the Punjab. The
Frontier Province also shows considerable positive relationship
but in Sind and Baluchistan the coefficient is not very
significant. Here the local mother tongues are relatively
more important in communication, a fact which may be of value
locally but in the larger interests of the state it hinders the
development of a common language and national assimilation.
If suitable data were available to demarcate the 'assimilated'
population as defined by Deutsch it is very likely that the
position of different provinces would conform to the figures
in Table 43. So, the major obstacles in the way of national
assimilation should be expected in areas of Bind, Baluchistan,
and to some extent in the Frontier Province, because a bulk
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of the'differentiated' population would "be found in those
provinces. These are, however, the prospects for West Pakistan
only; there are no indications that the two wings will he
assimilated to each other's language. There are, therefore,
no prospects for evolving a single system of communication
facilities spreading equally over both the wings.
One of the results of this linguistic heterogeneity in
Pakistan and the resistance of various areas to the adoption
of a common language has been the retention of English as a
compromise for government business and higher education. It
is the major language of communication between the two wings
because in East Pakistan it is more important as an additional
language than Urdu. Pig.24 shows the percentage distribution
of English speakers in all districts. Table 44 gives the rank
correlation coefficients of English with other distributions.
Table 44
Englisn as Additional Language
Rank Correlation between
English as Additional
Language and E.g. W.P. NWPP Pun.1 ■ Sind Balu.
+0.21 +0.81 +0.77 +0.83 +0.39 +0.45
+0.43 +0.66 +0.43 +0.61 +0.73 +0.13




4. Urdu as additional
language +0.75 +0.75 +0.43 +0.94 +0.68 +0.71
English is generally positively related to literacy everywhere
except in East Pakistan which is lower on the scale of higher
education as discussed in Chapter 5, and also in Sind for
Fig„ 24. Distribution of En^li-h. as a spoken
laaguaga (Districts) 5 l$6l ♦
i -
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reasons already mentioned. Urbanization also seems to have
some influence on the distribution of English speakers which
does not need any explanation. Like Urdu, in Sind and
Baluchistan English also has strong positive relationship with
the in-migrants which supports the contention that these areas
are less equipped for national assimilation and have largely
differentiated populations. Urdu and English as spoken
languages are strongly correlated because by far the majority
of English speakers must be educated persons who must also have
studied Urdu at some level, or that those literate in Urdu who
form the 'assimilated* group are likely to proceed to higher
education. Table 45 gives the percentage of total literates
in Urdu and in the predominant local languages in West Pakistan.
The figures clearly illustrate the different character of Sind
compared to other areas.
Table 45
Literates in Urdu and Local Languages




















This, however, does not mean that Sind is the only area
to face national conflict. So far only cultural aspects
have been considered. Economic distributions also have
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an important influence on cultural relations and the
situation is worse where cultural conflict is combined
with economic conflict. The next Part deals with some
of the economic aspects to see how these culturally
diverse provinces of Pakistan are affected by economic
realities.
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PARS III ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTIONS
Chapter 8 Agriculture
Chapt er 9 Industry-
Chap ter 10 Transport and Communication
Chapter 11 Trade and Commerce




Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy of Pakistan
and supports directly an overwhelming majority of the population.
Even with the continuing industrial development the prosperity
of the country will remain dependent on agricultural production
in any foreseeable future. Industrial expansion itself is to
a very large extent ancillary to agriculture because of the
scarcity of mineral resources, and most of the manufacturing
has to be tied-up with the requirements of and the production
in the agricultural sector. Agriculture and other related
occupations employ a large percentage of the labour force in
all parts of the country except in a few areas, like Karachi,
where the concentration of industries and greater urbanization
account for higher employment in manufacturing and services.
Although both the wings are similar in their dependence on
agriculture, there are some important differences in land
tenure and ownership, besides the more obvious differences in
crops and agricultural practices because of the diverse physical
environment. This chapter deals mainly with the social and
political aspects of agriculture, and the pattern of crops,
their production, the problems facing agriculture etc., receive
only brief mention because such topics have been dealt with
more thoroughly in various published works and, moreover, they
are not of much direct relevance to this study. The general
approach of this chapter is the same as in the previous part,
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in this instance to find out the regional differences in the
nature of land tenure and ownership, the pressure of population
on agricultural land and the general level of agricultural
development. In order to do this a large amount of data on
the district level - the total number of districts is 62 - was
gathered and analysed. Frontier states and Tribal Agencies
had to be excluded because no detailed statistical information
is available on them. An attempt has been made to reduce this
large amount of statistical data to a manageable quantity by
devising two indices which have been tabulated and mapped.
This is the first time, as far as the writer is aware, that the
land statistics of Pakistan have been analysed and mapped in
this form, and although these indices may seem a little crude,
this is probably the best that can be done with the information
available. They can, however, be refined as the quality of
various censuses and surveys improves, and even in their
present form, it is felt, they depict a fairly accurate picture
of the conditions prevailing in the state. Much of the informa¬
tion was derived from the 1961 Census, which may seem a little
outdated, but the 1961 District Census Reports are still the
only source which provide information on the district level
in some detail.*
* 1. Useful data is published by various agencies, such as the
Planning Commission and the Central Statistical Office,
on the inter-census period but the figures are seldom given
below the level of the wings.
161
It is a well known fact that Pakistan is predominantly
dependent on agriculture and out of the total labour force
of the country about three-quarters are directly involved in
agriculture. Since independence there has been an increase of
over 40 per cent in the value of agricultural production
calculated at constant factor cost, giving an average annual
growth rate of about 2.4 per cent. However, as a result of
industrial expansion, the share of the agricultural sector in
the G-HP has decreased from 60.9 per cent in 1949-50 to 46.5
per cent in 1966-67. The total GNP itself has shown an increase
of over 80 per cent over the same period. Agricultural develop¬
ment in the two wings has been summed up in Table 46 in the
form of indices for acreage, quantity and value of production.
Table 46
Development of Agriculture
(Base: 1959-60 = 100)
Acreage Quantum Value
East West East West East West
Year Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak.
1947-48 95 80 85 74 85 74
1954-55 100 91 91 88 45 62
1959-60 100 100 100 100 100 100
1964-65 108 109 120 128 118 147
1966-67 109 110 115 135 167 184
(Bource: Govt, of Pakistan, 20 Years of Pakistan
in Statistics, 1947-67)
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In the years immediately following independence till the
middle '50s agriculture actually experienced a little decline
as a result of various causes, mainly decreasing fertility,
dislocation because of partition, stoppage of canal water in
the Punjab,* water logging, fluctuating world prices etc.
However, since the late r50s agricultural sector has been
showing more or less steady progress. As is evident from
Table 46 agriculture has undergone a faster expansion in the
western wing than in the eastern one. There are various
reasons for this unequal development but the main one lies in
the sheer size of West Pakistan. West Pakistan is about six
times the area of Bast Pakistan but contains less than half the
total population of the state. Thickly populated, lowland,
humid East Pakistan is about 65 per cent cultivated compared
to only about 20 per cent of West Pakistan; of the total
cultivated area of over 62 million acres, over 20 million are
in East and about 40 million in West Pakistan. In addition
there are 28 million acres of cultivable waste, 26 million in
West Pakistan could be brought under cultivation if water could
be made available for irrigation but only 2 million in East
Pakistan. The eastern wing has almost reached its limit of
cultivable area and any measures to increase agricultural
* As a result of the partition some canals, which irrigated areas
in the xJakistani Punjab, were cut off from their take-off
points. The resultant shortage of water in the Punjab remained
a serious problem till the Canal Water Treaty was signed by
Pakistan and India in 1960 under the auspices of the ,/orld Bank.
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production must concentrate on raising the productivity of the
existing cropland. On the other hand there are still possibili¬
ties of bringing more land under the plough in West Pakistan
though at an increasing cost in irrigation works and here
again raising of yields, which are some of the lowest in the





Land Use Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan
Total area 234.0 35.3 198.7
let sown area 53.7 20.3 33.4
Current fallow 9.4 1.4 8.0
Total cultivated area 63.1 21.7 41 .4
Forest area 8.6 5.5 3.1
Area not available for cultivation 37.4 5.6 31.8
Other cultivable land 26.0 1.9 IV) •
Area not reported 98.9 0.0 98.9
(Sources Govt, of Pakistan, The Third Five Year Plan, 19 65-70)
Because of this highly unequal distribution of area and
population between the two wings, per capita acreage of
cultivated land is 0.44 in Bast Pakistan and 0.90 in West
Pakistan. Even in the latter the amount of per capita cultivated
land is too small for any reasonable standard of living. In
view of the factthat in Bast Pakistan most of the cultivable
area is already cultivated it is not possible to significantly
raise the per capita acreage of cropland. The acreage is, in
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fact, "bound to go down with increasing population. Even in
West Pakistan growing population, 2.7 per cent per annum, puts
definite limits to the man/land ratio and the present pressure
on land can only be releived by higher yields and diversion
of agricultural labour to the industrial sector.
The differences in the natural environment of the two
*
wings are well known and have been discussed in various
regional and economic texts, therefore these topics are not
taken up here. However, to have an idea of the effects of
these differences Table 48 gives the area, production and yields
of the principal crops in both the wings. Two food and two
fibre crops, wheat and cotton in West, rice and jute in East
Pakistan, are by far of greatest importance. As has been
pointed out the actual production and pattern of crops is not
of direct interest to this study. Note, however, that as far
as the two wings are concerned, the western one is usually
self sufficient and has a small surplus for export even in
food grains while East Pakistan's self sufficiency in food
crops is highly precarious and in most years considerable
quantities of rice and other food grains have to be imported.
Pig.25 shows the percentage of cultivated area and brings
out interesting differences between the regions. A relatively
higher percentage in East Pakistan has already been mentioned
but the map also shows interesting variations within West
Pakistan. Generally eastern and central districts of the
Punjab are as highly cultivated as East Pakistan. Most of
Baluchistan remains out of cultivation because of its hilly
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gable 48
Acreage, Production and Yield
of Principal Crops, 1966-67
(Acreage in 000 acres; production in 000 tons; yield in maunds*/
acre)
East Pakistan West Pakistan
Crops Acreage Produc¬
tion
- Yield Acreage Produc¬
tion
Yield
Rice 22414 9424 11.4 3483 1343 10.5
Wheat 180 58 8.8 13205 4266 8.8
Jute 2165 1143 14.4 - - -
Cotton - Lint 36 2 1.5 3939 448 3.1
- Seed 36 4 3.0 3939 896 6.2
Sugar cane 413 8070 531.9 1605 21635 366.9
Tea 95 29 8.3 - - -
Tobacco 113 37 8.9 177 138 21.2
Rape and mustard 486 102 5.7 1136 200 4.8
Maize 9 3 9.1 1368 578 11.5
Millet - - - 2069 369 4.8
Vegetables 282 665 64.2 285 831 79.3
(Source! Govt.
1947-67)
of Pakistan, 20 Years of Pakistan in Statistics,
nature and a lack of water for irrigation. In East Pakistan
the Chittagong Hill Tracts District is least cultivated, also
because of its hilly terrain, and the southern coastal parts
ofiu.
of Khulna district are covered by raangrove»^cailed 'Sundarbans'•
In West Pakistan agriculture, mainly in the Punjab and Sind,
depends on the Indus River and its tributaries for irrigation.
The River Indus itself passes through three of the West Pakistan
* Maund is the standard unit of weight and equals 82.244 lbs.












Fig» 25. Cultivated Area (Districts).
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provinces, N.W♦P.P., Punjab and Sind. 3o far there has been
no dispute regarding the distribution of its water as West
Pakistan has been under one provincial administration since
1955, but now with the re-emergence of former provinces this
could lead to inter provincial conflict because irrigation and
land management are provincial responsibilities. This point
will be taken up again later.
Apart from the differences in the percentage of cultivated
area, the provinces also vary in their dependence on agriculture
measured in terms of persons employed in agriculture. Table 49



































(Source* Census of Pakistan, 1961)
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Clearly East Pakistan is most highly dependent on agriculture
and the Punjab least dependent. Sind, if Karachi which is
highly urbanized and industrial is excluded, is second only
to East Pakistan in its reliance on agriculture. The relatively
lower percentage of the agricultural labour force in Baluchistan
and the Frontier Province is certainly due to the lower
percentage of the cultivated area and not because of higher
industrialization. The pre-eminent position of the Punjab is
too obvious to require any further emphasis. Here, a high
percentage of the cultivated area (Fig.25) and a lower percentage
of the population directly dependent on agriculture (Fig.26,
Appendix XVIII, column 1) show that this province is relatively
more advanced. In all but one district of the Punjab agriculture
employs less than 75 per cent of the total labotir force; in
three districts the percentage is less than 50. On the other
hand there are five districts in Sind, four in Baluchistan, one
in the N.W.F.P. and fifteen in East Pakistan where the percentage
of agricultural labour is over 75. In five, out of seventeen,
East Pakistani districts agriculture acoounts for more than 90
per cent of the total labour force.
This unequal distribution of agricultural labour and
cultivated area gives different man/Land ratios in the various
provinces. Columns 3 and 4 in Appendix X5/TII give respectively
per capita acreages for the whole population as well as for
the actual cultivators in each district. Because of higher
population densities and greater dependence on agriculture per
capita acreage of cropped area in East Pakistan ranges between
0 100
1 1 Miles
: f> » ~! 0 ^ 1
Fig. 26. Dependence on Agriculturef 1961.
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only 0.23 and 0.64 for the whole population, and between 0.66
and 2.26 for the actual cultivators. In West Pakistan there
are variations from one area to another but on the whole the
man/land ratio is relatively low in Baluchistan and parts of
the K.W.P.P. Per capita cropland is highest in Sind, because
of its low overall population compared to the Punjab, but since
there are relatively less people directly dependent on
agriculture in the latter, acres available to each cultivator
are as many, or even more, than they are in Sind. So, once
again the relatively better economic status of the Punjab is
reflected.
Besides these regional differentials in dependence on
agriculture another important feature is the degree to which
this dependence has changed in different areas. Column 2 in
Appendix XVIII gives the percentages of agricultural labour
for 1951 and a comparison with the figures in Column 1, i.e.
1961 percentages, clearly shows the changes in the dependence
on agriculture, expressed solely as percentage of people
employed in agriculture, in each district. In East Pakistan 12
out of the 17 districts show an increase in the percentage of
agricultural labour. On the other hand only 9, out of 45,
districts in West Pakistan registered a similar increase. This
obviously means that in the eastern wing where land available
for cultivation was already limited an increasing percentage
of agricultural labour has further deteriorated the cultivator/
land ratio, while in West Pakistan, particularly in the Punjab,
the trend is clearly towards a decreasing percentage of the work
force employed in agriculture.
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Land Tenure arid Ownership: In political geography a study of
land tenure, ownership and land legislation is more important
than an assessment of general agricultural development in
economic terms. It not only yields information on the relative
economic levels of the agricultural population "but also about
the influence on politics of the existing land system. In
countries like Pakistan most of the electorate is rural and
agricultural. In any democratic system the nature of land
tenure i3 bound to be reflected in the complexion of the people
elected to manage the affairs of the state. The policies framed
by the government and the legislation enforced directly affect
the power of the landlords, the rights of the peasants and the
overall social and political relationships of the population.
Where new land is brought under cultivation by irrigation, as
in West Pakistan, governmental policies on
land grants are of vital importance in that they may or may
not tend to favour certain groups of population. Sometimes
such policies are deliberately formed to benefit certain sections
of the population and may be resented or actively fought against
by others. All these things are of interest in order to have
a better understanding of the social, economic and political
processes operating within a state.
The present land system in Pakistan is the direct outcome
of the British policies in the sub-continent. The British
themselves inherited the land tenure system from the Moguls
and it was modified to suit the needs of the changed circum¬
stances. On the whole both the systems tended to create a class
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of rich landed gentry with vested interests to resist any
change in the system. After the Mutiny of 1857 large land
grants and 1jagirs'* to those who had fought on the British
side gave control of much of the agricultural land to a
ylcj?e~i,1i 'u
relatively small /fyumnn lap1 of the population. A large
majority of the actual tenants remained landless with little
security of occupancy. However, the system, like most other
things in the sub-continent, was far from being uniform in
all areas.
In the East Pakistan area the first legislation, and that
of most far reaching effects, was passed under Lord Cornwallis
in the form of the Permanent Settlement Act of 1793. Under
this act propriety and hereditary rights in land were conferred
on those who were previously only tax collectors. These new
landlords were required to pay to the government a land
revenue which was permanently fixed, and the landlords were
empowered to collect their revenue from the tenants. The
Act benefited only the landlords, and the government, for a
short while, because of its convenience in collecting revenue
from a small number of owners rather than from millions of
actual cultivators.** The land owners, or •zamindars', rarely
* Jagirs were large estates exempt from land revenue granted for
services to the Grown. A similar system of reward also
existed under the Moguls.
** Lack of transport facilities could also have been a considera¬
tion as it must have been difficult for the officials to
travel frequently to check records and collect revenue.
distributed the land themselves to cultivators "but, instead,
gave it to wealthy tenants who in turn sublet it further down
the line. This chain of subletting had grown so long by the
time of independence that there were often as many as ten
intermediaries between the actual cultivators and the land¬
owners. During the course of years some of these intermediary
•tenants' were given security of tenure either by judicial
decisions or legislation. Nevertheless, at the time of
independence only about half the land was controlled by such
persons; the rest was still being cultivated by hired labour
or sharecroppers. At the time of the enactment of the original
legislation the fixed revenue taken by the government was
estimated to be 90 per cent of the total collected by the
landlords, the rest being the income of the owners and inter¬
mediaries. Over the years, as a result of increased yields,
prices and the value of land, the rental income of the owners
had gone up ten times and the government's revenue, which
remained fixed at the 1793 level, now formed only ten per cent
of the total collected from the tenants. So, the whole system
had developed into an institution whereby the bulk of the
population of Bengal lived under the overwhelming economic
power of a handful of landowners. Since the government was
entitled to a fixed revenue every year it was neither interested
nor obliged to carry out any measures for agriculture development
of the province, least of all to alleviate the hardship of the
peasants. It was partly for this reason that Bengal, industrially
most developed, a majority of the population remained very poor.
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Besides these economic consequences of the Permanent
Settlement there were social and political effects, more
profound and far reaching. It has already Been mentioned
(Chapters 3 and 5) that Hindus proved more adaptable to
.European rule and were in fact favoured by the British. They
readily took to modern education and became predominant in
the civil service, business and industry. Consequently, as a
result of the 1793 Act which conferred ownership rights on
tax collectors, who were mostly Hindus, the predominantly
Muslim peasants came under the control of this new class of
Hindu owners. This vertical stratification of society in the
land tenure system, perpetuated by the Act, came to coincide
with the religious divisions of the population. Naturally,
Bengali Muslims resented the whole system very much and
protested in favour of a change, but nothing could be achieved
in the face of the enormous influence of the vested interests.
However, in 1905 the British Government decided to create a
new province of the predominantly Muslim east Bengal and
Assam, a step which was celebrated by the Muslim population of
the area. Before the administration of the new province could
remedy the injustices of the system the partition of Bengal
was annulled under strong Hindu pressure and the conditions
continued the same till the second partition came with
independence in 1947« After the creation of Pakistan, although
most of the East Pakistani Hindus preferred to remain there,
they were no longer in so strong a position to block any
attempt to change the system.
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The first land reform measure was taken by the provincial
government in the form of the East Bengal State Acquisition and
Tenancy Act of 1950. Under this Act it was provided "to
eliminate all intermediary rent-receiving interests? to acquire
this interest for the state on payment of compensation to
previous intermediary interests in instalments? to limit the
area of tenancies that may be held under the state; and to
distribute the land over and above the ceiling limit among
cultivating families owning uneconomic holdings and landless
agriculturists" (The Third Five Year Plan 1965-70, pp.409-10).
A ceiling of 33 acres per family or 3.3 acres per family member,
whichever was larger, was put on the size of holdings under the
Act. Provisions were also made for the consolidation of
holdings and restrictions put on further subdivisions.*
The actual implementation of the Act proved such a slow
process, especially in the assessment of land, that in April,
1956, the government announced the summary application of the
Act with the details of compensation to be worked out later.
As a result all the rent-receiving interests and intermediaries
were abolished, occupancy rights were given to cultivators and
about 300 thousand acres of land were acquired by the government.
In 1958 the East Pakistan government appointed a Band Revenue
* Under the Islamic Law of Inheritance the property of a person
is divided among all his heirs and this leads to a progressive
fragmentation of holdings which has been a serious problem
for agricultural development.
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Commission to examine the progress made under the 1950 Act.
As a result of the recommendations of the Commission the
ceiling on the 'Kims', or self-cultivated, land was raised
from 33 to 125 acres. The limits of subsistence and economic
holdings were fixed at 3 and 8 acres respectively, though this
provision was later abolished. In 1962 another Land Revenue
Administration inquiry Commission was set up and it was decided
that the implementation of the original Act would be completed
during the Second Rive Year Plan, though the full settlement
operations would take fourteen years. Curiously the Commission
also recommended the stoppage of the consolidation programme.
However, voluntary consolidation of holdings was continued.
It will be some years before the full extent of the effects
of the 1950 Act, and its later modifications, can be assessed.
Some idea of the effects of these reform measures can be had
from the fact that the land revenue receipts of the government
increased from about Rs.* 20 million in 1948-49 to 180 million
in 1967-68. After the abolition of the intermediary rent-
receiving interests the government revenue receipts doubled in
just one year.
In West Pakistan area the land tenure system of the British
was different from that in Bengal. The British had reached this
area much later, about the middle of the last century**, and
* Rupee is the standard currency unit in Pakistan and, at the
current rate of exchange, one Pound Sterling is equal to 11.4 Rs.
** In most of the West Pakistan area the British rule lasted almost
exactly a century wh£le in Bengal, starting with the East India
company, the British influence dated back to the first half
of the eighteenth century.
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by that time they had either realized the defects of the
permanent land revenue settlement or they now believed in the
emergence of a strong middle class to ensure the safety of
their empire. As a result, a system of temporary settlement
was established which provided for a reassessment of land
revenue every thirty years. This system required an elaborate
machinery to keep accurate land records from village to village,
although the practice of land grants and 'jagirs' in reward
for loyal services was continued which also created a rich
class of landlords with large holdings. However, with the
extension of irrigation, land was given to cultivators in the
canal colonies with varying degrees of proprietory rights. As
a result of this about half the land in West Pakistan was held
by big landlords and the rest by owner-cultivators. A large
portion of the population still remained landless peasants
working as tenants with little security of occupancy, though in
some areas tenants had hereditary rights. Out of the owner-
cultivators a majority owned extremely small holdings often
highly fragmented. To supplement their income from their own
small holdings they also worked as tenants and sharecroppers.
The whole system thus created three main classes: landlords;
owner-cultivators; and landless tenants. The percentages of
these three categories of agricultural population varied from
one area to another, but generally there were more owner-
cultivators in the central districts of the Punjab with
southwest Punjab and Sind characterized by big landlords and
tenants. So, here in the West Pakistan area again power lay
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mainly in the hands of a few* who controlled the majority of
the population consisting of landless peasants and small¬
holders, "but the conditions in the Punjab were probably better
than in other provinces. In Baluchistan, of which only about
half was administered, the percentage of owner-cultivators was
relatively larger but because most of the land was unproductive
owners of irrigated land were considerably more prosperous than
others and had greater influence. The conditions in the
princely states ranged from not unlike those in the British
administered districts to extreme feudal systems. The state
rulers were completely autonomous in their internal affairs
as long as they remained loyal to the crown. In the tribal
areas, where British administrative control was minimal, power
rested with the tribal chiefs, and unlike British India where
a person could go to the law courts for the redress of his
grievances, legal jurisdiction was vested in the 'Jirgas',
assemblies of tribal chiefs. Apart from the landlords there
were the 'Pirs', or spiritual leaders, and the loyalties of the
peasant were divided between these two. For his spiritual
salvation he would go to a 'pir', for his more worldly needs
he depended on his landlord. The conditions were, perhaps, even
worse where the local 'pir' also happened to be the local
'zamindar'. However, on the whole the system was probably not
* Even a small owner-cultivator is usually under the influence
of his big landlord neighbour ana is politically no more
independent than a landless tenant.
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so oppressive as in East Pakistan because a majority of the
landlords as well as of the peasants was Muslim, and, however
wide the economic differences between the two might have been,
the social distance was much narrower because of the egalitarian
principles of Islam.
Before independence there was some discussion on land
reforms but the Muslim League had no clearly defined policy
on this issue mainly because the League itself derived most
of its leadership from the landed classes of West Pakistan.
After independence there were some attempts to introduce land
reforms which were successfully thwarted by the landlords who
controlled politics, because any measure of reform was bound
to be unfavourable to them. However, some legislation was
passed by the various provincial governments which either
affected only a minority of tenants or was ineffective because
of weak enforcement.
Soon after the proclamation of Martial Law in October,
1958, when for the first time the government was free of the
influence of landlords, a Land Reforms Commission was appointed
to make recommendations for changes in the system. The
Commission submitted its report on January 20, 1959, and a
month later work started on the implementation of the recommen¬
dations. To the surprise of many people the measures announced
were not too unfavourable to the landlords. A ceiling of 500
acres of irrigated and 1000 acres of unirrigated land was fixed
on individual holdings, but the then existing owners were allowed
to retain an area equivalent to 36000 units of produce index,
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a classification of soil based on productivity, in addition
to 18000 units which they could transfer to their heirs.'*
Further concessions were allowed in the form of an additional
150 acres of orchard and of land used for dairy fanning. The
limits of subsistence and economic holdings were fixed between
12-§—16 and 50-60 acres respectively, depending upon the quality
of land and irrigation supply, and their sub-division forbidden.
All *jagirs' and gifts in the form of land revenue remissions
were abolished and rights of ownership were conferred on
occupancy tenants. Some security to other landless cultivators
was also assured. All the excess land resumed from the land¬
lords was to be offered to the tenants for purchase over 25
years. The landlords were to be paid compensation for the
resumed land in the form of government bonds bearing 4 per
cent interest and redeemable in 25 years. That the reforms were
too mild to bring any radical changes in the system is evident
from the figures released. Because of a fairly high ceiling
on individual holdings the landlords were mostly able to
surrender only the uncultivated parts of their holdings. The
total land resumed by the government as a result of these
reforms was about 2.3 million acres, out of which only 0.7
million were under cultivation - just over 1 per cent of the
total cultivated area of west Pakistan. The rest was either
cultivable waste (1.2 million) or not available for cultivation
*. During the years immediately after independence when there
was a talk of land reforms many landlords transferred their
lands to their heirs and, when the reforms did come, escaped
surrendering any property. Thus they remained as wealthy as
before.
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(0.4 million). Tribal areas of Baluchistan and the frontier
were altogether excluded from this reform programme. However
mild these reforms were they farmed, nevertheless, an important
step in the improvement of the land tenure system and it was
demonstrated for the first time that a government could curtail
the dominant influence of landlords on rural population if it
so desired. The full effect of the Land Reforms is still "being
assessed and a complete picture will not "be available for some
years as the redistribution of land has not yet been completed.
Figures on the ownership of land on the basis of religious
communities show the same provincial characteristics as
observed in the distribution of religious communities in Chapter
3. Table 50 gives the percentages of landowners on the religious
basis (breakdown of figures on the district level is given in
Appendix XIX.. In East Pakistan and Sind there is a considerable
Table 50




























(Source; Census of Pakistan, 1961, Vol.2 and 3)
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percentage of non-Muslim owners who, in both the provinces,
are mostly Hindus; in the Punjab they are only about 2 per
cent and are Christians. Within Sind, however, there are
considerable variations from district to district. Generally
in upper Sind, districts adjoining the Punjab, the percentage
of non-Muslim owners is relatively small, but further south
it reaches over 32 per cent in Tharparker which is only exceeded
by two districts of Hast Pakistan. Because Hindus have this
high percentage of landowners in these areas they are more
rural (Chapter 3) in Sind and East Pakistan than are the
minorities in other provinces.
Even more interesting than this religious aspect of owner¬
ship are the provincial variations in land tenure. Different
categories of land tenure and their percentages in the total
agricultural population is given in fable 51 on the provincial
level (district figures are in Appendix XX).
The first important thing that emerges from land tenure
figures is the low percentage of owner-cultivators in Sind.
This province has been notorious for its landlords owning very
large estates and as a result of this nearly 40 per cent of
the declarations of excess land, filed after the implementation
of the Land Reforms, came from Sind. Of the total 2.3 million
acres of resumed land, over one million were located in
Hyderabad Division alone. Fig.27 clearly brings out the
distinctive nature of Sind in land tenure.
The second important feature of Table 51 is the relatively
large percentage of landless labourers in East Pakistan and the
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Percent of Agricultural nabour Force
Category
Bast
Pak. NWFP Punj. Sind 3alu
1.Non-cultivating agriculturists 1.8 2.4 4.8 5.2 15.6
2.Owning all land tilled 34.7 29.6 27.6 10.2 34.6
3.Owning part and renting part 2.8 7.1 9.4 6.4 5.1
4. Owning part, renting part
and working for hire 6.4 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.3
5. Renting all land tilled and
sharecropping 4.2 17.0 24.9 35.1 15.9
6.Renting land and working for
hire 0.5 1.0 0.8 1.6 0.7
7.Unpaid family help 32.4 25.5 25.9 32.6 22.2
8.Landless agricultural labourers 17.1 17.0 6.0 8.1 5.6
(Sources Census of Pakistan, 1961, Vols . 2 and 3)
Frontier Province. A larger share of Category 5» renting all
land tilled and sharecropping, in the Punjab and bind represent
a greater availability of agricultural land on the holdings of
the landlords. The Land Reforms particularly provided for the
security of these tenants. Because of the extremely small
size of many holdings in East Pakistan a greater percentage of
the population has to supplement its income by renting some
land as well as working for hire. However, there is a limit
to the availability of land in East Pakistan because of higher
population density and cultivators cannot find more land to
hire even if they want to. For this reason 5 per cent of the
agriculturists in East Pakistan find it necessary to woik in
non-agricultural subsidiary occupations against about 3 per
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cent in West Pakistan (Census 1961). The 1961 Census, the
latest available, could not show the effects of various land
reform measures in both wings of the country because of the
slow progress made in their implementation, but the next one,
due in 1971, should show an increase of owner-cultivators and
a decrease of landless labourers if these measures have made
any impact on the whole system.
Pressure of Population: Another important aspect of
agriculture, besides land tenure and ownership, is the pressure
of population on cropland. It has important political
implications because it directly affects, together with other
factors such as industrialization and urban growth, the volume
and direction of internal migration. In order to assess this
pressure an index was devised in which the density of population
was weighted by the amount of per capita cropland available
and the average productivity of land in each district. The
index values for the 62 individual districts were, thus,
calculated as
density of population
per capita cropland X productivity
The productivity of cropland was calculated on the basis of
average per acre yields of the two major food crops, rice in
East and wheat in West Pakistan (data from Ahmad 1968; Zaidi
1966), and the values were reduced to an index in relation to
the lowest yield. This index is given in Appendix XXI together
with the final index of population pressure on cropland which
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relationships "between this map and that of internal migration
(Chapter 6, Fig.16). When canal irrigation was started people
from the central and eastern districts of the undivided Punjab,
where population was more dense and holdings had become small
through sub-division, gradually moved out into the new canal
colonies in western Punjab, After independence this process
of extending irrigation was continued southwestwards down the
Indus valley, drawing in its wake people from older settled
areas. At present the main projects are under way in the
extreme western districts of the Punjab and in Sind. In East
Pakistan too the main direction of migration is east to west,
i.e. from darkly to lightly shaded areas on Fig.28, with the
exception of Sylhet and Chittagong Hill Tracts into which more
people have been moving in than those moving out.
It has been mentioned that the British policy in the Punjab
canal colonies was to give more land to owner-cultivators and
therefore land grants of moderate size, 25 to 100 acres, were
made to ex-servicemen and other groups. Before independence,
and after that till 1955, some Punjabis had obtained land in
the canal colonies of Sind, but because of their relatively
small numbers their presence was not too much resented by the
local population. Up till 1955, when Sind was a separate
province, the Sindhi landlords did not mind the coming in of
Punjabis as they themselves had more than enough land and were
in political control of the provincial administration. After
the integration of West Pakistan, however, circumstances
became different. Not only had the seat of provincial government
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shifted to Lahore "but also the whole administration was now
dominated by the numerically superior Punjab. It was now
easier for the Punjabis to obtain land in Sind as the
administrative control was transferred to Lahore from Hyderabad.
Secondly, although there are no figures available, the
whole government policy of land grants was somewhat partial
during the regime of Ayub Khan. Land grants in the Sind canal
colonies were frequently given to: retired, or in-service,
civil servants and military personnel, fields in which Punjabis
have traditionally dominated, So, this policy, though fair on
the face of it, was intrinsically biased in favour of the
Punjab and, to a certain extent, N.W.P.P. Shis naturally
resulted in a strong feeling against Punjabis among Sindhi
leaders who not only felt frustrated about losing their own
provincial government, but, probably, also saw an impending
erosion of their hold on the vast majority of their tenants
by the presence of a growing middle class of owner-oultivators
in their midst. More of these political issues will be
discussed in Part IV.
finally, an attempt has been made to quantify the degree
of prosperity of the agricultural population and map the results
obtained in the form of another index (fig.29, Appendix XXI).
The best measure to assess the relative agricultural prosperity
would have been, had it been available, the average farm income
per acre for all districts, but no such estimates have been
prepared. Therefore, the sort of data that is available, and
which has been used in this chapter, was utilised and the
jj'ig 29. Agricultural productivity (per capita of
cultivators), Districts, 19°1*
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prosperity of the agricultural population was simply calculated
as the product of acres of cropland per cultivator and of
productivity in each district. This index as plotted in
Pig.29 once again clearly illustrates the relative poverty
of East Pakistan and Baluchistan. Punjab is again prominent
as being more prosperous, followed by Sind and Baluchistan.
However, while Baluchistan's poverty in agriculture is due to
unfavourable physical conditions, low figures for East
Pakistan are undoubtedly due to high population densities and
a relatively higher percentage of population directly dependent
on agriculture.
Pig.29 provides a very good picture of the economic level
of the agricultural population but it does, however, conceal
some vital information. If all the land were being cultivated
by its owners then the map would have been much more accurate,
but since a considerable portion of the cultivated land is
still owned by the absentee-landlords and cultivated by the
tenants it does not take account of the vertical distribution
of income. Of course, there is no information available on
personal incomes, the inclusion of which would make the index
of prosperity more comprehensive. It is not known how much
from each farm is taken away by the landlord and how much left
for the actual cultivators, but if it is kept in mind that in
Sind the percentage of owner-cultivators is relatively lower
and in East Pakistan higher, the difference between the two in




In the preceding chapter it was seen that Pakistan is
heavily dependent on agriculture, but because of high population
densities, particularly in East Pakistan, the per capita
cultivated acreage is low. With low average yields of all
crops the present man/land ratio is not favourable for any
great improvement in the living standards. Although there are
possibilities of increasing the yields, as well as of addition
to the cultivated area, a high population growth rate puts
limitations on any significant increase in the per capita
production of various crops. Any improvement, therefore, in
the national and in personal incomes requires development in
the non-agricultural sectors of manufacturing, commerce, mining
etc. Progress in the agricultural sector too, which is of
prime importance in view of the percentage of the population
dependent on it, necessitates industrial development. Industries,
not only to process the produce and supply the demands of
agriculture, but, more importantly, to absorb the labour bound
to become surplus as a result of agricultural modernization.
So, a study of industrial development is very important in
terms of assessing the relative development of different regions,
and the influence it has had on politics.
This chapter is attempted on the same pattern as the
preceding one but there are certain difficulties. The sources
of data are about the same - population censuses, reports of
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the Planning Commission, the Central Statistical Office and
other official agencies - hut in some respects the industrial
data lacks something compared with agricultural statistics.
In the latter some idea of the relative status of the various
districts could he had from the figures on average yields,
hut no such information is available on industrial production.
Similarly, the land tenure statistics provided information
ahout the ownership of agricultural land and the status of
agricultural population, hut in industries no figures exist
ahout ownership or the status of those employed in the various
branches of industry. It has often been said in Pakistan that
ahout 80 per cent of the industrial and business assets are
concentrated in the hands of only 20 families. However, even
if these assessments are not correct, it seems certain that the
owner/worker ratio in industry is probably more in favour of
the owner than is the case in agriculture, especially since the
land reforms. Nevertheless, from whatever information has been
published, it appears that the average per capita income is
higher in industry than in agriculture; in both the wings the
per capita income of the rural population is about 4 per cent
less than the per capita income for the whole population. This
means that although the industrialist/worker relationships may
not be any better than those of the landlord/tenant, the
industrial worker is slightly better off than his agricultural
counterpart in financial terms, but of course there are wide
regional variations. There is another respect in which the
industrial worker stands better than the agricultural one.
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Because the former is urbanized, concentrated and relatively-
organized through labour unions, he is not only aware of his
problems but is sometimes in a position to at least protest
about them. On the other hand the agricultural tenant,
especially one without any statutory rights, is practically
helpless to do anything about his problems. So, in this
respect industrialization also means, apart from its economic
consequences, an important social change which, with all its
concomitant problems of urban growth, is reflected in the
political life of a state.
Immediately after independence the need was felt for
industrial development in order to relieve pressure on the
agricultural land and to raise the general economic standards.
Since then considerable progress has been made through imple¬
menting various development programmes and establishing a
number of semi-autonomous public bodies to undertake these
programmes in different sectors. Table 52 shows the progress
made in the non-agricultural sector of the economy and its
share in the Gross National Product at constant factor cost.
As this chapter is mainly about manufacturing industries it
is useful to have a brief look at the breakup of the GNP
figures into different sections of the non-agricultural sector
(Table 53). The share of manufacturing has been steadily and
firmly rising throughout the period since independence and by
the end of the Third Five Year Plan in 1970 it was estimated
to reach about a quarter of the total non-agricultural GNP.




Amount Percent of the Percentage
Year (million ruoees) Total GBP Increase
1949-50 9797 40 —
1954-55 12254 44 25
1959-60 14686 47 20
1964-65 21297 52 45
1967-68 26566 54 24
Accumulated increase
1949-50 - 1967-68 169
(Source: Govt, of Pakistan, 20 Years of Pakistan in
Statistics, 1947-67)
Table 53
Bon-Agricultural GNP by Sectors
As percent of the non-agricultural GBP
Sectors 1949-50 1954-55 1959-60 1964-65 1967-63
1.Manufacturing 15.0 o•00 20.0 22.0 22.0
2.Mining and quarrying 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5
3.B1ectricity,gas,water,
and sanitary services 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.3 1.4
4.Banking and insurance 00.8 0.9 1.5 1.7 2.3
5.Transport, storage and
communications 12.6 13.0 12.6 11.4 12.2
6.Trade 29.2 26.6 25.0 24.0 23.3
7.Construction 2.4 3.4 4.4 9.0 8.6
8.Ownership of dwellings 14.2 12.7 12.1 9.5 8.3
9.Services 15.1 14.5 14.4 11.9 10.8
10.Public administration
and defence 10.9 10.1 9.1 8.4 10.7
(Source: Govt, of Pakistan, 20 Years of Pakistan in Statistics,
1947-67)
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and electricity which, of course, are all connected with the
manufacturing industries. The Central Statistical Office index
of the production of manufacturing industries shows an increase
from 29.6 in 1950-51 to 233.0 in 1966-67 with the base year
1959-60 "being equal to 100.0 (20 Years of Pakistan, 1968).
However, the interest of this study lies more in the regional
differences than in the overall progress, but unfortunately no
official publication provides a regional breakdown of the GNP
statistics. In order to assess the relative position of the
provinces one has once again to approach it in an indirect way.
Before attempting a map of industrial development, similar to
the one of agriculture, it is necessary to look into the
mineral and power resources of the various provinces.
Minerals: Table 53 very clearly shows the paucity of minerals
in Pakistan. The whole value of mining and quarrying in the
GNP does not exceed about 0.5 per cent of the non-agricultural
sectors. Nearly all the important mineral bearing areas of the
sub-continent were inherited by India, and Pakistan was left
with a few relatively minor areas producing mostly non-metallic
minerals. After independence considerable attention was given
to the search for new deposits, particularly of petroleum, but
so far only a few exploitable discoveries have been made. The
total known mineral resources at present are far from providing
enough indigenous production to support any large scale
industrial requirements. However, mineral production since
independence has gone up considerably both by the exploitation




Quantum Index of Mineral Production
(Base Year: 1959 ti0VD1 100)
Year Index Year Index Year Index
1950-51 42.3 1956-57 75.9 1962-63 144.7
1951-52 49.1 1957-58 82.9 1963-64 160.5
1952-53 57.1 1958-59 97.2 1964-65 174.5
1953-54 60.4 1959-60 100.0 1965-66 182.3
1954-55 62.7 1960-61 114.7 1966-67 193.0
1955-56 70 w 2 1961-62 124.0
(Source: Govt, of Pakistan, 20 Years of Pakistan in
Statistics, 1947-67)
An important feature of the mineral production is the
highly uneven distribution between the wings. Of the non-fuel
minerals, which include limestone, gypsum, rock salt, glass
sand, china clay, chromite, iron, sulphur, marble, baryte,
antimony etc. in varying quantities, most are found in West
Pakistan and the entire present production, except that of
limestone and china clay, comes from that wing. Many of the
deposits in West Pakistan are located in renote areas (Fig.30)
and their exploitation is therefore not economically feasible.
Table 55 gives the production of some selected minerals between
East and West Pakistan.
Table 55

























(Source: Govt, of Pakistan, The Third Five Year Plan, 1965-70}
and 20 Years of Pakistan in Statistics, 1947-67)
Nig. 30. Non-fuel minerals.
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Fuel and Power: At the time of independence the fuel and
power resources of Pakistan were as meagre as those of minerals
except that there was a considerable hydro-electric potential
which could be exploited; but again most of the potential sites
were in West Pakistan. As any programme of industrialization
depended heavily on the availability of power the government
launched various plans to boost power production in both the
wings. In order to assess the power production various power
sources are taken up one by one.
The known reserves of coal at the time of independence
were located only in two areas of West Pakistan, in Baluchistan
(Quetta and Kalat divisions) and in the Salt Range in northern
Punjab (Pig.31). The total annual production of between 600
and 700 thousand tons was about equally divided between these
two areas, which made up only about one-third of the total
requirements. The present production should be about 3 million
tons as planned in the Third Five Year Plan. There have been
some new discoveries of coal reserves in Sind and the N.W.F.P.,
but most of these are difficult to work and are of low quality.
Only about 20 thousand tons are being mined annually near
Jhimpir in Sind. More important finds of coal have come about
in East Pakistan. This wing was without any known coal in
1947 but since then about 700 million tons of reserves have
been discovered at various places, the main ones being in
Sylhet and Bogra districts. Most of this coal is of good
quality, suitable for coking, but is located at a depth of
1200 to 4000 feet which means greater cost of mining. At
0 100
1 ' Miles
Fig. 31. Power resources.
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present plans are under way to utilize these resources and the
production was scheduled to start in 1970. Goal from these
reserves will go a long way towards meeting the requirement of
power in East Pakistan.
In addition to coal, about 1,000 million tons of peat
deposits, mostly in Faridpur, Sylhet and Khulna districts of
East Pakistan, have also been found, but so far there has been
no production because of the difficulties of transport.
However, a plan has been prepared to produce about 200 thousand
tons of air-dried peat a year.
All the present petroleum reserves are located in the
northern areas of the Punjab, but there are prospects of more
reserves in other areas of West Pakistan as well as in the
eastern wing. Production has gone up from 15.6 million gallons
in 1947 to about 150 million gallons in 1970, but it still is
only about 20 per cent of the country's needs.
Most of the attention in the field of mineral prospecting
has gone to petroleum. By the end of the Second Five Year
Plan in 1965 Rs. 596 million had already been invested in oil
exploration. A further 300 million was planned to be spent
in the Third Plan. In addition an agreement worth Rs. 142.9
million was signed with the U.S.S.R. for the provision of
surveying and drilling equipment and the services of experts.
So far there have been no important new discoveries but it is
expected that some reserves will be found in. certain areas of
both wings.
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The most important mineral discovery, which changed the
whole power situation, was that of natural gas. This came
directly as a result of oil drilling and the first strike was
made at Sui in Baluchistan in 1952. Later more gas-fields were
discovered in the adjoining areas of Baluchistan and Sind.
The interesting feature of the gas discovery lies in its
distribution, and not so much as in its quantity, although the
Sui field is considered to be one of the largest in the world.
In 1955 extensive gas reserves were also discovered in the
Sylhet district of East Pakistan followed by more finds in the
adjoining areas. So, in natural gas at least the two wings
of the country stand on almost equal footing as the estimated
reserves in East and West Pakistan are about 20 and 16 million
million cubic feet respectively. The annual production of
natural gas, which was 80 thousand million cubic feet in 1964-65,
was estimated to reach 200 thousand million cu. ft. in 1969-70.
The discovery of natural gas in large quantities did not only
alter the picture of power resources but also provided raw
material for some new industries. The location of the Bui gas
field (Pig.31) required long pipelines - 347 miles to Karachi
and 217 miles to Multan - to be laid in order to get the gas
to the industrial areas. Prom Multan the pipeline has been
extended to Lyallpur and Lahore and will eventually be taken
to the Rawalpindi/Islamabad area.
Before the discovery of this gas, however, some natural
gas from the oilfields (Pig.31) was already being piped 40
miles to Rawalpindi where it has been used in the first oil
refinery, the only one inherited in 1947.
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Most of the hydro-electric sites lie in the northern parts
of Vest Pakistan where steep gradients and rivers with sufficient
water supply throughout the year have made the generation of
electricity possible. As a large part of East Pakistan is a
deltaic plain the only water power resources are situated in
the extreme southeast in the Ghittagong Hill Tracts district
and it is here that the only development so far has taken place.
Generation of electricity is not only essential for any
industrial development, but is also a good indicator of the
general standards of the population if its consumption figures
are available. In 1947 the total installed capacity of hydro-
electricity was only 10,700 k.w. Most of the cities depended
on small local thermal stations using imported coal. Since
then the electric generating capacity has increased greatly *
by the installation of either hydro-electric stations or large
thermal stations using natural gas. Pig 31 also shows the
location of various generating stations in relation to provincial
boundaries. The total installed capacity of the generating
stations is given in Table 56 and Pig.32. At present the
output of electricity is quite enough for the needs of the
country but with the expansion of industry the demand for power
is expected to rise. The projected schemes for new stations
and for increasing the capacity of the existing ones will,
however, keep pace with the increasing needs. In addition to
the hydro and gas/coal stations two nuclear ones, one in East
Pakistan at liooppur of 70 m.w. and the other in Karachi of 132
m.w. will be completed in the next plan period.
Pig. 32. Electricity (installed capacity), Provinces, 1970.
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Table 56


























(Source; Govt, of Pakistan, the Second and Third Five
Year Plans)
For the distribution of electricity a West Pakistan grid
system is being constructed (Fig.31) to join all the stations
in the wing. The northern section between the Punjab and the
N.W.F.P. has already been completed. A similar integrated
power grid is also under construction in East Pakistan with
the completion of which all the important industrial centres
will be connected to each other. Although there are good
prospects for East Pakistan to catch up with the western wing
in the generation of electricity, the present production in
the former is about only 40 per cent of the country's total.
Within West Pakistan the share of the four provinces in power
production is; N.W.F.P., 16.1 per cent; Punjab, 62.9 per cent;
Sind, 19.8 per cent; and Baluchistan, 1.2 per cent. This share
in power generation is more or less proportionate to the share
of the provinces in the total population of West Pakistan.
However, there is one important fact which must be noted, i.e.
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a high degree of interdependence of these provinces in the
utilization of power resources. Nearly all the thermal
production of the Punjab and Sind is dependent on the Sui
natural gas which comes from Baluchistan. Unfortunately no
consumption figures are available on the provincial level
but it is likely that the Punjab consumes some power produced
in the N.W.F.P. With increasing demand for electricity the
Punjab is likely to become more dependent on the Frontier
Province for its hydro-electricity or on Baluchistan for more
gas to generate power. This integrated development of power
was certainly facilitated by the integration of West Pakistan
into one administrative unit and the break-up into the former
provinces is likely to raise some problems, unless the central
government takes over the whole system.
Taking Pakistan as a whole, despite all the development
in power production, per capita consumption is still low
relative to other countries. According to one estimate in
1960 Pakistan consumed 30 units of electricity per head of
population. By comparison there were 38 units consumed in
India, 92 in Turkey, 870 in Japan, 2083 in U.K., 4159 in U.S.A.
and 5640 in Canada (Ahmad 1964). If similar figures were
available on the district level it would have been much easier
to assess the relative levels of economic development in different
areas.
Manufacturing Industries: Pakistan inherited some of the least
industrialized areas of the sub-continent and very few of the
large modern factories fell to her share. Although Bast
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Pakistan was the main jute producing area there was not a single
jute manufacturing mill within her boundaries. Most of the
cotton from West Pakistan was likewise exported raw to foreign
countries or to mills located in areas which went to India.
Most of the non-agricultural labour was engaged in small scale
craft industries and modern manufacturing had to be started
almost from scratch. Conditions were favourable for setting
up industries based on local agricultural produce, particularly
jute and cotton, and there was an abundant supply of labour.
However, there were some serious problems which did not allow
for an accelerated development, namely a shortage of capital,
of experienced personnel in financial and technical fields,
resettlement of refugees and the general political instability.
Immediately after independence whatever industry there was
suffered a decline as a result of the emigration of non-Muslims
who mistly provided the technical and financial personnel. The
economic difficulties were somewhat relieved in 1949 because
of the Korean War which boosted the prices of cotton and jute,
the main exports of Pakistan, and the country was able to earn
enough foreign exchange to meet the import requirements of
manufactured goods. With the end of the Korean boom in 1950
and a sharp fall in world prices of jute and cotton a rapid
drain of the foreign exchange reserves resulted, and the
government had to restrict the import of consumer goods. The
free import of machinery and capital goods was, however,
continued in order to encourage the establishment of domestic
industries. High tariff restrictions on imported goods, liberal
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tax holidays and other incentives encouraged industrialists
to invest in the manufacturing industries. Despite all these
encouragements private capital either proved to be insufficient
in the sectors where it was invested, or was not forthcoming
at all in such industries which did not promise fast returns.
As a result of these circumstances the government decided to
step in directly in industrial investment.
The first step was taken in 1952 with the establishment
of Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, a public body
empowered to invest in whichever industry it considered the
private efforts to be inadequate. Most of the private invest¬
ment had gone into the cotton textile industry where there
was a large home demand and, with heavy restrictions on imported
cloth, the industrialists were able to make profits of over 100
per cent (The Third Plan). The PIDC, through which most of the
public sector investment has been channelled, prepared plans
to invest in jute, fertilizer, paper and newsprint, natural gas,
coal, iron and steel, shipbuilding, cement and chemical industries.
The establishment of this organization must be considered the
most important landmark in the short history of industrializa¬
tion in Pakistan. The general policy of the Corporation was to
set up industries and then sell them to the private sector as
going concerns and retain only those which were either too big
for private hands or which had special importance for the
country's economy. In 1962 the PIDC was decentralized into two
separate bodies, East and West Pakistan Industrial Development
Corporations, one in each of the wings under their respective
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provincial governments. They inherited the policies, functions
and projects of the parent PIDO.
Another important step was the establishment of an
Industrial Development Bank (IDB) in 1961 which replaced the
earlier Pakistan Industrial B^inance Corporation set up in 1949.
The main function of the IDB was to provide loans to private
investors over medium and long periods. Later the work of
relending foreign loans was also entrusted to the Bank.
A public limited company, Pakistan Industrial Credit and
Investment Corporation (PICIC), is also engaged in the
establishment, expansion and modernization of industrial
establishments. Pakistani investors have contributed 60 per
cent of its capital, and the rest has been subscribed by
American, British and Japanese entrepreneurs. It purchases
shares of public and private companies, as well as granting
loans to investors. It receives loans, for direct investment
or relending, not only from individual countries but also from
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD). In addition to these organizations there are the
Rational Investment Trust - a unit trust organization, Invest¬
ment Promotion Bureau - to act as an intelligence and informa¬
tion service for investors, and several other smaller organiza¬
tions, all intended to help accelerate the growth of industry.
Soon after the proclamation of Martial Law in 1958 a
Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) was set up to
co-ordinate and implement development of water and power-
resources. It too was split into two bodies, one for each wing.
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Later its functions in matters of irrigation were transferred
to the Agricultural Development Authorities, "but it remains in
control of all policies regarding the utilization of water and
power resources and hands over irrigation to ADA only after
the completion of a project.
These are the public/private bodies which are the actual
instruments for the implementation of various development
plans, and the plans themselves and broad policy decisions are
made by the Planning Commission directly under the President.
Till the middle fifties there was no co-ordinated plan for
development and the whole progress in the industrial sector
took place in a rather haphazard manner. The Pirst Pive Year
Plan was prepared for the period 1955-60 but because of
political instability and administrative inefficiency it fell
far short of its targets. The Second and Third Plans for 1960-65
and 1965-70 proved more successful and for these ten years an
average annual growth rate of 5 per cent has been achieved, as
against only 2.5 per cent for the ten years before 1960. The
actual outlay and allocations of these plans are discussed in
the last chapter of this part.
As a result of these efforts industrial expansion has
taken place at a relatively rapid rate and the share of
manufacturing in the G-NP (Table 53) has gone up considerably.
The Statistical Office quantum index of manufacturing is shown
in Table 57. The increase during the Second and Third Plan
periods has been greater than in the years before that. The
value index of manufacturing has shown an even higher increase,
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Table 57
Quantum Index of Manufacturing, Pakistan
(Base 1959-•60 = 100)
Year Index Year Index Year Index
1950-51 22.6 1956-57 79.4 1962-63 159.5
1951-52 26.2 1957-58 84.6 1963-64 181.3
1952-55 36.2 1958-59 92.3 1964-65 201.7
1953-54 47.3 1959-60 100.0 1965-66 214.2
1954-55 60.9 1960-61 118.7 1966-67 237.0
1955-56 73.7 1961-62 138.8 1967-68 261,0
(Bourcei G-ovt. of Pakistan, Pakistan: Basic Pacts. 1966-67;
and C.S.O., Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Vol.17)
from 100.0 in 1959-60 to 302.8 in 1967-68. However, these
indices do not show the share of the two wings in the total
industrial production of the country. Table 58 gives the share
of the wings in some selected industries. Although the share
of East Pakistan in the total industrial production has been
increasing at a faster rate during the past two plan periods,
it is still considerably less than that of West Pakistan. It
has been the declared policy of the central government that
the difference in the industrial development between the two
wings must be removed as quickly as possible, but, in view of
the greater population of the eastern wing, its share in the
industrial production will have to be raised to more than half
of the total in order to bring the per capita value at par with
that of West Pakistan. During the Third Five Year Plan there
was a greater emphasis on removing these inter-wing differentials
and the targets of production set for 1969-70, the last year
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Table 58
Production of some Selected Industries,
East and West Pakistan
















Cotton Yarn million lbs. 22 172 64 454 77 495
Cotton cloth million yards 63 282 49 715 52 715




sq.yds. — 0.09 32 2.8 64.8
Sugar million tons 28 47 77 156 91 318
Tea million lbs. 56 - 62 - 65 -
Vegetable
products
million tons — 13 5 90 6 90
Cement million tons 0.05 0.6 0.06 1.6 0.08 2.0
Chemical
fertiliser
thousand tons - - 72 87 112 105
Paper and
newsprint
thousand tons - - 79 - 78 -
Paper-board thousand tons - - - 24 - 22
Matches million gross
boxes
— - 11 1 10 0.8
Cigarettes thousand mills. 0.4 4 6 14 15 20
Chemicals thousand tons 1 27 5 63 12 89
(Source: Govt, of Pakistan, G.S.O., Monthly Statistical Bulletin,
Vol,17)
of the plan, are shown in Table 59. It can be seen that if
these targets have been achieved the disparity between the wings
should now be less than at any time in the past. However, since
industry still constitutes a relatively small section of the




Third Five Year Plan, 1965-70,








Sugar thousand tons 230.0 410.0
Tea million lbs. 74.0 -
Cigarettes thousand mills. 11.5 18.5
Cotton yarn million lbs. 234.0 486.0
Jute manufactures thousand tons 864.0 56.0
Writing and Printing paper thousand tons 65.0 35.0
Paper-board thousand tons 30.0 70.0
Newsprint and mechanical paper thousand tons 65.0 35.0
Machine tools and heavy
machinery million rupees 102.0 160.0
Chemical fertilizer million tons 1.6 1.4
Chemicals thousand tons 341.0 511.0
Petrochemic als thousand tons 151.0 178.0
Cement million tons 2.0 4.0
Steel (ingots) thousand tons 300.0 900.0
Electrical wires and cables thousand tons 15.0 20.0
Heavy electrical equipment million rupees 30.0 90.0
(Source) Govt, of Pakistan, The Third Five Year Plan, 1965-70
Industrial Labour Force: There is no need to discuss the
distribution of industrial labour force, which includes all
non-agricultural occupations, separately as it is a corollary
to the agricultural labour as described in the previous chapter.
All the districts which are relatively less dependent on
agriculture have a greater percentage of their population in
the industrial labour force, and any map of the distribution
of the latter will be complementary to the one showing dependence
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on agriculture. However, the composition of the industrial
labour, i.e. in the different sectors of industry, is very
important. Pig.33 shows the share of different categories of
industrial population, as well as its total numbers, in the
various provinces.
The most important feature of the distribution of the
industrial labour force as revealed by Pig.33 is that in 1961
East Pakistan, with about 2& times the population of the Punjab,
had fewer persons in the industrial occupations than in the
Punjab alone. The whole of West Pakistan had more than twice
the actual number of the non-agricultural labour of East
Pakistan. Then there are differences in the composition of
industrial labour and West Pakistan has again a considerably
higher percentage of those employed in manufacturing industries
than^fc&^fe^the eastern wing. Within West Pakistan the
inter-provincial differences are as pronounced as those between
the wings. Baluchistan is clearly least developed in terms of
manufacturing industries though, because of its coal, chromite
and natural gas deposits, it has the highest percentage of the
labour force working in mining. In manufacturing the leading
position of tne Punjab is only too obvious, followed by Sind
and H.W.P.P. In Sind the percentage in manufacturing, however,
would have been considerably lower if Karachi was not included.
Figures of industrial production, by quantity or value,
however useful they may be for assessing the regional balance
in industrial development, do not show the significance of such
development to the actual population of the areas considered.
Q<•>•/-. cTiq I C$6.1. a *
Pig. 33. Distribution and Composition of non-agricultural
Labour Force, 1961.
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An increase in the total value of production may not have much
relevance to personal incomes, though it will no doubt be
reflected in the increase of per capita incomes, if it does
not directly involve a significant portion of the population.
For this reason the distribution of the employment in manu¬
facturing is shown in Fig.34 as percent of the total labour
force in each district. Given that average economic level of
the industrial labour is higher than that of the agricultural
labour, this map is a more accurate reflection of industrial
development than the actual figures of production. One can see
the higher level of industrial development in West Pakistan
compared to the eastern wing, and also of the Punjab within
the former. Karachi, of course, is the most highly industrialised
district in the country. However, since these figures relate
to the 1961 Census, some difference in the inter-regional
disparities must have taken place since then as the various
tables in this chapter tend to suggest, but it appears that no
radical change in the employment structure as shown in Figs.33
and 34 will be revealed by the next census. The differences
between the wings in the inter-censal period 1951-61 did
actually widen as pointed out in Chapter 8 in connection with
the changes in the percentage of agricultural labour. It was
shown that while in the western wing the percentage of those
engaged in agriculture decreased generally during the period,
there was an increase in most of the East Pakistani districts.
In the modern large scale manufacturing industries, however,
the inter-wing disparity was slightly less as 3.0 per cent of
Source: Census 1951.
Index scores.













Fig. 34. Magnitude of Manufacturing (Districts)f l$6l.
(in terms of employment in manufacturing)
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the industrial labour in West Pakistan was engaged in cottage
industries, against only 1,8 per cent in hast Pakistan.
Location of Industries: Although the government has been
committed to removing inter-regional disparities in industrial
development, its main concern has been to bring about a parity
between the two wings.
"Industrial investment policy as to kind and location
of industry will be pragmatic and rational to the
maximum extent consistent with over-riding Plan objective
of eliminating economic disparity between Last and West
Pakistan" (Third Plan, 1965, p.451).
However, so far as the location of industry on the intra-wing
basis was concerned the Plan is explicit about the maximization
of returns as being the main consideration.
"As a general guide, investment opportunity which offers
maximum rate of return on invested capital will be selected
over alternative investments for the same purpose but
indirect benefits of dispersing industries throughout the
country will be fully taken into account" (ibid. p.451).
Thus, the location of industries in Pakistan has been thoroughly
controlled by the government, especially during the period of
the various plans. Pig.55 shows the location of important
industries and the main industrial areas. Another important
feature (Pigs.34 and 35) is the remarkable concentration of
industries in and around the various provincial metropolitan
and port cities. Within the five provinces the highest
percentages of manufacturing labour is found in Karachi and
Hyderabad (Sind); nahore (Punjab); Peshawar (N.W.P.P,); Quetta







































Source: K.S. Ahmad 1964.
Fig, 35* Location of Main Industries.
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So, the proximity of the administrative centres seems to he as
important a factor as the economic considerations, or, perhaps,
there is an inevitable correspondence between economic and
political control. Only in the Punjab is there a significant
dispersal of industries, though only within the central, more
densely populated, districts, and the position of Lahore
remains prominent.
The economic importance of the administrative centres is
also reflected in Pig,36 which shows the distribution of
employment in banking and insurance, sectors of the economy
which have a very strong influence on the whole investment
policy. In the Punjab a considerable dispersal can be seen
but in other provinces the metropolitan or port cities have
financial predominance. Karachi is "by far the leading
financial centre and in much of the rest of the country it has
an overwhelming financial control. In fact much of the
employment in finance in all the provinces is subservient to
the industrial, financial and commercial interests based in
Karachi, and the Third Plan frankly admits that
"The rapid industrial development in the last two decades
has been accompanied by growing concentrations of income
and wealth in the hands of a few family groups" (ibid. p.450).
It will be interesting to know in the next census what effect
the shifting of the central capital has had on both Karachi
and Rawalpindi-Islamabad.
Total.
Fig, 36. Hierarchy in Financial Control, 1961.
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Labour Relations and Legislation; Labour relations in Pakistan
were governed till 1958 by the labour laws inherited from the
British and by the 'First Labour Policy' announced in 1955.
These laws specified mainly the duties of management towards
labour but their enforcement remained very weak. Since the
areas of the sub-continent forming Pakistan were mainly
agricultural, industrial labour relations were relatively
unimportant. Though some labour unions did exist even before
independence, they were generally weak and ineffective and the
whole situation was very much in favour of the employers.
However, with expanding industrialization and increasing
industrial labour the previous laws proved inadequate. So,
after the proclamation of Martial Law in October, 1958, the
government announced the 'Second Labour Policy', which was to
a considerable extent based on the recommendations and
conventions of the International Labour Organization. This
policy was designed to encourage a healthy labour union move¬
ment and to bring about a general improvement in industrial
relations. Under the policy various new legislations were
enacted. One of these legislations was the Industrial Disputes
Ordinance of 1959t superseding the Industrial Disputes Act of
1947» which provided for statutory investigation, conciliation
and arbitration in industrial disputes. In 1960 works committees
and bipartite bodies on the various regional and national levels
were established to provide a forum for labour/management
discussions. If a dispute failed to be resolved in these conci¬
liation bodies, often presided over by government representatives,
only then could it lead to a strike.
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The Ordinance also established Industrial Courts to which
either party could go for a decision in a dispute, ig&sia the
decision of the court being subject to appeal to the provincial
High Courts. However, this Ordinance was applicable only to
those establishments which employed more than fifty workers.
The Trade Unions (Amendment) Ordinance of 1960, replacing
an earlier Act of 1926, provided for compulsory recognition of
unions by the employers, as well as laying down certain
conditions for the labour unions to fulfil to be eligible for
recognition.
In 1961 the National Minimum Wage Ordinance was
promulgated which provided for the necessary machinery for the
determination of minimum wages but only in selected industries.
In addition there were a number of other legislative measures
directed towards improving the working conditions in particular
industries, e.g. tea estates, mining, road transport etc.
While on the whole these various legislative provisions meant
a betterment in the working conditions of the industrial labour,
the government lagged behind in their proper enforcement.
"It can be stated on the basis of available information
that the industrial relations during the Second Plan period
(1960-65)» looked at in the context of the requirements of
a developing economy, remained far from satisfactory"
(ibid. p.233).
During the period prior to the Martial Law of 1958 there
was an increasing number of strikes and the highest figure
of man-days lost was recorded in 1957 when a total of 150
stoppages involving more than 188,000 workers cost about
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808,000 man-days. With tlie proclamation of Martial Law there
was a sudden drop in the number of strikes "but after the
lifting of the Martial Law in 1960 they again showed a rapid
rise as shown in Table 60.
Table 60
Industrial Strikes
Year No.of Stoppages No.of workers No.of man-days
involved lost
1960 42 25749 78765
1961 54 26503 79191
1962 121 69482 387847
1963 221 221613 1888167
(Source: Govt, of Pakistan, Third Five Year Plan,
1965-70)
Despite all the efforts of the government, which have not been
very successful in the enforcement of legislation, the labour
unions are still very weak and are not in a position to protect,
much less to Improve, the conditions of the industrial labour.
Their weakness is shown by the figures on their number and
membership in Table 61.
Table 61
Labour Unions






(Source: Govt, of Pakistan, Third Five
Year Plan, 1965-70)
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In 1961 the total union membership amounted to less than 5
per cent of the population engaged, in non-agricultural
occupations. Thus, the labour relations in Pakistan remain
heavily in favour of the employers, and one of the reasons for
this is the general illiteracy. Since the employers are
invariably educated they are in a better position to defend
themselves than the workers who, because of illiteracy, cannot
even understand their own statutory rights, much less defend
them before conciliation bodies and industrial courts. They
have to depend in these matters on outsiders who have often
exploited them. The idea of collective bargaining, though
embodied in the various legislative measures, is of little
value to workers in practice because of the lack of enforcement
of laws. The wages, though slightly better than in agriculture,
are hopelessly low and the income differentials between the
workers and owners are high. The retention of the job,
however ill-paid, is often more important to a worker than the
improvement of labour conditions.
"During the Second Plan period the number of trade unions
grew keeping pace with the growth of industry. The same
is not, however, true of their organization and function.
The movement has continued to be weak. The result has
been that the system of collective agreements based on the
principle of bilateral collective bargaining has been
unfortunately rare in the country's system of settling
industrial disputes" (ibid. pp.234-35).
The present Martial Law regime earlier this year announced yet
another 'Labour Policy' under which, apart from the usual
provisions for better industrial relations, for the first time
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in the history of the sub-continent a minimum wage of Rs.120
per month was fixed for all industrial workers. The amount
may seem too small "by western standards but in the context of
the sub-continent where the worker, industrial or agricultural,
has been at the mercy of the employer for a long time, this
marks an important step towards better working conditions.
It is still too early to assess the effects of this industrial





The role of transport and communications is vital in all
spheres of human activity and, therefore, has received due
attention in various branches of geography. Apart from the
importance of the means of transport and communications in the
physical movement of goods and people, as well as of ideas and
information, from one place to another, access is essential
to the political control of an area.* It is difficult to
extend effective political control over an area which is
isolated, has poor transport facilities and is not easily
accessible from other parts of the state, especially from the
seat of the central authority. However, only occasionally are
networks of roads and railways constructed for political
reasons; in most cases such construction is motivated by
economic interests. For this reason thinly populated and
economically less productive areas which are not capable of
generating enough trade and movement tend to be poorly served
by roads and railways, and thus are, especially if they are
marginally situated, not fully integrated into the political
framework of a state. If international boundaries do not form
* Zaidi, I.H. in 'Toward a Measure of the Functional Effective¬
ness of a State: the Case of West Pakistan', A.A.A.G.,
vol.56 (1966), has shown the importance of accessibility in
the functional effectiveness of an area.
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an effective economic and cultural "barrier then such areas may
often form a potential threat to the integrity of the state by
having "better economic and cultural links with a neighbouring
state. It is therefore useful to study the network of
transport lines and means of communication in order to assess
how different areas within a state are linked to each other in
economic and cultural terms.
Besides indicating the degree of integration of different
parts of a state, transport and communication networks are
also a good indicator of the economic development of different
areas. Despite all the development in transport technology,
the physical nature of an area does not only influence the
alignment and cost of transport lines but also the economic
justification of such cost. That is to say that if the scarcity
of resources of the area has restricted economic activity
within it there will not be enough movement of goods and people
to justify the expenditure on the construction and maintenance
of roads or railways. Thus better transport facilities
generally mean relatively higher economic standards and higher
population density. In some cases, however, the construction
of roads and railways is necessitated by political and strategic
reasons, as for example in the north western parts of the sub¬
continent during the British period, which may also bring about
some increase in the economic activity. So, there is a two-way
relationship between the economic and political nature of an
area and the lines of transport and communications.
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The territorial division of Pakistan has created enormous
problems of transport and communication between the two widely
separated parts of the state. The actual distance of about
a thousand miles between the two wings understates their real
separation from each other considering that the relations
between Pakistan and India have not been friendly. Surface
transport between the two wings of Pakistan through India
virtually ceased to exist some years after the partition in
1947. liven before independence there was no direct train
service between the East and West Pakistan areas. Transport
by sea involves a much greater distance as one has to go round
the Indian peninsula. Air transport is fast but expensive
and again depends on the nature of Indo-Pakistan relations for
rights to overfly India, Otherwise the distance is more than
doubled by flying via Ceylon. The problem of distance also
besets the means of communication - telephone, telegraph,
radio, television, press etc. - and although the advances in
space technology, namely satellite communication, promise
radical changes in telecommunications the problem of cultural
distance between the wings, imposed mainly by linguistic
differences, is likely to remain for the foreseeable future.
Apart from these inter-wing difficulties transport and
communications are by no means free from problems within the
wings. The deltaic nature of East Pakistan has rendered the
construction of roads and railways extremely difficult with
very high construction and maintenance costs. The railway
network which existed at the time of independence was severely
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mutilated by partition. In West Pakistan surface transport is
relatively easier but large tracts of arid mountainous terrain
and thin population still remain isolated. There has been a
rapid expansion in air transport during recent years but costs
place air transport out of the reach of the vast majority of
the population. Although most of the cities in "West Pakistan
are fairly well connected, means of transport in rural areas,
particularly west of the Indus, are poor. Thin population and
the scarcity of natural resources in most of the trans-Indus
areas do not justify the high cost of road and railway
construction which the rugged nature of the terrain in these
areas imposes. Thus the cultural fragmentation of the state,
more or less perpetuated by the relative isolation of some
areas in terms of transport facilities, makes effective
political integration in Pakistan a difficult proposition.
In the following pages of this chapter different means of
transport and communications are discussed with a view to
assessing how well connected different areas are with one
another.
Hallway a: Railway construction in the sub-continent started
under the British around the middle of the last century. The
first tracks were laid around Bombay and later the network was
gradually extended inland. In the West Pakistan area the first
line was constructed between Karachi and Kotri in 1861, and
in the following year a railway line between Barsana and Jagati
was laid down, the first in the East Pakistan area. By the
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time of independence in 1947 there was a wide and well established
system of railways serving most parts of the sub-continent.
This system was severed at a number of places by the partition
boundaries. Since railway construction in the sub-continent
started as private enterprise, which was later taken over by
the government in 1925, different companies preferred different
railway gauges with the result that Pakistan, like India,
inherited three types of railways: broad gauge (5 ft. 6 in.);
metre gauge (5 ft. 3^ in.); narrow gauge (2 ft. 6 in.). The
partition left Pakistan with 6931 route miles of railways of
which 5041 miles were broad gauge, 1413 metre gauge and 477
narrow gauge (Table 62). West Pakistan got a major share of
the broad and narrow gauge lines and most of the metre gauge
was inherited by East Pakistan. During the last three Five-
Year Plans for development the emphasis was put on the improve¬
ment of the existing railway network rather than increasing the
mileage of routes.
Table 62
Route Mileage of Railways
East Pakistan West Pakistan
Total Broad Metre Narrow Total Broad Metre Narroi
Year Gauge Gauge Gauge Gauge Gauge Gauge
1947-48 1615 500 1095 20 5316 4541 318 457
1954-55 1708 548 1140 20 5333 4558 318 457
1959-60 1715 546 1149 20 5327 4628 318 381
1964-65 1713 546 1147 20 5334 4636 318 380
1966-67 1713 554 1139 20 5335 4637 318 380
(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, 20 Years of Pakistan in. Statistics,
1947-67)
219
Although East Pakistan received ahout 24 per cent of the
total mileage of railways in Pakistan - against ahout 15 per
cent of area - the railway network is relatively less efficient
than in the western wing. There are three main reasons for
this (Ahmad 1968); a) The deltaic nature of the wing with
numerous rivers liable to extensive flooding during the monsoon
season puts limitations on the construction of railway lines.
It is not only expensive to construct railways in East Pakistan
which require many bridges but also involves huge expenditure
on the maintenance and repair of track, embankments and bridges
which are washed away year. Because of the physical nature of
the area, there is also a shortage of stone required as ballast,
which has to be imported. The result is that there are frequent
gaps in the network at river crossings where ferries involve
more time and money in trans-shipment. For example, all along
its course through East Pakistan the Brahnmputra River is still
unbridged. b) The railway network in that part of the sub¬
continent was constructed to serve the port of Calcutta (except
for the metre gauge system in the east linking Assam with
Chittagong), which was cut off by partition and the truncated
lines inherited by East Pakistan were not suited to serve the
needs imposed by the new political boundary, c) Whatever
Litlx
railway lines and rolling stock w&s received in 1947 run
down as a result of over-use during the war on the Burma front
and mm in need of extensive repair and replacement. Unfortunately
no important railway workshops were left in East Pakistan,
particularly on the broad gauge system.
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Some improvements since independence have taken place by
laying 98 miles of new lines, improvement of existing ones,
replacement of the rolling stock, setting up workshop
facilities and by changing over from coal to diesel, but the
overall situation is still far from satisfactory. She general
orientation of the railway lines in East Pakistan has been
influenced by the direction of rivers. There are in fact two
separate systems east and west of the Brahiuaputra (Pig.37).
The eastern one is entirely metre gauge and is part of the old
system designed to serve the tea estates of Assam through the
port of Chittagong. The western one is mostly broad gauge,
with some branch metre gauge lines, and was severed by the
partition at a number of places. However, with the construction
of some new lines it now provides direct connections between
all the western districts. It may be noted that while north-
south travel, that is in the direction of the rivers, is generally
easier, east-west is usually tediously slow. For example a
rail journey between Dacca and Khulna takes more than 24 hours
involving a long circuitous route though the two cities are
less than 100 miles apart. Moreover even this long detour
involves one ferry on the Brahi.mpu.tra, There are plans to make
further improveiaents in the railway system but it appears that
it is very difficult to have a really efficient network in
the near future.
West Pakistan has about 75 per cent of the total rail
mileage of the country but because it has an even larger share
of the area, the ratio between a mile of railway and area is
Fig. 37« Railways.
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higher than in East Pakistan. Though some districts west of
the Indus are not served by railway, all districts to the east
of the river do have rail connections. In the irrigated
districts of the plains which are more thickly populated the
railway network is more dense (Pig.37). In this part of the
sub-continent too railways were constructed to provide an
outlet (except for some lines in the northwest laid for
strategic and political reasons), in this case for the raw
produce of the Indus plains through the port of Karachi,
However, unlike East Pakistan, the western wing received the
major port of the area as well as most of its hinterland and
inherited not only an efficient railway network but also the
major workshop situated at Mughalpura near Lahore, Of the
total 5335 miles of railways in West Pakistan 4637 are broad
gauge without any gaps at river crossings. Even metre and
narrow gauge sections are connected to broad gauge terminals.
The main broad gauge line runs north from Karachi - it is
double tracked for 500 miles - to Lahore, Rawalpindi, Peshawar
and beyond to the Afghan border through the famous Khyber Pass.
Many branch lines take off from it and, serving all the
districts of the Punjab, join it again before the Indus crossing
at Attock. The only district of the Punjab without a railway
line, Hera Ghazi Khan on the west bank of the Indus, is now
being joined up through a new line under construction. Another
important broad gauge line takes off at Kotri and goes to
Quetta where it bifurcates, one branch going to Chaman on the
Afghan border and the other 500 miles to the west to Zahidan in
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Iran. A 300 mile metre gauge network serves the cotton
growing areas of Sind with a line running east across the
border to Jodhpur in India. Two narrow gauge systems in
Baluchistan and N.W.P.P. were constructed to serve the
military garrisons in the rough country of the legendary
north-west frontier. Since independence some new track has
been laid in the sugar cane area of Mardan district but the
main improvement has taken place on the existing lines. Steam
locomotives have been replaced by new diesel-electric ones and
the renovation of the track and rolling stock has increased the
speed and efficiency of trains. A 170 mile section of the main
line between Lahore and Khanewal is being electrified. After
independence the rapid growth of Karachi as the capital and
the principal port greatly increased the volume of traffic on
the main line and the need was felt for an alternative route
between the coast and the northern districts. This will be
provided by the completion of a 180 mile line between Kasmor
and Kot Adu along the west bank of the Indus.
In view of the above, railways play a more important role
in West Pakistan in the movement of goods and passengers than
in the eastern wing where inland waterways carry the bulk of
traffic. Table 63 shows the movement of people and freight
by railways in both wings of the country. During the year 1966-67
Pakistan Western Railway carried about 75 per cent more
passengers than Pakistan Eastern Railway and because of the larger
size of the western wing involving longer distances the passenger-
miles operated were more than three times that in the east.
ixca rf.










East West East West East West East West
Year Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak. Pak.
1947-48 101 81 2923 4875 2 3 441 1908
1954-55 46 86 1368 4410 3 10 474 2855
1959-60 70 121 1816 5590 6 12 872 3814
1964-65 71 132 1923 6257 6 15 894 4949
1966-67 73 128 2005 6207 5 15 809 5046
(Source: Govt. of Pakistan, 20 Years of Pakistan in Statistics,
1947-67)
Roadst The road network in East Pakistan is even poorer than
the railway although considerable development has taken place since
independence. In 1967 West Pakistan had over 80 per cent of the
total mileage of 'high type' (hard surface, all weather) roads
in the country as well as of 'low type' (paved but motorable in
fair weather). However, East Pakistan has a larger share of the
'unmetalled' dirt roads which can be used only in the dry season
and even then are often not suitable for motor vehicles.
Since independence the length of 'high type' roads in East
Pakistan has increased from 240 to over 2500 miles but the road
system in this wing is still rudimentary. Most of the mileage
is in the form of short stretches radiating from urban centres
and longer journeys involve ferries which are even more frequent
than in the case of railways. The longest stretch of road
uninterrupted by ferry is that between Cox's Bazar and the Meghna
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Table 64
Road Mileage in Pakistan
East .Pakistan West Pakistan
Year High type Low type High type Low type
1947-48 240 - 5053 8768
1954-55 320 150 7980 11122
1959-60 890 150 8772 10912
1964-65 1963 150 9971 11787
1966-67 2438 150 10759 11749
(Sources Govt, of Pakistan, 20 Years of Pakistan in
Statistics, 1947-67)
River, a distance of about 280 miles. The main problems of
road building in Bast Pakistan are the same as that of railway
construction, and it is estimated that, like railways, one mile
of road building in the eastern wing costs about four times as
much as in the western one. The cost of maintenance is also
proportionately higher. As a result roads in Bast Pakistan
have for the most part local importance, and that only in the
dry season.
Pig.38 shows the main roads in both wings of the country
and it is clear that they form an important means of transport
in West Pakistan. Generally the road network is similar to that
of railways and many roads run parallel to railway lines, but
in areas not served by railways they provide the only means of
transport. Almost all the districts are linked by all weather
roads except in the extreme north where high mountain passes
become snowbound in winter. Like railways, river crossings are
frequently bridged and one can travel from Karachi to Peshawar
Pig. 38. Main Roads.
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and beyond without any interruption, a distance of well over
1000 miles. Many branch roads take off from trunk arteries and
serve smaller towns and rural areas. Although West Pakistan
has a smaller share of 'unmetalled' dirt roads, they are more
useable than they are in the eastern wing because of drier
climate, especially in the plains.
In order to improve the road network in all parts of the
state a Central Road Fund was created in 1949 out of customs
and excise duty on motor spirit. Out of this 80 per cent was
given to provincial governments and the remaining 20 per cent
retained by the central government for research, grants-in-aid
and other projects connected with roads. In 1951 a new Fund
for Roads of Rational Importance was created to provide the
Central government's share of 50 per cent in the cost of
construction of major arterial roads. The First Five Year Plan,
1955-1960, allocated Rs. 580 millions for research and new road
machinery. The Second Plan, 1960-65» allocation for road
development totalled Rs. 569 millions out of which Rs. 250
millions was for each wing and the remainder was for certain
specific purposes in West Pakistan. For the Third Plan period,
1965-70, the total expenditure was raised to Rs, 2070 million
with East Pakistan getting a larger share of Rs. 1100 million
and West Pakistan Rs. 900 million. The remaining Rs. 70 million
was set aside for development in the centrally administered areas
(Pakistan, Basic Facts 1966-67). As a result of these efforts
the road situation has considerably improved in both wings of
the country, particularly in West Pakistan. At present a project
226
to link Karachi and Peshawar "by a modern multi-lane highway
is under way with the help of the World Bank. A 100 mile
section of this system Between Karachi and Hyderabad has
recently been opened. While the Central government keeps the
overall control of policy, roads and railways are provincial
responsibilities. Many minor and all village roads are
maintained by local authorities.
There are no official statistics available on the movement
of traffic by road. However, with the help of the above facts
and the number of registered motor vehicles (Table 65) it is
not difficult to see the difference in the importance of road
traffic between the wings. Although the number of motor vehicles
has registered a higher percentage increase in East Pakistan
since 1947, West Pakistan has well over 80 per cent of the
country's total. In addition to motor vehicles, which have to
Table 65
Registered Motor Vehicles
East Pakistan .test Pakistan
Year 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1947-48 2662 668 80 118 10255 4519 832 5603
1954-55 4346 1391 1774 1151 39200 6514 13349 12514
1959-60 6072 1948 3736 2654 58481 8688 19412 22647
1964-65 14300 2976 7077 18207 101035 13402 29578 74451
1966-67 16641 3516 7241 28887 105136 15382 25704 113173
(Source: Govt, of Pakistan, 20 Years of Pakistan in Statistics,
1947-67)
1. Motor cars including 5. Trucks.
"tl Q
4. Other vehicles including two
2. Buses. and three wheelers.
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to be registered, there is a large number of other road users.
There are no figures available but a great deal of movement of
people and goods takes place by animals and animal drawn vehicles,
particularly in the rural areas of West Pakistan. The quantity
of farm produce that reaches market towns from villages by these
methods must be very large. It is interesting to see how
villagers use bicycles not only for transporting an entire family
but also a considerable quantity of freight. However, with the
development of the road system and an increase in motor vehicles,
many areas, which were isolated before, have become easily
accessible. In many cities cabs and three-wheeled scooter
'rickshaws' have replaced, or are replacing, traditional horse
drawn 'tongas'.
Inland Waterways: The very physical conditions that have hindered
the development of roads and railways in hast Pakistan are
ideal for inland water transport. The rivers of this wing
provide a cheaper, though slower, transport system which carries
about three quarters of the total passenger and cargo traffic.
The total length of perennial waterways navigable by steamers
is about 3000 miles (Pig.39); they increase to over 4000 miles
during the monsoon season. Insofar as the bulk of the total
traffic is carried by small country craft of shallow draught
the total length of waterways actually used for transport must
be considerably higher. In fact during the flood season almost
the entire local traffic is carried by boats and many places
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Source: N. Ahmad 1968.
Fig. 39. Inland 'Waterways, East Pakistan.
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In East Pakistan waterways have the same importance as roads
and railways have in the western wing. West Pakistan's bullock
carts, horse-drawn 'tongas', trucks and buses have their counter¬
parts in dinghies, flat-bottomed 'pulwars', 'putelees', launches,
barges and steamers in the eastern wing. In addition to country
boats the flotilla of the East Pakistan Railways and of some
private operators, using motor craft, is used mainly for trans¬
porting baled jute to factories and the port of Ohalna, as well
as for ferry services between road- and railheads. Pakistan
River Steamers Ltd., a British based private company in which
the government-owned Pakistan Eastern Railways also have shares,
operate steamer services for both passengers and cargo on long
distance as well as feeder routes.
Despite the enormous importance of waterways in East
Pakistan this sector of transportation remained more or less
neglected till 1958 when the government set up an Inland Water
Transport Authority to plan and co-ordinate the development of
river transport. An amount of Rs.316.1 million (Rs. 134.1
million in the public sector and Rs. 182.0 in the private sector)
was allocated under the Second Five Year Plan for this purpose.
In the public sector the main schemes completed were the
provision of navigational facilities, a workshop ar Barisal,
development of river ports at Dacca, Harayanganj, Ohandpur,
Khulna and Barisal, in addition to the improvement of waterways.
Under the private sector the period from 1960-66 saw an increase
of 61 per cent in the number of motor vessels, 126 per cent in
the number of operators, 40 per cent in the cargo and 32 per
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cent in the passenger carrying capacity. The Third Five Year
Plan, about to end shortly, allocated an even higher amount of
Hs. 965 million, about two-thirds in the private sector, for
further development. Shortly before the launching of the Third
Plan an East x3akistan Shipping Corporation, a semi-public
enterprise, was established to provide steamer services especially
between the mainland and the offshore islands. One of the
serious problems of river navigation in East Pakistan is the
silting and the consequent high expenditure of dredging. The
Karnaphuli Project in Chittagong and the projected Grange s-Kobadak
scheme are intended to control excessive silting in their
respective areas (Third Plan 1965; Pakistan, Basic Pacts 1968).
Inland water transport in West Pakistan was once important
but could not survive in competition with railways, and the
construction of irrigation barrages on rivers created obstacles
in the way of boats. Secondly, the drawing of water for
irrigation reduced the flow in rivers, particularly in winter,
making them unable to take any craft larger than small boats.
Some rivers in their mountain reaches, as also the Karnaphuli
in East Pakistan, are used for floating timber downstream to
markets in the plains.
Sea Transport: Because of the division of the state area into
two halves sea transport is vital for inter-wing movement.
Unfortunately all the major ports of the sub-continent were
inherited by India after partition and Pakistan received only
two relatively minor sea-ports, Karachi and Chittagong, in West
and East Pakistan respectively.
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At the time of partition Chittagong was a small dilapidated
port, situated near the mouth of the heavily silted Karnaphuli
River, handling only a small portion of the trade of Bengal.
Most of the export and import trade of the area was oriented
towards Calcutta and Chittagong served only the tea exports of
Assam. It had only four berths capable of handling about half
a million tons of cargo each year and the presence of a sand bar
at the mouth of the Karnaphuli limited the size of ships entering
the harbour to 8000 tons. With independence, and consequently
the cutting off of Calcutta, the whole burden of the external
and inter-wing trade of East Pakistan was put on Chittagong.
As a result extensive improvement works had to be undertaken
involving a short term scheme costing Rs. 10 million completed
in 1950, and a long term plan involving an expenditure of Ss.
134.1 million. These development projects have increased the
handling capacity of the port to over 3 million tons annually,
though the problem of silting still does not allow larger ships
to enter the port. Chittagong has good rail and road connections
with the districts east of Meghna River but has a marginal
location in relation to the rest of the province. Although the
bulk of freight to and from Chittagong is carried by rail, a
considerable portion of jute exports reach the port by coastal
steamers.
As a result of the increased pressure on Chittagong and its
remote location relative to the main jute producing areas there
was a need for another outlet somewhere on the coast of the delta.
In December, 1950, an anchorage for ocean going vessels was
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opened to traffic at Chalna on the Pussur River. Pour years
later another anchorage at Mongla, downstream from Chalna on
the same river, was also "brought into use. Because the Pussur
is in fact a creek of the sea it is free from silting and ships
up to 23 feet draught can easily enter it. The nearest railhead
at Khulna is about 18 miles to the north but this is not a very
great disadvantage because Chalna is mainly meant for jute
exports, most of which can come by boats through the Pussur and
lie alongside the ocean going vessels for the transfer of cargo.
The port is at present handling between 1.5 and 2 million tons
of cargo annually and permanent shore facilities are under
construction.
Karachi is the only sea-port in West Pakistan and, in
addition to the trade of West Pakistan, has been handling the
transit trade of Afghanistan as well. Before independence it
was used mainly for handling the export of cotton and other
agricultural produce from the Punjab and 3ind. In 1947 there
were 17 berths out of which 13 were over 60 years old. The
increased pressure as a result of partition necessitated
extensive development and by 1962, at a cost of Rs. 159 million,
four new berths had been added in addition to the reconstruction
of the older ones, which with the extension of railway yards and
storage facilities, increased the handling capacity to over 5
million tons, further improvements were carried out with the
help of the World Bank and by 1967 it was able to handle imports
and exports totalling about 9 million tons (Pakistan, Basic
Pacts, 1968).
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To relieve pressure on Karachi various plans to construct
a new port on the Mekran coast have "been studied. A feasibility
study for Sonmiani, about 60 miles northwest of Karachi, lias
already been completed. However, no definite plans have yet
been announced mainly because the whole of the coast west of
Karachi is rather remote with almost no transport facilities
in relation to the rest of the wing. Some coastal settlements,
namely Pasni, Gwadur and Jiwani, engage in offshore fishing and
local coastal traffic. There is also a regular weekly mailboat
service between these settlements and Karachi.
Because of the importance of sea transport between the two
wings, as well as for foreign trade, Pakistan's merchant navy
fleet was rapidly expanded. In 1947 Pakistan had only three
ocean going vessels, one built in 1904 and the other two in 1920.
It was decided at once to build up the fleet and by the end of
the First Plan in 1960 the number of vessels had increased to
26 with a total dead weight of about a quarter of a million tons.
Efforts to improve the merchant fleet continued during the
Second Plan increasing the number of ships to 52 with an
aggregate of over half a million tons dead weight. The setting
up of the National Shipping Corporation and of a shipyard at
Karachi during the Second Plan period helped the whole develop¬
ment programme. By the middle of 1970, the end of the Third
Plan, the total strength of the fleet is estimated to reach 98
ships totalling about 1 million tons dead weight. Besides
operating cargo and passenger services on international routes,
the entire seaborne inter-wing trade is now carried by Pakistani
ships.
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Airways: To have a 'national' airline seems to have become a
symbol of prestige for many states, but for Pakistan a network
of efficient air services is necessary not only to bridge the
long distance between the two wings but also to connect remote
areas with them. As has been seen, in East Pakistan, although
distances are relatively short, journey times are long because
of many interruptions in surface transport at river crossings.
Within West Pakistan there are vast areas, particularly west of
the Indus, where roads and railways are scarce. Air cannot
provide a complete alternative to surface transport, if only
because of costj it can, however, supplement the conventional
methods of movement and has a great advantage in terms of time
saved. So, the need to have a domestic airline was realized
immediately after independence.
After the inability of two ill-equipped private airlines,
one after the other, to cope with the requirements of the new
state a semi-public Pakistan International Airlines Corporation
(PIA) was established in 1955 to promote and develop air
transport on domestic as well as on international routes by
acquiring new equipment, improving airport facilities and signing
air agreements with other countries. Fortunately there were
many aerodromes and landing strips in both wings of the state
built during World War II and although most of them were not
fit to be used by modern civil aircraft, they could be improved
and developed into civil airports. The result has been a rapid
expansion of air transport within and outside the state.
Operating Boeing, Trident and F27 Fokker aircraft, PIA's
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international network extends from Tokyo to London including
China and the USSR. Internally, 9 places in Bast and 18 in
West Pakistan are now linked by regular air services carrying
passengers as well as cargo (Pig.40). At least one air route
in West Pakistan, Peshawar to Chitral, as is also the case
between Rawalpindi and Gilgit and Rawalpindi and Skardu in the
disputed territory, provides the only link in winter when roads
are snowbound.*
In 1963 PIA also started, in addition to services shown
on Pig.40, a network of helicopter services in East Pakistan
linking Dacca to Chalna, Barisal, Begumganj, Hatia, Sandwip,
Kushtia, Sirajganj, Rajshahi, Bogra, Rangpur and Dinajpur.
These services proved very useful by cutting drastically journey
times between these isolated places - the rail journey of about
24 hours between Dacca and Jessore is cut to just half an hour
by air I Unfortunately these services had to be given up for
technical reasons and now the possibilities of introducing
short-take-off-and-landing aircraft are being studied. Hovercraft
is another possibility to improve transportation in East Pakistan.
Karachi is the main base of the PIA and is by far the most
important international as well as domestic airport. Other
international airports are at Dacca and Peshawar - and also at
Lahore when Indo-Pakistani relations are better and air
services operate between the two countries. There are also
regular services to Rangoon from Chittagong.
* Information supplied by Pakistan International Airlines,
45-46 Piccadilly, London W.1.
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Pig. 40. Scheduled passenger flights, 1970.
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Postal, Telegraph and Telephone Services: There is a fairly
developed postal system in both wings of the state run by the
dependent on means of transport as discussed above, it is
relatively slow in areas where there are poor transport
facilities. Here again rural areas are at a disadvantage both
in terms of distances to post offices and the time taken in the
movement of mail. However, in the more densely populated parts
of West Pakistan village post office facilities are better
compared to other areas of both the wings. The very nature of
rural settlement pattern in East Pakistan - scattered hamlets
rather than nucleated villages - makes the diffusion of postal
facilities more difficult. Nevertheless, although the number
of post offices in East Pakistan has been less than that in
West Pakistan (Table 66), the post office/area ratio is much
more favourable to the former wing. In 1966-67 East Pakistan
central government, but since postal services are directly
Table 66
Post Offices in West and East Pakistan
(rounded to the nearest thousand)
















(Source; Govt, of Pakistan, Some Socio-Economic
Trends, 1968)
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had one post office for about 10 square miles of area; West
Pakistan had one for nearly 44 square miles, "but it must be kept
in mind that shorter distances in East Pakistan may not
necessarily mean shorter journey time compared to some areas of
West Pakistan. Table 66 also shows that postal services in
West Pakistan have clearly expanded at a faster rate mainly
due to better transportation.
Telephone and telegraph services are, together with post
offices, under the central Ministry of Communications. The
network of telephone and telegraph is not so much developed as
that of post offices. However, the services operate in all
parts of the state though, because of the lower number of
telephones and exchanges (Table 67), the average distances to
the nearest telephone are longer than to the nearest post office.
Table 67
Telephones and Telephone Exchanges
No. of telephone No. of telephones
exchanges
Year E.Pak. W. Pak. E.Pak. vV.Pak.
1951-52 40 250 3,000 18,000
1954-55 50 390 5,000 31,000
1959-60 100 730 12,000 60,000
1964-65 240 1100 28,000 100,000
1966-67 270 1200 32,000 120,000
(Source; Govt, of Pakistan, Some Socio-Economic Trends, 1968)
as far as the ratio with area is concerned the two wings are
not very different from each other - one telephone exchange for
every 200 sq.m. in East and for every 276 sq.rn. in West Pakistan -
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but considering the number of telephones and the population of
each wing West Pakistan is in a much better position. There
is one telephone for every 415 persons in the west, against one
for every 1639 in the east.
Between the two wings, as also to some remote mountainous
places in the north, the telephone is through radio link. It
is hoped that the inter-wing link will be greatly improved
through the projected communications satellite over the Indian
Ocean. It will also improve inter-wing radio and television
broadcasting. Within the wings telephone services have improved
during the past years, apart from the expansion of network,
through telex and direct dialling systems between many cities.
Radio and Television: Radio and television are state monopolies
operated under the central Ministry of Information and Broad¬
casting# At the time of independence there were four radio
stations, three in West and one in Bast Pakistan, Since then
some new stations have been opened in both the wings. The short
wave transmitters at Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi and Dacca
broadcast programmes in Urdu, Bengali and English while the
regional medium wave stations produce and transmit in the local
languages besides relaying national programmes from the main
stations. Since independence the transmission hours have
increased about four times and the number of radio licences
have gone up by more than ten times. Although the radio is
not available to political parties as a communication medium,
the government in power uses it overtly for political reasons.
The introduction of cheap transistor sets in recent years promises
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useful possibilities for broadcasting in the field of mass
communication.
Television is a more recent development as the first
station was opened in Lahore in November, 1964, shortly followed
by another in Dacca. Two more stations, one in Karachi and the
other in Rawalpindi, have also been operating for about two
years. Because of the limited range of television in the absence
of a network the stations in Dacca, Lahore and Karachi are
effective only in their immediate environs. The Rawalpindi-
Islamabad station, however, is received over a large area north
of Lahore because of the installation of a transmitter near
Murree at a height of 7000 feet above sea level. Because of
the cost of sets television is still limited only to well-off
urban families but it can play an important role in the field
of education.
Press: The circulation and effectiveness of newspapers is
directly related to literacy which, as has been seen, is not
high in Pakistan. The second problem for the press in Pakistan
is the linguistic heterogeneity, Any paper intended to have a
circulation in both wings of the state has to be published in
English and the percentage of those literate in English is low.
The press, which was generally independent and privately
owned, came under strict government control in 1958 with the
proclamation of Martial Law. The restrictions were temporarily
lifted but with the promulgation of the Press and Publications
Ordinance in September, 1963, a sort of censorship was again
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imposed. Later the formation of the official National Press
Trust further weakened the independent press as some newspapers
were taken over "by the Trust. In the face of increasing official
pressure some independent dailies did, however, manage to
survive. Since about the last days of the previous regime
government restrictions on the press seem to have been relaxed.
In the number of daily newspapers and periodicals published
West Pakistan is ahead of the eastern wing (Table 68).
Table 68
Newspapers and Periodicals in Pakistan
hailies Weeklies other periodicals
Year L.Pak. W.Pak. L.Pak. W.Pak. E.Pak. w.Pak
1954 12 63 66 248 40 372
1955 13 66 62 243 50 396
1956 16 72 63 265 52 440
1957 17 81 74 320 78 562
1958 16 87 78 318 77 540
1959 12 90 79 342 93 647
1960 13 61 67 250 248 529
1961 12 58 67 235 269 480
1962 16 59 59 213 302 476
1963 19 80 59 273 334 846
1964 21 73 64 247 308 775
1965 22 70 69 241 387 763
1966 22 75 72 240 385 794
(Sources Govt, of Pakistan, 20 Years of Pakistan in Statistics,
1947-67)
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She greater number of dailies and periodicals in West Pakistan
was, one would have assumed, due to the linguistic heterogeneity
of the wing but this is not entirely mtesaai*# as revealed by
the circulation figures. According to one estimate, in 1963
the total circulation of all the dailies was about 500,000.*
Out of this about half was accounted for by Urdu papers,
150,000 in English, 45»000 in Bengali, 30,000 in Gujrati and
7000 in Sindhi (The American University 1965). This is really
surprising because, as lias already been shown, Bengali claims
to be the language of a majority of the literate population.
This may be due to the relatively lower economic levels in East
Pakistan. A quite high circulation of Gujrati papers is explained
by the fact that most of the Gujrati speaking people belong to
the richer commercial class concentrated in Karachi and have a
high rate of literacy. Table 69$ which shows the language of
newspapers and periodicals, throws interesting light on the
_ lio-t
relative importance of different languages in the/wings;
unfortunately there is no information available at the level of
districts or provinces but it is reasonable to assume that most
of the regional language publications are printed and circulated
in their respective areas. The position of Bengali in Y/est
Pakistan and of Urdu in East Pakistan may particularly be noted.
* The actual number of readers is, however, greater because one
copy has its own circulation among family members and friends.
Even illiterates sometimes get someone to read out the news.
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Table 69
Newspapers and Periodicals by Language, 1966
Bi-/multi-
Area Beng. Urdu Engl. Bind. Push. Pun.i. lingual
East Pakistan 271 4 92 - - - 112
West Pakistan 1 716 184 54 10 3 122
(Source: Govt, of Pakistan, 20 Years of Pakistan in Statistics,
1947-67)
Connectivity: Because railways and roads are the most efficient
and relatively fast means of transport, it is interesting to
find out the relative position of different areas in terms of
connectivity with adjoining districts by road and rail links.
In order to do this an index of connectivity was derived for all
districts based on the existing roads and railways. This index
was calculated as a ratio between the transport connections and
the number of contiguous districts for each district as:*
0 s» (L - N)/D where
C is the index of connectivity;
L is the number of direct road and rail links each
district has with contiguous districts;
N is the number of contiguous districts without any link;
I) is the total number of contiguous districts.
For L one point was given for every uninterrupted all-weather
road or rail connection and half a point for those involving a
ferry. The relevant information was obtained farom the Survey of
* This method is only intended to determine connectivity
between districts and not necessarily within them.
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Pakistan, Road Map of West Pakistan, Third Edition, 1965, on
a scale of 25 miles to the inch, and the Survey of Pakistan,
Province Map of East Pakistan, Second Edition, 1962, on 1:1,000,000.
The index scores thus derived are given in Appendix XXII and have
been plotted in Pig.41, which gives a fairly accurate picture of
the whole state in terms of connectivity by road and rail. In
East Pakistan the districts which are marginally situated have
relatively better connectivity than the central districts of
the delta. Within West Pakistan the Indus River divides the
wing into two halves. East of it the transportation is
relatively well developed and the connectivity is relatively
high in the Punjab. West of the Indus, except Quetta and a
part of the N.W.P.P, around Peshawar, the whole area has poor
surface transport facilities. Here it is an interesting
relationship between the physical features, population density
and transport network. Most of Baluchistan and the N.W.P.P.
are as poorly connected as the central districts of East
Pakistan, but while in the latter inland waterways provide an
alternative the former areas have no other means of surface
transport available to offset the scarcity of road and rail
connections. Even in Sind, where the terrain is not difficult,
inter-district connections are poor relative to most of the
Punjab. This map of connectivity brings out clearly the
importance of domestic air links as shown in Pig.40. In East
Pakistan, although the districts with low rail and road connect¬
ivity have generally better river transport facilities, it should
be kept in mind that since a large majority of the river craft
Fig. 4i» Connectivity (road & rail), Districts.
243
are small country boats the movement is limited to short
journeys. Most of the rural countryside as well as many urban
places are isolated, and river transport, although cheaper,
is nevertheless not suitable for easy mobility especially
involving longer distances.
After having looked at the various means of transport and
communications the question no?; arises as to their role in the
movement of goods, people and information. While the movement
of goods is dealt with in the next chapter on trade, this chapter
is concluded by discussing the exchange of people and information.
Unfortunately there is no published information available on
the various aspects of transport and communications at any level
below that of the wings. Even the statistics on the level of
the wings are scanty as, for example, there is no data on the
movement of passengers or goods by road and river transport.
However* some idea can be found about the extent to which
people move about within the state by a few published statistics.
As has already been pointed out, traffic between the two
wings by land route through almost completely ceased after
independence. 'fhe entire traffic is now carried either by air
or by sea. Table 70 gives passenger movement between East and
"West Pakistan (1959-67), which shows a large increase, 158 per
cent, in the inter-wing traffic. Most of this increase is due
to the expansion of air services. In 1959 about 40 per cent
of the passengers travelled by sea and by 1967 this percentage
had fallen to about 20. During the period of eight years covered
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28 per cent increase in sea travel. The entire sea traffic is
"between Karachi and Ohittagong, while two thirds of the air
movement takes place between Karachi and Dacca, and the
remaining one third between Lahore and Dacca.
While the increase in the inter-wing movement of people
may seem quite large the fact is that the total number of
persons involved was a little oyer a quarter of a million, or
just about 0.2 per cent of the whole population. Assuming that
most of the persons had undertaken a return journey, and were
counted twice, and some probably travelled many times during
the one year, the percentage of actual people involved in inter-
wing movement must be even smaller. The fact is, though there
are no statistics to prove it, that the bulk of these travellers
is made up of government officials, businessmen and their
families and that there is practically no contact between the
wings at the level of the common man. This conclusion is in
accord with the earlier observation made in connection with
internal migration (Chapter 6).
As regards the movement of people within the wings it has
at c
been pointed out that no data^i^ available. However, the total
7me
number of persons carried by the railways in the/wings
are, irrespective of the origin and destination of journeys,
published and are shown in Table 63. Disregarding the figures
for 1947-48, which were inflated by the movement of refugees,
rail passenger traffic increased between 1948-49 and 1966-67
by 78 per cent in West and by only 9 per cent in East Pakistan.
The low increase in East Pakistan has been undoubtedly due to
the rudimentary nature of the railway system. In 1966-67 75
per cent more people travelled by railways in West Pakistan
than in the eastern wing even though the total population of
the latter was higher. On average, assuming that all members
of the population undertook rail journeys during the year, in
East Pakistan every person had 1.3 trips as against 2.7 in West
Pakistan. The figures do not reveal the nature of journeys in
terms of distance and areas, but it is reasonable to suppose
that the average length would be higher in the western wing.
There is also no clue as to the extent of inter-provincial
travel within West Pakistan but presumably most of the journeys
would be intra-provincial but with a fair number of travellers
on long distance inter-city routes. Because much of the travel
is necessitated by family occasions there must be considerable
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movement back and forth between the home areas of migrants and
where they have settled and found work.
It is estimated that a greater number of persons travel
by other means of transport - by boats in East Pakistan and by
roads in West Pakistan* - but in the absence of any data the
estimate cannot be substantiated. Prom looking at the figures
of registered motor vehicles as given in Table 65 it can be
seen that road transport is of far greater importance in the
western wing than it is in the east. On the whole, means of
transport are more developed in West Pakistan where in many
areas, despite longer distances, movement is easier and faster
than over most of East Pakistan. Within the western wing,
however, transport facilities do bear some relation to the
provincial units,** that is the Punjab has definitely better
road and rail networks than the rest of the wing. Baluchistan
and parts of the N.W.P.P. and Sind are relatively isolated.
The available figures on postal traffic also show a greater
movement in "West Pakistan compared to the eastern wing. Table
71 shows the number of registered letters and parcels, money
* Many local journeys in rural areas are also undertaken Off
foot even where some transport is available and people can
afford it.
** Unlike railways before they were taken over by the central
government in 1955» though transferred back later, roads
have always been provincial responsibilities and there was not
much co-ordination between the provinces on the extension of




Postal Traffic in East and West Pakistan
Bast Pakistan West Pakistan
Money orders ~ „ Money orders
Year le£|§* Dar®fiB Value le£j§* 'ofi. /aiuetters p cel3 No. (m.Rs.) lettera parcels No. (m.Rs.)
1954-55 4975 396 3812 141.0 8118 1238 4612 217.9
1959-60 5950 560 5121 224.6 10857 1903 5099 309.4
1964-65 5992 648 5198 279.1 11614 2621 5880 422.0
1967-68 7413 769 5318 355.7 12567 2587 5766 432.2
(Source:
1969)
Govt, of Pakistan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, March
orders and their value. The position for ordinary mail iB
probably not very different and the main reason for the
relatively smaller postal traffic in Bast Pakistan seems to lie
in the fact that there has been less internal movement of people
in the eastern wing. Greater urbanization and relatively
long-distance migration may be the cause of greater traffic in
fleet Pakistan, even though literacy is lower compared to Bast
Pakistan. It may also be a reflection of the economic conditions
in the two wings that not only a greater amount of money has
been sent by money orders in West Pakistan, but also the average
amount of a money order is higher in the western wing - Rs. 7.5
against Rs. 6,3 in East Pakistan.
The number of radios, as revealed by radio licences issued
(Table 72), shows the same imbalance between the two wings. In
1966-67 the estimated ratio between radio licences issued and
population was 1 licence for every 65 persons in west Pakistan,
and 1:196 in the Eastern wing. One cannot think of any reason
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Table 72
Number of Badio Licences Issued
















(Sources Govt, of Pakistan, 20 Years of
Pakistan in Statistics, 1947-67)
other than the financial status of the population as responsible
for this disparity. Unfortunately no comparison can be made
between the provinces of West Pakistan but other evidence
suggests that the Punjab should be ahead of the rest with
Baluchistan at the bottom. The inclusion of Karachi would
undoubtedly increase the relative position of Sind which
otherwise is comparatively less developed.
In view of the above discussion it can be argued that
East Pakistan, in spite of having a compact area and
linguistically homogeneous population, is much less integrated
in terms of transport and communications both internally as
well as in the wider framework of the state as a whole. This
does not, however, mean that West Pakistan is entirely better
organized in this respect because clearly there are marked
differences within it. These differences are all the wider
when one considers the cultural fragmentation of the wing and,
although considerable improvements have taken place in the
transport and communications facilities, the area is far from
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"being one effectively integrated unit. Movement across
provincial boundaries has increased during the years since
independence but there is no evidence that the cultural
barriers are falling down. The break up of the one admini¬
strative unit of West Pakistan and the reassertion of the
former provincial basis clearly indicates the inadequacy! to
say the least, of governmental action towards an effective




In political geography the study of trade and commerce,
as also of other economic activities, has two aspects quite
distinct from each other "but having a close relationship
between themselves. The first one is purely economic insofar
as it deals with only the material side of the exchange of
goods and commodities, i.e. the nature, direction and the
intensity of trade between different areas within a state or
at the inter-state level. Such a study may reveal the degree
of economic interdependence of the areas engaging in trade
with each other, as well as throwing light on the relative
levels of economic development in those areas. The intensity
and direction of trade will yield valuable information about
how far the areas under study are linked with each other in
economic terms, while the nature of goods and commodities
exchanged may show the characteristics of the economies of
those areas.
The second aspect is social and political, though it is
closely linked to economic considerations. Movement of goods
from one area to another, whether within a state or on the
international level, must bring about some movement of people
and information, people involved in the actual transportation
of goods and merchants travelling in search of suppliers and
consumers as individuals within a state or as official trade
delegations between states. Thus trade and commerce create
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a movement of people and information which, though primarily
of an economic nature, may well have social and political
implications.
Another point about the second aspect of trade, which
may be more important than the first, particularly at the
intra-state level, is that it gives considerable power to those
who control it. In all countries where trade is a private
enterprise .without strict government control - as in Pakistan
it is internally - people engaging in this activity have
considerable financial control which can be used for political
purposes. Sometimes when trade and commerce is more or less
exclusively controlled by one or more particular communities,
as has been the case in the sub-continent before and since
independence, a social and political conflict can arise out
of the grievances and jealousies of the less favoured population.
It is true that a major portion of the population in Pakistan
is poor and liable to exploitation by various vested interests.
The main source of power, which was traditionally vested in
the rich landed class, has gradually shifted to commercial and
industrial communities as a result of industrialization and
the Land Reforms of 1959. However, whereas the influence of
landlords was local, that of commercial classes and industrialists
extends far beyond the place where they live because the scope
of their activities is state-wide. It is necessary, therefore,
to consider these two aspects of trade and commerce in order
to relate the economic conditions of the area to the social and
political relationships of the population.
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Unfortunately the task is made extremely difficult as
practically no information is usually published by governments,
particularly on the second aspect of this important human
activity.* Since foreign trade is subject to customs and
tariff regulations all governments usually keep accurate records
of goods exchanged between them and other countries, and
frequently they are published in one form or another. This is
not the case in internal trade. In most countries there are
no restrictions on the movement of goods and commodities within
their boundaries and consequently little statistical information
is available on the nature and volume of trade between provinces,
districts or their equivalent sub-state units. This is, at
least, the situation in Pakistan** but, because of its
territorial shape, there is one sector of the internal trade
in Pakistan on which some information is collected and regularly
published. Because nearly the entire inter-wing trade is
sea-borne it has to pass through the seaports of the country,
and port records of shipments provide some account of its
volume and nature.*** Within the wings, however, no such
* Because of these difficulties domestic trade usually
receives a brief treatment, mostly qualitative, in regional
and economic texts.
** Excepting some occasional government controls on the
movement of certain commodities to check smuggling or
procure them for export.
*** The accuracy, however, of the inter-wing trade statistics
is not high because it is generally not subject to any
control and regulations.
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records are available, except for the indirect information on
transport discussed in the preceding chapter.*
The second aspect of trade as pointed out earlier is even
more difficult to substantiate by statistics because very
little in official publications is available to elaborate the
many imponderable issues involved. There is no way to get
information on the cultural background, the influence on
government policies and the political importance of those who
control the overall trade and commerce in the country except
to rely on personal observation and judgement. It is necessary
to do so, however subjective it may seem, because in recent
years the whole political debate in Pakistan, resulting in
violence and changes in governments and governmental policies,
has rested on the issue of the management, or mismanagement,
of financial resources not only by successive governments but
also in the private sector.**
While the political implications of this topic are pursued,
together with other topics, in Part IV, the following pages of
this chapter deal with the pattern of trade in both the wings
as well as between them, followed by a brief discussion of the
social nature of trade relationships. Because this chapter,
* With the formation of one administrative unit of West Pakistan
as far as the government was concerned the old provinces,
which were also more or less cultural units, did not exist, and
so no statistics of any sort were published on the provincial
basis.
** This is reflected in the various provincial demands for more
powers in relation to economic autonomy.
255
ae indeed the whole of thia work, deals with domestic conditions,
foreign trade has "been excluded but some reference to it will
be necessary in order to make certain points.
Rural tradei Although in general the nature of rural trade
is not very different in the two wings of the state, the
variations in the settlement pattern, means of transport and
general economy give a different character to the pattern of
trade in the rural areas of East and West Pakistan.
As mentioned earlier in this work the rural settlements
in East Pakistan are in the form of scattered hamlets rather
than nucleated villages, with the result that the village
shop as the local trading centre is non-existent in that wing.
Most of the local buying and selling take place at 'hats' which
are open markets held once or twice a week, sometimes throughout
the week in the more densely populated areas, at which people
from the surrounding area gather. These hats, of which there
is a profusion - one for every 10 square miles (The American
University 1965) - are usually situated at a convenient place
on a riverbank, near a railway station or road and to them
converge farmers with their produce, village craftsmen with
their manufactures and a few factory made goods from cities.
Most of these 'hats' last for a day only, or part of a day,
and when they are over the places remain deserted till the next
'hat', but at some places a few permanent stalls may be built
to form a more or less regular bazaar. The main items which
are sold and exchanged at these country markets and are moved
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from one area to another are paddy and rice, cloth, fish,
cattle, crude sugar, pulses and spice3. By its very nature
and the difficulty of transportation, rural trade in East
Pakistan is very local and the goods do not generally move
"beyond the vicinity of the area where they have been produced.
In addition to these regular 'hats' there are a number
of annual or bi-annual 'melas*, or fairs, usually attached to
the anniversary of some local religious personage. They may
last for a week or longer and attract people from a wider area.
Considerable trading takes place at these 'melas', mostly in
the same local produce but there is a greater amount and variety
of city goods as well.
Apart from their importance in local trade, 'hats' and
'melas' are also important in the dissemination of information.
Many people go to them primarily for social reasons, and much
of the local information is exchanged there because the
scattered settlement pattern keeps the rural people somewhat
isolated from each other.
*
A third category of trading centres is that of rural centres
engaged mainly in collecting activity and their location is
determined by transport facilities - a steamer station, a road
or rail-head. Villagers go to these trading centres to get
those things, mostly manufactures, which they usually cannot
get at 'hats' and 'melaa'.
By comparison, in West Pakistan for most of the rural
population, mainly concentrated in villages, the village shop
is the immediate trading place. These shops - the number varies
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in each village according to its size - provide many of the
local requirements, cloth, foodstuffs, kerosene, cigarettes,
matches, etc., and farmers can sell their surplus produce to
the shopkeepers. For their other needs the villagers go to
nearby towns, which are more numerous in West Pakistan, and
are relatively easier to reach.
There are no periodic 'hats' in West Pakistan although
at some places open markets are occasionally held mainly for
the trading of cattle and other livestock. Annual 'melas',
or 'urs' when connected with the anniversary of some religious
personality, are also held throughout the wing "but, unlike
hast Pakistan, such occasions are mainly for entertainment and
recreation rather than trading. The villages are still to a
large degree self sufficient "but over the past years more and
more city goods have been finding their way to rural areas.
Marketing of Agricultural Produce: while some money does
change hands in rural trade, most of it is Btill on a barter
basis; village craftsmen providing the needs of the farmer
in exchange for grain and other farm produce. In order to get
cash to pay off his debt,* his land revenue and to purchase
city manufactures, the farmer has to sell his cash crops
* After the departure of Hindu money lenders from West
Pakistan not much credit has been available to the farmer
which in some ways is good for him because he is now not so
heavily in debt. In hast Pakistan the practice probably still
continues.
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and whatever other produce is in excess of his needs.* This
aspect of internal trade differs considerably between the wings.
Rice is the main food crop in East Pakistan and it is estimated
that about three quarters of the total production is consumed
the producers themselves. Host of the rest is exchanged
at local 'hats' and very little enters into trade beyond the
district borders (Ahmad 1968). So, to farmers rice is not an
important source of income,**
Jute, on the other hand, is mainly a cash crop. Almost
the entire production enters into trade either for export or
for home consumption. It passes through three or four stages
from the grower to the factory or the port. A very large
portion of the total production, about three quarters, is sold
by farmers at their doorsteps, after it has been retted, to
small itinerant dealers, 'farias', who move about in their
small boats. Most of these 'farias' are on their own but some
are engaged as agent by bigger merchants or 'aratdars' at the
collecting centres. When a 'faria' has collected about a ton
of jute, which is the maximum capacity of their boats, he takes
it to the 'hat' or thecollecting centre and sells it to a
'beopari' or middleman who in turn takes the fibre to larger
* This necessity to earn cash, and the importance of money for
buying other things, makes those areas relatively better off
where important cash crops are produced. In areas where the
emphasis is on food crops people are comparatively poor, though
they may be better fed.
** There is no similar estimate for West Pakistan but it is
certain that wheat does enter into trade in fairly large
quantities. Rice is also an important cash earner in many canal
irrigated areas.
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centres where it is graded* After grading the jute is pressed
into loosely packed 'kacha' bales if it is meant for home
consumption, or tightly pressed 'pacca' bales if for export.
The main distributing centres are Narayanganj, iQiulna and
Ghittagong, but before partition all these functions were
performed by Calcutta. Because of this long chain of middle¬
men involved in the marketing of jute the actual growers, most
of whom cannot take their crop to market themselves because
of transport difficulties, are forced to sell at far below
the market prices. This is shown by the fact that most of the
crop - although it is not a perishable commodity - is sold in
a few months immediately after the harvest when the countryside
is still flooded and farms are easily reached by country boats.
Only in the north and northwest of the province, where rivers
are less numerous and railways more frequent, is a considerable
portion of the crop transported by rail wagons or by road.
Secondly, because of their poverty, the farmers are not in a
position to hold the crop in order to get better prices; they
are forced to sell it immediately at terms favourable to the
purchasers.
The second important cash crop is tea which is graded and
packed in chests on the plantations and transported by rail to
Chittagong for distribution to West Pakistan or to foreign
countries. Because of rising home demand the export of tea
has been gradually falling; it virtually ceased in 1963 but
picked up again and now varies between 4 and 6 million pounds
per annum.
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In West Pakistan "besides cash crops, mainly cotton, sugar
cane, oil seeds, tobacco, fruits, etc., a considerable quantity
of food grains, which is surplus from local needs, also enter
trade and in many areas are a source of income for farmers.
Although a large portion of the produce is sold in the villages
to the local shopkeepers or the travelling middlemen often
working on behalf of commission agents, a considerable amount
is taken by growers directly to market or 'mandi' towns and
sold to purchasers through 'dalals' or brokers.
The marketing of sugar cane and tobacco has a different
pattern. Depending on the crushing capacity each sugar mill
is allotted two zones, A and B, within two particular radii.
The mill is required to purchase 65 per cent of the crop of each
grower in zone A, which is the nearer one, and 35 per cent in
zone B. Usually each grower delivers his quota himself at the
factory on the date already settled and the means of transport
vary from trucks to pack animals. The rest of the crop is
converted by the grower into crude sugar or 'gur' for his own
consumption as well as for selling in the market. The mill
may also buy this 'gur' for refining when the crushing season
is over. Some better off farmers, who can afford the equipment,
may make brown sugar, instead of 'gur', which fetches better
prices.
In areas suitable for the cultivation of Virginia tobacco
the production is controlled by tobacco companies who allot a
quota to each grower and also provide seed to maintain quality.
When the crop is ready it is purchased by the companies at their
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collecting centres. The local varieties of tobacco used in
'hookahs' are sold by the farmers in 'mandis' through brokers
and commission agents.
The marketing of fruit has again a different pattern.
Some time before the crop is ready, sometimes one or many years
before, it is bought by dealers who look after the orchard in
the final days before harvesting. When ready the fruit is
picked and transported to 'mandis' where it is sold to buyers
through commission agents. Recently more of the crop is taken
directly from the farms by trucks to cities throughout the wing
where there is a demand. The dealers are generally well aware
of the current prices at different centres through telephone,
telegraph or radio and send the produce to cities where they
can get the best profit. By its very nature this type of
marketing involves considerable speculation but generally the
dealers come out with good profits.
Although there are similarities in the general pattern
of marketing between the wings, the producer in East Pakistan
is relatively more dependent on middlemen and this is largely
because of the scarcity of transportation facilities. In West
Pakistan, especially in the plains, the farmer has access to
market towns which, compared to the eastern wing, are more
numerous. The same is true of retail trade and consequently
prices of manufactured goods are generally higher in East
Pakistan. There are, however, areas in West Pakistan where
conditions are similar to, or worse than, those in East
Pakistan.
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Inter-wing Trade: Prior to independence there was little direct
trade between East and West Pakistan areas. The whole economy
of Bengal was tied up with the port and industries of Calcutta
and there was very little produced in the East Pakistan area
which was needed in the northwest of the sub-continent.
Similarly, not much of the produce of the latter area went
directly to east Bengal. Whatever commodities were exchanged
between the two areas had to pass through Calcutta either for
distribution or processing. With independence and partition
the situation was radically changed. Calcutta was cut off from
east Bengal as the main outlet and industrial area and East
and West Pakistan became directly dependent on each other as
parts of one independent state. Even then during the years
immediately after independence there was not much to be exchanged
between the two wings because the economies of the two areas
were mainly export oriented - jute and tea from East Pakistan;
cotton from West Pakistan. With relatively little industriali¬
zation there was not much that the two areas needed from each
other and, thus, their economies were not integrated to any
large degree. However, the volume of trade between the wings
increased rapidly after independence because of their reliance
on each other for some commodities which they could obtain,
before independence, from parts of the sub-continent situated
more closely bux now cut off by partition boundaries. The
interwing trade by value is shown in Table 73. Besides the sea¬
borne trade as sho?/n in this table there has been a considerable














1954-55 180.7 17.5 198.2 293.0 12.0 305.0
1955-56 220.7 17.6 238.3 318.9 14.9 333.8
1956-57 235.1 8.9 244.0 510.3 21.6 531.9
1957-58 264.0 5.5 269.5 689.2 12.2 701 .2
1958-59 277.6 11.1 288.7 660.7 25.1 685.8
1959-60 361.0 1.4 362.4 542.6 26.8 569.4
1960-61 355.9 7.6 363.5 800.5 25.0 825.5
1961-62 394.7 7.3 402.2 829.3 25.8 855.1
1962-63 465.3 6.2 471.5 917.5 39.7 957.2
1963-64 508.6 2.6 511.2 844.2q 51.0 895.2
1964-65 536.0 1.1 537.1 856.8 17.7 874.5
1965-66 649.7 2.1 651.8 1189.8 18.8 1208.6
1966-1-61 720.3 18.6 738.9 1304.7 20.1 1324.8
1967-68 778.6 6.3 784.9 1216.6 16.6 1233.2
(Source: Govt, of Pakistan, Central Statistical Office, Bulletin
No.3, Vol.17)
total trade is still small and is mostly confined to certain
perishable commodities, mainly fruit. There are two important
features of the inter-wing trade which should be noted: firstly
that West Pakistan exports about 50 per cent more to Bast
Pakistan than the latter does to the western wing, and,
secondly, the value of re-exports of foreign merchandise from
West to East Pakistan is higher and has generally imcreased
compared to the flow in the other direction. The sudden
decrease after 1964 was due to the war with India in 1965 which
was followed by a more strict import policy.
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Although accurate figures are not available, it is clear
from various Central Statistical Office publications that the
major exports from East Pakistan to the western half are tea,
jute and jute goods, matches, paper and leather. In the
opposite direction the main items are cotton and its products
including garments, rice, finished factory goods, rape and
mustard seed, vegetable oil, tobacco, cement, drugs and
chemicals.
Before going into the political implications of the
domestic trade, which are one of the causes of the political
conflict, it is necessary to look into the relative standing
of the wings in the foreign trade of the state. Despite the
small size, scarcity of resources, high population density and
other handicaps, East Pakistan has contributed a larger share
in the total exports of Pakistan (Table 74, Pig.42). During
the twenty years from 1947 to 1967 East Pakistan's share in
the total exports amounted to about 57.2 per cent by value -
during the year 1966-67 jute and jute products alone constituted
over 50 per cent of the exports - and, by contrast, it received
during the same period only 30.6 per cent of the total foreign
imports.* Out of these twenty years there were only two when
imports into East Pakistan exceeded exports from it in value;
West Pakistan imported more than it exported in all the years
* These figures relate to the visible imports and exports, and
differ from the current account statistics but the overall




East Pakistan West Pakistan Pakistan
Year Im- Ex¬ Bal¬ Im¬ Ex- Bal- Im¬ Ex¬ Bal-
ports ports ance ports ports ance ports ports ance
1947-48 24 273 +249 245 444 + 199 269 717 + 448
1948-49 478 1328 +850 1009 542 - 467 1487 1870 - 383
1949-50 410 683 +273 874 535 - 339 1284 1218 - 66
1950-51 453 1211 +758 1167 1342 + 175 1620 2554 + 934
1951-52 763 1087 +324 1474 922 - 552 2237 2009 - 228
1952-55 366 643 +277 1017 867 - 150 1383 1510 + 127
1953-54 294 645 +351 824 641 - 183 1118 1286 + 168
1954-55 320 732 +412 783 491 - 292 1103 1223 + 120
1955-56 361 1041 +680 964 743 - 221 1325 1784 + 459
1956-57 819 910 + 91 1516 698 - 818 2335 1608 - 727
1957-58 736 988 +252 1314 434 - 880 2050 1422 - 628
1958-59 554 881 +327 1024 444 - 580 1578 1325 - 253
1959-60 655 1080 +425 1806 763 -1043 2461 1843 - 618
1960-61 1015 1259 +244 2173 540 -1633 3188 1799 -1389
1961-62 873 1300 +427 2236 543 -1693 3109 1843 -1266
1962-63 1019 1249 +230 2800 996 -1802 3819 2247 -1572
1963-64 1448 1224 -224 2982 1075 -1907 4430 2299 -2131
1964-65 1702 1268 -434 3672 1140 -2532 5374 2408 -2966
1965-66 1328 1514 +186 2880 1204 -1676 4208 2718 -1490
1966-67 1567 1668 + 101 3625 1338 -2287 5192 3006 -2186
(Sourcej Govt, of Pakistan, 20 Years of Pakistan in Statistics,
1947-67)
except two. This gives an accumulated surplus of 5799 million
rupees during the period to East Pakistan and a deficit of
18680 million rupees to the western wing. The country as a
whole incurred a deficit in the balance of trade amounting to
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12881 million rupees. Since 1960-61 West Pakistan's imports have
been running at a higher level than the total exports of Pakistan,
a fact sufficient to arouse even the most indifferent East
Pakistanis.
Before independence non-Muslims, mainly Hindus, dominated
in the spheres of banking, insurance, trade and commerce, except
a few small Muslim communities in Bombay and other large centres.
After the departure of Hindus and Sikhs in 1947 there was a
shortage not only in the amount of money available but, perhaps
more seriously, in personnel trained in banking and finance.
This vacuum was partly filled by those of the local people who
had some experience in these fields, for example Parsis, but
largely by such Muslim commercial communities as Memons, Khojas
and Ismailies who migrated from India and settled down mostly
in Karachi.* Although many Hindus preferred to stay in East
Pakistan their position was somewhat weakened with the cutting
off of Calcutta where most of them had their connections.**
So, trade and industry remained exclusively under the control
of small well-knit communities who were not identified with
the rest of the population in many ways.***
* Some of these communities were already settled in Karachi
and many of the others, who were mostly in Bombay, had some
connections in Karachi which was a part of Bombay Province till
the separation of Sind in 1935.
** However, it is believed that Hindus in East Pakistan still
have a considerable influence in business, in excess of
their numbers.
*** The Muslim commercial communities of Karachi are mostly
Gujrati speaking, a language not understood in other parts
of the state.
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Another important development was the emergence of
Karachi as the state capital as well as the main financial
centre. As far as East Pakistan was concerned the change
meant a shifting of financial control from Calcutta - pre¬
dominantly Hindu hut located nearby - to Karachi - mostly
Muslim but distant physically a3 well as culturally. Though
independence had brought equal opportunities to the Muslims
of the eastern wing to enter into finance, which had been an
almost exclusive domain of Hindus before 1947, there were two
factors which gave an advantage to those in the western wing,
particularly in Karachi, firstly, there was a relatively
greater shortage of capital in East Pakistan, and, secondly,
businessmen in Karachi were in a better position to obtain
official favours from the central government which was located
in the same city. Both these advantages were fully exploited
by the commercial communities of Karachi to the detriment of
not only East Pakistani businessmen but also of those in other
parts of West Pakistan. The result was that Karachi-based
businessmen and commercial firms gained control of the foreign
and domestic wholesale trade, and the high profits thus obtained
further strengthened their position to the extent that when
various plans for industrialization were launched the same
communities also became the leading industrialists. Their
financial position inevitably brought them considerable
political power which they used, to some extent by entering
into politics, but largely by invisible influence on government
policies.
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These were the conditions which have resulted in the trade
figures given in Tables 73 and 74. Large deficits in the
balance of trade of West Pakistan were caused by the import of
capital goods to set up manufacturing industries which brought
huge profits as a result of protectionist policies, profits
which were either ploughed back to increase the assets or used
to import luxury goods. This fact has been one of the main
issues of discontent in East Pakistan where it has been felt
that the foreign exchange earned by East Pakistani exports has
been used for the benefit of West Pakistan. This is reflected
in the figures on inter-wing trade which show the commanding
position of West Pakistan in relation to the eastern wing.
It is clear from the figures that in the economic situation that
has developed since independence East Pakistan has become more
dependent on the western wing. During the past years nearly
half of the total imports into East Pakistan have come from
the western wing - in 1966-67 43.5 per cent of the total imports
were of West Pakistan origin; on the other hand goods from East
Pakistan constituted less than 20 per cent of the total imports
into West Pakistan - 18.5 per cent in 1966-67. The share of
manufactured goods in the export from West to East Pakistan has
been rising, a fact which many East Pakistanis see as a result
of West Pakistani industrialists' attempts to use the eastern
wing as a market for their products.*
* The greater amount of re-exports from West to East Pakistan
is also interpreted as the result of most of the importers
being based in Karachi who then distribute the goods through
their agents in East Pakistan, thus earning exhorbitant profits.
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It is very difficult to assess the true position within
the two wings because of the lack of information. However,
it seems that there is clearly an imbalance in the pattern of
trade and commerce at this level also and economic arguments
have, therefore, been very prominent in the political
controversies that have recently taken place.
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CHAPTER 12
A MEASURE OP ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
This last chapter of Part III is an attempt to integrate
the various indices that have "been used in the previous
chapters to prepare a single map of the relative levels of
economic development at the district level. Economic issues
have been very prominent in the various political debates during
the last decade, and tliey are certainly going to play an
important role in the coming elections and the subsequent
constitutional wranglings. illthough the lack of statistical
information on incomes and per capita production on the
district and provincial levels makes it difficult to assess
the level of economic development in different areas, the
evidence used in the preceding chapters is sufficient to create
a reasonably accurate picture of the standing of various
districts in almost all fields of economic development.
However, since the main efforts of the governmental development
activity have been directed towards bringing about an economic
parity between the wings, there is more information available
on the inter-wing level. Therefore, before going on to the
task of making a map of economic development it is useful to
have some further discussion of the economic conditions and
particularly the government's attitude towards them.
Although economic development on a planned basis started
in 1955 with the First Five Year Plan, relatively little was
achieved in practice till 1960. The First Plan fell far short
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Table 75..
Sates of Economic Growth






























(jourcei Govt, of Pakistan, Third Five Year Plan, 1965-70)
of its targets and the economy, particularly in East Pakistan,
actually experienced stagnation and decline. Even in West
Pakistan the growth rate only slightly exceeded the increase in
population. For the whole of Pakistan the economic growth
rate barely equalled the population growth rate (Table 75).
Economic growth in East Pakistan till 1959-60 was in fact so
low that the average per capita income actually suffered a
decline of 0.3 per cent. However, since the launching of the
Second Five Year Plan in 1959-60 the situation has changed
mainly because of more vigorous planning made possible by a
strong and stable government. The trend has been towards the
narrowing of the gap between East and West Pakistan; the
average per capita income in West Pakistan in 195960 was 32 per




(in Rupees per annum)
1959-60 1964-65 1969-70 1974-75 1979-80 1984-85
.area (— planned )
Pakistan 340 386 467 577 727 932
East Pakistan 297 340 416 537 709 932
West Pakistan 391 442 531 627 750 932
(Sources Govt. of Pakistan, Third Five Yea# Plan, 1965--70)
come down to 29 per cent. It was planned to reduce it further
to 28 percent in 1969-70, 17 per cent in 1974-75* 6 per cent
in 1979-80 and remove the differential altogether by the end
of the Perspective Plan in 1984-85. The actual figures of per
capita income in the two wings are shown in Table 76.
This trend towards narrowing the economic gap between the
two wings has come about as a result of increasing development
expenditure in the eastern wing, which in turn has been, to a
considerable extent, motivated by growing political discontent
in East Pakistan, Table 77 shows the total development funds
allocation between the wings during the three plan periods.
It can be seen that the allocation in the public sector has
been turning more in favour of East Pakistan, but it should be
remembered that a major portion of the Central government
allocations has been spent in the western wing because of the
location of the central capital and of the centrally administered
areas in that wing.
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gable 77
Inter-wing Allocations of the Development Plans
(Public Sector)
(million rupees)


















(Source: Govt, of Pakistan, Second and Third Five Year Plans)
The performance of the private sector has been more biased
towards West Pakistan, probably to the extent that any advantage
that East Pakistan may have had in the public sector has been
more than offset. The Third Plan recognized this problem thus
"There will, however, be a difference in the role of the
private sector under the Third Plan in East and West
Pakistan. The experience of the Second Plan shows that
the private sector is relatively less active in East
Pakistan. There is no firm estimate of private invest¬
ment for East and West Pakistan separately, but available
information indicates that only about one-third of the
total private investment during the Second Plan period
will have been made in East Pakistan" (Third Plan, 1965,
Despite this the Third Plan allowed for the private sector
investment of Hs, 22,000 million, equally divided between the
wings. As both the Second and Third Plans emphasise in a
number of places the poor performance of private investment
in East and the exceeding of the targets in west Pakistan,
p.101 ).
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Its. 11,000 million in the private sector for 1965-70 seems too
optimistic for the eastern-wing. A shortfall in the private
sector of about 10 per cent in East Pakistan and a similar
over-subscription in the western wing - a very likely possibility
in view of the past experiences and recent political upheavals -
would bring the total development expenditure during the Third
Plan period at par in the two wings. This will mean that East
Pakistan, with greater population, will experience a consequent
shortfall in the estimated growth rate. The performance of
the private sector is probably going to be even more biased
towards West Pakistan for several reasons. Another aspect of
the private investment, which unfortunately cannot be substantiated
by statistics, is its origin. The Second Plan emphasised the
need for transferring private investment and savings from West
to East Pakistan and, if it means that a considerable portion
of private investment is of West Pakistani origin, then the
benefit of development to the East in real terms would be even
smaller. Pig.45 shows the amount of post office savings bank
deposits, which are more representative of small middle class
savings, and a widening gap between the two wings is clearly
noticeable. Considering the higher population of the eastern
one the per capita values would show an even wider gap. This
problem of the shortage of capital in East Pakistan is because
of various economic and historical causes and the disparity
between the two areas existed even before partition.
"Historically the economic growth of East Pakistan has























the two areas started from different levels of develop¬
ment. After Independence, for a variety of reasons, a
larger flow of immigrant capital, enterprise and technical
skills went into West Pakistan than into East Pakistan"
(Second Plan, 1960, p.397).
The shortage of capital in East Pakistan probably worsened
after independence because there is evidence that during the
early stages of economic development regional inequalities tend
to increase
"...rising regional income disparities and increasing
North-South dualism is typical of early development stages,
while regional convergence and a disappearance of severe
North-South problems is typical of the more mature stages
of national growth and development there is a systematic
relation between national development levels and regional
inequality or geographic dispersion" (Williamson, 1965,
p.155).
Williamson has specifically noted the widening gap between the
two wings of Pakistan.
Perhaps more important than growth rates and development
expenditure, to the politicians and public at large, is the
social nature of the process of development, that is the impact
on the real incomes of the population. Despite the large share
of the public sector in development, private investment has
remained important; it has been over 40 per cent in the Third
Plan and probably exceeded the allocated share. The Plan
admitted the problem of the concentration of wealth:
"In Pakistan the process of rapid industrialization based
on the reinvestment of corporate profits, led to the
emergence of a relatively small class of dynamic entrepreneur
who owned and controlled a substantial portion of the small
industrial sector" (Third Plan, 1965» p.117).
The Plan laid down certain measures aimed at a better distribu¬
tion of incomes and wealth but it is too early to expect any
real impact on the whole situation regarding the vertical
distribution of wealth. In view of the large share of the
private sector it is not likely that the measures proposed by
the Plan will have any significant effect. Moreover, the
proposing of remedial measures is one thing, their proper
implementation is quite another. Por example the Third Plan
stated the different measures taken during the Second Plan
period to counter the concentration of wealth in a few hands,
and one of them was the refusal of permission "to holders of
large industrial undertakings to open financial institutions
like banks and insurance companies". This was certainly an
appropriate measure but the plan is silent about its implementa¬
tion, and anyone familiar with the conditions in Pakistan cannot
help thinking that there has not been a proper execution of
this particular proposal. In short, to the millions of common
inhabitants the benefits accrued as a result of development
have meant far less than the impressive growth figures indicate.
"To the ordinary citizen, however, the progress which may
seem impressive to the observer as yet means very little.
Of the scant 2i» increase a year in income, a quarter is
taken back in taxes to provide the balance needed beyond
the massive contributions of foreign aid and investment"
(Spate and Learmonth 1967, p.366).
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Table 78
Distribution of Personal incomes, 1959-60









1 .Lowest group,5% 186 203 80
2.Lower middle group,
45% 222 276 211
5.Upper middle group,
45% 368 398 624
4.Highest group,5% 686 995 2165
(Source: Govt, of Pakistan, The Third Five Year Plan, 1965-70)
As has been stressed a number of times there are no accurate
statistics about the distribution of personal incomes, but there
is some information available from sample surveys in the rural
areas of both the wings and in Karachi (Table 78), The two
important features of Table 78 are: i) the difference between
the rural areas of the two wings; ii) a much greater difference
in the vertical direction, between low and high income groups,
in Karachi, If these figures could be shown in more detail
a greater clustering of incomes would probably be seen towards
the upper part of the highest group. The Third Plan, although
concerned about raising the incomes and decreasing the vertical
differences, ruled out any radical measures to achieve this.
It preferred "a rapid increase in production and employment"
to "a drastic redistribution of existing incomes" in order to
bring about an "enlightened capitalism" and a "greater social
justice".
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However, talcing Pakistan as a whole the development
planning has proved so far quite sound (Spate & Learmonth 1967)
and as a result of it important changes in the economy have
taken place. Besides the growth rates achieved, as shown in
the tables earlier in this chapter, the country has "become an
exporter of manufactured goods while previously almost the
entire exports consisted of raw materials. Table 79 shows the
sectoral allocation of development funds since 1950.
Table 79
Sectoral Priorities in Development
Expenditure, 1950-70
Percent of the total expenditure
in each period
Sectors 1950-55 1955-60 1960-65 1965-70
1.Agriculture 6 7 13 15
2.Industry, fuels and minerals 36 31 28 26
3.Water and power 13 17 19 15
4.Transport and communications 14 17 17 18
5.Physical planning and housing 22 20 15 13
6.Education 5 6 4 5
7.Health 3 2 1 2
8.Manpower and social welfare 1 - - 1
9.Works programme - - 3 5
(Source: Govt, of Pakistan, The Third Pive Year Plan, 1965-
The output and employment of the main sectors of the economy
till 1970 and at the end of the Perspective Plan in 1985 are
given in Table 80.
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Table 80
Structural Changes in the Economy,
1950-1985
Percent of the total in each year
Sectors 1950 1965 1970 1985
OUTPUT
1. Agriculture 60 49 45 36
2. Manufac turing 6 12 14 21
3. Others 34 39 41 43
EMPLOYMENT
1. Agriculture 75 65 62 49
2. Manufacturing 25 11 12 14
3. Others 24 26 37
(Source; Govt, of Pakistan, The Third Five Year Plan, 1965-70)
Enough has been said about the economic inequalities between
East and West Pakistan, and the government's concern to achieve
a parity between the wings in production and per capita incomes.
This may come about, according to the estimates of the Planning
Commission, by the end of the long-range Perspective Plan in
1985. The whole thinking behind the development planning seems
to be dominated by the East-West inequalities, but v/hat about
economic development and per capita incomes on the intra-wing
or the intra-provincial level? The Third Plan contains exaotly
two paragraphs, or half a page, on this issue out of a total
of 549 pages. Obviously West Pakistan, at the present stage,
is economically more advanced than the eastern wing but there
are wide variations from district to district, and the Plan
stresses the lack of data on the district level. However, some
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material has "been collected "by the Central Statistical Office
on inter-district per capita income differentials "but it has
not yet been published.
"Studies to determine the extent of these disparities
(inter-district) in per capita incomes are at present
underway, and specific policies will be recommended as soon
as the final results of these studies become available.
Tentative findings indicate that while the average district
per capita income is higher in West Pakistan than in East,
the deviations from this average are also much more
pronounced in the former. The preliminary results show
that 31 out of 51 districts in West Pakistan and 5 out of
17 in East Pakistan have per capita incomes that are less
than the provincial averages. In fact, there are ten
districts in West Pakistan which have a lower per capita
income than the lowest in East Pakistan. Further comments
will have to await the completion of these studies" (Third
Plan, p.131-32).
No specific proposals were made to counter these inequalities
and the matter was left to the discretion of the respective
provincial governments regarding the actual spending of
resources. The Frontier states and Tribal Agencies, however,
remained central responsibilities.
In order to find out these inter-district disparities an
attempt has been made to derive an index of economic development
by adding together the scores of various districts on four
different indices which have been used in the preceding chapters.
They are: literacy, agricultural productivity per capita of
cultivators, the magnitude of manufacturing and connectivity
by road and rail. The result, which has been reduced in
source: as for App,. XXIII.
Fig, 44. Relative levels of economic development,
(Districts) 1961.
281
relation to the district with lowest rating taken as 1, is
given in Appendix XXIII and plotted on Pig.44. This Pig. is
therefore, a combination of the four Pigs. - 12, 29» 34 and 41.
The important things to note from Pig.44 are: a) the relatively
lower level of economic development in hast Pakistan; b) a
much greater degree of inter-district disparity in West
Pakistan; c) the relatively higher level of the Punjab; and
d) the importance of the provincial metropolitan districts and
port cities. This Pigure is in accordance with the findings
of the Planning Commission and, although it does not represent
absolute figures of incomes or any other economic variable,
it does show with reasonable accuracy the relative standing of
each district on the general level of economic development,
which itself is a rather vague and elusive subject.
On the basis of this economic assessment and the cultural
distributions already considered in the preceding Part this
study turns to political issues with a view to exploring the
two way relationship between the socio-economic and political
realities.
282
PAhi IV POLI'l'ICAL jflSTBIBUTIOHS
Chapter 13 Pattern of Administration
Chapter 14 Political Institutions and
Constitutional Changes





In considering the spatial pattern of administrative
areas, the historical development of the territorial admini¬
stration is discussed "briefly, followed by an account of the
administrative hierarchy that existed at the time of indepen¬
dence. As stated earlier, the District is the "basic administra¬
tive unit and since independence very few changes in fact have
taken place in the pattern of Districts. In many ways the
administrative heritage of the British period has hampered
political integration "because of the imprint of the administra¬
tive boundaries not only upon the landscape "but also on the
minds of the people over a period of generations. At the same
time this heritage has proved to "be "beneficial insofar as it
provided a well-established adtoinistrative system which,
despite the difficulties caused by partition, was able to
support the running of an entirely new state created almost
overnight. Although the pattern of administrative districts
has not changed much, there has been important reorganization
regarding the provinces and princely states. These changes are
discussed and, finally, the role of the Givil Service as the
actual wielders of power, and of the armed forces, which have
been a most significant political force since the 1958 Martial
Law, are considered.
The British had evolved a complex pattern of administration
in the subcontinent to maintain law and order and to collect
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revenue. Before them the Moguls too had an elaborate admini¬
strative machinery for the same purposes. In each case the
territory was divided into various levels of administrative
areas controlled by appointed officials, either drawing salaries
or having rights to collect revenue for themselves. However,
the British system was more comprehensive and extended to the
whole of the subcontinent. This was the system which was
inherited by both Pakistan and India at the time of independence.
Although many changes have taken place since 1947, the basic
pattern of administration in Pakistan remains very much the
same as it was before independence..
Before independence the British Empire in the subcontinent
in fact consisted of two 'Indias'j the 'native India' and the
'British India'. The first one included over 500 semi-
autonomous principalities, called 'states', scattered all over
the subcontinent and ranging in area from over 80,000 square
miles to 0.29 square mile. The degree of autonomy in these
states also varied greatly according to their individual
treaties with the British government. Some had the right to
issue their own currencies and postage stamps and to maintain
small armies, while others were no more than small feudal
estates. The only thing that they had in common was their
allegiance to the British crown which they served well. The
British had the right to remove any ruler who proved recalcitrant,
and replace him by any of his relations.
The 'British India' consisted of several categories of
administrative areas based, in some cases, vaguely on linguistic
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distributions. These areas could be grouped into three broad
categories: a) Governor's Provinces; b) Chief Commissioner's
Provinces; c) Tribal and Special Areas. The Governor's
Provinces were the most important with highly developed
administrative machinery and the greatest amount of represen¬
tative government. Chief Commissioner's Provinces were also
directly administered areas and some of them, like Baluchistan,
were directly under the Central Government with no elected
provincial administrations. Tribal Areas, or Agencies as they
were called, were subject to only a minimal administrative
control. Although parts of the 'British India', the Agencies
were in fact more autonomous than the princely states. That
they were kept under the empire at great military expenditure,
particularly those in the northwest, was because of their
strategic importance.
Although the British had established themselves at
Calcutta about the middle of the eighteenth century, it was
not before the later half of the nineteenth century that the
whole of the subcontinent came under their control. Bengal
was naturally the first area to be taken over but it was not
until 1872 that they could annex Assam. In the West Pakistan
area Sind was annexed in 1943» the Punjab in 1849 and by 1860
the British control had reached most of the trans-Indus areas.
However, the provinces that existed at the time of independence
were created later as the lines of transport developed and
administration became more intensive. The North Western
Frontier Province (NWFP) was separated from the Punjab as a
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Governor's province in 1901 because of administrative
convenience but the new province also conformed, to some
extent, to the cultural distributions. Sind remained a part
of Bombay till 1935 when it was separated and constituted as
a new province. In the east the Bengal province proved too
large for effective administration and therefore it was
partitioned in 1905 creating a new province consisting of East
Bengal and Assam. The partition was, however, annulled in
1911 and East Bengal was rejoined to West Bengal, though Assam
remained a separate province. There were no main changes in
the administrative pattern after 1935.
Pakistan inherited areas belonging to all the three
categories mentioned above.* These main categories of
administrative areas are shown in Pig.45. In East Pakistan
there has been a uniformity in administration as this wing
inherited only the administered districts. The only change
* 1. Governor's Provinces:
The partitioned half of Bengal with one district of
Assam, Sylhet.
The partitioned half of the Punjab.
Sind.
TOP.
2. Chief Commissioner's Province:
Baluchistan.
3. Princely States:
Bahawalpur in the Punjab.
Khairpur in Sind.
Kalat, Mekran, Kharan and Lasbela in Baluchistan.
Swat, Dir, Chitral and Amb in the NWFP.
4. Tribal areas:
Tribal Agancies of North and South Waziristan, Kurram,
Khyber, Mohmand and Malakand in the NWPP.
Some tribal areas attached to various administered
districts.
Fig. 45. Pattern of Administration, 1947.
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was that one Muslim majority district of Assam province,
Sylhet, was also awarded to Pakistan after a referendum. All
the other districts belonged to the province of Bengal. By
comparison the administrative nature of the West Pakistan area
was complex as its provinces included all the three categories
of administrative areas except that there were no tribal areas
in Sind. Before looking at the changes that have taken place
since independence it is useful to examine briefly the
administrative hierarchy within the provinces.
The provinces were divided by the British into Districts,
two or more of which were grouped into Divisions. As explained
in Chapter 2 the Districts were further subdivided into Tehsils,
Talukas or Thanas. At each level of these administrative areas
there was an official who was in charge of all the administrative
functions of the government. Pig.46 shows the hierarchy of
administrative functions, both executive and judicial. It is
clearly noticeable that the District was the most important
level of local administration, and the Deputy Commissioner or
his equivalent was the key official in charge of a District.
There was a separation of judicial and executive functions, the
former under the control of the District and Sessions Judge,
who had below him Civil Judges dealing with civil actions.
Criminal judicial functions were performed by Magistrates who
also had to perform executive duties. In their judicial
functions they were under some control of the District Judge
and in executive matters the Deputy Commissioner was their
immediate superior. At the Tehsil level the Tehsildar or his
Levels of Executive Judicial
administrati on functions functione
Province Governor or High Court or
Chief Commissioner Judicial Commissioner
Division ., Commissioner
District Deputy Commissioner, District and













equivalent, directly under the Deputy Commissioner, was mainly
concerned with the collection of land revenue and other
executive functions, "but he also performed some minor judicial
duties. The Deputy Commissioner was the central figure in the
whole administrative machinery and his main task was the
maintenance of law and order, and the collection of revenue.
All officials in the district were subordinate to him except
the judicial officers who worked directly under the supervision
of the District Judge.
Above the level of the District the District and Sessions
Judge was under the supervision of the High Court. On the
executive side two or more districts were grouped in a Division
under a Commissioner who also acted as a court of appeal against
the decisions of the Deputy Commissioner in matters related to
land revenue. The Commissioner worked directly under the
provincial administration headed by the Governor. So, it was
a highly developed bureaucratic system which efficiently
maintained the British empire for over a century.
To run this efficient bureaucratic system the British had
evolved a complex civil service structure with various central
and provincial branches. At the top of this structure was the
elite Indian Civil Service (ICS) whose members filled most of
the administrative posts in the districts and divisions as
well as in the central and provincial secretariats.* In the
* In addition the members of the ICS were also appointed to
judicial posts in the districts as well as in the High Courts.
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beginning the ICS was exclusively filled by the British
personnel, but later its ranks were opened to the 'Indians'
as a result of the 'Indianization' and 'democratization'
policy. By the time of independence nearly half of its members
were 'Indians'. This ICS, with a little over a thousand members,
was responsible, assisted by the Army, for the running of the
empire and all other branches of the central and provincial
civil services were subordinate to it. The 'Indian' 103
officers by their training became thoroughly British in outlook
and identified themselves with the colonial rulers rather than
with the native population. The relationship between the
district and divisional administrators and the people remained
formal. To the common man the Deputy Commissioner was a
representative of the British crown and the Viceroy, and the
people exercising power were remote from the vast majority of
the population.
Since independence, although the basic structure of
administration has remained more or less the same, there have
been some Important changes in the form of administrative areas.
The pattern of administration inherited by Pakistan at the
time of independence (Pig.45) was uniform in the eastern wing
but West Pakistan contained a variety of administrative areas.
This variety of administrative areas, though useful in the
British period when the main objectives were law and order and
revenue collection, was not very suitable for an independent
state where economic development and co-ordination of planning
are important functions. It is necessary to create an
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administrative homogeneity in order to achieve homogeneity in
the cultural and economic spheres. However, the administrative
pattern continued substantially unchanged from 1947 to 1955.
The two important administrative changes that took place during
this period were the creation of a federal district of Karachi
around the state capital and the inclusion of the princely
state of Amb into the NWFP. All other areas remained unaffected.
Amb was the smallest and probably the most retrograde feudal
state acceding to Pakistan with a population of only about
50,000. On February 16, 1949> the Provincial Assembly of the
NWFP passed a resolution requesting the central government to
take over the administration of Amb (Wilcox 1963). Its
territory was then gradually taken over and added to the
adjoining administered districts and by 1953 the state had all
but vanished; the ruler was left with only about 15 square
miles (ibid).
Unlike the Congress Party in India, the Muslim League had
no clear policy about the integration of the princely states.
In the years immediately after independence the main concern
in Pakistan was to secure the legal accession of the state
rulers to Pakistan. By March 17, 1948, all the state rullers
had signed the instruments of accession which were accepted
by the central government. The position of the rulers within
their states was, however, not affected and they continued
with their powers and privileges as before independence.
Throughout this period the central government and the Constituent
Assembly were concerned with framing the constitution (see
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Chapter 14) and nothing was done towards administrative reforms.
However, when the draft of the constitution was at last prepared
in 1954 it was intended to provide for a federal system in
which the states were assured of their separate existence as
federated units. This draft was, however, not able to become
the actual constitution as the Constituent Assembly was dissolved
before it could pass.it. This period did not bring any change
in the status of Tribal Areas.
The most important administrative change came in 1955
with the integration of the provinces of West Pakistan. As
will be discussed in Chapter 14 this step was not taken
primarily as an administrative reform but was in fact a
political move. Although there were proposals to merge the
provinces into a single administrative unit during the time of
the first Constituent Assembly, opposition, mainly from East
Pakistan and Sind, did not allow any definite step to be taken.
It was after the Assembly had been dismissed that the central
government prepared a definite plan of merger which was accepted
by the second Constituent Assembly and the new unit of West
Pakistan came into being on October 14, 1955. The new
administrative pattern as it emerged as a result of the
integration is shown in Pig.47. It can be seen that it brought
some important changes compared to Pig.45. Hot only the
provinces and their boundaries vanished but also all the
princely states in the Punjab, Slnd and Baluchistan. Kalat,
Mekran, Kharan and Khairpur were incorporated within the
administrative framework of West Pakistan as individual
Fig. 47. Fattem of Adainistration, 1955.
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districts, and Bahawalpur was integrated in the form of three
districts, that of Bahawalpur, Bahawalnagar and Hahimyar Khan.
For the first time a large part of the western wing came under
a unifoim administration. The district of Karachi, although
it remained a federal area, was also put under the jurisdiction
of the West Pakistan government for actual administration.
However, the states in the NWFP were allowed to go on as
before, enjoying all their previous rights. Although no
official explanation of this was given, the exemption granted
to these states was certainly because of their strategic
location. The government feared that the state rulers might
create some trouble, backed by the Afghanistan government who
had supported the cause of Pathan autonomy, if their states
were taken over. The Tribal Areas too remained the same for
the same reasons.
As expected there was considerable opposition from the
state rulers, particularly of the Baluchistan states, to the
mergfer plan but on the whole the government were able to
overcome such difficulties. The main opposition, however,
came from East Pakistan who saw this as a move to counter the
population superiority of the eastern wing; and from Sind,
NWFP and Baluchistan who feared the domination of numerically
and economically superior Punjab. The central government did
manage to overcome this opposition as well by using all sorts
of means, foul and fair. There is no need to emphasise that
there was no need of any such administrative change in the
eastern wing except that its official name was changed from
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Bengal to East Pakistan when the one unit of West Pakistan was
created by the merger of the provinces.
This administrative pattern continued as shown in Pig.47
till the spring of 1970. One point which must be noted is that
despite these changes the basic pattern of districts did not
undergo any alterations and the administrative hierarchy which
existed at the time of independence (Pig,46) continued to
function.
During the strongly centralised rule of Ayub Khan the
opposition to the one unit of West Pakistan grew stronger
because of various political reasons explained later. The
result was that when his government fell in 1969 the new Martial
Law government at once promised to break up West Pakistan
into the former provinces as soon as possible to placate the
bitter opposition resulting in violence that had erupted during
the winter of 1968-69. Accordingly on March 30, 1970, the
former provinces re-emerged as the administrative units that
they had been before 1955. Nevertheless, the reorganization,
which is still going on, did not lead to exactly the same
administrative pattern as that of the pre-integration period,
firstly the states in the Punjab, Sind and Baluchistan which
had been absorbed have not re-emerged. They will remain as
administered districts within their respective provinces.
Secondly, during this reorganization the government took the
opportunity to integrate the states of the NWPP which had
hitherto remained an administrative incongruity. The Tribal
Areas, however, once again have been left out and they are
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scheduled to continue as before. Thirdly, the district of
Karachi has "been returns d to 3ind of which it was a part before
1947. The new administrative pattern (Pig.48) is on the one
hand more complex than its predecessor (Pig.47) as the former
provincial boundaries have been recreated but on the other it
is simplified in that it has removed the states of the NWFP
by integrating them as regular districts. The only areas which
remain out of line from the rest of Pakistan are the Tribal
Agencies of the NWPP. It remains to be seen if another
political upheaval will bring them into uniformity with the
rest of the wing.
Apart from these changes in the spatial pattern of
administration, equally important is the role of the civil
service and its political and social implications. The civil
servants as the wielders of actual administrative power usually
remain obscure from the eyes of the public but in actual fact
much that a government and politicians do is related to the
attitudes of the civil servants. They are not only important
in the execution of policies but are equally significant in
their formulation. Since independence the bureaucratic nature
of the government in Pakistan has not changed very much.
In fact the powers of bureaucracy have increased in more than
one way.
On partition the members of the civil service were given
the option to go into either of the two successor states.
Because the Muslims had taken to modern education less readily




Source: Pakistan News. |
Fig, 43, Pattern of AcLiainistrat ion t 1970,
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their proportion in the population, and therefore comparatively
much fewer trained civil servants in senior appointments became
Pakistanis. There were only 82 members of the IOS and the
Indian Political Service who opted for Pakistan in 1947
(Callard 1957). As a successor to the ICS the Pakistan
Government set up a Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) which
recruited and trained new officers to fill the shortage of
administrative personnel. Before independence the civil
servants were only concerned with the maintenance of law and
order and the collection of revenue, but now they had the
additional and more important duties of planning and development
to fulfil. Nevertheless, the training of the new recruits was
continued on the same lines as before independence, producing
alienated young officers who looked back to the ICS traditions
for inspiration. In administrative matters they proved almost
as efficient as their ICS predecessors. Their role in the
political life of the state is directly related to the
political conditions as described in Chapter 14. The dis¬
location caused by partition, large influx of refugees and the
setting up of a new capital and the machinery of the central
government put a huge strain on the resources of the state.
The civil servants had enormous problems in running the whole
administration machinery, the creation of many new ministries
and departments. It must be said in fairness that they
fulfilled their responsibilities very ably and it was they who
carried the major task of steering Pakistan through those
difficult years. After the death of Liaquat All Khan, the
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first Prime Minister, in 1951 and with the decline of the
Muslim League the civil servants "became more important because
of the changing governments at the centre and the provinces.
The politicians were too busy in their political intrigues and
the constitutional controversies, and the actual government
was very much left to the civil servants. Moreover, during
the periods when provincial governments were dismissed by the
central government under Section 93 of the Government of India
Act and the assemblies dissolved, the whole governmental
machinery was run by civil servants under the supervision of
the Governors. Thus, although the legal powers of the Civil
Service were the same as before independence, they could be
used more effectively in the changed circumstances. Even
provincial chief ministers and their colleagues were in many
ways dependent on district officials because of their powers
to influence voters and landlords. Two civil servants, though
they did not belong to the ICS, rose to be Governors-General
and one to be Prime Minister.
The power of the civil servants was enhanced when
Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed, a former civil servant,
dissolved the Constituent Assembly and appointed a non-party
cabinet to rule the state. His Minister of Interior, also a
civil servant, said:
"You cannot have the old British system of administration
(and) at the same time allow politicians to meddle with
the civil service. In the British system the District
Magistrate was the king-pin of administration. His
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authority was unquestioned. We have to restore that"
(quoted in Callard 1957).
This man, Iskandar Mirza, later became Governor-General and
the first president of Pakistan, and it was he who imposed
Martial Law on October 8, 1958. Such was the importance of
the civil servant in administration and politics. After the
election of the second Constituent Assembly in 1955 there
again followed a period of falling governments and shifting
loyalties. One day a particular member of the Assembly was
in opposition, the next day he had joined the government by
changing his party loyalty, and so on. The civil service
again remained important in running the administration and it
was during this period that corruption also got into the ranks
of the high officials. In the years immediately before the
Martial Law of 1958 conditions were worst, politicians were
desperately trying to remain in power so that they could turn
the coming elections to their advantage, and the conduct of
the civil servants was being openly questioned.
.After the proclamation of Martial Law in October, 1958,
the government set about cleaning the morass created by the
political conditions of the past years. First of all the past
record of all the politicians who had held public offices or
who had been members of the central and provincial assemblies
was examined, and those found guilty of misconduct were debarred
from public life for varying terms. Then the government under¬
took a screening process of the entire civil service. Many
civil servants, including some very senior members of the G3P
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were dismissed, retired or sent on leave leading to retirement
on account of charges of corruption and inefficiency. Some
of them were even imprisoned. This was the first "blow that
the civil service had suffered since its establishment. ho
civilian government was strong enough to make any changes in
the administrative structure and the power of the civil
servants had gradually grown. However, after this initial blow
to the civil service the Ayub regime soon discovered that, in
spite of Martial Law, they could not function and carry out
their policies without the support of the civil service. In
fact, in the absence of any representative government it was
discovered that the civil servants would have to be taken
into confidence and given considerable powers. After the
first few years of the Ayub regime the power of the civil
service increased more than ever. Even after the introduction
of the 1962 Constitution and the restoration of civilian
government and democratic institutions the civil service
gathered greater influence and power. As explained in Chapter
14, the 1962 Constitution, although it established elected
representatives at every level of the administrative areas,
did not allow much power to the various elected bodies. In
fact with the provision for the civil servants to be chairmen
of the various councils, the Deputy Commissioner and the
Commissioner were now not only responsible for law and order
but they became also the appointed guardians of democracy. As
a result of the increased development and planning activity
after 1960 the civil service obtained additional economic
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powers because of their considerable influence in the framing
of the policy, the granting of various licenses and entirely
controlling the actual expenditure of development funds.
Members of the CSP, who rarely had any specialized training,
were often appointed to such specialized agencies as the Water
and Power Development Authority, Pakistan Industrial Develop¬
ment Corporation and so on. Whenever there was any devolution
of administrative powers the District and Divisional officers
were vested with more functions, and power, instead of gradually
flowing into the hands of the elected representatives, became
concentrated into the hands of a few civil servants. One
illustration of the influence of the civil service is the
fact that when the Pay and Services Commission appointed by
Ayub Khan in 1959 submitted its report in 1962, it was kept
secret for "further study". It has been said that because the
report recommended radical reforms in administration by
abolishing the CSP and joining all the categories of public
servants into a single cadre, the higher civil servants were
powerful enough to get this report shelved and unimplemented
(von Yorys 1965). It is a fact that the report has never been
published.
Another aspect of the civil service which is equally
important in this study is the representation in it of the
two wings. Of the 82 of the ICS and the Political Service
personnel which Pakistan received at the time of independence
only two were from East Pakistan (Callard op.cit.); the rest
were either from West Pakistan, mainly the Punjab, or from
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United Provinces or other areas which had gone to India;
some British officers also chose to serve in Pakistan. Because
of the shortage of East Pakistanis in the civil service
persons from West Pakistan had to he posted in the eastern
wing at all levels of the administration, and the attitude
of some of these towards the East Pakistani people was far
from satisfactory. Their arrogant Behaviour and a sense of
superiority earned unpopularity not only for themselves hut
also for the whole of West Pakistan, particularly the Punjab.
After independence the recruitment to the GSP and all
other branches of the central civil service was put on a quota
basis in order to give a fair representation to all areas.
After a written examination and an oral test, 20 per cent of
the vacancies were filled strictly on merit, the rest were
equally divided between the wings i.e. 40 per cent each to
East and West Pakistan. Within West Pakistan the vacancies
were again allotted to the provinces on the basis of
proportional representation. Although this recruitment policy
has been fair regarding the new recruits entering the civil
service after independence, so far the original imbalance
between the wings has not been removed. This unfavourable
position of East Pakistan has been a source of considerable
tension between the wings and East Pakistanis have expressed
their dissatisfaction time and again. Besides this imbalance
between the wings in the number of persons in the civil service
there has been an added cause of grievance regarding the
postings of civil servants. East Pakistanis have always
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complained that all the important civil service jobs in the
central government have been held by persons from West
Pakistan. Some figures tend to prove these allegations
(Table 81).
There are no exact figures available but it is certain
that within West Pakistan the same sort of imbalance exists
between the provinces despite the fact that even after the
integration of West Pakistan recruitment on the basis of the
former provincial areas had been continued. Moreover, some
areas have felt that the recruitment policy, although
apparently fair, has benefited only some particular groups.
For example, the vacancies alloted to Sind appear to have been
filled beyond an acceptable proportion by non-Sindhi settlers,
who have been educationally more advanced (Chapter 6), and not
by the local inhabitants of Sind. There is no doubt about
the fact that the higher ranks of the civil servants have
been dominated by Punjabis and the Urdu speaking refugees.
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After the new Martial Law government took over in 1969 they
appointed six Last Pakistani secretaries in the central
government and the news was prominently published in the
papers.
Another important group which has "become, during the
past years, even more significant politically, is the aimed
forces. The services - army, navy and the air force - became
directly involved in politics and administration in October,
1958, when Martial Law was proclaimed. However, there are
indications that long before Martial Law some army officers
had been taking an interest in the political conditions of the
state. In his autobiography Ayub Khan (1967) has reproduced
a memorandum which he wrote in 1954 when he was C.-in-C. of
the Army. This is a political document in which he reviewed
briefly the political conditions in Pakistan and sketched a
plan for constitutional, economic and legal reforms for the
state. One may ask why a serving soldier should write a
political essay and lay down specific proposals for constitutional
and economic reform. It may just be coincidence but there is
a marked resemblance between what he wrote in 1954 and what he
did after coming to power in 1958. This raises a number of
interesting points but they are not relevant here. The
constitution that he introduced in 1962 was almost exactly
on the lines he proposed in the 1954 document. However, even
if the army and other armed forces generally were not interested
in politics before 1958, they did become very much involved
after that and have remained so till the present. Even after
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Martial Law had heen lifted and the civilian government
restored "by Ayub Khan the army, though no longer active in
politics, was the main source of strength for the president.
He remained the supreme commander of the armed forces and,
by virtue of being a Field Marshal, did not leave the active
ranks of the army. Moreover, when he was forced to resign he
handed over power to another Martial Law regime. So, the
armed forces, particularly the army, is at present a
significant political force in Pakistan.
Provincial representation in the armed forces is once
again a very highly unbalanced picture (Table 81).
Table 81
Representation of the Wings in the Armed Forces
(Senior Officers), 1956*
Positions


























* No authentic figures of a more recent date, regarding the
representation of the wings or of provinces in the Civil
and Armed Services, are available.
304
The causes of this imbalance actually date back to the British
days and to the mental inclination of the East Pakistani people.
They have always tended to be averse to employment in the
armed forces though some regulations regarding recruitment,
like the physical qualifications, have tended to be biased
against them. Traditionally the Punjab and the NWFP have been
more inclined towards military professions, but after twenty
years of independence this unequal representation in the
services is an obvious politically explosive issue particularly
when in the economic and political fields there have been
many grievances of East Pakistan against the central government
and West Pakistan. Reoently the government has been giving
some thought to removing this disparity in the services as
for example:
"The beginning of proportional representation of East
Pakistanis in the Army was made when a platoon of the
East Bengal Regiment, the Junior Tigers, was inducted into
the Frontier Force Regiment ... at a parade at Dacca
stadium" (Pakistan News, London, Feb. 1, 1970, p.3).
and
"the C.-in-C. of Pakistan Navy, Vice-Admiral Muzaffar
Hasan, in a speech in Ghittagong on March 5 regretted that
although 40 per cent of sailors of Pakistan Navy came from
East Pakistan, the number of officers from this Wing was
not satisfactory" (ibid., April 1, 1970, p.1).
If detailed figures on the provincial level were available it
is very likely that relatively small representation from Sind
as well would be shown. The army, and the other branches of
the services, are predominantly Punjabi and Pathan. During
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the last years of Ayub Khan's regime when feelings in East
Pakistan against him and the western wing were high, the units
of Pakistan Army stationed in East Pakistan were openly labelled
by some as an 'army of occupation' and as instruments of
Punjabi domination. If the policies of the present government
are carried through vigorously the imbalance between the wings
will no doubt decrease but it will take some time to bring
about proportional representation in the civil service and the
armed forces. Now with the re-creation of the provinces the
question may no longer be that of differences between the wings
but also of those between the four provinces of West Pakistan.
As things stand at present in the administrative distributions,
there is the same sort of inter-wing differentials as found
in the case of various economic distributions and this time
the magnitude of the differentials is even higher. Apart from
that the pattern of administration has undergone a change
towards uniformity since independence though the pace of change
has been slow. It has been shown that vested interests tend
to make administrative reform, like all other reforms, difficult
to carry out by normal democratic process. All the major
changes have taken place as a result of executive pressure.
The anomaly of the Tribal Areas still remains but since it
involves some external factors, particularly the relations






The actual history of the constitutional development is
not of particular relevance to this study. However, it is
necessary to consider the main features of the various
controversies over constitutional provisions for two reasons.
Pirstly, they illustrate the role that religion has played in
the post-independence politics, a question very much relevant
to the present work. Secondly, they also show the attitude
of the various provinces particularly in relation to the
division of powers "between the central and provincial govern¬
ments, i.e. the question of federalism versus a unitary system.
Almost the entire history of Pakistan has "been dominated
"by the efforts to shape a constitution for the State. There
has been a general lack of agreement among the various interested
groups not only about the general shape of the constitution
but very often on small insignificant points with the result
that all attempts to work the various constitutions have ended
in failure. As pointed out in Chapter 2, there was no real
effort before independence to sort out some of the constitutional
problems which were bound to be faced once partition had taken
place. So immediately after the partition the energies of the
new state were sapped by its efforts to frame a constitution,
energies which at that critical stage should have been more
usefully employed towards solving the social and economic
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problems that arose as a result of the general dislocation.
Before noting the actual constitutional changes that have taken
place since 1947, it is appropriate to consider the political
institutions which existed at the time of independence.
For centuries the subcontinent had remained under one
form or another of absolute rule and when the British formally
took over in 1857 a highly centralized and absolute system of
government was built up to administer the British Indian
Empire. However, after the turn of the century various
legislative measures were gradually taken to allow increasing
participation of the native inhabitants in government and
administration, though the supremacy and the control of the
centre was maintained. Modern political institutions in Pakistan
and India developed only during the fifty years prior to
independence and owe their origin to the western, particularly
British, ideas of democracy, but there is a fundamental
difference in the growth of democratic institutions between
the subcontinent and western Europe. While in the latter such
institutions grew as a result of a conscious effort on the
part of the people to wrest power from the traditional rulers
and ruling classes, in the subcontinent every step towards
democracy was taken as a result of a concession granted by the
colonial rulers, except in the later part of the British rule
when pressure from the local inhabitants was considerable.
The history of the constitutional development and the growth
of political institutions in the subcontinent has been discussed
in detail in various published works (e.g. Sayeed 1968; Symonds
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1950; Coupland 1944; etc.). Such historical material has
limited relevance here except to point out that the divergence
"between the Muslim and Hindu communities had become a political
fact during the last century, though the Muslim League, the
first political organization of the Muslims, was formed only
in 1906. Although there were some attempts to bring the two
communities closer - at one stage they did formally come together
in what is known as the Lucknow Pact of 1916 - the differences
between the two were too wide to be permanently bridged. Even
long before the Muslim League demanded partition and independence
it was almost always at loggerheads with the Congress on nearly
all constitutional and legislative measures proposed or imple¬
mented by the British government. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (d.1898),
a modernist Muslim leader in the later half of the nineteenth
century, frequently and publicly expressed his fears of the
numerical superiority of the Hindus (Stephen 1964; Sayeed 1968).
The result had been a disagreement between the two communities,
or at least between their two main parties, on all-important
political issues and reforms, particularly the Morley-Minto
Reforms of 1906; the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919; the
Government of India Act of 1935; and the Cabinet Mission Plan
of 1946. The basis of all these differences was the League's
fear of Hindu domination and their insistence on safeguarding
the interests of the largest minority. The Congress was,
however, opposed to any such proposals and insisted rather on
•India' being one nation and that it should remain one state.
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By 1347» when independence and partition came, the gradual
process of democratization and 'Indian!zation' of political
institutions had reached a stage whereby in all provinces of
British India there was an elected parliamentary system of
government. Besides a central legislature and a cabinet,
there were provincial Legislative Assemblies and cabinets of
ministers headed by their respective chief ministers. The
chief executive authority was the Viceroy in Delhi, represented
by a Governor or Chief Commissioner in each province. The
working constitution was the Government of India Act of 1935.
This Act allowed for a federal system of government with
provinces having a considerable degree of internal autonomy,
but in practice there were many safeguards in the Act which
ensured the supremacy of the British.
Another important feature of the Act was the provision
of separate electorates on a religious basis, i.e. the Muslims
had their separate constituencies from which only Muslims could
be returned. In those provinces where they were in a minority
they were given some weighting in excess of their percentage
of the population. No such favours were, however, given to
Hindus in provinces where they formed minorities. Besides their
own seats the Muslims could also vote in and contest the general
constituencies, though in practice the Congress controlled
most of them. The franchise was restricted on the basis of
property and education and, although the actual conditions
differed from province to province, only about 15 per cent of
the population was eligible to vote (Callard 1957). Although
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separate electorates were given constitutional recognition
in the Indian Councils Act of 1909» Muslims had remained
politically very weak. Since they were generally poor relative
to Hindus, especially in Bengal, the property requirements for
the right to vote did not make much difference in spite of
all the weighting. In the Bengal Legislative Council, the
province where they were in a majority, they had only five out
of the total twenty-eight elected members, in the Punjab,
another Muslim majority province, there was not a single
Muslim elected member (Ambedkar 1946). These were the
circumstances that made the Muslims believe that under a Joint
electoral system in a united India they would always remain at
a disadvantage. However, under the Government of India Act
of 1935 and with the broadening of the electorate the League
was able to win most of the Muslim seats in the 1945-46 elections.
Moreover, they were able to form the government only in Bind
and in the rest of the Muslim majority provinces the League
sat as the main opposition party. After partition the position
was changed. The outflow of non-Muslims and the inflhw of
Muslims rendered all areas predominantly Muslim. The
partitioned half of Bengal, which became Pakistan, had a large
Muslim majority even though most of the non-Muslim population
decided to stay on. The Muslim League was now able to form
governments in all the provinces.
After independence no new elections were held and the
central legislative assembly, which was indirectly elected in
1946 from the various provincial assemblies, was divided into
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two to form the central legislatures of Pakistan and of India.
Members of the central assembly in the undivided India did not
represent any territorial constituencies but were elected 'en
bloc' proportionally by each provincial legislature. The
Pakistan portion of the assembly, consisting of less than 69
members, became the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan.
It was originally elected to perform two functions, i.e. to
act as a constituent assembly to amend the Government of India
Act and also to act as the central legislature. After indepen¬
dence, besides performing these two functions, its major task
was to continue to frame a new constitution for the state, and
till then it was to continue with all its previous functions.
Throughout its life it sat separately for the two different
sets of functions and its proceedings were also published
separately as the 'Debates of the Constituent Assembly' and the
'Debates of the Constituent Assembly (Legislature)'. While
in its latter role it was like any other elected parliament
with cabinet government, in its former capacity it was in
theory above party politics. The cabinet ministers sat as
ordinary members and there were no government and opposition
parties. However, in practice there was not any difference
when it sat for either business and the government acted as
the party in power even when the Assembly debated constitutional
matters.
Pakistan inherited the Government of India Act of 1935
as a working constitution and the Constituent Assembly made a
number of amendments in the Act according to need. The Act,
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as has been noted earlier, set up a federal system of
parliamentary government with the centre having many over¬
riding and residuary powers. The most important was the
Section 93 under which the central government, i.e. the head
of the state, could at any time dismiss a provincial government
and legislature, and assume direct control of the province
through its governor or chief commissioner who, in all cases,
was a nominee of the Viceroy or the Governor General. The
main features of the Act have been shown diagramatically in a
simple form in Fig.49. The solid arrows show the electoral
system and the broken ones the direction of political and
administrative controls. Below the level of the province the
local government consisted of elected Municipal Committees/
Corporations in towns/cities and District Boards for the rural
areas of each district. Their main functions included health
and sanitation, primary education, some roads and other public
utilities. They were rather like miniature parliaments and
their chairmen were elected from among their members.
For a study of the salient constitutional and administrative
changes since independence it is convenient to divide the past
twenty-three years into four periods} 1) the First Constituent
Assembly, 1947-1954; 2) the Second Constituent Assembly, 1955-
1956; 3) the First Constitution, 1956-1958; and 4) Martial Law
and the Second Constitution, 1958-1969.
The First Constituent Assembly} The first Constituent Assembly
of Pakistan, which had been elected in 1946 indirectly by
Viceroy
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provincial assemblies on the "basis of communal groups and
proportional representation, met for the first time in Karachi
on August 10, 1947. The Assembly was originally elected for
the whole of the British India before independence and partition
had been conceded. So, its division into two parts, one each
for Pakistan and India, was a development which was not in
view at the time of its election. Although the members of the
Assembly were elected at the ratio of one to each million
inhabitants, the total authorized membership of the Pakistan
Assembly at the time of its inauguration was sixty-nine, a
little less than it should have been. Some of these members
decided to remain in India and at least six non-Muslim members
later resigned and migrated to India, their constituents having
already left Pakistan. However, in time the membership was
gradually increased to give representation to the refugees
and the princely states. Towards the end of its life in 1954
the Assembly thus had seventy-nine seats of which four non-
Muslim seats were lying unfilled. In no session of the
Assembly were all the members present, the maximum number
recorded at a division was 53 and often the attendance was only
around forty. Callard (1957) has discussed the reasons for
poor attendance in detail. Perhaps the most important reason
was the fact that many members accepted various offices in
the central and provincial governments or diplomatic appoint¬
ments abroad and did not care to either resign their seats
in the Assembly or attend its sessions more regularly. Another
reason was the short duration of the sessions for which the
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Assembly was called so that many members did not take the
trouble to travel to Karachi from far off places only to be
there for a short time.
Until 1954 the Muslim League controlled the central and
all the provincial legislatures, and whenever there was a
vacancy in the Assembly it was sufficient to secure the
nomination of the Central Parliamentary Board of the League to
be elected, The total strength of the opposition in a division
never exceeded fifteen. Although there were a few Muslim
dissidents in the Assembly, the opposition mainly consisted
of the Hindu members, mostly from East Pakistan, belonging
to the Pakistan National Congress, the partitioned remnant
of the Indian National Congress, the ruling party in India.
This opposition was not only small in numbers but was totally
ineffective because the members belonged to a party, and to
a religious community, which had strongly opposed the idea of
Pakistan. The opposition members, instead of levelling
effective criticism at the government were occupied all the
time in saving themselves from being labelled as traitors.
As has been said earlier the main task of the Assembly
was to frame a constitution and in the meanwhile to amend the
Government of India Act of 1935 whenever necessary. During
its life it passed 44 amendments to the Act Including the
provision for adult franchise. In constitution-making the
first major step was taken in the form of the Objectives
Resolution which was then moved by the Prime Minister, Liaquat
Ali Khan, and was adopted by the Assembly in March, 1949.
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The Resolution was 'Islamic' in nature and laid down some
fundamentals of the future constitution. It started with
"In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful;
Whereas sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to
Allah Almighty alone, and the authority which He has
delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people
for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him
is a sacred trust" (Oallard 1957, p.89)»
and required the state to be democratic, to guarantee funda¬
mental rights, to provide opportunities to Muslims to lead
their lives according to the teachings of Islam, to protect
minorities and to operate a federal structure with autonomous
units. The Resolution was a compromise in that it did not
lay down specifically the requirements of an Islamic state and
was open to many interpretations. Binder (1961) remarks:
"The Objectives Resolution, acknowledged the sovereignty
of God, recognized the authority of the people derived
from their creator, and vested the authority delegated by
the people in the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of
making a constitution for the sovereign state of Pakistan.
Thus is God sovereign, the people sovereign, parliament
sovereign, and the state sovereign in Pakistan" (ibid,
p.149).
The day the Objectives Resolution was adopted the Assembly
established the Basic Principle Committee to prepare a report
on which to base the draft of the constitution. The Committee
was composed of 25 members with the President of the Assembly
as its president and the Prime Minister as vice-president.
Provincial Chief Ministers and the Chief Justice were also
co-opted as its members. Very soon it was realized that the
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Committee was too large and that most of its members had other
official duties to fulfil and so could not give their full
attention to its business. It was, therefore, divided into
three sub-committees, each responsible for federal and
Provincial Constitutions and Distribution of Powers, for
Franchise, and for the Judiciary. Moreover, a Board of
' l'alimaat-e-Islamia', teachings of Islam, was set up,
consisting of ,Ulama,,# to advise the three sub-committees
on the religious aspects of their recommendations.
The Federal and Provincial Sub-Committee was the first to
present its report in July 1950 which, after having been
discussed in the main Committee, was presented to the Assembly
in September of the same year. This was the first time that
these constitutional efforts were made public because the
proceedings of the Basic Principles Committee and its sub¬
committees were considered to be confidential. This report
did not cover all the constitutional matters as the other two
sub-committees had not submitted their views, but its recom¬
mendations bore a marked similarity to the Government of India
Act, 1935, recommending a bicameral parliamentary system. It
could not recommend the distribution of seats in the two houses
because this was the task of the Franchise Cub-Committee.
Among its recommendations there were two points which were of
"* 'Ulama' is the plural of Arabic 'Alim' meaning a learned person.
In Pakistan the word has been specifically used for the
traditional religious scholars, learned in the Koran and
Arabic.
317
main importance: a) that the report contained very little by
way of clearly defined Islamic provisions, a fact which
disappointed the Ulama who had welcomed the Objectives
Resolution! and, b) it was clearly stated that Urdu was to
be the national language of Pakistan, a fact which was resented
by Bast Pakistanis. Besides, the East Pakistani members also
somehow inferred that in the new legislature they would not
get representation proportional to their population. So, this
report should be treated as the starting point at which the
religious as well as the inter-wing differences actually came
into politics. She religious differences between the secular
politicians and the Ulama can be judged from the views of the
Board of 'Talimaat-e-Islamia' on the report of the sub-committee
contained in two documents which have been reproduced in Binder
(ibid). The Board listed ten qualifications for the head of
the state who could only be elected by "...the learned and
pious representatives of the people". Moreover, the head of
the state was to be elected for life and, although he was
required to take advice from the representatives of the people,
he had wide administrative powers. All these recommendations
were in conflict with the secular democratic ideals of the
modernist politicians who argued that since a modern parliament
could be the equivalent of 'Shura', an advisory body, or of
'Ijma*, consensus, the institutions allowed in Islam, the
recommendations of the Board were unnecessary. However, the
Board did not prove to be very rigid in their views and did
in fact give much ground towards the election of the head of
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the state for a fixed term and the acceptance of the proposed
federal legislature as the equivalent of '...the pious and
learned representatives of the people'. Nevertheless, the
Ulama insisted that there was no provision in Islam for the
inclusion of non-Muslims in any process of law making, though
this particular point was not taken up by the hoard in the
document quoted above.
After the submission of the Federal and Provincial bub-
Committee report the Assembly appointed yet another special
sub-committee to receive suggestions from the public about the
recommendations of the report. The number of suggestions
received by this sub-committee was described as 'enormous',
and most of them referred to making the constitution Islamic
according to the varying interpretations of their authors
concerning the requirements of an Islamic state. The suggestions
included a 'Draft Constitution for Pakistan' by Abul Ala Maududi,
the fundamentalist leader of the religio-political party
'Jamaat-i-Islami'. As it proved later Maududi, despite his
changing views on the Islamic constitution, turned out to be
more intractable for the politicians than some of the blama,
but unlike the latter Maududi was not a member of the Assembly,
though he could arouse enough public feeling to emba^ass the
politicians. This was not an entirely unforeseen development
as sectarian differences within the Ulama had always existed
but now they had moved out into the political field, and in 1953
led to violent disturbances in the Punjab resulting in the
imposition of Martial Law in Lahore.
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The Suggestions Sub-Committee submitted its report to the
parent Basic Principles Committee in July, 1952, and by that
time the other two sub-committees, on Franchise and Judiciary,
had also presented their reports. It took a further five months
for more discussions and the consideration of the recommendations
of the Board of 'Talimaat-e-Islamia', and finally the draft of
the final report was presented to the Assembly on the 22nd
December, 1952. This draft did not receive a better welcome
than the earlier report of the Federal and Provincial Sub-
Committee. This time the awkward insertion of the Islamic
provisions was considered objectionable as was their absence
from the earlier report. Besides the controversy over the
religious clauses the interwing rivalry continued. The East
Pakistanis continued to infer that they had not received their
due share in representation and the Punjabis held the view that
too much had been conceded to the eastern wing. The question
of language was left open in both the reports and therefore
remained a source of suspicion on the part of both East
Pakistanis and Punjabis. However, after the presentation of
the Report the Assembly was adjourned for three weeks to allow
time to its members to study it. At the end of this period
the Assembly was once again adjourned and when it finally met
again in March, 1953» the report was surprisingly not on the
agenda. In April the central government was changed and the
new Prime Minister, who had been out of Pakistan as Ambassador
to the United States, needed time to become familiar with the
political conditions in the state. It was not before October,
1953» that the Prime Minister was able to announce that
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"The House will be pleased to learn that the formula has
been unanimously accepted by my colleagues, by the Chief
Ministers of hast Bengal, the Punjab, Bind, the H~W,F,P.
and Bahawalpur and by all members of the Muslim neague
Parliamentary Party" (Constituent Assembly, Debates, Yol.
XV, p.14).
This magic formula, known as the 'Mohammed Ali Formula' related
to the most controversial issue of representation in the new
constitution. Under the formula there was to be proportional
representation in the lower house of the central legislature
and an equal number of seats allotted to the provinces and
/ Um.
other administrative units in the upper house. Ahouses,
however, were to have equal powers and the total number of seats
in the combined legislature was to be equally divided between
the two wings as shown in Table 83.
Table 83
Allocation of Seats in the Central Legislature
according to the Huhammed Ali Formula,
October, 1953
Upper Lower
Areas House House Total
East Bengal 10 165 175
Punjab 10 75 85
NWFP, Frontier States, Tribal Areas 10 24 34
Sind and Khairpur 10 19 29
Baluchistan, Baluchistan States Union,
Karachi 10 17 27
Total 50 300 350
(source: Binder 1961)
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The important thing to note about this formula, as indeed about
all the important issues during that period, is that all the
discussions and compromises were made outside the Assembly and
there was not much debate in the formal proceedings of the
Constituent Assembly. Commenting on this Callard writes
"The conclusion is unavoidable that, on major constitutional
issues, the place of decision was transferred from the
Assembly to the Muslim Leagie Parliamentary Party" (op.cit.
p.98).
Most of the issues were decided in the meetings of the Party
and presented as 'fait accompli' to the Assembly where, because
of weak opposition, there was not much discussion. It was only
towards the end of the period when the League was declining
in the provinces, particularly in East Pakistan, that the
Assembly became an arena of heated debates. However, it shows
that the Muslim League, because of its strong position in the
Assembly, had circumvented the normal democratic practices by
deciding everything in its closed door meetings rather than
on the floor of the Assembly. Democracy was being undermined
by the very people who stood for modern democratic institutions.
After the introduction of the Report of the Basic Principles
Committee there followed a period of meetings and legotiations,
mostly in secret and out of the Assembly, and finally in
September, 1954, a drafting committee was appointed. It was
announced that the new constitution would be presented to the
next session of the Assembly and that it would be launched on
25th December, 1954, the birthday of Jinnah. A month later,
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in October, 1954, the Assembly was dissolved by the Governor-
General. Thus ended the first Constituent Assembly of
Pakistan which, after seven years of political struggles was
about to frame a constitution for the state of Pakistan. The
Draft Constitution, on which most of the work had probably
been finished when the Assembly was dismissed, had not been
fully disclosed to the public. The decision of the Governor-
General was later challenged by the President of the defunct
Assembly in the Supreme Court but was upheld.
There were several reasons for the dismissal of the Assembly.
One of them was the argument that all the provinces had had
new elections and legislatures after independence, and the
Assembly as elected by the provincial legislatures elected
before independence, was no longer a representative body.
This argument would not have mattered much, because the Muslim
League still controlled all the provincial legislatures in
West Pakistan, but for the eastern wing where in 1954 the League
was routed in the provincial elections by a United Front formed
by several opposition parties, who claimed that the League
members in the Constituent Assembly had now no right to repre¬
sent East Pakistan as their original electors had miserably
lost in the elections.
The second reason, which was probably more important, was
the conflict that had developed between the Assembly and the
Governor-General. There was no question of such a conflict
arising during the life of Jirrnah, 1Quaid-e-Azam' or the
great leader as he was called, because of his personal prestige.
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He was not only the Governor-General "but also the President
of the Constituent Assembly as well as being the President
of the Muslim League. After his death, on September 11, 1948,
Khawja Nazimuddin, a veteran Bengali politician, was elected
as the Governor-General and remained in this office till October,
1951. During this period too the relations between the head
of the state and the Assembly went on smoothly and the real
power lay in the hands of the Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan,
a trusted lieutenant of Jinnah. It was after the death of the
latter on October 16, 1951» that the crisis of leadership
gradually developed. Khawja Nazimuddin stepped down to become
the Prime Minister and Ghulam Muhammed, a former civil servant
and the then Finance Minister, became the Governor-General.
It was the latter who proved to be strong and ambitious,
particularly in the last years of his office, and came in
direct conflict with the Constituent Assembly. It was he who
dissolved the Assembly in October, 1954.
Part of the reason for conflict lay in the ambiguities
of the Government of India Act of 1935. All acts of the
Assembly required the assent of the Governor-General in order
to become law, but, whereas the Assembly asked for such assent
for all its legislative acts, it considered itself sovereign
in constitutional matters. The Assembly not only extended its
sovereignty in regard to the framing of the new constitution,
but also in relation to any amendments in the working constitu¬
tion, i.e. the Government of India Act, 1935. This, in other
words, meant that the Assembly considered that it had the
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powers to amend the Act without the assent of the head of the
state hut Ghulam Muhammed did not think that it had the legal
right to make any changes in the powers of his office without
his approval. The matter came to a head in 1954 when in
September members from Sind and East Pakistan moved and passed
an Act repealing the Public and Representative Offices
(Disqualification) Act, 1949. This Act had provided powers to
the Governor-General to institute a judicial inquiry against
any politician suspected of misconduct while holding a public
office. This was the first blow which the Assembly aimed at
reducing the powers of the Governor-General.
The second, and a more drastic, step was taken by the
Assembly on the day immediately following the passage of the
repeal Act. On October 21, 1954, circumventing many procedural
rules the Assembly passed The Government of India (Fifth
Amendment) Act by which the Governor-General was almost
stripped of all independent powers. The Bill was moved by a
Sindhi member and was supported by a majority of the members
from East Pakistan. This important constitutional amendment,
it may be noted, was carried through only two months before
the Assembly was supposed to adopt a new constitution. A few
days later, when the Assembly was in recess, the Governor-
General reacted viciously and did away with the Assembly itself.
So the Assembly died, and the new constitution as well, before
it was even born.
This was briefly the state of politics during the first
seven years of Pakistan. There is no need here to go into the
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details of the various political manoeuvres, which have "been
fully treated in various published works. She interest of
this study lies in the general pattern of politics and its
relationship with the cultural and economic distributions, a
subject discussed in the next chapter.
She Second Constituent Assembly and the First Constitution:
The first Constituent Assembly was dissolved in October, 1954,
and the second Assembly was not elected till June, 1955.
During this period of nine months the Govemor-General ruled
directly by degree and assisted by a cabinet appointed by him.
Some very important things had happened during this interval
in connection with the administrative integration of West
Pakistan. Although the actual unification took place in
October, 1955* most of the ground had been prepared before the
election of the second Assembly.
It is the general opinion of most of the independent
observers that the unification of West Pakistan was a very
sensible step. 'One Unit', as the new unit of West Pakistan
was popularly called, was necessary mainly because of three
reasons: a) the development of transport, communications, water
and power needed to be planned and executed on the West Pakistan
level rather than on the levels of various provinces and other
units; b) it provided an opportunity to rationalize the
administrative structure by integrating princely states, an
odd heritage of the colonial past. The second objective was
not fully achieved as the Prontier States and the Tribal Areas
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were allowed to continue as before, c) It also provided an
opportunity for the culturally diverse areas of West Pakistan
to be more closely linked to one another and thus create
conditions for potential cultural integration.
However, the One Unit scheme as it was carried through,
had strong political overtones. During the life of the first
Constituent Assembly the plan to integrate West Pakistan was
moved from time to time but was always successfully thwarted
by members from East Pakistan and from some areas of West
Pakistan. With the victory of the United Front in East
Pakistan in 1954, their subsequent demands for more autonomy
forced the central government to think seriously about the One
Unit. They were not prepared to give greater powers to East
Pakistan without having a comparable organization in the
western wing. There was one plan for retaining the provinces
and the states but having a 'zonal federation', a new level
of government inserted between those at the provincial and
central levels. No decision was, however, taken by the first
Constituent Assembly on this issue.
After the dismissal of the first Assembly the government
had no opposition to face at the centre, but the approval of
the provinces was necessary. Within three months of the
announcement that West Pakistan was to be integrated the three
provincial legislatures of the Punjab, the NWFP and Sind had
approved the plan. The methods used by the central government
to get the approval were quite persuasive (Callard op.cit.).
The Punjab Assembly smoothly voted its approval but some
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opposition was expected in the NWPP Assembly. However, it
too 'unanimously' passed its assent when the opposition had
staged a walkout. Sind was the most difficult province as
its Chief Minister, Pirzada Abdus Sattar, who was a public
opponent of the unification plan, had got a statement opposing
the One Unit signed by 74 out of the 110 members of the Sind
Assembly. On November 8, 1954, he was dismissed by the
Governor-General under the 'breakdown' clause of the Government
of India Act, 1935, and was replaced by M.A.Khuro who proved
so persuasive that the assembly passed the proposal by 100 votes
to 4. Thus the central government was able to secure the
agreement of the provinces about their merger into the one
unit. All the functions of the various provincial governments
were to be transferred to the new administration based in Lahore.
By March, 1955, the new Governor and the Chief Minister of West
Pakistan had been announced and the unification, by an order
of the Governor-General, was about to go into operation when
the federal Court stepped in and, ruling on a petition, held
that the Governor-General had no powers under the Government
of India Act to integrate the provinces. So, the matter had
to be postponed till the election of a new Constituent Assembly.
The second Assembly, consisting of 80 members equally
divided between the wings, was elected by the various provincial
legislatures and held its first meeting in July, 1955. As
expected the Muslim League now no longer had so strong a
position as in the first Assembly, particularly in East Pakistan.
A Bill was moved in the new Assembly in August, 1955» to
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bring about the integration of West Pakistan and a heated
debate extending over four weeks followed. Most of the opposi¬
tion to the Bill was voiced by members from East Pakistan and
3ind, but a few from the Punjab and the NWFP also spoke against
it. However, the government was able to force enough members,
many against their will, to get the Establishment of West
Pakistan Act passed on September 30, 1955. In the final
division, of the thirteen votes cast against the Bill, all but
one came from East Pakistan. On October 14, 1955, the new unit
of West Pakistan came into being. To many people it was not
the proposal for One Unit but rather the manner in which it
was carried through that appeared undesirable. It was felt
that when the Constituent Assembly was elected to frame a
constitution it should have been left to it to incorporate the
One Unit plan in the new constitution. The manner by which an
important constitutional issue was decided by almost an
executive order certainly appeared objectionable. However,
as Callard (op.cit.) has remarked, this issue of integration
was of such a nature that some coercion had to be applied
anyway. Nonetheless the fact cannot be missed that the
Governor-General and the central government wanted to rush this
plan through in order to strengthen their positions before the
bargaining regarding the new constitution restarted. Secondly,
the civil service was very much in favour of the One Unit and
their covert support of the plan was probably responsible for
its successful completion in a relatively short time. The
main opposition to the plan can be divided into two categories.
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That of the members from East Pakistan was based on the fear
that the whole scheme was aimed at reducing the numerical
superiority of the eastern wing in the central Assembly; and
that of the politicians from Sind and the UWFP was due partly
to the fear of Punjabi dominance and partly because of impending
redundancies in ministerial jobs as there was going to be one
administration instead of several provincial ones. However,
the Governor-General and the central government proved strong
enough to get the approval of the provincial legislatures as
well as of the central Assembly. One important feature of the
Act, which otherwise was a simple document, was that the
Punjab was allowed to have only 40 per cent representation in
the new West Pakistan assembly, which was indirectly elected
by the existing provincial assemblies, for a period of ten
years. Only after the end of this period the Punjab could have
60 per cent of the total seats which was in actual proportion
to its share in population. Karachi, which remained a federal
district, was also allowed representation in the Yifest Pakistan
Assembly, a fact particularly opposed by East Pakistanis.
After the Assembly had disposed of the unification of
West Pakistan it began framing the constitution. In functioning
this Assembly was not different from the first one, but because
of the experience gained during the first seven years no
committees were now appointed to make recommendations for the
new constitution. Instead the government prepared their own
draft constitution which was published on January 15» 1956.
After a recess of one week to allow time to the members to
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study the Sill the Assembly met to discuss the various provisions
ox the Bill. As expected the debate that followed was heated
with most of the opposition coming from the East Pakistani
members, Muslims as well as non-Muslims. At the first division
the combined opposition recorded 26 votes against 40 for the
government. On another issue, the adoption of the title
'Islamic Republic', when the government whip was not used, the
opposition scored 47 votes against 22. However, the government
was able to carry all the clauses of the Bill, most of them
during periods when the opposition members had walked out of
the chamber in protest against one thing or another. Finally
the Constitution was passed by the Assembly on February 29,
1956, and it came into force on March 23, the anniversary of
the Lahore Resolution of 1940. Pakistan was declared to be a
"Federal Republic to be known as the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan" (Constitution 1956, Part I Clause 1 (1)), within the
Commonwealth.
This Constitution was again not very different from the
Government of India Act, and the major departure from the Draft
Constitution of 1954 was the provision for a unicameral central
legislature with the two wings having equal rather than
proportional representation. The head of the state, to be
called President, emerged to be as powerful as the Governor-
General was under the Act of 1935. The controversial clause 92(a)*
* The Section 93 of the Government of India Act of 1935 was
repealed immediately after independence but was soon reincor¬
porated, on the insistence of Jinnah, as Section 92(a) without
any amendment of the original provision.
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was retained as clause 193 which gave powers to the President
to dismiss provincial governments and take over direct admini¬
strative control through the Governor. The other difference
"between 1954 and now was that there were to "be only two units
of the federation instead of the several provinces, West
Pakistan having been merged into one unit. The main features
of the Constitution are shown diagramatically in Pig.50.
As far as the Islamic nature of the Constitution is
concerned there was very little to satisfy the Ulama. The
only specific provision in this regard was that the President
must "be a Muslim, over 40 years of age. Chapter I of Part
XII of the Constitution <?id, however, provide for the appoint¬
ment of a Commission "by the President to advise on the enactment
of Islamic law "but the recommendations of the Commission were
not binding on the legislature. Clause 198 also stated that
no law should be enacted against the principles of Islam but
again there was no mention of a procedure to decide whether a
particular law was or was not in conformity with Islamic
provisions. There was, however, no provision to debar religious
minorities from any office except that of the President.
On the issue of federalism, the subjects on which provincial
and central legislatures could legislate were separately
demarcated but there was also a concurrent list including some
subjects which were the common jurisdiction of both levels of
government. In essence the degree of federalism was not in any
sense greater than that under the Government of India Act.
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in the hands of the central government to deal with any
provincial government who proved to "be recalcitrant. This was
against the spirit of federalism "because the party in power at
the centre was in a position to impose their will on a province
where a different party might "be in control.
On the coming into force of the new Constitution the
existing offices and assemblies continued to function "but under
new names pending the elections. Thus the then Governor-General,
Iskander Mirza, became the President, the Constituent Assembly
turned into the first National Assembly and the provincial
legislatures into the Provincial Assemblies of East and West
Pakistan.
Another important question, that of electorates, was left
open in the Constitution. The Muslim League before independence
had fought hard, as the main minority party, to secure separate
electorates and seats in the various Assemblies. After indepen¬
dence it retained this policy, which had now become even stronger
as a result of the religious pressure to keep non-Muslim
minorities out of the main decision making process, and there¬
fore advocated separate electorates for Hindus, Scheduled
Castes, Christians and Parsls. In West Pakistan there was
widespread support for separate electorates, but in the eastern
wing, as things turned out, there was a considerable opposition
to separate and support for joint electorates. There were two
main reasons for this. East Pakistani Hindus, particularly
Caste Hindus, felt that by separate electorates they would
remain in perpetual political isolation and would have no
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influence in the legislature where Muslims would always remain
in overwhelming majority. Secondly, the opposition Muslim
parties in East Pakistan felt that under a Joint system they
could he in a position to get the support of the non-Muslims
and oust the League - and this is what actually happened in
the elections in 1954. By having separate electorates they
could not use the 25 per cent religious minorities to their
advantage. This line of thought also appealed to Hindus because,
although they would be entitled to a quarter of seats from
East Pakistan under a separate system, Joint electorates would
enable them to hold the balance between rival Muslim candidates
in a greater number of constituencies.
The whole question of electorates was left by the Constituent
Assembly to be decided by the two provincial legislatures.
Accordingly the West Pakistan Assembly in August, 1956, decided
in favour of separate electorates by 129 to 10 votes. A few
weeks later in October, the East Pakistan Assembly, after a
violent debate, rejected a motion for separate electorates and
decided for the Joint system by 159 to 1 votes. Now, everything
was left to the National Assembly which, meeting a week later
in Dacca, passed a Bill in a stormy session establishing
separate electorates for the religious communities. Thus the
old philosophy of the League, on which it had fought the
Congress before 1947, found a statutory recognition in the first
Constitution of Pakistan. It also pleased some of the Ulamas,
though others remained adamant on excluding all non-Muslims
from at least the main law making body.
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On the question of language the Constitution followed the
Draft Constitution of 1954 in declaring "both Urdu and Bengali
as the national languages "but it retained English for official
use for a period of twenty years.
The period "between 1956 and 1958 was characterized "by
continuous political intrigues, shifting loyalties and
unscrupulous manoeuvres, as the various factions prepared to
gain power in the coming elections, the first under the new
Constitution. Stephens (1964) has summed up the conditions
that existed in 1958 thus:
"By now, mere stratagems to retain or capture office were
practically the sole preoccupation of politicians, Central
and provincial, because of the prospect of general
elections early next year, the first in Pakistan's
history. Everyone assumed that, v/hoever held Minister¬
ships at the time in Karachi, Dacca or Lahore would rig
the results and so keep power. Manoeuvring^ of the most
shameless sort therefore intensified, while the country's
affairs slid towards chaos. The national finances were
in frightening disarray; prestige abroad had slumped to
almost nil; corruption or allegations of it flourished
everywhere, and there could be little doubt that it had
reached the higher ranks of the civil service. In the
East wing, during September, a meaningless vendetta in
the Legislature resulted in the Awami League faction
getting the Speaker formally declared insane; whereupon,
two days later, its rivals of Mr Eazal-ul-Haq's Krishak
Sramik party, in an organized demonstration, hurled pieces
of furniture at his Deputy, causing his death" (pp.298-299).
It was in these circumstances that Martial Law was proclaimed
on October 8, 1958, by President Iskandar Mirza who, three weeks
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later found himself on a plane to London after having "been
forced to resign by the Chief Martial Law Administrator, ^yub
Khan.
Martial Law and the Second Constitution. 1958-1969? Martial
Law, under the circumstances described above, was welcomed
generally. Of course, the politicians did not like it because
they suddenly found themselves out of business and office, but
to the general public it was a relief after years of political
wrangling and intrigue. Martial Law was, however, very mild
compared to the experiences of some other states mainly because
the politicians had become so much discredited that the military
regime had nothing to fear from them, and so they were let go
without any harsh treatment. Besides debarring most of the
politicians from public life and removing the corrupt and
inefficient officials, the new government took several reform
measures, particularly the agricultural Reforms discussed in
Chapter 8.
Immediately on assuming powers in October, 1958, President
Ayub Khan announced that he would hand over power to a civilian
government under a new constitution suited to the needs of the
country. On the first anniversary of Martial Law in 1959 the
President stated his willingness to go ahead with the framing
of the new constitution, but before that he had to have some
legal framework and a legitimate authority to institute the
new constitution. So, in October, 1959, a Basic Democracies
Order was issued under which 80,000 representatives,* equally
divided "between the wings and each representing a constituency
of "between 600 and 1000 population, were elected to form an
electoral college. This electoral college returned a 95.6
per cent vote of confidence confirming Ayu"b Khan as the civilian
President. On February 17, 1960, a Constitution Commission
consisting of eleven members was appointed by the President
to make recommendations for the future constitution. The
Commission submitted its report in May, 1961, the Constitution
was promulgated in March, 1962, and went into effect on June
8, 1962. On the same date Martial Law was formally withdrawn.
The new Constitution was really new in that it marked a radical
departure from all previous attempts. Its main features are
shown in Fig.51. For once all pretence of federalism and
parliamentary democracy was dropped. It was a straightforward
Presidential system in which the executive was all-powerful.
The legislature, and to some degree the judiciary too, was
subservient to the President. The National Assembly, elected
on the basis of parity between the two wings, did not have
much power against the wishes of the President who, once elected,
was not responsible to anybody. The powers of a central
legislature under any democratic system to amend or reject the
annual budget proposed by the government were so much curtailed
under this Constitution that the Assembly was not much more
* Later the total number of the 'Basic Democrats' was increased
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than a rubber stamp to give a formal approval to the Bills
moved on behalf of the President. For example a part of the
financial procedure of the centre reads
"Article 41, Clause 1.
So much of an Annual Budget Statement as relates to
expenditure charged upon the Central Consolidated
Fund may be discussed in, but shall not be submitted
to the vote of, the National Assembly.
Article 41, Clause 4.
The National Assembly may, with the consent of the
President, reduce a demand for a grant referred to in
clause (3) of this article and, in that event, the
Assembly shall be deemed to have assented to the demand
as so reduced."
and so on.
The President was to appoint a council of ministers who
were not to be members of the Assembly and, therefore, not
responsible to it. Later, by an amendment, the ministers were
chosen from among the members of the Assembly but they remained
answerable only to the president. There is no need to go into
all the details of the Constitution which was in effect meant
to give legal sanctity to a highly personalized and almost
absolute rule. There were many ingenious safeguards to protect
the incumbent of the office of the President as, although there
were provisions for the impeachment of the President, in practice
it was highly unlikely to happen. Any motion for his impeachment
was required to be signed by at least one-third of the members
of the Assembly and, in order to succeed, it had to be carried
by a three-quarters majority of total members. In case such
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a motion failed to get one half the members of the Assembly
in its support, the original signatories were to lose their
seats in the National Assembly.
In the two wings there were two Provincial bodies and the
head of the executive was the Governor, an appointee of the
President, v>?ho could only be removed by the latter. This was
another disguised measure but very effective to safeguard the
executive. Since the actual administration was carried out
by the two provincial governments, if either of the wings was
dissatisfied with its Governor it was necessary to impeach the
President in order to remove the former. This was impossible
without the substantial support of the members from the other
wing. In view of the cultural and past political differences
it was not very likely that the two wings would join together.
The Governors in the wings enjoyed the same sort of relationship
with the Provincial assemblies as did the President with the
Central one.
The 1962 Constitution was the least Islamic of all the
attempts made. It did not even carry the name 'Islamic
Republic', though some years later the word was inserted in
face of growing pressure from the Ulama. The Constitution did,
however, provide for the establishment of an Advisory Council
of Islamic Ideology and an Islamic Research Institute, but
j feOsfefe'these bodies/Jdse^**®^ have any powers. This was just an
ineffective measure to give an 'Islamic' semblance to the
Constitution.
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Besides consolidating the power of the President and the
central government, the Constitution also introduced a new
method of elections. As mentioned before the 80,000 repre¬
sentatives elected on the basis of adult franchise (Pig.51)
formed an electoral college for the election of the President,
the National Assembly and the two provincial assemblies.
Moreover, the 80,000 'Easic Democrats' formed members of about
8,000 local councils, 4,000 in each wing, called Union Councils
in rural areas and Union Committees in urban areas. Above
them there were several tiers of councils at the Tehsil,
District and Division levels, headed by official chairman
who virtually controlled these councils. It was in fact a
reproduction of the President/National Assembly combination
on a decreasing scale down to the level of Tehsil or Thana
Councils. Only the Union Council or Committees had elected
chairmen but these bodies had no real functions. So, while
on the one hand the system involved public representatives at
all the levels ranging from a small neighbourhood to that of
the state, it ensured the concentration of power in one man
and his trusted appointees.
Gradually the people realized the faults of the system
and the opposition started growing, first in East Pakistan and
then spreading to all parts of the state. The system had
unwittingly brought political consciousness at the grass roots
level through the so-called 'Basic Democracies'. Iftots and
widespread violence, directed particularly at the supporters
of the government during the winter of 1968-69 ultimately
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forced Ayub Khan to abdicate in the spring of 1969 and hand
over power to another Martial Law regime. Under his system
there was no provision for an instant alternative government;
one personalised rule had to be replaced by another in the
situation where law and order in many areas had completely
broken down.
The new Martial Law government has, however, arranged to
hold elections to a new Constituent Assembly on December 7,
1970, After the election of the Assembly a limit of 120 days
has been set to frame a constitution, failing this the Assembly
shall stand dissolved and fresh elections shall be held.
One important step the present government has taken is
the disintegration of West Pakistan into the former provinces
as a result of rising demands from East Pakistan, Sind and the
NWFP. The details of the reorganization are still being carried
out at the time of writing.
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CHAPTER 15
SOCIO-ECONOMIC REALITIES ARE POLITICS
Insofar as politics is a product of organized human society
it must reflect the socio-economic conditions of the population
of a state. This does not mean to say that socio-economic
conditions are a determinant of the foim of government and
constitution hut they do have a strong influence on the political
processes and the administration of territory. As pointed out
in Chapter 1 there is a two-way relationship between politics
and geography - the latter includes all the cultural, social
and economic characteristics of the population as well as the
physical aspects of territory, climate and resources. Politics
is affected by the economic and cultural distributions, while
political decisions directly bear on the pattern and the nature
of those distributions. Obviously, on the one hand, the influence
of cultural and economic distributions on politics is relatively
more visible in a democratic system, and on the other hand the
effect of politics on geography becomes deeper the more
regulatory a state is. In the preceding chapters an attempt
has been made to find out the important differences in the
various cultural and economic distributions between the wings
and the provinces. In some cases the inter-regional differences
are very marked, in others the variations are relatively slight.
Wherever possible the trends in these differentials have also
been observed. In this chapter a systematic examination of
the inter-relationships between these distributions and the
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actual politics in Pakistan has been made. It must be remembered
that twenty years is a short time in the history of a state.
It is not fruitful, therefore, to attempt a projection of the
future conditions, nor is it useful to base any definite rules
on past political history because man's political behaviour
is not subject to any laws. However, it is necessary to find
out the relevant relationships in order to have a better
understanding of the functioning of the state. To this end the
various cultural, economic and political aspects are considered
in turn.
Religion has undoubtedly been one of the most important
issues both before and since independence. The state-idea of
Pakistan was based on the assumption that the Muslims in the
subcontinent were a nation and therefore entitled to live in
a state of their own. The complex nature of the religious
distributions in the subcontinent has already been noted (Chapter
3), but the main problem for Pakistan on the religious question,
however, arose after partition. Although a new state was
demanded on religious grounds, there was no definite commitment
to establish a theocratic state as was implicit in the Lahore
Resolution of the Muslim League (see Chapter 2). Because of
the preoccupation of the leaders with the independence issue
it was taken for granted that once Pakistan had been achieved
it would not be difficult to resolve the question of an Islamic
state and that whatever differences there were between different
groups would be removed after independence. It was not so when
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the discussions about the future constitution started after
1947. It has been remarked earlier (Chapter 3) that the bulk
of religious opinion opposed the idea of Pakistan on the grounds
that Islam did not provide for any territorial nationalism and
that it was a universal religion based on the unity of all the
believers irrespective of their nationalities. In fact
nationalism was condemned by some religious leaders as something
evil and anti-Islamic (Binder 1963). On the other hand the
leaders of the Muslim League and that section of the religious
opinion which supported the League not only found nationalism
desirable but necessary to protect Islam in the subcontinent.
These differences, which remained rather academic till 1947,
came to dominate the post-independence politics, particularly
in connection with the discussions over the shape of the future
constitution.
Much of the differences between different groups on the
nature of an Islamic state can be attributed to the fact that
Islam has not laid down any specific constitutional provisions,
and the various sources and precedents on the subject are liable
to different interpretations.
"The desire to have an Islamic constitution, as in Pakistan,
Egypt and the Sudan, is in part the acceptance of a
European idea, namely, that of constitutional government.
The difficulties in framing an Islamic constitution for a
modern state are formidable, since at many points the Islamic
political tradition is far from being clear and unambiguous"
(Watt 1968, p.121 ).
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However, as the controversy over these issues developed during
the years after independence different views and interpretations
crystallised into three categories:
a) Traditionalists; h) Fundamentalistsj c) Modernists.
To the first category belonged the Ulama, including those who
supported the Muslim League in demanding partition, who were
prepared to accept most of the proposals of the modernists as
long as they received a statutory recognition of themselves
as an institution with the sole right to interpret the Islamic
law. In other words they wanted to have control over the
legislative functions as to them secular politicians were not
competent to frame Islamic laws.
The second category, fundamentalists, have been represented
by Maududi, head of the 'Jamaat-i-Islami', a politico-religious
party, and they looked back for precedents and guidance to the
time of the Prophet and the first four Caliphs. They wanted
to re-establish the caliphate and, despite his changing views,
Maududi has not been prepared to give any statutory recognition
to the Ulama. According to his views all the executive,
legislative and judicial powers must be vested in the head of
the state who must be a pious Muslim elected for life by an
electoral college of pious Muslims.
The third category of Modernists included the leaders of
the League and other secular politicians who did not find
anything un-Islamic about the western democratic institutions
as long as such laws were not passed which clearly violated
the religious injunctions. On some points the differences
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"between the first two categories proved to be deeper than those
between the Ulama and the modernists. In fact Ulama did give
much ground to modernists but they, as well as the fundamentalists,
had no place for the religious minorities in any process of law
making. In this regard the only concession the two groups
received was the provision in the 1956 and 1962 constitutions
that the head of the state must be a Muslim. Despite the
so-called Islamic provisions in the two constitutions both were
basically secular and thus not acceptable to most of the Ulama.
So, till the Martial Law of 1958 religion played a very prominent
role in politics, sometimes resulting in violence, but in
practical terms religious opinion gained almost nothing. As
Gallard remarked in 1957$
"Men of religion have laid claim to complete authority
and have achieved almost none" (ibid, p.5).
The electorate maintained a complete separation of religion
and politics. While people always looked to the religious
leaders for matters of the spirit - as happened in the violent
religious riots in the Punjab in 1953 - they never failed to
return the secular politicians as members of legislative
assemblies. However, the poor performance of the Jamaat-i-Islami
and other religious parties in elections is not indicative of
their influence in arousing public sentiment on certain issues.
The regime of Ayub Khan and the 1962 Constitution proved
even more secular than their predecessors. However, because
of the greater coercive power of his government there was not
much public expression of opposition. There was no occasion
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for a formal or public debate over the 1962 Constitution as it
was framed by one man and imposed by one man rather than by
an assembly. Because of the almost absolute powers of the
president, the Islamic Advisory Council and the Institute of
Islamic Research, provided under the 1962 Constitution, were
even less effective as Islamic provisions than in the 1956
Constitution. For the same reasons the government, which
derived most of its power from the aimed forces rather than
from the people, was less sensitive to any pressure from the
religious leaders though at times it did accept some minor
demands, as for example the changing of the name from the
Republic of Pakistan to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. On
other issues, when the government believed it was in the
interest of the people, it did not yield to any pressure from
the Ulama. The family planning programme and the Family Laws
Ordinance, which among other things put some restrictions on
polygamy, were vehemently opposed by nearly all Ulama but there
was no change in the policy of the government.
As a result of the prolonged controversies on religious
issues, which even years of debate failed to resolve, there
has been a certain amount of disillusionment among the more
articulate sections of the population. This is not due to
any decrease in the importance of religion in the daily life
of the people but because of the unnecessarily long and unpro¬
ductive bickering between the politicians and Ulama. That
Islam is very much the major force keeping all the different
parts of the state together is shown by the fact that no
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political party or politician can afford to divorce religion
from politics, at least not publicly. Even the extreme left
wing parties find it necessary to include Islam in their
policies as is diown by the manifestoes of the various parties
prepared to fight the coming elections to the Constituent
Assembly (Pak. News, Jan,15, 1970). However, the confusion
regarding the Islamic Constitution is again clearly reflected
as none of the parties have put forward any definite constitu¬
tional proposals even though the Assembly is to be specifically
elected to frame a constitution; it will have no legislative
or financial powers. The debate in this coming Assembly is
bound to be heated particularly if the Ulama and the Jammat-
i-Islami can find enough public support to get some of their
members returned to the Assembly, There is, however, no
indication that all the parties concerned can agree on the exact
provisions of an Islamic constitution. The fact that the
Objectives Resolution passed by the first Constituent Assembly
was accepted by all the interested groups within and outside
the Assembly, except by the minorities, was because of its
ambiguous nature which allowed for different interpretations
to be made satisfying all the viewpoints of the traditionalists,
fundamentalists and modernists.
Related to the problems of an Islamic constitution is the
question of minorities. Although Pakistan is overwhelmingly
a Muslim state, the substantial Hindu minority in East Pakistan
is important in holding the electoral balance between the
various parties. The importance of their political support
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was shown in the Muslim League defeat in the 1954 provincial
elections in Bast Pakistan, Any proposal hy the fundamentalists
or the traditionalists to keep non-Muslims out of the decision¬
making process is hound to he opposed hy most of the East
Pakistani politicians. It will he seen as an attempt hy the
western wing to turn the eastern wing's numerical majority
into a minority, although this argument cannot now he validly
maintained as East Pakistan can no longer argue so convincingly
that West Pakistan as a whole is aligned against it because
of the recent disintegration of the western wing. Secondly,
the elections to the Assembly itself are going to he held on
the basis of proportional representation and that minorities
will have the same rights as the Muslims, with the result that
Bast Pakistan will have more members. It must also he noted
that there are regional differences among Muslims in their
attitude towards minorities, particularly towards the Hindus.
In the Punjab, which experienced the greatest amount of violence
at the time of partition, and among refugees, there is a general
feeling of hostility towards Hindus who, at certain times, have
been regarded as a fifth-column working for the interest of
India, In East Pakistan Hindus suffered considerably after
independence hut when feelings against West Pakistan grew
deeper there was some improvement in the Muslim-Hindu relation¬
ship. Although Islam remains a strong social and political
force, the feeling of being Bengali is very strong in East
Pakistan and the common language shared hy Bast Pakistani
Hindus and Muslims is a factor of considerable importance.
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In the question of minorities Sind has been markedly-
similar to East Pakistan. Here too the largest religious
minority is Hindu (Chapter 3) and the relationship between the
Sindhi Muslims and Hindus has been on the whole very good.
In fact all the religious trouble in Sind took place after
independence when the refugees clashed violently with the
Sindhi Hindus, a clash in which Sindhi Muslims either did not
take part or supported the Hindus (Binder op.cit.). In
Baluchistan and the NW3PP the question of minorities is not
very important because of their relatively small number.
On the whole the relationship between religion and politics
in Pakistan has proved to be inconclusive. Religious issues
have for many years dominated the politics of the state but
the Ulama have not succeeded in bringing about a religious
state. The main reasons for their failure to do so lie in
their own differences regarding the nature of an Islamic state,
the remoteness of the historical precedents on which they have
tried to base their interpretations, the secular outlook of
the politicians and the intelligentsia, and the absence of any
ecclesiastical organization in Islam. However, Islam is an
important influence in the lives of people because even those
who are not practising Muslims, or are agnostics, generally
"...feel a deep loyalty to Islamic society as a cultural
entity" (Watt op.cit., p„120). Among the modern educated
classes there is a tendency towards what has been called "a
secular Islamic nationalism" (ibid. p.120). Many Pakistanis
feel disappointed or embarrassed by the many internal
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dissensions within the Muslim world and try to ascribe these
to the intrigues of the Western powers. It is not advisable
to make any predictions but it is likely that in Pakistan the
importance of religion in politics will somewhat decrease as
other issues, economic and political, have become quite
important during the recent years. Nevertheless, since Islam
affects all spheres of human life, it is not possible to
eliminate the religious issues altogether even if the questions
considered are purely economic, cultural or political.
The second important cultural element to be considered
is language. The politics of language has been as important
as that of religion, though there has been some temporary
agreement since 1956. The variety of languages spoken in
Pakistan and their distribution (Chapter 4) and the importance
of language in education (Chapter 5) are basic to the discussion
of the role that the language issue has played in politics
since independence,
Puring the Mogul period Persian was the official language
of the government but Urdu had developed as a 'lingua franca'
by the fusion of Persian and Sanskrit. When the British took
over, Persian was replaced by English as the official language
but local languages continued to be used on the lower admini¬
strative levels and for basic literacy. Under the overall
superiority of English there was no question of a rivalry
between the different local languages in the subcontinent.
After independence, however, when it was understood that English
would be given up as the official language because of its
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connection with the colonial past, the rivalries between the
various languages came to the surface and led to violence.
The Muslim League leadership was agreed that the state language
of Pakistan would be Urdu and immediately after independence,
for the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly, both English
and Urdu were allowed to be used. In 1948 when a Bengali Hindu
member of the Assembly introduced a motion to use Bengali in
the house, the motion was turned down and the Prime Minister,
Liaquat Ali Khan, emphatically said that Urdu was going to be
the state language (Callard 1957). Later in March, 1948,
Jinnah himself, while addressing a public meeting in Dacca,
declared that"...the State Language of Pakistan is going to
be Urdu and no other language" (ibid p.182). Such was the
authority and prestige of both these leaders that there was no
strong reaction against their pronouncements in favour of Urdu
and Liaquat Ali Khan was able to incorporate this attitude in
the Interim Report of the Basic Principles Committee which flatly
declared that Urdu alone was to be the national language.
After the death of these two leaders, there was no one in
the Muslim League strong enough to impose this decision. In
February, 1952, when the then Prime Minister, Khawja Nazimuddin,
himself a Bengali, spoke in favour of Urdu in Dacca, students
of Dacca University violently protested resulting in the police
firing on the demonstrators causing some deaths. It was at
once made clear that the people of Bast Pakistan were not
prepared to accept Urdu as the national language. Within twenty-
four hours of this incident the East Bengal Assembly passed a
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resolution asking the central government to give Bengali the
status of a national language. The result was that the national
language question was dropped altogether from the Interim Keport
followed by a period of uncertainty during which Bast Pakistanis
continued to feel that the central government was not prepared
to accept their demand.
This controversy over the language issue continued until
in the 1956 Constitution Urdu and Bengali were both declared
as national languages but English was retained for a period of
twenty years as the language of the government, higher education
and the lav/ courts. The Constitution of 1962 gave the same
recognition to Urdu, Bengali and English. This arrangement
is likely to continue and because of the rivalry between Urdu
and Bengali, English will probably go on as an official language,
at least at the level of the central government and in higher
education.
Although Urdu has been officially recognized as the language
of West Pakistan, regional languages have played an important
part in the politics of the western wing. As remarked earlier,
Urdu has been fully accepted in the Punjab, to the extent that
Punjabi is not taught in schools at any level. Mohammed
Iqbal, a famous poet/philosopher and one of the originators of
the Pakistan idea, wrote most of his poetry in Urdu and not in
Punjabi even though it was his mother tongue. Punjabi language
has not been a basis of any regionalism, the main reasons for
which are probably the relatively advanced status of the Punjab
and the fact that Punjabi is basically a spoken language with
wide regional variations.
353
In the NWFP where Pushto is the main language, it has
been important as a basis of local nationalism. The separatist
movement of Pukhtoonistan derived most of its strength from the
common language which is spoken on both sides of the Pakistan-
Afghanistan boundary. However, Pushto, because of its relatively
low state of development (Chapter 4), is not a very important
language of literacy and education. In Sind the local language,
Sindhi, is more deeply entrenched. Even after the adoption of
Urdu as the national language in West Pakistan Sindhi has
remained important as a language of literacy. It has formed
a basis for the strong Sindhi regionalism. Baluchistan, because
of a higher degree of cultural heterogeneity, has no single
language in a majority and thus the basis of a province-wide
linguistic regionalism is relatively weaker, though at times
Baluchi speaking people have appeared to be conscious of their
separate cultural identity.
The one unit of West Pakistan was formed with the aim of
gradually integrating the provinces but for various reasons
it could not achieve this aim. In fact it has been in operation
for only fifteen years, too short a period to break down the
traditional linguistic barriers. The policy of the government
on the question of language has not been firm and consistent.
It did not use its influence and powers after the integration
of West Pakistan to introduce Urdu at all levels of education
in all areas. Looking back it appears that the integration
was achieved only in administrative matters. In language
policy the former provincial areas, particularly Sind, continued
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as before. However, because of the removal of provincial
boundaries in 1955 the movement of people and goods between
different areas was certainly facilitated and the full extent
of the effects of one unit will only be assessed after the
1971 Census. On the whole the problem of language as such is
not serious but when the linguistic differences combine with
other differences in the economic and political fields,
language can give a considerable stimulus to regional tendencies
because it is the most effective and tangible differentiating
feature of the population. That the linguistic differences
are still very important is shown by the recent re-emergence
of the provinces. It is difficult to see what the future
policy of the government will be in connection with language
but it is almost certain that the provincial governments of
Sind and the NY/FP will try to advance the cause of their local
languages. If this happens then the cultural isolation of the
population will be perpetuated and the prospects of integration
will become that much more remote.
There does not seem to be any prospect of Pakistan evolving
into a unilingual state in any foreseeable future but bi- or
multilingualism is not necessarily a weakness for a state if
there are no other regional differences, economic and political,
and if there is a common acceptance of the aims and objects
for which a state has been established. However, the linguistic
fragmentation in Pakistan is further aggravated by its physical
fragmentation and, as shown in Chapter 6, the contact between
the two wings is very limited and affects only a small fraction
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of the whole population. Because of isolation the differences
are often exaggerated and misunderstanding between the people
grows. Moreover, the politicians have capitalized on this
misunderstanding in order to grind their own axes. Greater
and frequent contact between the provinces is essential for
evolving homogeneity because it has been shown that where
different linguistic groups have lived together for a sufficiently
long time multilingualism is a relatively common phenomenon
(Chapter 7» Big.18).
In the coming constitutional discussions language itself
may not prove to be an important issue but in the wider question
of provincial autonomy it is certainly going to play a significant
role. The main linguistic problem, however, arises out of the
simple fact that Bengali is a regional language, like Pushto,
Sindhi or Punjabi, but its speakers are in a numerical majority.
If the Bengali speakers, like other linguistic groups in
Pakistan, had formed a minority the problem of national language
would not have been so serious and it is likely that Urdu would
have been declared the only national language. Now the best
which can be hoped for is a bilingual state and that only if
all the provinces of West Pakistan accept Urdu, at least as
the lingua franca. In that case too the retention of English
at the central government level will probably remain a
necessity.
In the field of cultural integration all governments have
failed to take any definite measures. Of course it is impossible
to overcome the linguistic and cultural barriers which have
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existed for centuries in a matter of a generation but the absence
of any concrete policies is not going to make the problem any
easier. The main obstacle undoubtedly lies in the lack of
contact, particularly between the two wings. It is not easy
for the government to offset the effect of the physical separation
of the two wings. However, air travel, which carries most of
the passengers between the wings, has been made relatively
easier by subsidizing it by 50 per cent. Even then it is too
expensive to be used by any appreciable number of people.
Almost the whole contact between the wings is limited to govern¬
ment officials and businessmen and at the level of the common
man the two parts are almost completely isolated.
Within the two wings the movement of people is also not
very significant. In East Pakistan the lack of a good transport
system and in West Pakistan the linguistic barriers keep people
separated from each other. Because of social traditions, even
in large cities people tend to concentrate in various linguistic
groups. With the expansion in literacy, language barriers are
bound to become weaker but because of the government's pre¬
occupation with economic development education has received a
relatively small share of the funds.
The most important measure towards cultural integration
was taken by the government in 1959 with the establishment of
a Bureau of National Reconstruction, with the object "to coalesce
all the divergent linguistic, sectarian and social groups into
a single cohesive nation" (Dawn, January 14, 1959, p.1). Por
the first time an organization had been created which operated
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on a secular basis though religion did form a part of its
activities. However, despite the fact that the Bureau did a
useful job, mainly through holding discussions, seminars and
arranging the exchange of students and other persons between
the wings, its activities were totally limited to large urban
centres and affected only a tiny minority of educated people.
Oddly enough the Bureau also encouraged literature in the local
languages. However, its functions were greatly hampered by the
scarcity of funds, and there is evidence that the Bureau failed
to achieve any of its objectives partly because of its policy
of encouraging regional languages, but mainly because of the
suspicions and misunderstandings of East Pakistan (von Vorye
1965).
"It is my impression, moreover, that even among the more
educated, urbanized segments the initial results were on
the negative side. Identification with regions and the
provinces did not perceptibly decline in favour of
national orientation. More often it intensified" (ibid,
p. 154).
During recent years the economic issues have become
increasingly prominent in political debates. The nature and
the main causes of economic differences have been discussed in
Part III. It was seen that Pakistan is a relatively poor
country and there are considerable variations in the level of
economic development between different areas. Much of the
economic differentials undoubtedly result from the different
initial levels of economic development at the time of independence.
East Bengal was relatively poor but there were also differences
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within West Pakistan. In fact some districts in the latter
have "been poorer than the poorest in hast Pakistan, During the
past twenty years or so, differences in some cases have deepened;
in others the trend is towards achieving equality. However,
the major complaint of the relatively less developed provinces,
particularly East Pakistan, has been that the central government
as dominated by West Pakistan have failed to remove these
differences in incomes and in general economic development.
In fact a section of opinion has accused the central government
of deliberately keeping certain areas backward. As in the case
of language, the main confrontation has been between the wings.
East Pakistani leaders have argued that East Pakistan, which
has been the major earner of foreign exchange, has not received
its due share of the development funds (Chapter 11). West
Pakistan has certainly been receiving a larger share of the
imports though it has exported less than East Pakistan. The
same sort of grievances have been voiced by other provinces in
West Pakistan against the economic dominance of the Punjab and
Karachi.
As a result of the general issue of poverty the most signi¬
ficant political development in recent years has been the
emergence of left wing parties. The Communist Party of
Pakistan, which had never been of much political significance
was totally banned in 1954 and because of religious influence
any leftist movement did not have much chance of success as a
result of being labelled anti-Islamic by Ulama and right wing
politicians. Even though the Communist Party of India had
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supported the claim of the Muslims for Pakistan in the early
1940s, it failed to attract any large scale following among
the Muslims. However, when the religious controversies over
the constitution failed to he resolved after years of discussions
and later when economic issues became more important, socialist
views came to be accepted by certain sections of the population.
Sino-Indian conflict in the early 1960s and the resultant
friendship between Pakistan and China gave an impetus to leftist
parties. Nevertheless, even the extreme leftist parties in
Pakistan have not found it possible to present a purely secular
philosophy and have frequently used the term 'Islamic Socialism'.
Por example it was reported about Maulana Bhashani, leader of
the pro-Peking left wing National ^wami Party, that:
"Maulana Bhashani reiterated his demand for Islamic
socialism. 'Call me what you like - Communist or
anything - but I will remain a Mussalman till my death',
said the Maulana" (Pakistan News, January 5, 1970, p.2).
This new development in the politics in Pakistan, which in the
past have been almost completely monopolized by the right wing
elements whether Ulama or politicians, has opened up possibilities
of a polarization between right and left wing philosophies
rather than between the traditionalists, fundamentalists and
modernists. Expansion in literacy and an increasing realization
of the economic problems is bound to weaken the position of the
Ulama, though not necessarily of Islam.
Regional economic disparities (Chapter 12, Pig.44) have
strengthened the claims for provincial autonomy. Whether
provincial autonomy in the utilization of resources can solve
the economic problems in Pakistan is an academic question open
to different arguments, "but the centralization of policy-making
processes, particularly under the Ayub Khan regime, gave a
powerful tool in the hands of East Pakistani politicians for
their demands for greater provincial autonomy, in fact for a
loose confederation. All the political parties, irrespective
of their ideological complexion, which derive their main
support from East Pakistan stand for provincial autonomy in
all functions except defence, foreign affairs, interwing communi¬
cations and currency. They all want complete provincial control
over finance, trade, planning etc. The increased expenditure
on development in the eastern wing during the Second and Third
Plan periods has failed to placate the demands for greater
provincial powers. The decentralization of some government
and semi-government functions during the 1960s - like the
Railways, Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, Water
and Power Development Authority, etc. - were not accepted as
sufficient concessions to the demands of provincial autonomy
because, as seen in Chapter 14, there was little room for
devolution in the 1962 Constitution and the elected assemblies,
central and provincial, had no financial control. During the
last decade a gradual hardening of the attitudes in East Pakistan
against the central government and in particular against the
Punjab which was believed to be dominating in the centre, in
the armed forces and in the civil service, took place. All the
measures taken by the central government, including coercion
and appeasement, to pacify the opposition brought no results.
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Consequently the fall of the Ayub regime was celebrated as a
victory more in the eastern than in the western wing.
Within West Pakistan similar demands for provincial
autonomy have also been voiced by politicians in Sind, the
NWFP and Baluchistan. There are no official figures available
in detail about the economic benefits or otherwise accruing to
the provinces as a result of the administrative integration,
but the Punjabis have maintained that they have lost to other
provinces a considerable portion of funds that they would have
had if the Punjab had remained a separate province. On the
other hand the provinces of Sind, the NWFP and Baluchistan
complain that some of their revenue has been spent on develop¬
ment projects in the Punjab. It is not possible here to
ascertain the validity of the arguments but it is a fact that
a lot of misunderstanding and conflict have developed between
the Punjab and other provinces which, together with the demands
for^provincial autonomy from East Pakistan, has brought about
the disintegration of West Pakistan. It is unfortunate that
this integration, which might have proved tremendously useful
to all parts of the wing, had to be undone because of various
political and cultural reasons before it could show its effects.
Keeping in view that the NWFP and Baluchistan had been two
deficit provinces depending on subsidies from the central
government, it is likely that they may not have any of the
benefits which the opponents of one unit think they will have
as separate provinces.
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All the statistical evidence used in Part III shows that
the central government, at least during the period of the Third
Five Year Plan, did pursue a policy towards achieving a regional
equality in economic standards. It failed to convince East
Pakistan of its sincerity in this regard "because of the
political unpopularity which it had already earned as a result
of the strongly centralized constitution under which the provinces
had really no powers. While the central government tried to
concede some economic demands at the cost of political control,
East Pakistan has "been pressing for political power in order
to gain financial control. It is to "be seen how the next
constitution will tackle the problem of economic planning at
the state level and the provincial demands for greater powers.
In day to day politics the constitutional issues, which
of course derive from the cultural and economic differences,
figure more prominently because they are usually the favourite
subjects of politicians. In Pakistan the main constitutional
issues, as can be gathered from the previous chapter, have
been those of federalism and of representation. The two questions
are very much related but here they are discussed separately.
As pointed out in Chapter 2 the original demand for
Pakistan incorporated a federal idea in very vague terms.
This was the price paid by the Muslim League to obtain the
support of all the Muslim majority provinces. According to
this demand, expressed in the Lahore Resolution of March 1942,
a federal structure with a high degree of provincial autonomy
was explicitly conceded. However, once Pakistan came into being
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there were several factors which favoured a more centralized
system.
First of all there was the problem of creating the whole
governmental machinery for a new state which required a strong
central administration to cope with the problems. Secondly,
the general dislocation due to partition and the tremendous
problem of the settlement of refugees also necessitated a strong
centre to co-ordinate all the efforts to meet these difficulties.
If the problems had been left to the provincial governments
there would have been many complications, as for example the
rather uncompromising attitude of Sindhis and the Sind provincial
government towards refugees. Here the central intervention was
necessary, so much so that, when rioting broke out in Sind
between refugees and local Hindus, the central government stepped
in and later removed the Chief Minister of Sind on the implicit
charges of aiding the Hindus.
Another important factor was the almost autocratic leader¬
ship of Jirtnah. His authority over the Muslim League was
almost absolute and it was perhaps not conceivable to have
Jinnah as the head of a weak central government. Everybody
in the League accepted his authority and judgement; those who
did not had already left the League or did so soon afterwards.
There was no other party of any consequence because the fight
for Pakistan had been fought solely by the League.
A more important factor favouring a strong central
government was, perhaps, the Government of India Act of 1935.
Although it was styled as a federal constitution, it in fact
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provided for a strong centre - reference to Section 93 has
already been made (Chapter 14). Because under the Independence
of India Act of 1947 the earlier Act was inherited, with some
amendments, "by Pakistan as the working constitution, the setting
up of a strong central government was inevitable. Perhaps it
can be argued that if the first Constituent Assembly had framed
a constitution within a short time after independence some of
the conditions of the Lahore Resolution might have been fulfilled.
However, as the constitutional controversies dragged on for
years the central government grew stronger day by day. It used
the emergency powers of Section 93 (92a) in three provinces,
the Punjab, Sind and East Bengal. When the Assembly did after
all try to curb the powers of the Governor-General it found
itself dismissed under the same provision.
Luring all these years the working of the Government of
India Act had become so familiar to politicians, civil servants
and the public at large that the 1956 Constitution differed
only in some details from the provisions of the Act. At the
time the Constitution was passed by the second Constituent
Assembly the central government under Governor-General Mirza
had become so strong that it was not prepared to give up much
of its power in the new constitution. Insofar as the delay
in framing of a constitution is a reason for the strong
centralized rule, the politicians from both the wings as well
as the Ulama are equally responsible.
With the proclamation of Martial Law in 1958 all vestiges
of federalism vanished altogether, but before that in 1955 the
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provinces of West Pakistan had already vanished along with
their dreams of "being "sovereign and autonomous" units of
Pakistan. Although there was some speculation about the nature
of the constitution promised by Ayub Khan, there was no doubt
that it was going to bring an even stronger central government.
Its main features have already been discussed in Chapter 14.
So, all the hopes of the provinces being autonomous, assured
them in the Lahore Resolution, were gradually dashed and as
the degree of autonomy decreased the opposition to the central
government, particularly in East Pakistan, increased. The
question of representation in the central legislature has had
a similar history. The first Constituent Assembly as elected
before independence on proportional representation contained
more members from East Pakistan. However, under the overwhelming
majority of the Muslim League the opposition in the Assembly
was weak and ineffective as it consisted mostly of Hindu members.
The Draft Constitution of 1954 provided for a bi-cameral
legislature with the provinces having proportional representation
in the lower house and an equal number of members in the upper
house (Chapter 14, Table 83)» but the Assembly was dismissed
before it could pass the constitution.
The second Constituent Assembly came into being in 1955
and was elected on the basis of parity, i.e. membership equally
divided between the two wings. The principle of parity was
also incorporated in the Constitutions of 1956 and 1962. Thus
East Pakistan's numerical majority was compromised on a
principle of equality between the two wings not only in repre-
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sentation but also in development funds and in recruitment to
the armed and civil services. However, whereas the political
aspect of parity became a fact very soon, its economic and
recruitment sides remained very much a matter of controversy
and bitterness between the wings. The persisting or increasing
differentials in economic development and employment forced
East Pakistani politicians to draw back from the principle of
parity and strongly demand proportional representation along
with their demands of provincial autonomy. This is construed,
as an attempt on their part to wrest as much of the governmental
functions from the centre as possible and also to ensure that
West Pakistan does not dominate whatever functions are left
with the central government. Punjabis have seen these demands
as purely an attempt by East Pakistan to extend their control
over the western wing as well as in the centre and to undermine
the economic and administrative superiority of the Punjab.
East Pakistan has not only demanded autonomy for itself
and proportional representation, but has also insisted on the
disintegration of the one unit of West Pakistan. On the face
of it this demand appears extremely unreasonable but it is,
perhaps, motivated by long term interests. It was observed
in Chapter 2 that population in East and West Pakistan has
grown at different rates, 2.1 and 2.7 per cent per annum
respectively between 1951 and 1961. In the 1951 Census the
share of East Pakistan in the total population was about 55.4
per cent, and it decreased to 54.2 per cent in 1961. It is
likely that the East Pakistani leaders might have reasoned that
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at some time in the future, because of this differential growth
rate, the population of West Pakistan might exceed that of
East Pakistan. In that case proportional representation, which
favoured them now, would work against them. Thus to meet any-
such eventuality it was necessary for them to press for the
disintegration of West Pakistan. The question of parity was,
therefore, very much tied with the integration of West Pakistan
if proportional representation was to be achieved then West
Pakistan had to be broken up into the former provinces. In
this regard East Pakistan has succeeded as the provinces have
been re-established and the elections to the Constituent
Assembly are to be held on the basis of proportional represen¬
tation.
Politics in Pakistan have been, it has been suggested in
the preceding discussion, very much confounded by the highly
complex cultural and economic distributions which have given
rise to divergent political demands. However, during the
twenty-three years in which the state has existed there has
been a development of some thinking within the framework of
Pakistan as a whole rather than of the provinces. In the
concluding chapter the various internal regional tendencies




Chapter 16 Regionalism and Political Integration
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CHAPTER 16
REGIONALISM ARE POLITICAL INTEGRATION
The pursuit of some measure of integration, however
qualified or imperfect, which is the "basic aim of any political
community faces major problems in Pakistan. The difficulties
posed by the territorial fragmentation cannot be overemphasised
and the cultural fragmentation of V/est Pakistan, expressed in
the variety of languages spoken, is an equally important obstacle
in the way of achieving effective political integration. Many
provincial differences, which result mainly from cultural
differences but strengthened by economic and political factors,
have deepened during the twenty-three years of Pakistan's
existence. On the other hand the very fact that the state has
existed for over two decades, through many difficult periods,
has led among certain sections of the population to the
emergence of some thinking on the state level which transcends
the traditional provincial and cultural divisions. However,
it is not easy to obliterate, or even diminish, the divisions
in society that have existed for generations particularly when
such divisions have had political recognition in the form of
provinces and districts. It is easy to change political
boundaries, inter-state or intra-state, but it is extremely
difficult to change the impression those boundaries have made
on the minds of the people affected by them. "The real
partitions, those which are the most stable and the least
flexible, are in the minds of men. The worst barriers stem from
the diversity of the historical past" (Gottman 1952, p.85).
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The influences upon regionalism and political integration
in Pakistan maj be seen as of two types, those inherited from
the pre-independence period and those which have emerged since
1947. The influences derive from the complex interplay of the
various cultural, economic and political distributions.
Foreign influences have also been important in some cases and,
although they do not form a part of this study, some reference
to them is necessary in order to make certain points. It is
not easy to separate the influences upon regionalism and
political integration under the three headings - cultural,
economic and political - because in most of the cases there is
not any sharp division, and the three types of distributions
have all combined in various degrees to produce the several
centrifugal and centripetal influences. Regionalism and
political integration are, however, discussed separately followed
by an attempt to create a balance between the two.
An important stimulus to regionalism came from the heritage
of the British period. Although during that period there was
a strong central government, the federal nature of the admini¬
strative system kept the provinces rather isolated from each
other. At the time of independence the provinces had been in
existence as separate administrative units for varying lengths
of time. The provincial boundaries had become strongly
imprinted upon the landscape partly because of their historical
existence but largely because they more or less corresponded
with linguistic boundaries. The various linguistic units had
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come to "be identified with sharply defined political units i.e.
Bengali-speaking with Bengal, Punjabi-speaking with the Punjab,
Sindhi-speaking with Sind and so on. This does not mean that
these units were entirely the creation of the British because
these linguistic groups had existed in their respective areas
for a long time. However, only under the British rule were
they sharply demarcated by provincial boundaries and given
constitutional recognition and a degree of representative
government. So, the traditional linguistic divisions of the
population became a political fact not only on the administrative
map of British India but also in the minds of the people.
Peoples' loyalties, which were most intense at the kinship
level stopped at the provincial boundaries, often they did not
extend beyond the boundaries of their districts. There were
few feelings of being 'Indian'. To Sindhis, for example, there
were Punjabis north of their province and not other 'Indians.'
This provincial identity was further strengthened by the
policy of the Muslim League before independence. Until partition
was conceded by the British government in 1947, provincial
autonomy was the keynote of the League policy. It was feared
that in a united 'India', whether dependent or independent,
the central government would always be dominated by Hindus
because of their numerical superiority in the subcontinent.
As a result of this fear the League insisted on the greatest
possible degree of provincial autonomy so that at least in the
Muslim majority provinces the interference from the Hindu-
dominated centre would be at a minimum. This policy stimulated
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the already strong provincial loyalties and as a result the
Lahore Resolution of March 23, 1940, not only asked for indepen¬
dent Muslim states in the "Northwestern and Eastern zones of
India" but also autonomy and sovereignty for the "Constituent
Units" (Chapter 2). It was a clear stipulation that if the
demand for Pakistan was accepted the provinces would be even
more autonomous and distinct identities than they were in
British India. Thus the League had unwittingly promised and
promoted regionalism, a mistake which was to be regretted later,
because once partition was assured the policy of the League
changed completely towards political integration while some of
the provinces insisted on fulfilling the conditions of the
Resolution.
Luring the British period there was no occasion for any
conflict between different languages because of the overall
superiority of English which was the official language. Apart
from making English compulsory in higher education, government,
the law courts, etc., the British had not tried to impose any
of the local languages. The provinces were free to use their
local languages for primary and secondary education and also
as official languages at the lower administrative levels.
This policy encouraged cultural isolation because only those
persons who were literate in English could communicate across
linguistic boundaries and the percentage of such persons was
smallto widespread illiteracy. After independence this
language policy was continued until in the 1956 Constitution
Urdu and Bengali were recognised as national languages.
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However, nothing practical was done to translate this constitu¬
tional recognition into the educational field and some of the
local languages, notably Sindhi, were allowed to continue as
before independence. This adherence to the local languages has
been an important factor of regionalism because linguistic
differences are the most differentiating cultural attribute.
Even bi-lingualism is a considerable strain on the integration
of a state but where seven different languages are spoken, as
in Pakistan, the adoption of a common language is a necessity
if a cohesive nation is to be evolved. The fact must be noted
here that Punjab has been the only area where the local language
has not been given any importance. Urdu was accepted in the
Punjab as the language of literacy long before partition and
since then there has been no significant movement to enhance
the status of Punjabi. It has been shown (Chapter 5) that as
a language of literacy Punjabi has been the least significant.
However, in other provinces there has been no such voluntary
acceptance of the lingua franca.
Besides these historical and cultural causes, regionalism
in recent years has gained a new stimulus from economic
distributions. Before independence, as in cultural relation¬
ships, the provinces had very little economic contact with
each other. After 1947 when they became parts of a new
independent state there was bound to be a change in their
economic relationships. The economy, which was geared to the
interests of Britain, Calcutta or Bombay had to be planned
according to the needs of an independent Pakistan. Industriali-
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zation, which in the Pakistan area had lagged behind relative
to some other parts of the subcontinent, had to be accelerated
in order to raise per capita incomes and standards of living.
There is no need here to discuss again the main features of
economic development in Pakistan (Part III) except to point
out that there are important differences in the relative levels
of development not only between the wings but also within West
Pakistan. Before 1947 it was the general belief among the
Muslims of the subcontinent that their relative poverty was
due only to the dominance of Hindus in industry and business
and that once independence was achieved their economic condition
would improve and inter-regional differences would vanish.
However, when the post-independence period failed to fulfil
any of these expectations frustration and disappointment led
to sharp differences between the relatively poor areas and
those a little better off. Again these economic differences
arose in the provincial framework though the problem of intra-
provincial economic disparities was as serious as that of inter-
provincial. The provinces as territorial units dominated the
various economic and political controversies. Thus all the
cultural and economic bases of regionalism had a ready-made
political framework of considerable standing provided by the
existing provincial units. Against this provincial framework
the state framework was rather weak because of its recent
origin and the fact that the Muslim League had recognised and
promised the continuance of the provinces as autonomous units.
The main weakness of the state-idea lay in the vagueness of
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the Lahore Resolution which apparently rejected the idea of a
cohesive, integrated state.
Another factor which ga ve considerable support to
regionalism was the composition of the Civil Service and the
Armed Forces. The provinces did not have proportional repre¬
sentation in the Civil Service and the Army (Chapter 13)> with
the result that the Punjab and the refugee element dominated
the higher ranks of the Civil Service, and the Punjab, with
the NWFP to some extent, almost exclusively controlled the Army.
Before independence it did not matter whether the Civil Service
and the Army was dominated by one province or the other because
the two, irrespective of the provincial origin of their
personnel, represented the British Crown. As long as they
remained under the control of an impartial alien rule there
was little cause for concern on the part of those provinces
which did not have enough representation. After independence,
however, that impartial sovereign power was replaced by a new
state authority which did not enjoy a loyalty strong enough to
transcend provincial loyalties. The provinces had, of course,
accepted the idea of partition but not at the cost of losing
their separate political identities.
Finally, in discussing regionalism and political integration
it is necessary to note the external influences deriving from
Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan and India. The open
support given by both these countries to some regional tendencies
has caused considerable problems for Pakistan. The influence
of India in promoting regionalism in Pakistan has not been as
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strong as that of Afghanistan, a neighbouring Muslim country.
To examine the role played by the various factors discussed
above in promoting regionalism it is convenient to consider
the provinces one by one. By far the most serious manifestation
of regionalism has been the conflict between the wings. The
economic and political grievances of East Pakistan against the
central government, which has been strongly identified with
the Punjab because of the latter's dominance in the central
politics, in the Oivil Service and in the Army, have over the
years become deeper. The feeling in East Pakistan that the
central government, as based in the western wing, is remote
and unwilling to understand and solve the problems of the
eastern half of the state has gradually grown stronger. Apart
from the historical causes and the pre-independence policy of
the Muslim League, a number of other causes can be identified
which have strengthened the regional tendencies of East Pakistan.
Because of the long distance that separates the two wings
there has been little cultural contact between them. The first
contact after independence on the human level was in the form
of the posting of West Pakistani, particularly Punjabi and
Urdu speaking refugee civil servants, to administrative jobs
in East Pakistan. The attitude of some of these officers to
East Pakistanis was certainly far from being one of a compatriot.
They, by their very training, considered themselves to have
been sent there to rule rather than to serve the people. This
initial unfavourable experience with West Pakistanis was later
strengthened by other issues. The Civil Service cannot wholly
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escape the responsibility of initiating suspicion and hostility
among East Pakistani people against the central government.
East Pakistanis utilized the first opportunity they had to
defeat the ruling Muslim League in the 1954 provincial elections.
The very fact that the various central governments and
Punjabi politicians and bureaucrats have tended to look at
East Pakistan as a culturally and economically inferior part
of Pakistan has been very much resented by the people of East
Pakistan. East Pakistanis have always looked at Pakistan and
at themselves as shown in 3?ig.7, and not as in conventional
maps on which East Pakistan appears relatively insignificant.
They have been conscious of their numerical superiority which
because of the political and economic pov<jer of the western
wing has not yet been truly translated into political reality.
The attitude of many West Pakistani politicians and bureaucrats
is perhaps exemplified in Ayub Khan's words.
"East Bengalis, who constitute the bulk of the population,
probably belong to the very original Indian races. It
would be no exaggeration to say that up to the creation
of Pakistan, they had not known any real freedom or
sovereignty. They have been in turn ruled either by the
caste Hindus, Moghuls, Pathans, or the British. In
addition, they have been and still are under considerable
Hindu cultural and linguistic influence. As such they
have all the inhibitions of down-trodden races and have
not yet found it possible to adjust psychologically to the
requirements of the new-born freedom. Their popular
complexes, exclusiveness, suspicion and a sort of defensive
aggressiveness probably emerge from this historical back¬
ground. Prudence, therefore, demands that these factors
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should be recognized and catered for and they be helped so
as to feel equal partners and prove an asset. That can be
done only if they are given a considerable measure of
partnership" (Khan 1967» p.187).
So, "a considerable measure of partnership", and not proportional,
had to be given to East Pakistan, and that too as a result of
"prudence" instead of as a democratic right because of its
higher population. Perhaps, even a faint smell of racial
superiority can also be detected. No wonder Past Pakistan has
a number of times expressed views in conflict with the central
government.
The language question was another issue on which the local
aspirations of Bast Pakistan were at variance 'with the central
government (Chapter 15). The public declarations by Jinnah and
Liaquat Ali Khan about the adoption of Urdu as the only state
language were certainly resented in East Pakistan, though
because of the stature of these two leaders there was no public
expression of that resentment. After the death of the two
leaders, however, this language policy of the central govern¬
ment was met with violent opposition in the eastern wing and
ultimately, after much hostility, the two-language compromise
was accepted. Although the question of national language has
been 'solved' since 1956, when Urdu and Bengali were both
declared as national languages, the feeling among East Pakistanis
still persists "that they have had to fight desperately to
secure satisfaction that should have been theirs without
argument, as a matter of simple justice" (Callard 1957, p.183).
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The economic causes of East Pakistan's grievances against
the central government and West Pakistan have already been
discussed (Chapter 12). Prom the speeches of the East
Pakistani political leaders and from the personal experience
of the writer it is certain that there is a general belief in
the eastern wing that the central government, dominated by the
Punjab, have throughout the past twenty-three years deliberately
ignored the economic development of East Pakistan in order to
enrich the western wing. The foreign exchange earned by East
Pakistani exports has been spent on importing luxury goods and
industrial plants for West Pakistan. Prom the data analysed
in Part III it is apparent that there is considerable evidence
to suggest that the various central governments have failed to
strike a balance between the wings in development expenditure.
However, there is also evidence that at least during the Third
Five Year Plan 1965-70 a conscious effort was made to narrow
the gap in the economic levels of the two wings but, like in
the language question, East Pakistanis do not feel satisfied
and tend to remember the growing economic disparities during
the earlier years. During recent years the economic basis of
regionalism has grown more popular, particularly among students
and the educated.
The political history of the past two decades has done
nothing to remove the differences and misunderstandings; it in
fact has reinforced regionalism considerably. The increasing
centralization of political authority (Chapter 15), concentrated
as it is in the state capital located in West Pakistan, has
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has produced a strong corresponding reaction in East Pakistan.
Every step taken by the central government to enhance its power,
a process which reached its peak under Ayub Khan, was accom¬
panied by a growing support in East Pakistan for the demands of
regional autonomy, A1though the selection of Karachi as the
state capital was not relished in certain quarters of East
Pakistan, it was gradually accepted because the choice was made
by Jinnah himself. When the capital was later shifted to
Rawalpindi and Islamabad it was seen as another attempt to
further consolidate the power of the Punjab and demands were
raised to make Dacca the capital of Pakistan.
All these factors have resulted in a strong East Pakistani
regionalism. Its political expression has been a demand for
some form of autonomy, its cultural consequences have been East
Pakistan's general dislike of anything suggesting the superiority
of West Pakistan, particularly of the Punjab. During the
disturbances which caused the downfall of the Ayub regime in
1969 slogans like "Punjabi imperialism", "Punjabi domination"
and "Punjabi army of occupation" were often used in East
Pakistan. The results have been that East Pakistani leaders,
who might have been satisfied with the principle of parity in
1956, now demand "full regional autonomy" based on the Lahore
Resolution. For example, the leader of one of the East
Pakistani political parties, Rational Progressive League, was
reported to have demanded
"a sovereign constitution to be framed by the elected
representatives of the people - a constitution that would
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ensure full regional autonomy on the basis of Lahore
Resolution and two economies and socialistic society.
Referring to his earlier suggestion that two parts of the
country should have two separate constitutions, he said
this would help remove many inequalities between the two
Wings of the country.
He said the Centre should have a separate constitution
with the responsibility of currency, foreign affairs and
defence of the country" (Pakistan News, January 15, 1970,
p.4).
Some leaders have even gone further to demand separate currencies
for the two wings as well as the right to recruit provincial
militias.
The central government in the past have at a number of
times alleged Indian involvement in promoting regionalism in
East Pakistan but there is no authentic information available
to prove this, though considering the nature of relations
between the two states any internal embarrassment to the Pakistan
government must be more than welcome in India, and vice versa.
However, the regionalism of East Pakistan, strong as it is, has
not yet become separatism. At least no political leader or
party has publicly expressed any separatist feelings, although
separatism must be regarded as a potential threat.
Another important manifestation of regionalism, with
strong separatist tendencies, has been that of the North-West
Frontier Province. This regionalism, founded mainly on cultural
grounds, has derived much support externally and, therefore,
has been of greater concern. The boundary between Afghanistan
and British India was delimited by a joint Anglo-Russian
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Boundary Commission headed "by Sir Mortimer Durand, and in
which Afghanistan participated as an observer. The boundary,
known as the Durand Line, was drawn in 1893 and divided a
linguistically homogeneous people, the Pushto or Pukhto
speaking Pathans. The Afghan government had to accept this
boundary because of the might of the Imperial power in the
subcontinent but when the British withdrawal from the subcontinent
was announced the Afghanistan government started showing its
refusal to recognize the Durand Line as the boundary between
Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, instead of openly claiming
the Pakistan side of the Pathan territory, Afghanistan fostered
a movement for the self-determination of Pushto speaking people
whom they considered would prefer to join with Afghanistan.
The leader of this movement was Abdul Ghaffar Khan, popularly
called "Frontier Gandhi" because of his association with
Gandhi and the Congress Party. With the open support of
Afghanistan and Indian governments the Pukhtunistan movement
created some difficulties for Pakistan from time to time.
However, because of the relatively better economic status of
the Pathans on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line the movement
appears to have lost much of its momentum and at present it
does not constitute a serious separatist threat.
"Khan Abdul Ghafar Khan, the 80-year-old Pathan leader of
Pakistan's North-West frontier region, surprised India
today by hinting that he had given up his struggle for a
separate homeland for the Pakhtoons, and conceded Pakistan's
sovereignty over Pakhtoonistan" (The Times, Wed. October 8,
1969, p.7).
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Although it has lost its separatist component, the
regionalism of the NWFP still remains fairly strong. Its
supporters have tried to strengthen their claim on economic
arguments that since the integration of West Pakistan they
have not received their due share of the finances but there
is no convincing statistical evidence available to prove this
contention. Unlike East Pakistan no valid complaint can be
made by the EWFP about their representation in the Civil and
Armed Services.
Although Sind has not posed any separatist problem, the
province has proved to be more difficult to integrate than
other areas of West Pakistan. The distinctive nature of Sind's
cultural and economic distributions has already been noted
(Parts II and III). The Sindhi regionalism first came into
focus soon after independence when the Muslim refugees from
India were not welcomed by the Sindhi people. In fact there
were instances when they were not allowed by the local
inhabitants to settle in Sind (Binder 1963). This resulted
in riots when the desperate refugees clashed with the local
Hindus and it was the Hindus who were aided by the Sind govern¬
ment. The central government took action and Sind not only
lost its Chief Minister but also Karachi which became a federal
district. It is estimated that the inflow of refugees
drastically changed the demographio ratio of Sindhi/non-Sindhi
population to nearly 50-50 (Tayyeb 1966). This sudden arrival
of a large culturally alien population was too much for the
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local Sindhis who had been probably the most insulated people
in West Pakistan (Chapter 6). The tensions between the locals
and outsiders have persisted to this day.
The opposition of Sind to the plan to integrate West
Pakistan was indicative of the strong regionalism and the
continued adherence to the local language has reinforced the
inward-looking character of Sind. The better economic status
of many Punjabi and Urdu speaking immigrants has produced a
greater reaction against integration. The narrow provincial
outlook of most of the Sindhi leaders has made it very difficult
to integrate the various cultural elements in Sind. The
notoriously corrupt politics of Sind have been observed by many
independent political writers. One Sindhi member of the first
Constituent Assembly while speaking about the PROUA (Chapter 14),
an Act which gave powers to the central government to start
proceedings against any politician considered guilty of mis¬
conduct, said "it (PROUA) made the life of people in Sind very
miserable" (Callard op.cit., p.102-3). By "people of Sind"
he meant a handful of politicians, invariably belonging to the
rich landed classes. The extreme feudal system of land tenure
in Sind (Chapter 8) had kept a large majority of the population
oppressed by landlords and 'pirs', and the Sindhi regionalism
has been an attempt to preserve the vested interests which, it
was feared, might be whittled away by an effective integration.
Already the presence of a large percentage of non-Sindhi
peoples, not subject to the influence of local wielders of power,
was seen as a potentially dangerous influence on the local
peasants.
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As a result of these factors Sind has always found an
ally in the East Pakistani politicians. Throughout the period
since independence there have been many instances when Sindhi
I
and East Pakistani members of the Assembly joined to oppose
the central government. In its opposition to the 'One Unit'
plan Sind derived much strength from East Pakistan's hostility
to the same plan, though for different reasons. However,
whereas the regionalism of East Pakistan has been based on
genuine grievances that of Sind has been simply a reaction
against change and the impending diminution of the powers of
the landlords. The presence of a large percentage of non-
Sindhi population, particularly in the urban areas of Sind
which has been a source of present conflict, may well prove
to be in the long run an aid towards cultural fusion within
the province. However, at the time of writing the prospects
of further conflict unfortunately appear more probable than
those of integration.
Baluchistan covers a very large part of the area of West
Pakistan but has only a small of the population
(Chapter 2). During the British period it had remained largely
out of the mainstream of politics because of its rather remote
location, thin population and economic backwardness. It did
not generate enough revenue to justify a regular provincial
administration and was directly controlled by the central
government in Delhi through an appointed Chief Commissioner.
It also remained without any representative government which
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all the Governor's provinces enjoyed. A large part of the
territory was within the four princely states of Kalat, Kharan,
Mekran and Lashela. linguistically it was also different from
other provinces in that it did not have a majority tongue (Table
10). In 1961 the major language was Baluchi "but it claimed
only 33*5 per cent of the population. Baluchi, Pushto, Brahui,
Sindhi and Punjabi together accounted for 97 per cent of the
total inhabitants. Therefore, in Baluchistan there has been
no basis for strong cultural regionalism extending to all parts
of the province. In fact in some districts the local rivalries
between the economically better off Pushto speakers and the
relatively poor Baluchs have been more frequent than any
widespread feelings of loyalty to Baluchistan.
However, the province has not been without troubles. The
first serious expression of regionalism was made about the
time of the integration of West Pakistan which involved the
abolition of the princely states as such and their incorporation
as regular administrative districts. There had been reports
that Kalat's ruler opposed the merger plan and it has been
said that he was called to Karachi and forced to sign the legal
document, thus conceding his authority over the Baluchistan
States Bhion of which he was made the head after independence
(Wilcox 1963). The dissatisfaction of the Kalat ruler
resulted in October 1958 in a rebellion which, the government
alleged, aimed at separation and independence (ibid. ). However,
the ruler was later arrested and the rebellion - if there was
one (ibid.) - was crushed and conditions returned to normal.
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In 1960 the ruler was released and some of his privileges
restored though he could not recover his state. Afterwards,
during the 1960s, sporadic trouble in Baluchistan continued
mainly in the form of, according to government reports,
seditious acts by certain Baluch tribal chiefs. Nevertheless,
because of the relatively low population, such incidents have
usually been within the power of the government to control
although the difficult terrain and lack of transport required
the deployment of regular troops to control such recalcitrant
elements. Throughout this period the northern Pushto speaking
districts did not pose any problem though the Pukhtoonistan
movement included all such districts of Baluchistan in its
scope.
Much of the cause of these regional tendencies in Baluchistan
can be attributed to two reasons. Firstly, like Sind, there
has been a determination on the part of traditional state
rulers and tribal chiefs to maintain their power which they
feared might wither away as a result of integration. Secondly,
Baluchistan has become increasingly conscious of its poverty
(Chapter 12). All the districts in Baluchistan, with the
exception of Quetta, are relatively very poor (Fig.44). Because
of the rocky nature of the terrain and the lack of rainfall
and water for irrigation there is not much scope for agricul¬
tural development. However, Baluchistan produces a large share
of the minerals - all the chromite, about half the coal and
all the natural gas production of West Pakistan. Whereas coal
and chromite may not be very significant in the total economy,
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the gas is extremely important to the whole of the wing, but
so far all the gas being produced has been used outside
Baluchistan. There is, therefore, some concern in Baluchistan
about sharing the benefits of development which has been made
possible by the Sui natural gas (Chapter 10). Otherwise
Baluchistan may not pose any great problem for integration
because the total number of population involved is relatively
small, but transport and communications (Chapter 11) will have
to be improved in order to break the isolation of the area.
There has been no such thing as Punjabi regionalism
because the Punjab has stood for a strong centre. It can be
argued that the reason for this attitude is that because of
its economic and political superiority it has been in the
interests of the Punjab to have a strong central government so
that it can dominate other provinces. It was, for example,
alleged that the Punjab supported the integration of West
Pakistan so that its bureaucrats could have a wider area over
which to exercise their power and so that the province could
have financial control over the whole of West Pakistan. This
might have been the reason but the fact cannot be ignored that
the Punjab, in order to facilitate the integration of West
Pakistan, agreed to a 40 per cent representation rather than
its due 60 per cent. There were no significant public protests
against this proposal which was accepted in the wider interests
of the state.
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In the refugee problem also the Punjab showed considerable
maturity. The refugees were generally accepted everywhere in
the province. It is true there were some factors favouring
this receptive attitude of the Punjab. Firstly, a large
number of refugees came from East Punjab who were not culturally
different from the local population. Secondly, the Urdu
speaking refugees from further east in India did not have much
difficulty in settling in the Punjab because of the long¬
standing acceptance of Urdu language in the province. Another
factor which inhibits any Punjabi regionalism is the fact that
Punjabi, compared to other provincial languages, has a wide
range of variations in dialects. So, if there is to be any
regionalism in the Punjab based on language it has to be on
a smaller scale based on particular dialects and thus involving
relatively smaller areas.
While there may not have been any divergent regionalism
in the Punjab, the Punjabis have certainly contributed to the
growth of regionalism in other provinces by their condescending
attitudes. The role of the civil servants in this regard has
already been noted. This sense of superiority has created a
certain amount of reaction and hostility against Punjabi,
particularly among East Pakistanis and Sindhis, and against
everything for which the Punjab stands.
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The central governments since independence have done
little positive towards effective political integration (Chapter
15). However, the stark facts that statehood was achieved
under difficult circumstances and that Pakistan has been run
as an independent identity for over two decades are in them¬
selves of considerable importance in assessment of integration.
Islam is still the major force which keeps all the different
cultural elements together. Despite the vagueness of the
Lahore Hesolution it was implicit that, whatever the shape of
the constitution and the form of the government might be,
Pakistan was going to be a homeland for the Muslims. Despite
all the economic and political differences of opinion among
the politicians, to the millions of common people in Pakistan
Islam continues to be a source of inspiration. Lven if a
Bengali and a Punjabi cannot talk to each other they can pray
together and have many things common in their social behaviour.
The belief and pride in Islam is so strong that many people
feel perplexed at the internal dissensions of the Arab Muslim
world. Pakistan's continued support for Arabs and the U.A.R.
despite the unresponsive attitude of President Nasser is
indicative of the importance of religion. Perhaps religion
would not have been an integrating influence if it were only
a spiritual faith but since Islam is a complete code affecting
all the daily aspects of life and because of its universal
approach transcending all racial, ethnic, linguistic boundaries
it is the major centripetal force.
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The role of religious controversies in politics regarding
the Islamic constitution has already been discussed. Y/hatever
the differences on the Islamic requirements between different
interested groups and no matter how much one may blame the
religious leaders for their role in delaying the adoption of
a constitution, it must be admitted that their influence was
in some ways beneficial to the state. The religious contro¬
versies did not have a provincial bias and they affected the
whole state irrespective of cultural and economic differences.
While debating the Islamic provisions of the constitution the
focus had to be on the people of Pakistan rather than on
Bengalis and Punjabis. Secondly, all the interpretations of
the religious leaders about the requirements of an Islamic
state, despite their mutual differences on details, stressed
the unity, or integration, of Muslims under a strong central
government and a discouragement of regionalism based on
linguistic differences.
To this wider influence of religion must be added the
nature of the Muslim League leadership. It was a party of the
Muslims under the extremely strong leadership of Jinnah whose
authority was accepted in all the provinces. Among his other
qualities of leadership was the fortunate coincidence that he
did not come from any of the areas inherited by Pakistan. He
was settled in Bombay and so could not be identified with any
of the provinces or the linguistic groups. As long as he lived,
the inter-provincial rivalries and hostilities did not emerge.
He lived for only about a year after independence but he left
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a tradition and symbol of unity which is reflected in the
respect that his name still commands.
Like the religious controversies, economic development
and the debate concerning it, on the one hand produced further
causes of conflict, this time between the provinces, but on
the other hand developed some thinking on the state level.
Because of highly centralised planning under the Ayub regime
there developed some state-level uniformity in trade union
organization, ill though labour unions are still not strong
enough to improve the conditions of their members (Chapter 10),
there has been considerable contact between them at the state
level. One recent newspaper report states:
"The power of industrial workers in Pakistan under a
surprisingly able leadership has now been recognised by
General Yahya Khan's regime as the most important new
political factor with which he and the dominant elite must
come to terms before political stability can return to the
country....
What surprised and disconcerted the employers and the
regime was the degree of unity and understanding between
labour leaders from East and West Pakistan" (The Guardian,
Tuesday July 28, 1970, p.3).
If this is true then for the first time an important section
of the population, which hitherto have remained out of
politics, will play an important role not only in day-to-day
^politics but also in the integration of the state because the
labour movement has shown its tendency to overcome provincial
barriers. Unfortunately the rural peasants, who form the
majority of the population, are still illiterate and isolated
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and thus susceptible to the influence of the local landlords
who tend to be inclined towards regionalism in order to resist
change.
Another consequence of the economic controversies and the
inability of the government to remove inter-regional disparities
has been the rise of leftist socialist parties. Traditional
religious opinion has tended to look at socialism as identical
with communism and thus un-Islamic. It is not possible to say
whether socialism will succeed but the very fact that socialism
is now talked about is a hopeful sign to curb regionalism. It
is hopeful because there are indications that politics, which
has been bedevilled so far by provincial rivalries, may become
polarised between right and left and thus desert regionalism.
It is still too early to detect any definite signs of such
polarisation because most of the political parties in Pakistan
are still based on personalities and lack ideological bases.
At present there are about twenty different parties preparing
to fight the coming elections. Perhaps most of them will be
eliminated in these elections to the Constituent Assembly, due
in the beginning of December 1970, and the rest will coalesce
into a few state-level parties with distinct policies. If
this happens then not only will a commonly agreed constitution
be relatively easier to frame but it will mark a good beginning
for a democratic system. If, on the other hand, the present
chaotic state of the parties is translated to the floor of the
Assembly then this Constituent Assembly may prove even less
fruitful than its predecessors because most of the parties at
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present, particularly those in East Pakistan, have a strong
regional bias.
Another important uniting factor, though a negative one,
has been the threat of India. Since external relations are
not within the scope of this work the basis and the nature of
Indo-Pakistan relations cannot be discussed here. However, it
is essential to note that the threat of India, whether supposed
or real, has been used by each successive government to induce
people towards greater unity and integration. This factor
might have weakened but for the short war between the two
states in September 1965 which again brought it into focus.
It is likely that this influence will continue to be used by
the central government in the future though its positive effects
are doubtful.
It is not possible to quantify the various centripetal
and centrifugal influences. Moreover, politics is such an
unpredictable area that the issues that may seem very significant
today may lose their importance tomorrow. When the second
Constitution was launched in 1962 by Ayub Khan it was generally
felt that Pakistan had achieved political stability but after
only seven years he had to leave unceremoniously as a result
of conditions not very different from those which had brought
him to power. The present Martial Law government has promised
to hold free and impartial elections on the basis of proportional
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representation to a Constituent Assembly to frame a constitution
within 120 days of its sitting. After the constitution has
"been framed, the government has promised to hand over power
to an elected civilian government. There is no reason to doubt
the sincerity of the government because in the coming elections,
for the first time in the history of Pakistan, the government
in power is not going to be an interested party. It is very
much in the hands of the politicians whether to agree and
restore democracy soon or to disagree as usual over trivialities
and prolong Martial Law.
It must be noted, however, that to a majority of the
population of illiterate peasants the wranglings of politicians
over constitutional provisions are totally irrelevant.
Federalism or a unitary system, presidential or parliamentary
government, an Islamic or a socialist constitution, cannot
enhance the resources of the state. What matters is a wise and
honest utilization of the already meagre wealth of the country.
Reference has been made to the widening inter-regional economic
disparities accompanying the initial stages of development
(Chapter 12). Since most of the population in Pakistan,
especially in the rural areas, believe what they are told by
their leaders, it is the duty of the politicians, if they wish
to see the state growing strong, to make the people understand
that in order to have a better future a further increase in
the inter-regiona'l disparities may be expected (Williamson 1965).
The linguistic differences and the lack of communication make
it easier to create misunderstandings and hostility between
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different regions. However, given wise and dedicated leadership
there are reasonable chances that despite the cultural diversity
and local loyalties a national feeling and a loyalty transcending
the regional boundaries can be evolved.
"However, the ordinary man is aware of his country's
independence and he takes pride in it. It is a source of
satisfaction to hear the name 'Pakistan', and to have an
Air Porce and a Navy and an Army. A sovereign independent
republic can claim equality with all other nations in the
eyes of the world. The foreign rulers have gone; Muslim
Pakistanis sit in positions of power, authority and
prestige, Every Pakistani is a nationalist at heart, and
there are few who regret the passing of the old order"
(Callard op.cit., p.270).
It is up to the leaders of Pakistan, religious or secular,
whether to utilize this latent nationalism for the good of the
state as a whole or to allow the divisive effect of regionalism
and potential separatism to impair the national achievement.
Regionalism has already scored a victory over the forces
of integration by compelling the government to re-create the
provinces of West Pakistan. The central government has also
conceded East Pakistan's demand for proportional representation.
Perhaps the very territorial and cultural structure of Pakistan
demands a federal system but any kind of federalism must involve
some sacrifices on the part of the component units. No federal
system in Pakistan can succeed if it entails the numerical
dominance of the eastern wing or the economic superiority of
the Punjab and Karachi. Once an acceptable compromise has
been reached the component units must contribute fully to the
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overall loyalty to the state in order to evolve a cohesive
viable entity. It is as easy to stretch provincial autonomy
to outright separatism as it is for a strong centralised rule
to become corrupt, abusive and insensitive to sub-national
aspirations. Now that the provinces have regained their former
political recognition they must subscribe equally to the
national feeling. Por effective integration it is essential
to evolve a supreme loyalty to which provincial loyalties should
be subordinate and not in conflict. Before independence the
supreme power of the British crown managed to keep the
provincial differences buried. After 1947 the personality of
Jinnah filled that role. Now the latent nationalism of the
Pakistani people must be sensibly exploited to create a viable
degree of homogeneity. Otherwise it may not be easy to draw
the line between federation, confederation or political disaster.
Politicians have tried to find political answers to social
and economic problems instead of striving for social and economic
change able to nourish democratic institutions. Democracy in
Pakistan collapsed in October 1958 because of the inability
of the men in politics to demonstrate an honest determination
to work for it rather than make it work for their parochial
interests. If it fails to revive in December 1970 it will be
precisely for the same reasons.
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APPEDDIX I
Area, Population and Density (Districts), 1961
Area Population Density
Districts (sq.miles) (thousands) (persons/
sa ,m, )
East Pakistan 55126 50840 992
1.Dinajpur 2609 1710 655
2.Rangpur 3704 3796 1025
3.Bogra 1502 1574 1048
4.Raj shahi 3654 2811 769
5.Pabna 1877 1959 1044
6.Kushtia 1371 1166 851
7.Jessore 2547 2190 860
8.Khulna 4652 2449 526
9.Bakerganj 4240 4262 1005
lO.Mymensingh 6361 7019 1103
11.Dacca 2882 5096 1768
12.Paridpur 2694 3179 1180
13.Sylhet 4785 3490 729
14.0omilla 2594 4389 1639
15.Noakhali 1855 2383 1285
16.0hittagong 2705 2983 1103
17.Ghittagong Hill Tracts 5093 385 76
West Pakistan 310403 42841 138
N.W.F.P. 39283 7578 193
1.Hazara 6051 1385 220
2.Mardan 1211 823 672
3.Peshawar 1545 1213 737
4.Kohat 2707 628 181
5.Dera Ismail Khan 3476 383 81
6.Bannu 1695 428 210
7.Frontier States, Tribal
Agencies, etc. 22598 2718 120
Punjab 79542 25582 322
1.Campbell-pur 4148 767 185
2.Rawalpindi 2022 1137 562
3.Jhelum 2772 749 270
4.Gujrat 2264 1326 586
5.Sargodha 4775 1468 307
6.Mianwali 5403 747 138
7.Lyallpur 3516 2684 763
8.Jhang 3401 1079 317
9.Lahore 2216 2480 1119














































Sind 58471 8469 145
1.Jacobabad 2982 529 177
2.Sukkur 5531 837 151
3.Larkana 2866 604 211
4.Nawahshah 2896 692 239
5.khairpur 6018 472 78
6.Hyderabad 4969 1286 259
7.Dadu 7342 485 66
8.Tharparkar 13435 728 54
9.Sanghar 4142 430 104
10.Thatta 6933 362 52
11.Karachi 1357 2044 1506
Baluchistan 133107 1252 9
1.Quetta* 5314 267 50
2.Sibi 10446 123 12
3.Loralai 7364 111 15
4.Zhob 10475 88 8
5.Chagai 19516 41 2
6.Kalat 30931 341 11
7.Mekran 23460 147 6
8.Kharan 18553 42 2
9.Lasbela 7048 91 13
Pakistan 365529 93721 256
(Sourcet Census, 1961)
*The official name of the district is Quetta/Pishin, but for




Distribution of .{elisions. 1951 and 1961 (000)
Province/
Divisi on 1 2 3 4 5 6
Pakistan 72993 62317 4348 5422 539 367
East Pakistan 41932 32227 4187 5052 106 360
Raj shahi 9338 7413 598 1314 11 2
Khulna 8240 5959 764 1479 21 17
Dacca 12632 9967 1150 1434 62 - 10
Chittagong 11720 8879 1675 825 12 331
West Pakistan 31061 30090 161 370 433 7
Peshawar 2643 2639 — 1 3 —
D.I,Khan 579 578 — - - -
Rawalpindi 3434 3427 _ - 6 -
Sargodha 4739 4664 - 1 74 -
Lahore 5339 5042 2 17 279 -
Multan 5302 5260 - - 41 —
Bahawalpur 1823 1808 1 12 2 -
Khairpur 2388 2312 53 23 1 -
Hyderabad 2537 2146 88 301 2 -
Quetta 603 594 3 1 4 -
Kalat 476 468 8 - - -
Karachi 1198 1152 6 13 20 6
1961
rvovmce/
Divisi on 1 2 3 4 5 6
Pakistan 93721 82557 4590 5411 733 430
East Pakistan 50840 4387 4993 4993 149 421
Rajshahi 11850 9755 713 1336 23 23
Khulna 10067 7617 867 1541 28 14
Dacca 15293 12669 1160 1370 78 16
Chit tagong 13630 10849 1647 746 20 368
West Pakistan 42881 41666 204 418 584 9
Peshawar 6372 6365 0.4 0.8 6 0.2
D.I.Khan 1206 1205 0.2 - 1 -
Rawalpindi 3979 3960 0.1 0.6 18 -
Sargodha 5977 5867 - 0.9 108 0.6
Lahore 6449 6101 2 18 328 0.3
Multan 6603 6541 0.3 0.8 61 -
Bahawalpur 2574 2544 2 18 10 -
Khairpur 3134 3056 53 21 3 0.8
Hyderabad 3291 2808 125 350 7 0.8
Quetta 630 622 2 0.7 5 -
Kalat 531 524 7 0.1 0.1 -
Karachi 2135 2073 12 7 37 6







Religions in Cities of over 100,000 Population,
1951 and 1961
mi
Cities 1 2 3 4 3
Karachi 1020732 4605 12617 20308 6195
Lahore 817236 215 1545 30279 58
Dacca 291054 27726 16041 —-1107
Hyderabad 234597 2501 4360 161 182
Lyallpur 173459 9 27 5632 -
Chittagong 245378 27622 13003 3980
Multan 189480 3 73 565 1
Rawalpindi 233842 20 92 2921 2
Peshawar 149549 43 304 1536 3
Gujranwala 112719 11 - 1462 1
Sialkot 150191 137 297 5752 1
Narayanganj 48914 14396 4895 168
Sargodha 76834 1 - 1612 -
Khulna 27535 7749 5480 645
Quetta 79784 144 560 3330 74
Sukkur 75349 852 707 100 18
1961
Cities 1 2 3 4 3
Karachi 1853484 10897 6786 35165 6266
Lahore 1240247 79 725 55221 205
Dacca 503189 33970 167 20 2558 275
Hyderabad 422786 3601 5882 1903 365
Lyallpur 410763 1 - 14482 2
Chittagong 307651 40349 10913 2781 2511
Multan 354991 67 284 2818 41
Rawalpindi 335030 52 156 4932 5
Peshawar 214116 178 405 3948 44
Gujranwala 191329 2 - 4822 1
Sialkot 157858 257 105 6125 1
Narayanganj 120079 99873 11919 170 13
Sargodha 123455 - - 585 5 1
Khulna 103019 14791 7855 2248 59
Quetta 102240 112 389 3807 85
Sukkur 100466 1439 770 484 57















B, Main Languages Q. Dialects







(b) European Branch 8.English
(c) Indo-European









































Las si, Thareli, Dhatki,
Kachhi.




A. Family B.Main Languages
III.Indo-European [contd.]

























Mother Tongues and Spoken Larimag.es as Per Gent






Bengali Punjabi Pushto Sindhi








1050374 0.03 0.10 86.30
813840 - - 1.98
1170183 0.10 0.20 11.17
378304 0.06 0.06 7.51
352247 0.01 0.10 73.92

















































































































































































































































Districts Pop. Bengali Pun.iabi Pusht o Sindhi
M.T. S.L. M .T. S.L. M.T. S.L. M.T. S.L.
Baluchistan
37.Quetta 267400 0.43 0.50 17 .74 20.40 61.35 65.60 0.46 1.90
38.Sibi 123049 0.05 0.10 4 .85 5.90 21.96 24.20 3.12 5.90
39.Loralai 110720 0.01 0.01 26 .39 27.00 61.08 64.30 1.93 2.90
40.Zhob 87686 0.01 0.01 2 .87 3.40 95.79 97.10 0.05 0.30
41.Ohagai 41263 0.01 0.01 2 .10 2.70 2.13 4.90 0.33 1.20
42.Kalat 341420 — 0 .92 1.40 1.79 3.10 24.74 33.80
43.Mekran 146990 — 0 .14 0.20 0.47 0.60 0.37 0.50
44.Kharan 42483 — 0 .22 0.40 0.12 0.60 0.21 1.50
45.Lasbela 90826 t<-\o•o 0.10 0 .85 1.50 0.70 1.00 66.58 75.60
Last Pakistan
46.Dinajpur 1709917 94.93 96.70 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 - —
47.Hangpur 3796043 97.88 98.40 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.01 - -
48.Bogra 1574105 98.19 98.80 - - 0.01 0.01 - -
49.Bajshahi 2810964 96.71 98.60 — — — - - -
50.Pabna 1959060 99.73 99.80 - — - - — -
51.Kushtia 1166262 99.44 99.60 — — — — — —
52.Jessore 2190151 99.45 99.50 0.11 0.11 0.01 0.01 — -
53.hhulna 2448720 99.08 99.60 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 - -
54.Bakerganj 4261767 99.66 99.80 - - - - - -
55.Mymensingh.7018906 98.38 99.30 - - - - - -
56.Dacca 5095745 97.48 98.30 0.07 0.10 0.02 0.03 - -
57.Paridpur 3178945 99.83 99.90 - - - - - —
58.Sylhet 3489589 96.64 97.10 - - - - - —
59.Comilla 4388906 99.90 99.90 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.01 - —
60.Boakhali 2383145 99.99 100.00 — - — - - -
61.Chittagong2982931 98.47 98.80 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 - -
62. Cb.ittagong











































Urdu Baluchi Brahui English
M.T. S.L. M.T. S.L. M.T. S.L. M.T. S.L.
4.39 8.60 •mm mm mm 0.80
0.45 4.50 - - - - 0.70
1.97 16.80 — 0.01 0.01 0.01 2.20
1.88 7.80 - - - — 1.60
2.2b 6.80 — - - — 0.70
0.58 5.00 0.01 0.01 - - - 0.70
1.15 6.60 — - - — 0,01 1.10
5.11 16.10 - — 0.01 0.01 0.04 3.80
1.45 9.50 — - — — - 1.40
2.03 7.00 — — - — - 1.10
6.37 11.10 — - — — — 1.30
4.46 10,-20 — — — — — 1.40
1.59 6.90 - — - - - 1.30
5.89 8.20 — - - — - 0.90
8.97 27.70 0.01 0.01 - - 0.05 7.40
4.52 15.40 - — 0.01 0.01 — 3.10
1.61 11.60 — — — — — 2.80
1.89 11.30 — — - — — 2.50
2.83 4.70 2.32 5.90 - - - 0.20
4.47 4.90 0.02 0.02 - - - 0.40
9.55 13.10 0.01 0.02 - — - 0.80
5.56 6.60 0.03 0.03 — - - 0.50
4.88 8.70 0.02 0,02 0.03 0,03 — 1.20
5.46 7.60 0,01 0.01 0.01 0.01 - 0.60















































Districts Urdu Baluchi Brahui -an^.lish
M.T. S.L. M.T. S.L. M.T. S.L. M.T. S.L.
Baluchistan
37.Quetta 6.00 28.50 2.24 5.50 7.81 11.00 0.07 4.70
38.Sibi 2.16 10.00 64.67 66.60 2.92 4.60 0.01 0.80
39.Loralai 0.61 6.30 8.12 12.60 1.52 1.80 - 0.50
40.Zhob 0.50 5.90 0.31 0.50 0.27 0.50 - 0.60
41.Chagai 0.76 11.50 60.27 71.20 31.17 43.10 0.01 0.50
42.iCalat 0.28 5.20 31.77 37.70 39.40 46.80 — 0.20
43.Mekran 0.14 0.60 93.59 93.70 5.19 5.50 — -
44.Kliaran 0.07 3.50 78.16 87.20 21.21 30.60 - 0.20
45.Lasbela 0.21 4.30 23.69 27.70 7.86 25.30 0.05 0.07
East Pakistan
46.Dinajpur 2.00 2.70 - - - - - 0.50
47.Rangpur 1.60 2.10 - - - - - 0.50
48.Bogra 0.80 1.30 — - - - - 0.60
49»Bajshahi 0.31 0.90 - - - - - 0.60
50.Pabna 0.13 0.60 — - — - — 0.70
51.Kushtia 0.42 1.02 — — - - - 0.70
52.Jessore 0.33 1.00 — — — — - 0.60
53.Khulna 0.78 1.50 - - — — - 0.90
54.Bakerganj 0.02 0.30 — - - - - 0.50
55.Myaiensingh 0.15 0.50 - - - - - 0.60
56.Dacca 2.17 4.20 - - — - 0.02 2.04
57.Paridpur 0.10 0.30 — - - - - 0.40
58.Sylhet 0.03 0.80 - - - - 0.01 1.10
59.Comilla 0.03 0.60 - - - - - 0.70
60.Noakhali — 0.90 — — — - - 0.80
61.Chittagong 1.03 2.70 - - - - 0.04 1.60
62.Chittagong




Spoken Lan/raages in Cities v/ith over 50.000 population
3eng. Pun.1. Push. Sind. Urdu Balu. Brah. iin«l.
0.40 24.90 80.80 0.30 16.10 mm 3.50
0.10 12.20 91.30 0.20 14.20 0.20 — 1.10
3.10 26.40 69.00 0.10 24.30 0.10 — 6.20
0.10 89.40 1.60 ... 36.60 mm 10.40
— 94.40 0.90 — 16.40 — — 3.30
0.10 75.10 0.80 0.10 37.40 0.10 — 4.10
0.50 84.30 4.10 0.10 33.00 - - 8.70
— 94.90 0.20 - 27.50 - - 7.30
0.10 90.70 0.30 — 24.30 0.10 — 8,20
0.30 70.80 2.00 - 46.10 - - 5.90
— 76.50 0.20 — 34.80 0.10 - 2.70
0.10 76.40 0.50 2.20 37.70 0.10 — 8.10
1.00 92.10 0.20 — 16.80 0.10 - 2.50
— 98.00 0.10 — 31.90 — — 11.70
— 86.10 0.50 0.20 24.50 0.50 - 1.30
— 93.80 — — 21 c90 — — 6.40
1.00 89.20 3.70 0.10 33.00 — — 6.80
0.40 7.80 2.60 28.50 72.20 1.10 0.70 6.80
0.40 16.90 4.00 44.30 55.80 2.20 0.80 5.90
— 11.30 1.50 36.80 66.70 4.60 0.30 8.20
0.50 6.80 0.90 73.10 28.50 2.20 1.60 1.70
1.40 15.70 6.10 7.70 72.80 5.10 1.20 8.10





























24.Lacca 556712 87.40 1.10 0.30 0.40 29.40 - - 11.60
25.Chit 'gong'364205 91.00 0.30 0.10 0.10 16.60 - - 6.60
26.Mara'ganj162054 96.10 0.20 0.10 0.30 13>80 - - 6.30
27.Khulna 127970 87.80 0.20 0,10 0.30 22.60 - - 5.80
28.Barisal 69936 99.20 - - 0.20 3*40 - - 7.90
29.Saidpur 60628 43.60 - - - 69.80 - - 3.10
30.Rajshahi 56884 95.70 - - - 2.60 - - 7.^0
31.Comilla 54504 96.90 0,80 0.10 - 8.20 - - 9.20
















































11.7 32. Dadu 15.5
9.8 3 3.Tharp arkar 9.7
15.7 34. Sanghar 12.1
14.5 35. Thatta 10.2
10.6 36. Karachi 38.1

















25.0 46. Dinajpur 25.9
17.2 47. Rangpur 18.9
12.2 48. Bogra 23.0
17.1 49. Rajshahi 20.0
8.1 50. Pabna 17.1
9.9 51. Kushtia 15.4
11 .4 52. Jessore 20.8
11.1 53. Khulna 27.2
11.5 54. Bakerganj 24.8
10.8 5 5. Mymensingh 17.3
10.4 56. Dacca 23.0
57. Paridpur 17.8
























































Educational Institutions, Enrolment and Teachers,
East and West Pakistan, 1947-66
Primary Schools Secondary Schools
Number Enrolment Number Enrolment
Year E. Pale., i<. Pak., E.Pak. E.Pak. E.P. W.P. n.Pak, •ii. Pak.
1947-48 29653 8413 2021702 544360 3481 2598 526020 508041
1948-49 28977 9073 2531324 592444 3551 2585 548616 516631
1949-50 26989 9411 2322669 667091 3552 2603 517802 572063
1950-51 26552 10577 2292760 779314 3510 2667 514512 626168
1951-52 26155 11176 2474917 935142 3338 2576 479857 644354
1952-55 26260 12670 2654765 1149637 3143 2018 453441 621578
1953-54 26227 15685 2653285 1209427 3102 2166 442499 659059
1954-55 26000 14162 2604369 1274099 3079 2264 457297 722822
1955-56 26220 15841 2646256 1384919 3105 2566 473120 798679
1956-57 26281 16457 2711770 1418082 3084 2672 497599 828715
1957-58 26579 16950 2794915 1431921 3030 2816 491045 837499
1958-59 26688 17536 2985258 1484232 5061 2969 495035 853110
1959-60 26585 17901 5180567 1547910 3053 3043 530485 912383
1960-61 26665 20909 5530582 1705962 3140 2970 532902 960606
1961-62 26747 24930 3423232 1907058 3254 3311 574867 982290
1962-65 27154 28538 3636497 2086228 5374 3586 659345 1101149
1965-64 27562 30950 3852322 2299738 3579 3838 755617 1239961
1964-65 27649 32589 4044179 2532324 3834 4323 848512 1369416
1965-66 27756 34313 4236036 2763670 3964 4472 949486 1481094
APPENDIX IX [contd.]
lumber of Teachers Teachers Training Insts,
Primary and
Primary Secondary Secondary Enrolment
Year E.Pak. Pi • Pak. W.Pak. W. Pak. E.Pak. W. Pak. E.Pak• W.Pak
1947-48 75624 17820 24362 18848 Data not available
1948-49 70403 17839 24597 19033
1949-50 66821 19891 24047 20095
1950-51 64815 22832 23690 21296 84 36 3081 3734
1951-52 61954 26144 23100 21700 85 37 2769 3839
1952-53 67088 29881 21921 20782 81 43 3661 5085
1953-54 71888 33119 21638 22229 73 39 3972 4461
1954-55 71477 35477 22289 23349 61 41 3526 5630
1955-56 71974 36062 22768 27368 58 42 3421 6197
1956-57 71238 37464 23160 31458 59 43 2908 6650
1957-58 74725 42230 2 290 9 30685 57 48 2904 6702
1958-59 77113 44306 22796 30807 48 48 3274 6642
1959-60 78462 44848 23571 31355 47 55 3305 6200
1960-61 80524 50021 24454 34361 48 56 3571 6999
1961-62 82477 54833 25318 38176 48 50 3799 11089
1962-63 86613 63550 27510 41716 49 51 4193 12464
1963-64 92447 69844 32579 44587 58 61 4850 12789
1964-65 94530 75960 33670 49828 59 86 9719 13284
1965-66 96634 83442 35655 55876 59 87 14547 13374
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APPENDIX IX [contd .]
Number of Number of Enrolment in
Colleges Universities Universities
Year E.Pak. Vi'.Pak. E.Pak. W .Pak. E.Pak. W.Pak
1947-48 1 2 1620 654
1948-49 1 2 1985 690
1949-50 Data not available 1 2 2290 737
1950-51 1 5 2083 969
1951-52 1 4 2391 1558
1952-55 1 4 2304 1686
1955-54 77 85 2 4 2431 1521
1954-55 75 96 2 4 2858 1998
1955-56 76 99 2 4 3349 2649
1956-57 75 109 2 4 3125 3106
1957-58 89 120 2 4 3450 3136
1958-59 89 141 2 4 396 2 3482
1959-60 95 159 2 4 3766 4092
1960-61 92 165 2 4 3970 5084
1961-62 97 176 4 6 5817 7214
1962-65 108 191 4 6 7140 9464
1965-64 122 225 4 6 7664 10078
1964-65 157 261 4 6 9714 14381
1965-66 181 500 4 6 8831 18708





Pakistan East Pakistan West Pakistan
Year (a) 0>) (a) w (a)
1948-49 647.0 2.8 160.5 19.5 301.3 35.4
1949-50 856.0 6.1 178.6 21.2 307.0 37.7
1950-51 1266.2 6.0 190.3 20.9 329.7 42.9
1951^*52 1442.3 10.0 227.5 21.5 376.4 49.2
1952-53 1320.1 12.3 258.3 26.0 411.0 60.7
1953-54 1108.7 10.4 260.2 20.5 447.0 70.5
1954-55 1172.6 19.6 284.7 23.1 435.3 74.8
1955-56 1433.4 18.1 285.1 26.5 477.3 84.6
1956-57 1330.7 21.5 338.5 22.5 548.1 100.6
1957-58 1521.8 26.1 276.3 39.9 614.7 102.8
1958-59 1956.5 29.8 521.0 34.4 878.3 136.6
1959-60 1846.5 36.4 377.0 25.2 654.3 115.7
1960-61 1894.2 35.8 437.0 61.9 700.4 121.6
1961-62 1986.8 17.9 499.1 67.2 803.1 155.7
1962-63 1795.3 11.8 672.5 76.5 1105.7 203.4
1963-64 2337.2 13.5 1013.5 88.3 1483.1 229.1
1964-65 1736.2 16.6 1091.2 95.4 1488.4 264.5
1965-66 4326.2 10.4 1140.8 121.8 1617.3 282.0
1966-67 3714.0 17.2 1311.4 138.0 1606.0 288.0
1967-68 3802.3 19.4 1611.6 159.0 1933.8 314.3
(Source: 20 Years of Pakistan in Statistics, 1947-67)
(a) Total budget expenditure
(b) Expenditure on Education
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APPENDIX XI
Educational Levels of Literates* 1961
Literates Inter-
Province/ No formal Matric mediate Higher
Division education Educated & over cc over Decree .je^ree
west Pakistan 568384 4703156 473135 100032 54632 23780
Peshawar ■ 15598 346970 39105 7581 4847 1424
D.I. Khan 1862 61298 5959 885 580 181
Rawalpindi 54492 713788 58804 11358 6484 2149
Sargodha 123302 690350 61626 10829 4941 1997
Lahore 98132 937076 105788 24625 13605 5256
Multan 85609 492511 44641 8424 4085 1665
Bahawalpur 25208 203010 18362 3181 1523 455
Khairpur 22079 323786 13024 3372 1373 1133
Hyderabad 27495 320201 19378 6080 1697 1714
Quetta 7408 60383 8888 1394 835 276
Kalat 3893 12576 916 177 96 34
Karachi 103306 541207 96644 22126 15057 7496
East Pakistan 1131320 5489106 188223 40762 24216 6034
fiaj shahi 263581 1304511 36153 7560 4260 964
Khulna 182524 1141621 33254 6094 3297 835
Dacca 405779 1393198 59178 15178 8822 2473
Chittagong 279436 1649776 59638 11930 7837 1762




Literates in Each Language
Province/ Bengali Pun.i abi Pushto
Division Literates** a b a b a b
West Pakistan 4754519 0.25 +300.0 1.28 + 17.3 1.22 +190.0
N.W.P.P. 394626 0.30 — 1.52 - 11.65 -
Peshawar 335657 0.36 n 1.27 -16.7 12.20 +173.3
D.I. Khan 58969 0.02 n 1.69 +42.9 8.47 +3470.4
Punjab 2934562 0.03 — 1.02 - 0.09 -
Rawalpindi 660464 0.08 n 0.76 -66.7 0.15 -33.3
Sargodha 259741 0.04 n 0.90 -53.8 0.06 +52.3
Lahore 902242 0.01 n 0.55 +150.0 0.03 +1500.0
Multan 514211 0.04 n 0.78 -20.0 0.08 +289.8
Bahawalpur 184348 0.01 n 5.43 +9500.0 0.22 +136.0
Sind 708907 0.20 — 1.27 — 0.49 -
Khairpur 344300 0.17 n 1.65 +1766.6 0.17 +500.0
Hyderabad 364607 0.22 n 0.99 +350.0 0.74 +1250.0
Karachi 631057 1.27 +230.0 2.22 +180.0 0.73 +254.0
Baluchistan** 85267 0.61 — 1.14 — 1.93 -
Quetta 67333 0.74 +265.2 1.19 -70.9 2.29 +25.0
Kalat 15857 n n 0.74 -10.0 0.60 +86.3
East Pakistan 8277867 97.60 +35.9 0.12 +343.9 0.04 +144.4
Rajshahi 1738540 95.90 +34.5 0.06 n 0.02 n
Khulna 1764416 97.80 +33.7 0.04 n 0.02 n
Dacca 2243792 98.7 +39.0 0.06 n 0.03 n
Chittagong 2531119 97.7 +35.5 0.28 n 0.07 n
a = percentage of the total literates.
b = variation in the actual number between 1951 and 1961.
n = negligible or not available.
* Literates here mean those able to read and write.
** Includes Lasbela district which is at present part of
Karachi division; figures for Karachi are for the district.
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APPENDIX XII [contd.]
.Literates in Each Language
Province/
Division
Sindhi Urdu Baluchi Persian
a b a b a b a b
West Pakistan 11. 82 +77.8 86. 43 + 101 .1 0.20 +350 6. 37 +88. 2
N.W.P.P. 0. 08 — 96. 20 n — 13. 92
Peshawar 0. 06 n 96. 13 +127 .5 n — 13. 69 + 172. 0
D.I. Khan 0. 15 n 96. 61 + 111 .1 n — 15. 25 + 100. 0
Pun.1 ab
Hawaipindi
0. 06 - 97. 90 0.02 - 6. 90
0. 06 n 99. 55 + 130 .5 0.01 n 7. 12 +95. 8
Sargodha 0. 04 n 99. 26 +135 .2 0.01 n 7. 88 +231. 0
Lahore 0. 02 n 97. 23 +60 .3 0.01 n 6. 76 +65. 0
Multan 0. 08 n 98. 83 +64 .4 0.03 n 7. 00 +71. 4
Bahawalpur 0. 22 n 90. 22 +86 .5 0.11 n 4. 89 +80. 0
Sind 74. 47 — 35. 54 0.85 - 1. 83
Khairpur 80. 23 +62.4 29. 07 +85 .2 1.45 n 1. 74 +1. 8
Hyderabad 69. 04 +95.3 41. 64 + 176 .4 0.25 n 2. 08 +58. 3
Karachi 4. 90 +100.0 82. 88 +275 .0 0.57 + 140 2. 69
Baluchistan 1. 84 — 91. 61 1.32 — 14. 42
Quetta 0. 58 -55.7 91. 91 +55 .0 0.84 +485 11. 63 +5. 4
Kalat 5. 11 +46.1 91. 46 + 275 .0 3.40 +670 26. 97 + 100. 0
East Pakistan 0. 07 +559.2 5. 40 +45 .8 0.06 + 1799 0. 40 -19. 4
Rajshahi 0. 07 n 7. 10 +68 .8 n - 0. 32 -91. 1
Khulna 0. 04 n 3. 90 -6. 8 n - 0. 27 -33. 8
Dacca 0. 04 n 5. 00 +16. 5 n - 0. 36 -50. 9
Ghittagong 0. 10 n 5. 70 + 130 .2 n - 0. 75 +35. 7
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APPE1QIX XII [contd.]
Literates in Each Language
Province/ Arabic English Brahui
Division a b a b a b
west Pakistan 3.34 +468 20.95 +58 0.08 mm
N.W.P.P. 1.77 — 24.05 - n -
Peshawar 1.70 -25.0 24.70 +97 n -
D.I.Khan 1.69 +233 20.34 +177 n -
Punjab 4.26 - 21.94 - n -
Rawalpindi 3.79 +525 21.82 +118 n —
Sargodha 2.82 +905 20.80 + 130 n -
Lahore 5.10 +475 25.83 + 15. 3 n -
Multan 4.47 +475 18.10 +19 n -
Bahawalpur 5.98 +3600 17.39 +46 n -
Bind 1.69 — 10.16 - 0.20 -
/hairpur 1.74 +550 8.72 +50 0.25 —
Hyderabad 1.87 +1033 11.51 +75 0,14 -
Karachi 1.58 +1187 25.67 +69 0.16 —
Baluchistan 6.14 - 26.97 - 0,76 —
Quetta 4.96 + 1000 29.70 +54 0,28 -
Kalat 11.77 +5388 16.52 +384 2.90 -
East Pakistan 3.17 +83.9 17.00 +6, 4 n —
Rajshahi 3.80 +154 16.27 + 14 n —
Khulna 2.27 +8.1 15.40 +3. 8 n -
Dacca 2.63 +25.5 18.85 +1. 0 n —




Languages of Literacy in Some Delected Cities. 1961
Percentage of Literates







3. Khulna 49656 88.7 0.1 0.1 0.2 16.8
44. Barisal 29227 99.4 0.2 n n 7.6
5. Mymensingh 24851 89.3 0.2 n 0.5 13.8
6. Dacca 217587 87.5 0.4 0.1 0.2 19.6
7. Earayanganj 56748 91.3 0.1 n n 13.0
8. Comilla 23118 89.3 8.4 5.2 2.2 17.1
9. Ohittagong 147074 84.5 0.5 0.1 0.1 17.1
West Pakistan
10. Mardan 14499 1.2 1.3 28.4 0.1 98.2
11. Peshawar 56223 0.5 1.7 4.4 0.1 95.8
12. Kohat 15790 2.7 1.8 3.1 0.4 98.8
13. Rawalpindi 131371 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.1 99.9
14. Jhelum 20543 0.2 0.5 0.2 n 98.5'
15. Cujrat 18844 n 0.1 0.1 n 97.4
16. Sargodha 32793 0.9 1.7 0.2 0.1 99.2
17. Lyallpur 99475 n 0.4 0.1 n 99.4
18. Jhang 21291 n 2.3 n n 99.5
19. Lahore 384447 0.1 0.5 n 0.1 98.9
20. Kasur 12230 0.1 0.3 n n 96.3
21. Gujranwala 46654 n 0.1 n n 99.3
22. Sialkot 49832 n 0.1 0.1 n 99.1
23. Multan 72843 0.1 1.3 0.2 0.2 99.2
24. Sahiwal 18494 n 0.4 0.1 0.1 95.8
25. Okara 12948 n n n n 100.0
26. Bahawalpur 21191 n 0.3 n 0.1 99.4
27. Sukkur 20262 1.3 17.0 1.1 56.8 53.8
28. Shikarpur 13507 n 0.3 0.2 73.2 43.5
29. Hyderabad 89224 0.1 1.6 0.2 37.0 77.2
30. Mirpur Khas 12521 n 0.3 0.2 41.0 71.3
31. Karachi 608740 1.3 2.3 0.7 4.1 83.2
32. ^uetta 38637 1.3 1.0 0.9 0.3 99.5'
n = less than 0. 1 £
* Persons able to read and write.









3 * Khulna 0.1 0.4 2.5 33.3 n
4. Barisal n n 11.1 37.1 n
5. Mymensingh n 0.3 2.7 61.7 n
6. Dacca n 1.2 2.2 32.8 n
7. Narayanganj n 0.2 3.4 19.5 n
8. Comilla 0.1 2.3 9.6 69.7 n
9. Chittagong n 1.0 2.6 34.4 n
West Pakistan
10. Alardan n 10.3 UA 35.7 n
11. Peshawar 0.1 13.1 1.2 36.3 0.1
12, Kohat n 13.5 1.4 35.8 n
13. Rawalpindi n 7.2 5.7 36.2 0.2
14. Jheluia n 11.1 5.8 42.1 n
15. Gujrat n 7.0 2.8 32.3 n
16. Sargodha n b. 9 2.8 37.3 n
17. Lyallpur n 7.1 2.7 29.3 n
18. Jhang n 6.3 2.5 21.5 n
19• Lahore n 6.7 5.7 33.0 0.1
20. Kasur n 8.5 4.8 26.2 n
21. Gujranwala n 4.4 6.7 29.3 n
22. Sialkot n 4.7 4.1 30.0 n
23. Multan n 7.7 5.3 30.9 n
24. Sahiwal n 7.6 3.8 35.6 n
25. Okara n 5.0 2.1 21.9 n
26. Bahawalpur n 6.5 2.6 42,8 n
27. Sukkur 10.1 1.7 1.2 17.6 1.3
28. Shikarpur 0.1 2.4 1.2 14.4 n
29. Hyderabad n 2.2 1.6 20.1 0.1
30. Mirpur Khas 0.1 1.7 1.1 25.8 n
31. Karachi 0.6 2.7 1.6 25.6 0.1
32, Quetta 0.2 8.3 1.8 38.1 0.1
(Source: Census, 1961)
n = less than 0.1%
420
APPENDIX IIV











































Ho. e/o of Ho. % of 1°
(000) total (000) total change
851 93.6 977 93.0 30.4
533 92.2 708 87.0 + 22.0
649 71.9 788 67.3 + 21.3
247 82.2 307 81.1 + 24.2
235 80.9 284 80.6 + 20.5
271 88.2 334 89.1 + 23.3
635 91.8 689 89.8 + 8.8
620 68.3 730 64.2 + 17.8
605 89.1 644 85.9 + 6.4
1027 88.7 1158 87.3 + 12.7
949 81.7 1183 80.6 + 24.6
492 89.6 605 81.0 + 22.8
1870 86.9 2111 78.6 + 12.9
741 84.7 906 84.0 + 22.2
914 48.3 1015 40.9 + 11 .0
796 76.0 947 73.3 + 19.0
841 91.1 944 87.4 + 12.3
1254 85.1 1342 84.1 + 7.1
556 88.6 679 87.5 + 22.2
697 92.8 917 92.6 + 31.6
1766 83.8 2125 78.6 + 20.3
1661 91.5 1895 88.8 + 14.1
437 82.9 597 81.2 + 36.5
577 91.5 718 87.2 + 24.5
615 92.5 902 88.8 + 46.7
401 94.2 470 89.0 + 17.4
586 80.0 623 74.5 + 6.4
444 88.5 507 83.8 + 14.1
456 93.0 602 87.1 + 32.0
298 93.1 426 90.2 + 43.1
601 67.4 771 60.0 + 28.3
384 92.2 430 88.7 + 12.1
559 92.5 635 87.1 + 13.5
286 88.7 360 83.6 + 12.6
281 96.7 341 94.2 + 21.5





No. i° of No. i* of
District (000) total (000) total cbtan^e
Baluchistan
Quetta 118 56.5 146 54.4 + 23.0
Sibi 109 91.2 107 86.7 - 1 .8
Loralai 93 95.4 103 92.9 + 10.5
Zhob 59 92.7 77 87.6 + 30.5
Chagai 35 94.2 36 86.1 + 2.9
Kalat 283 97.4 315 92.3 11.3
Mekran 128 92.5 122 82.9 - 4.7
Kharan 52 95.3 36 85.1 - 30.8
Lasbela 73 96.0 88 96.5 + 20.5
East Pakistan
Dinajpur 1278 94.4 1638 95.8 + 28.2
Rangpur 2789 95.6 3637 95.8 + 30.4
Bogra 1214 97.2 1527 97.0 + 25.8
Rajshahi 2120 96.2 2691 95.7 + 26.9
Pabna 1515 95.6 1860 94.9 + 22.8
Kushtia 844 95.4 1103 94.6 + 30.7
Jessore 1601 97.7 2115 96.6 + 32.1
Ivhulna 2007 96.7 2276 92.9 + 13.4
Bakerganj 3510 96.4 4142 97.2 + 18.0
Mymensingh 5603 96.9 6778 96.6 + 21.0
Dacca 3661 89.9 4342 85.2 + 18.6
Paridpur 2717 97.9 3100 97.5 T 14.1
Sylhet 2998 98.0 3419 98.0 + 14.0
Comilla 3676 96.9 4250 96.8 + 15.6
Noaknali 2050 99.0 2349 98.6 14.6
Ghittagong 2216 88.3 2610 87.5 + 17.8





No. i* of No. io of 1°
District (000) total (000) total change
N.W.P.P.
Hazara 58 6.4 74 7.0 + 26.1
Mardan 49 7.8 106 13.0 +116.5
Peshawar 254 28.1 382 32.7 + 50.6
Kohat 54 17.8 71 18.9 + 33.2
D.I. Khan 56 19.1 68 19.4 + 23.2
Bannu 56 11.8 41 10.9 + 13.3
Pun.i ah
Camp'bellpur 57 8.3 78 10.2 + 36.5
Rawalpindi 288 31.7 407 35.8 + 41.2
Jheluni 77 11.4 106 14.1 + 36.6
Gujrat 131 11.3 168 12.7 + 28.1
Sargodha 214 18.4 284 19.4 + 33.1
Mianwali 58 10.6 142 19.0 +144.3
Lyallpur 283 13.1 573 21.4 +102.5
Jhang 135 15.3 173 16.0 + 27.7
Lahore 981 51.7 1465 59.1 + 49.4
Gujranwala 251 24.0 345 26.7 + 37.4
Sheikhupura 83 8.9 137 12.6 + 65.4
Sialkot 220 14.9 255 15.9 + 15.5
D.G. Khan 75 11.4 97 12.5 + 29.9
Muzaffargarh 54 7.2 73 7.4 + 34.2
Multan 341 16.2 577 21.4 + 69.1
Sahiwal 155 8.5 239 11.2 + 54.6
Bahawalpur 90 17.1 138 18.8 + 52.9
Bahawalnagar 54 8.5 105 12.8 + 94.4
R. Y. Khan 50 7.5 114 11.2 +127.4
Sind
Jacobabad 25 5.8 58 11 .0 +133.6
Sukkur 147 20.0 213 25.5 + 45.1
Larkana 58 11.5 98 16.2 + 68.7
Dawahshah 34 7.0 89 12.9 +161.0
Khairpur 22 6.9 46 9.8 +110.7
Hyderabad 291 32.6 514 40.0 + 76.5
Dadu 33 7.8 55 11.3 + 67.6
Tharparkar 46 7.5 94 12.9 +105.9
Sanghar 37 11.4 70 16.4 + 92.2
Thatta 10 3.3 21 5.8 +110.0





No. c/c of No. a/c of oL70
District (000) total (000) total change
Baluchistan
Quetta 95 28.8 122 45.6 + 28.8
Sibi 12 9.9 16 13.3 + 38.1
Loralai 4 4.6 8 7.1 +100.0
2hob 6 7.3 11 12.4 + 83.3
Chagai 2 5.8 6 13.9 +200.0
Kalat 8 2.6 26 7.7 +225.0
Mekran 10 7.5 25 17.1 +150.0
Kharan 3 4.7 6 14.9 +100.0
Lasbela 5 4.0 3 3.5 -
East Pakistan
Dinajpur 77 5.6 72 4.2 - 6.5
Bangpur 128 4.4 159 4.2 + 24.2
Bogra 36 2.8 47 3.0 + 30.6
Rajshahi 85 3.8 120 4.3 + 41.2
Pabna 69 4.4 100 5.1 + 44.9
Kushtia 41 4.6 63 5.4 + 53.7
Jessore 37 2.3 75 3.4 +102.7
Khulna 69 3.3 172 7.1 +149.3
Bakerganj 132 3.6 119 2.8 - 9.8
hymensingh 182 3.1 240 3.4 + 31.9
Dacca 411 10.1 754 14.8 + 83.5
Paridpur 58 2.1 79 2.5 + 36.2
Sylhet 61 2.0 71 2.0 + 16.4
Comilla 117 3.1 159 3.2 + 18.8
Noalchali 22 1.0 54 1.4 + 54.5
Chittagong 296 11.7 373 12.5 + 26.0
G.H. Tracts — — 23 5.9 +100.0
(Source: Census, 1961 )
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APPEHPIX XV
Population "by Birth Places, 1951 and 1961,
by Divisions
(a = 1951; b = 1961)
1
Pakistan East Pakistan























Other parts of the
sub-continent
Muslim countries in Asia 34811
Other countries in Asia 11890







































1. Figures do not include data for Frontier States and Tribal
Agancies. For 1951 detailed figures for divisions not
available.
2. 1951 figures not available.
3. Included in the figures for the rest of the sub-continent in
1951 census.
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Ra.ishahi Div. Khulna Div.
Places of Birth a b a b
All places 9338453 11850089 8304869 10066900
Pakistan 8953288 11576582 8071229 9896725
Bast Pakistan 8952711 11575150 8069864 9893195
Rajshahi Div. 8804457 11293884 7374 20310
Khulna Div. 16784 20224 7931902 9642334
Dacca Div. 97900 196427 81437 122450
Chittagong Div. 33570 64615 49151 108111
West Pakistan 577 1232 1365 3530
Peshawar Div.
176 397 106 845D.I. khan Div. 38 43
Rawalpindi Div. 331 1625
Sargodha Div. 80 231
Lahore Div. 568 188 1231 410
Multan Div. 17 34
Bahawalpur Div. 3 29
Khairpur Div. 29 6 14 15Hyderabad Div. 17 5
Quetta Div. 4 26 Q 66Kalat Div. 8 y 123
Karachi — 121 5 104
Prorxtier Regions — — — —
Kashmir — 24 — 241
Other parts of the
sub-continent 384985 273587 233406 169787
Muslim countries in Asia 77 17 51 25
Other countries in Asia 68 49 114 99
Other Muslim countries — — — —
Other countries 35 30 69 23
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Dacca Div. Ohittalons Div.
Places of Birth a b a b
All places 12567237 15293596 11721770 13629650
Pakistan 12412729 15171167 11627935 13561534
Bast Pakistan 12409044 15164854 11634244 13556773
Rajshahi Div. 28631 46660 3977 12801
Khulna Div. 35091 56888 15464 31455
Dacca Div. 12260758 14871434 69437 109649
Chittagong Div. 84564 189872 11545366 13402868
West Paliistan 3685 6313 3691 4761
Peshawar Div. 983 1094 503 1085
D.I. Khan Div. 70 53
Rawalpindi Div. 1406 885
Sargodha Div. 277 114
Lahore Div. 2516 1659 2839 1301
Multan Div. 75 178
Bahawalpur Div. 14 10
Khairpur Div. 92 17 36 3Hyderabad Div. 66 80
Quetta Div. 35 114 23 85Kalat Div. 10 33
Karachi Div. 59 1511 290 934
Frontier Regions - - - -
Kashmir - 189 - 3
Other parts of the
sub-continent 153809 121320 76339 62695
Muslim countries in Asia 38 91 120 183
Other countries in Asia 586 649 7145 5011
Other Muslim countries 3 — 2 70
Other countries 72 180 229 145
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West Pakistan Peshawar Biv.
Places of Birth a b a b
All places 31060789 39442439 2643155 3412701
Pakistan 24312001 33524492 2591453 3373405
East Pakistan 5964 33884 882 3396
Rajshahi Biv. - 3500 - 393
Khulna Biv. - 2879 - 981
Bacca Biv. - 16376 — 1462
Ghittagong Biv. - 11129 - 560
West Pakistan 24306037 33490608 2590571 3370009
Peshawar Biv. 3222093 3211061 2488694 2960841
B.I. Khan Biv. 981346 7012 259047
Rawalpindi Bive 3970507 50833
Sargodha Biv, 4902841 7561
Lahore Biv. 15337581 5267931 50833 15640
Multan Biv. 5340972 2970
Bahawalpur Biv. 1911051 176
Khairpur Biv. 4269977 2865765 830 106
Hyderabad Biv. 2784985 756
Quetta Biv. 1157704 601011 2189 580
Kalat Biv. 554954 19
Karachi 318682 981940 164 1739
Frontier Regions — 116244 - 86377
Kashmir - 273301 - 7868
Other parts of the
sub-continent 6706652 5596139 41184 22547
Muslim countries in Asia 34525 39319 9820 8362
Other countries in Asia 3977 5211 414 335
Other Muslim countries 158 167 - 12
Other countries 3476 3810 284 172
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D.I. Khan Div. Rawalpindi Div.
Places of Birth a b a ' b
/ill places 579017 727546 3434155 3979139
Pakistan 562262 720010 3084972 3764807
Bast Pakistan 75 154 742 3476
Rajshahi Div. - 32 - 364
Khulna Div. - 13 - 357
Dacca Div. - 90 - 1860
Chittagong Div. - 29 - 895
West Pakistan 562187 719856 5084232 3761331
Peshawar Div. 7846 6544 31903 38389
D.I. Khan Div. 534554 699982 1733
Rawalpindi Div. 2889 3002628 3639758
Sargodha Div. 2682 17589 22287
Lahore Div. 16717 1087 25178 43304
Multan Div. 443 2221 55489
Bahawalpur Div. 60 2759 624
Khairpur Div. 148 33 742 267
Hyderabad Div. 26 710
Quetta Div. 52 121 638 1564
ICalat Div. - 24
Karachi Div. - 1680 579 5863
Frontier Regions - 4309 - 1319
Kashmir — 330 — 58874
Other parts of the
sub-c ontinent 16422 6558 346975 153134
Muslim countries in Asia 305 643 670 1166
Other countries in Asia 7 5 835 506
Other Muslim countries — — 4 —
Other countries 21 0 697 652
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Sarsodha Div. Lahore Div.
Places of Birth a b a b
All places 1738868 5976939 5339271 6448575
Pakistan 3369633 4828670 3567853 5005853
East Pakistan 122 640 500 1530
Rajshahi Div. - 111 - 56
Khulna Div. — 40 - 22
Dacca Div. - 401 - 1218
Chittagong Div. - 88 - 234
West Pakistan 3369511 4828030 3567353 5004323
Peshawar Div. 10117 15683 19182 33623
D.I. Khan Div. 6963 1950
Rawalpindi Div. 50729 75898 63281 70676
Sargodha Div. 5212815 4575660 40316 56300
Lahore Div. 63355 103895 3423890 4802581
Multan Div. 24574 39707 14952 24161
Bahawalpur Div. 4518 4608 1531 3800




Quetta Div. 521 1449 3032
Kalat Div. 6 14
Karachi Div. 181 1993 1162 5840
Frontier Regions - 355 - 13
Kashmir - 12035 - 170414
Other parts of the
sub-continent 1367533 1128568 1768008 1268581
Muslim countries in Asia 1288 7132 2176 1970
Other countries in Asia 157 239 739 555
Other Muslim countries 1 31 19 7
Other countries 256 264 476 1195
43U
AiR-ijLDIR KV [ c ont d. ]
Multan Div. Bahawalnur Div.
Places of Birth a b a b
All places 5301907 6602924 1822501 2574066
Pakistan 3813538 5414083 1397622 2155983
East Pakistan 52 329 28 242
Rajshahi Div. - 40 - 63
Khulna Div. - 3 - 2
Dacca Div. — 224 - 132
Chittagong Div. - 62 - 45
West Pakistan 3813486 5413754 1397595 2155741
Peshawar Div. 6337 7956 3041 4689
D.I. Khan Div. 3870 1536
Rawalpindi Div. 28790 39218 13597 17831
Sargodha Div. 60554 81215 50988 98330
Lahore Div. 67566 106756 42194 78813
Multan Div. 3640881 5152120 31618 76611
Bahawalpur Div. 6970 16732 1253919 1869662
Khairpur Div. 876 1100 1608 4874
Hyderabad Div. 961 1109
Quetta Div. 1306 1900 488 1107
Kalat Div. 24 32
Karachi Div. 206 1439 141 898
Frontier Regions — 463 - 249
Kashmir - 3054 — 1184
Other parts of the
sub-continent 1487004 1183449 423788 415007
Muslim countries in Asia 1217 1916 988 1706
Other countries in Asia 79 249 43 89
Other Muslim countries — 10 - 6
Other countries 69 163 60 91
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Khairour Div. Hyderabad Div.
Places of Birth a b a b
All places 2584389 3133712 2340953 3290956
Pakistan 2345083 2961864 2005383 2890570
East Pakistan 34 136 216 2759
Rajshahi Div. - 3 - 32
Khulna Div. _ . 20 - 8
Dacca Div. - 99 - 2356
Chittagong Dive - 14 - 363
West Pakistan 2345049 2961728 2005167 2887811
Peshawar Div. 2926 11161 6411 18294
D.I. Khan Div. 425 971
Rawalpindi Div, 9544 13548
Sargodha Div, 22455 12476
Lahore Div, 28565 25479 17103 21794
Multan Div. 17613 9754
Bahawalpur Div, 9705 3838
Khairpur Divc 2266496 2817286 13957 33745
Hyderabad Div. 16652 17199 1947808 2742651
Quetta Div. 28233 14853 12999 9820
Kalat Div, 10576 6318
Karachi Div. 2177 4076 6889 12161
Prontier Regions — 1356 - 2434
Kashmir - 685 - 2584
Other parts of the
sub-continent 237444 10084 333673 391337
Muslim countries in Asia 1839 997 1867 6239
Other countries in Asia 12 74 13 137
Other Muslim countries - - - -
Other countries 11 8 17 125
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Quetta Div. Ralat Div.
Places of Birth a b a b
All places 602588 630118 475810 530893
Pakistan 563878 606417 474417 528203
East Pakistan 467 1141 1 22
Rajshahi Div. - 118 - -
Khulna Hiv. - 127 — 2
Dacca Div. - 452 - 19
Chittagong Div. - 444 - 1
West Pakistan 563411 605276 474416 528181
Peshawar Div. 12286 13820 98 1143
D.I. Khan Div. 1579 202
Rawalpindi Div. 13194 516
Sargodha Div. 2916 169
Lahore Div. 22417 6981 240 327
Multan Div. 2899 207
Bahawalpur Div. 289 21




Quetta Div. 514172 553733 4407
Kalat Div. 12124 5782 473292 519187
Karachi Div. 288 955 33 310
Frontier Regions - 1808 - 1085
Kashmir - 3231 - 193
Other parts of the
sub-continent 28373 7111 352 1090
Muslim countries in Asia 10161 1964 1038 1369
Other countries in Asia 96 178 1 35
Other Muslim countries - - - -




Places of Birth a b
All places 1198175 2134870
Pakistan 535905 1274627
East Pakistan 2845 20059
Rajshahi Div. - 2298
Khulna Div, - 1304
Dacca Div„ - 8063
Chittagong Div, - 8394
West Pakistan 533060 1254568
Peshawar Div. 4967 98918
D.I. Khan Div. 3088
Rawalpindi Div. 53238
Sargodha Div. 20790
Lahore Div. 54298 61274
Multan Div, 8998
Bahawalpur Div. 1536
Khairpur Div, 14575 5270
Hyderabad Div. 18584
Quetta Div. 34109 8445
Halat Div. 12972
Karachi Div, 332111 944979
frontier Regions - 16476
Kashmir — 12885
Other parts of the
sub-continent 655896 838673
Muslim countries in Asia 3156 4855
Other countries in Asia 1581 2809
Other Muslim countries 134 101
Other countries 1503 920
(Sources Census, 1951 and 1961)
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APPERDIX XVI
Composition of Population in the Districts
by Birth, 1961
(thousands)
I = Total born in the district.
II = Total population of the district.
Ill = Born and living in the district.
I? = Born in but living out of the district.
V = Born outside and living in the district.
Districts I II III IV V
East Pakistan
Dinajpur 1557 1710 1538 19 172
Rangpur 3568 3796 3528 40 268
Bogra 1570 1574 1509 61 65
Rajshai 2654 2811 2613 41 198
Pabna 2024 1959 1913 111 46
Kushtia 1071 1166 1032 39 134
Jessore 2033 2190 1984 89 206
Khulna 2336 2449 2284 52 165
Bak erganj 4311 4262 4206 105 56
Mymensingh 7121 7019 6891 230 128
Dacca 4942 5096 4732 210 364
Paridpur 3237 3179 3080 157 99
Sylhet 3367 3490 3331 36 159
Comilla 4571 4389 4304 267 85
Noakhali 2585 2383 2348 237 35
Chittagong 2897 2983 2843 54 140
C.H. Tracts 346 385 344 2 41
West Pakistan
N.W.P.P.
Hazara 1144 1050 1029 • 15 94
Mardan 812 814 758 54 56
Peshawar 849 1170 771 78 399
Kohat 406 378 357 49 21
D.I. Khan 351 352 333 18 19
Bannu 630 375 363 267 12
Punjab
Campbellpur 819 767 745 74 22
Rawalpindi 1030 1137 937 93 200
Jhelum 802 749 700 102 49
Gujrat 1320 1326 1184 136 142
Sargodha 1277 1468 1200 77 268
Mianwali 700 747 657 43 90
Lyallpur 1917 2684 1700 217 984
Jhang 1009 1079 943 66 136
Lahore 1819 2480 1619 200 861
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Districts I II III IV V
Punjab [contd.]
Gujranwala 1045 1292 941 104 351
Sheikhupura 895 1681 771 124 910
Sialkot 1510 1596 1275 235 321
D.G. Khan 778 777 748 30 29
ffiuzaffargarh 892 990 886 26 134
Multan 2111 2702 2019 92 683
Sahiwal 1560 2134 1464 96 670
Bahawalpur 606 736 566 40 170
Bahawalnagar 522 823 505 17 318
H.Y. Khan 783 1016 774 9 242
Sind
Jacobabad 506 529 493 13 36
Sukkur 762 837 735 27 102
larkana 576 604 559 17 45
Hawabshah 597 692 576 21 116
Khairpur 425 472 415 10 57
Hyderabad 982 1286 941 41 345
Dadu 464 485 443 21 42
Tharparkar 660 728 627 33 101
Sanghar 324 430 318 6 112
Thatta 356 362 347 9 15
Karachi 895 2044 853 42 1191
■Ral urihi stan
Quetta 255 267 214 41 53
Sibi 114 123 108 6 15
Loralai 105 111 100 5 11
Zhob 85 88 82 3 6
Chagai 42 41 39 3 2
Kalat 349 341 331 18 10
Mekran 162 147 145 17 2
Kharan 44 42 42 2 0




Ranking of Districts. 1961
I = multilingualism.
II « linguistic heterogeneity.
Ill = literaoy. VII
IV = urbanization. VIII
V = in-migration.
VI = Urdu as additional
language,




Districts I II III IV V VI VII VIII
West Pakistan
N.W.F.P.
Hazara 28 19 24 43 43 41 21 27
Mardan 34 42 34 25 31 34 41 29
Peshawar 10 21 13 6 5 4 28 9
Kohat 25 24 17 14 35 28 30 12
D.I. Khan 26 13 30 12 36 32 24 30
Bannu 35 39 29 37 40 30 39 32
Pun.i ab
Campbellpur 30 30 15 38 42 18 36 22
Rawalpindi 17 25 2 5 34 5 11 4
Jhelum 27 41 4 22 17 11 35 14
Gujrat 37 40 6 29 26 25 26 21
Sargodha 32 26 12 11 16 27 9 16
Mianwali 29 23 16 13 25 16 17 13
Lyallpur 36 44 7 10 3 20 33 15
Jhang 40 36 20 19 20 29 19 24
Lahore 8 20 3 2 4 2 7 1
Gujranwala 19 33 8 7 8 6 15 6
Sheikhupura 21 45 21 30 7 7 32 7
Sialkot 23 43 10 20 15 9 29 8
D.G. Khan 33 32 37 31 39 43 23 42
Muzaffargarh 44 34 33 41 21 45 16 41
Multan 41 22 26 9 11 37 6 26
Sahiwal 43 38 27 35 6 39 22 38
Bahawalpur 39 31 25 15 13 36 12 18
Bahawalnagar 42 37 28 28 2 33 20 36
R.Y. Khan 38 29 31 34 12 35 27 39
Sind
jacobabad 6 3 36 36 33 23 31 23
Sukkur 22 16 9 8 24 26 5 17
Larkana 20 17 19 18 30 40 18 28
Nawabshah 18 12 18 27 18 15 8 19
Khairpur 24 18 23 39 23 21 13 34
Hyderabad 13 8 11 9 9 14 2 5
Dadu 14 15 14 33 29 22 14 20
Tharparkar 11 11 35 26 19 13 4 11
Sanghar 7 4 22 17 10 10 3 10
Thatta 12 27 32 44 38 38 34 33
Karachi 5 2 1 1 1 3 1 2
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Rankings
Districts I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Baluchistan
Quetta 2 7 5 3 14 1 10 3
Sibi 15 9 40 24 22 12 25 25
Loralai 16 6 41 42 28 17 38 37
Zhob 31 35 39 32 32 19 40 35
Chagai 3 5 38 23 37 8 37 40
Kalat 1 1 43 40 41 24 42 43
Mekran 45 28 42 16 44 44 44 45
Kharan 9 14 44 21 45 42 45 44
Lasbela 4 10 45 45 27 31 43 31
East Pakistan
Dinajpur 4 2 3 9 3 6 2 14
Ranghpur 15 6 12 8 6 10 3 17
Bogra 8 7 7 13 11 11 5 12
Rajshahi 5 4 11 7 7 13 10 10
Pabna 14 14 14 6 13 12 12 8
Kushtia 12 11 16 5 2 14 7 9
Jessore 13 12 9 10 4 9 8 11
Khulna 7 10 1 3 8 4 6 5
Bakerganj 16 13 5 14 17 15 16 15
Mymensingh 9 8 15 11 12 16 11 13
Dacca 2 5 8 1 5 1 1 1
Paridpur 17 15 13 15 15 17 13 16
Sylhet 6 3 10 16 10 7 15 3
Comilla 11 16 4 12 14 8 14 7
Noakhali 10 17 6 17 16 5 17 6
Chittagong 3 9 2 2 9 3 4 2




Agricultural Labour Force and Man/Land Ratios
Per capita Cultivatedas of Total labour oultiv£ted aores per
























































































Multan 53.7 66.1 0.99 5.95
Sahiwal 62.3 70.5 1.04 5.45
Bahawalpur 71.4 70.2 1.05 4.97
Bahawalnagar 71.7 70.5 1.50 6.90
Rahinmyar Khan 78.4 82.0 1.18 4.84
Sind
Jacobabad 82.8 80.5 1.54 4.31
Sukkur 67.5 67.3 1.06 4.86
Larkana 79.8 69.3 1.39 4.66
Lawabahah 75.0 78.3 1.30 5.54
Khairpur 75.7 78.5 1.02 4.42
Hyderabad 52.9 58.7 1.03 4.30
Dadu 71.2 75.1 1.38 5.99
Tharparker 80.5 75.3 1.47 6.13
Sanghar 73.3 72.4 1.53 6.52
Thatta 71.7 75.1 1.12 4.35
Karachi 2.4 1.3 0.02 2.82
Baluchistan
Quetta 35.3 39.0 0.46 4.85
Sibi 76.0 82.9 0.89 3.90
Loralai 83.6 86.6 0.87 3.79
Zhob 73.7 74.1 0.77 4.17
Chagai 53.0 58.9 0.81 8.28
Kalat 78.7 85.2 0.78 2.68
Mekran 61.8 78.4 0.24 0.71
Kharan 83.1 85.8 0.13 0.68




Ovv'ners of Band by Religion. 1961
I = Total owners as °/o of total population.
II = Non-Muslim owners as # of total owners.
Districts I II Districts I II
East Pakistan Punjab [contd.]
Dinajpur 22.3 29.7 Lahore 6.13 0.62
Rangpur 19.8 16.4 Gujranwala 8.11 0.12
Bogra 7.2 11.9 Sheikhupura 8.30 1.10
Rajshahi 21.3 14.5 Sialkot 9.9 0.30
Patina 16.4 12.0 D.G. Khan 10.1 —
Kushtia 18.7 5.5 Muzaffargarh 13.5 0.04
Jessore 21.9 24.7 Multan 8.1 0.30
Khulna 18.2 35.3 Sahiwal 9.5 0.57
Bakerganj 18.2 16.2 Bahawalpur 11.4 0.03
Mymensingh 20.9 11.0 Bahawalnagar 7.2 0.02
Dacca 16.7 15.1 Rahimyar Khan 10.0 0.10
Paridpur 17.2 25.1 Sind
Sylhet 15.3 22.3 Jacobabad 4.1 3.20
Comilla 17.9 12.8 Sukkur 5.0 2.38
Noakhali 16.4 13.3 Larkana 4.7 1.23
Chittagong 15.3 17.2 Nawabshah 4.9 0.65
C.II. Tracts 10.1 81.7 Khairpur 8.2 0.36
N.W.P.P. Hyderabad 3.3 3.19
Hazara 14.0 — Dadu 6.0 9.63
Mardan 9.6 0.02 Tharparkar 5.6 32.14
Peshawar 5.1 0.05 Sanghar 3.8 13.67
Kohat 8.1 — Thatta 4.2 1.13
D.I. Khan 8.9 0.05 Karachi 2.2 0.34
Bannu 9.7 — Baluchistan
Pun.i ab Quetta 24.0 0.04
Campbellpur 14.7 - Sibi 9.9 0.11
Rawalpindi 13.3 0.06 Loralai 12.2
Jhelum 16.9 — Zhob 18.1 —
Gujrat 13.8 0.01 Chagai 3.7 0.80
Sargodha 10.5 0.21 Kalat 10.2 0.12
Mianwali 13.4 0.11 Mekran 11.0 —
Lyallpur 9.5 0.28 Kharan 10.0 —





(as >> of agricultural labour force)
1 = non-cultivating agriculturists. 2 = owning all land tilled.
3 = owning part and renting part. 4 = owning part, renting
part and working for hire. 5 = renting all land tilled and
sharecropping; 6 = renting all land and working for hire.
7 = unpaid family help. 8 = landless agricultural labourers.
Districts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
East Pakistan
Dinajpur 1.1 28.1 CM.O 21.1 9.2 - 24.1 17.1
Rangpur 1.7 30.5 - 17.5 6.1 - 29.5 14.7
Bogra 2.3 44.9 3.1 5.2 6.0 2.8 19.8 15.9
Raj shahi 2.0 44.8 1.8 0.8 7.4 0.1 20.8 22.5
Pabna 2.1 37.5 5.5 0.4 9.5 0.9 23.7 20.6
Kushtia 1.0 23.0 1.1 20.5 3.7 0.2 30.6 19.9
Jessore 1.6 32.7 1.1 20.5 3.6 0.4 25.8 12.9
Khulna 12.1 19.7 1.9 19.8 4.8 0.3 22.7 18.7
Bakerganj 0.1 41.3 2.9 0.8 4.9 0.8 17.9 31.3
Mymensingh 0.3 36.8 6.0 3.0 2.8 0.1 35.7 15.3
Dacca 0.8 50.2 0.3 8.0 1.9 — 21.4 17.4
Paridpur — 47.3 1.6 0.6 2.8 0.1 22.6 25.0
Sylhet 6.4 32.1 2.6 2.1 2.4 0.5 41.1 12.8
Comilla - 29.4 2.3 2.9 1.4 0.2 54.0 9.8
Noakhali 1.7 28.2 3.8 3.8 5.2 2.3 38.8 16.2
Ghittagong 2.8 25.1 5.5 3.1 6.4 1.7 36.3 19.0
C.H. Tracts 0.2 20.8 3.2 1.9 9.6 1.8 45.2 17.3
West Pakistan
N.W.F.P.
Hazara 1.0 45.7 3.2 0.6 14.0 0.8 31.4 3.3
Mardan 2.3 9.7 4.0 0.1 15.2 0.9 13.4 54.7
Peshawar 4.2 26.4 7.4 0.6 20.8 1.8 20.7 18.1
Kohat 2.5 29.6 9.5 0.2 8.7 0.5 46.3 2.8
D.I. Khan 4.0 25.3 14.8 0.6 28.8 1.3 20.4 4.7
Bannu 1.4 28.7 18.1 0.3 21.4 0.6 24.7 4.8
Punjab
Campbellpur 4.0 27.0 12.2 1.9 15.6 0.9 36.4 2.2
Rawalpindi 8.1 51.1 6.4 1.1 5.2 0.5 26.5 1.1
Jhelum 4.5 44.9 15.4 0.7 8.4 0.9 24.3 0.8
Gujrat 8.9 37.2 11.3 1.3 10.1 0.9 27.6 2.6
Sargodha 2.8 26.7 7.8 0.7 28.3 0.8 25.8 7.1
Mianwali 1.5 29.0 15.5 0.9 25.7 0.8 23.9 2.7
Lyallpur 3.1 33.3 6.2 0.2 20.3 0.5 27.8 8,6
Jhang 2.4 25.0 8.6 0.1 31.8 0.4 27.3 4.5
Lahore 3.9 24.0 7.5 0.8 23.2 1.8 23.5 15.2
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Districts 1 2 4 5 6 7 8
Punjab [contd.]
Gujranwala 4.3 25.1 10.9 1.1 27.7 1.1 20.8 9.0
Sheikhupura 2.5 27.0 8.4 0.3 28.1 1.7 20.4 11.6
Sialkot 2.5 26.6 13.2 0.9 21.2 1.4 23.4 10.7
D.G. Khan 5.2 17.1 14.0 0.3 29.7 0.7 26.8 6.2
Muzaffargarh 4.3 31.7 14.5 0.2 21.5 0.3 24.4 3.2
Multan 4.5 25.9 7.8 0.1 37.2 0.6 20.2 4.0
Sahiwal 5.6 26.5 6.8 0.2 31.6 0.5 24.1 4.8
Bahawalpur 9.7 21.4 8.2 0.2 21.7 0.3 34.2 4.4
Bahawalnagar 7.4 17.1 4.8 0.2 29.3 0.3 36.0 5.0
Bahimyar Khan 8.8 17.9 9.2 0.2 31.5 0.8 28.8 2.8
Sind
Jacobabad 2.1 4.4 2.6 0.8 30.0 0.7 39.9 19.5
Sukkur 4.5 10.1 10.3 0.3 33.1 2.3 36.4 3.0
Lark ana 2.9 7.2 6.2 0.9 30.6 0.8 47.8 3.5
Nawabshah 4.4 10.1 5.9 0.2 49.3 0.4 28.1 1.7
Khairpur 6.2 14.9 10.3 5.1 30.3 2.1 30.5 0.6
Hyderabad 6.8 10.4 5.6 1.2 39.5 2.6 21.3 12.7
Dadu 5.0 11.1 9.0 0.1 38.9 0.8 34.6 0.6
Tharparkar 5.2 15.1 4.8 0.4 26.3 2.7 35.2 10.3
Sanghar 8.0 7.1 5.5 0.2 42.5 1.3 25.9 9.5
Thatta 7.2 9.8 6.1 0.3 41.7 1.0 19.0 15.0
Karachi 23.7 30.0 3.7 1.0 9.6 1.2 8.2 22.5
Baluchistan
Quetta 9.4 47.8 2.0 — 9.7 0.1 25.9 5.0
Sibi 25.3 22.3 5.1 0.1 25.7 1.3 18.0 2.2
Loralai 14.4 46.6 3.0 0.1 13.2 0.6 21.4 0.7
Zhob 25.1 40.9 1.6 — 9.1 - 23.2 0.1
Chagai 33.4 30.5 0.7 - 10.9 - 22.9 1.6
Kalat 8.6 28.3 8.0 0.5 20.4 1.0 29.8 3.4
Mekran 19.1 31.2 3.0 0.6 7.3 0.3 9.7 28.7
Kharan 13.6 35.8 7.2 — 27.0 1.2 8.0 7.2




Pressure of Population and Agricultural Productivity.
Index Values, 1961
1 = index of agricultural production "based on average yields
of wheat and rice.
2 = index of pressure of population on agricultural land.
3 = index of the relative productivity.
Districts 1 2 3 Districts 1 2 3
East Pakistan Punjab [contd. ]
Dinajpur 3.3 312 6.8 Lahore 3.4 799 13.8
Kangpur 3.2 854 4.1 Gujranwala 3.3 215 18.0
Bogra 2.7 749 5.2 Sheikhupura 3.3 161 14.4
Rajshahi 3.0 452 6.5 Sialkot 2.6 429 10.6
Pabna 2.5 803 5.7 D.G. Khan 2.6 37 8.8
Kushtia 2.8 567 6.2 Muzaffargarh 2.9 61 12.9
Jessore 2.8 614 5.7 Multan 4.3 114 25.5
Khulna 3.4 376 6.3 Sahiwal 4.2 117 22.8
Bakerganj 3.4 628 6.3 Bahawalpur 3.2 23 15.8
Mymensingh 3.2 1226 2.7 Bahawalnagar 3.1 51 21.7
Dacca 3.1 2526 3.9 Rahimyar Khan 3.3 58 15.9
Paridpur 2.3 1311 3.6 Sind
Sylhet 3.4 429 5.4 Jacobabad 2.3 51 9.9
Comilla 3.2 1639 2.3 Sukkur 2.7 52 13.2
Noakhali 3.3 1071 3.7 Larkana 2.4 62 11.3
Chittagong 4.4 1003 4.4 Nawabshah 2.8 66 15. 2
C.H. Tracts 3.8 58 2.5 Khairpur 2.8 28 12.3
N.W.F.P. Hyderabad 3.1 81 13.2
Hazara 2.1 275 4.1 Dadu 2.4 20 14.3
Mardan 2.9 373 8.9 Tharparker 2.9 13 17.5
Peshawar 3.0 526 9.7 Sanghar 3.0 22 19.8
Kohat 1.9 190 7.9 Thatta 1.7 27 7.3
D. I. Khan 1.9 34 14.1 Karachi 1.1 75300 3.0
Bannu 2.3 81 15.1 Baluchistan
Punjab Quetta 1.9 56 9.2
Campbellpur 2.0 69 10.8 Sibi 2.1 6 8.3
Rawalpindi 2.3 432 10.4 Loralai 2.3 8 8.5
Jhelum 2.4 117 13.7 Zhob 1.1 9 4.8
Gujrat 3.0 225 13.9 Ghagai 1.1 2 9.4
Sargodha 3.6 70 22.4 Kalat 2.4 6 6.4
Mianwali 1.9 39 16.4 Mekran 1.0 25 0.7
Lyallpur 4.7 218 20.9 Kharan 1.9 10 1.3
Jhang 3.2 79 21.2 Lasbela 1.2 43 1.9
(Sources for column 1: Ahmad 1968 and Zaidi 1966; for column 2:




Districts Score Districts Score Districts Score
East Pakistan
Dinajpur 2.50 Rangpur 1.83 Bogra 1.20
Ragshahi 0.67 Pabna 0.17 Kushtia 0.75
Jessore 1.50 Khulna 0.50 Bakerganj 0.13
Mymensingh 0.50 Dacca 0.75 Paridpur 0.14
Sylhet 1.25 Comilla 0.57 Noakhali 1.67
Chittagong 1.50 C*.H. Tracts 1.00
West Pakistan
N.W.F.P.
Hazara 1.13 Mardan 0.92 Peshawar 2.25
Kohat 0.71 D.I. Khan 0.79 Bannu 1.00
Pun.1 ab
Canipbel lpur 1.50 Rawalpindi 2.67 Jhelum 2.50
Gujrat 1.50 Sargodha 2.58 Mianwali 1.19
Lyallpur 2.40 Jhang 2.50 Lahore 3.75
Gujranwala 1.75 Sheikhupura 2.33 Sialkot 1.00
D.G. Khan 0.50 Muzaffargarh 1.08 Multan 2.08
Sahiwal 2.10 Bahawalpur 2.25 Bahawalnagar 1.33
R.Y. Khan 1.13
Sind
Jacobabad 1.80 Sukkur 1.50 Larkana 0.83
Nawabshah 1.00 Khairpur 1.25 Hyderabad 1.50
Dadu 0.43 Tharparkar 1.33 Sanghar 1.25
Thatta 1.50 Karachi 1.33
Baluchistan
Quetta 1.20 Sibi 1.00 Loralai 0.20
Zhob 1.00 Ohagai 0.67 Kalat 0.78
Mekran 0.33 Kharan 0.33 Lasbela 0.50
(Source: based on the Survey of Pakistan, Road Map of West
Pakistan, Third Edition, 1965; and Province Map of East
Pakistan, Second Edition, 1962)
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Relative Levels of Economic Development
(Districts). Index Values
Index Index Index
Districts Value Districts Value Districts Value
West Pakistan
N.W.F.P.
Hazara 2.75 Mardan 3.39 Peshawar 4.78
Kohat 3.57 D. I. Khan 4.24 Bannu 4.22
Punjab
Campbellpur 4.54 Rawalpindi 7.40 Jhelum 6.71
Gujrat 5.74 Sargodha 6.82 Mianwali 5.46
Lyallpur 7.26 Jhang 6.81 Lahore 7.69
Gu jranwala 6.92 Sheikhupura 5.13 Sialkot 5.33
D. G. Khan 2.92 Muzaffargarh 4.07 Multan 6.79
Sahiwal 6.19 Bahawalpur 4.18 Bahawalnagar 5.51
Rahimyar Khan 4.42
Sind
Jacobahad 3.14 Sukkur 5.11 Larkana 4.04
Nawabshah 4.74 Khairpur 4.12 Hyderabad 5.47
Dadu 4.61 Tharparkar 4.32 Sanghar 5.18
Thatta 2.99 Karachi 8.12
Baluchistan
Quetta 5.46 Sibi 2.49 Loralai 2.04
Zhob 1.90 Chagai 2.81 Kalat 1.76
MeIran 1.11 Kharan 1.00 Lasbela 1.10
East Pakistan
Dinajpur 5.07 Rangpur 3.60 Bogra 4.29
Rajshahi 4.06 Pabna 3.58 Kushtia 3.56
Jessore 4.19 Khulna 5.11 Bakerganj 4.58
Mymensingh 3.05 Dacca 4.58 Paridpur 3.24
Sylhet 3.92 Comilla 3.99 Noakhali 4.36
Chittagong 5.13 C.H. Tracts 2.83




A.A.A.G. = Annals of the Association of American Geographers.
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